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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Reconfigurable Real-Time Power Grid Emulator for Systems With High Penetration of Renewables

Novel power system control and new utility devices need to be tested before their actual deployment to the power grid. To assist with such a testing need, real-time digital emulators such as RTDS and Opal-RT can be used to connect to the physical world and form a hardware in the loop (HIL) emulation. However, due to the limitations of today's computational resources, the accuracy and fidelity suffer from different levels of model reductions in purely digital simulations. CURENT has developed a reconfigurable electric grid hardware testbed (HTB) to overcome the limitations of digital emulators. The HTB has been used to develop measurement, control, modeling, and actuation techniques for a national grid with a high penetration of renewables. The power electronic-based system includes emulators for synchronous generators; photovoltaics with grid-interfacing inverter; wind turbines; induction motor loads, ZIP loads, power electronic loads; batteries; ac and dc transmission lines; short circuit faults and grid relay protection; and a multiterminal HVDC overlay including power electronics interfaces. The system contains real elements of power flow, measurement, communication, protection, and control that mimic what would be seen in an actual electric grid. This paper presents an overview of the HTB and several scenarios that have been run to determine control and actions needed for the future power grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

End-To-End Decentralized Transmission Line Protection in IBR-Dominated Weak Grids Using Interpretable Data-Driven Methods

Traditional transmission line protection relies on predictable synchronous-based fault signatures, which frequently fail under the non-standard, current-limited fault characteristics of Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs). This study investigates how to achieve secure, communication-free fault isolation in IBR-dominated weak grids without relying on opaque, computationally heavy "black-box" machine learning algorithms. To address this, we propose a novel, standalone, and inherently interpretable data-driven protection framework. Unlike centralized methods requiring multi-terminal communication, this decentralized approach relies solely on local measurements using a hierarchical linear-kernel Support Vector Machine (SVM). The methodology decomposes the protection task into four sequential stages that mimic traditional protection elements: fault detection and fault direction identification, fault type classification, zone classification, and location estimation. This multi-stage architecture allows for specialized feature engineering at each stage, combining high computational efficiency with logic traceability. The framework's end-to-end performance was validated via C-code and PSCAD/EMTDC co-simulation, utilizing a real-world utility network and an OEM black-box IBR model. The proposed relay achieves 97.2% overall accuracy and provides a reliable trip decision within a 2.5-cycle window. The results confirm 100% accuracy in fundamental fault detection, reliable zone selectivity across low to moderate fault resistances, and robust security against non-fault transients, proving its immediate viability for integration into commercial numerical relays.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity Considerations for Grid-Connected Batteries with Hardware Demonstrations

The share of renewable and distributed energy resources (DERs), like wind turbines, solar photovoltaics and grid-connected batteries, interconnected to the electric grid is rapidly increasing due to reduced costs, rising efficiency, and regulatory requirements aimed at incentivizing a lower-carbon electricity system. These distributed energy resources differ from traditional generation in many ways including the use of many smaller devices connected primarily (but not exclusively) to the distribution network, rather than few larger devices connected to the transmission network. DERs being installed today often include modern communication hardware like cellular modems and WiFi connectivity and, in addition, the inverters used to connect these resources to the grid are gaining increasingly complex capabilities, like providing voltage and frequency support or supporting microgrids. To perform these new functions safely, communications to the device and more complex controls are required. The distributed nature of DER devices combined with their network connectivity and complex controls interfaces present a larger potential attack surface for adversaries looking to create instability in power systems. To address this area of concern, the steps of a cyberattack on DERs have been studied, including the security of industrial protocols, the misuse of the DER interface, and the physical impacts. These different steps have not previously been tied together in practice and not specifically studied for grid-connected storage devices. In this work, we focus on grid-connected batteries. We explore the potential impacts of a cyberattack on a battery to power system stability, to the battery hardware, and on economics for various stakeholders. We then use real hardware to demonstrate end-to-end attack paths exist when security features are disabled or misconfigured. Our experimental focus is on control interface security and protocol security, with the initial assumption that an adversary has gained access to the network to which the device is connected. We provide real examples of the effectiveness of certain defenses. This work can be used to help utilities and other grid-connected battery owners and operators evaluate the severity of different threats and the effectiveness of defense strategies so they can effectively deploy and protect grid-connected storage devices.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Systems and methods for controlling electrical grid resources

The present invention relates to PMU-based control systems for dampening inter-area oscillations in large-scale interconnected power systems or grids to protect against a catastrophic blackout. The control systems receive phasor measurements from two or more locations on an AC transmission line and generates a power control command to a power resource on the grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

AI-enabled traveling wave protection for microgrids

Grid forming inverters provide voltage and frequency regulations for microgrids; in the meantime, new challenges are introduced for microgrid protections. For instance, inverters’ control strategies can affect protection behaviors, and low short-circuit ratios and bi-directional power flows also make protection operations complex. Protection schemes based on conventional principles such as overcurrent and distance relays do not always provide reliable, sensitive, or selective operations. Here, we devise a traveling wave protection approach for microgrids using a wavelet-driven deep neural network named WaveletKernelNet (WKN). Compared with conventional methods, the presented approach provides enhanced sensitivity, higher selectivity, and better identification of various faults in microgrids. Extensive case studies validate the efficacy and excellent performance of the devised approach.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Reliable Protection for an Inverter-Based Resources Dominant Grid: Technology Development and Field Demonstration

The project aimed to address the challenges posed by the rapid growth of inverter-based resources (IBR) such as solar, wind, and battery storage, which have fundamentally changed fault behavior, system strength, and protection performance in bulk power systems. Traditional protection schemes, designed for synchronous generator-dominated grids, are inadequate under high IBR penetration. Overall, the project materially advances protection modeling and simulation capabilities needed to maintain reliable grid protection under high IBR penetration. The results build utility confidence in operating power systems safely and reliably across a wide range of generation mixes, supporting grid modernization goals.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

A Generic FSC Wind Park EMT Model with IEEE Std 2800-Compliant Fault Ride-Through Capability

The modern power grid is seeing more and more electricity come from renewable sources like wind farms, which use sophisticated power electronics instead of traditional spinning generators. To keep everything running smoothly and meet industry standards such as IEEE 2800, these systems need smart control strategies. In our work, we built a flexible computer model of a full-scale wind farm converter that can handle grid disturbances without shutting down. When a fault or storm hits, the model’s built-in logic automatically adjusts the currents it sends to the grid and protects its internal energy storage, ensuring the wind farm stays connected and doesn’t damage its own equipment. Once the disturbance clears, the model restores normal operation seamlessly, so there’s no long interruption in power delivery. At the same time, it carefully regulates the voltage where the wind farm ties into the larger grid, helping to maintain safe voltage levels across the network. Our simulations show that this control setup not only meets all the requirements of IEEE Standard 2800 but also allows the wind farm to recover quickly and predictably, keeping the lights on no matter what happens on the grid.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Analysis of Line Distance Elements for Various Ibr Controllers and System Conditions

The large-scale penetration of inverter-based resources in power systems has challenged protection engineers because of the different fault behaviors these sources provide compared to conventional generation systems. The main challenges include a low level of fault current magnitude, unpredictable angles of sequence currents, and lack of inertia that can lead to maloperation of conventional phasor-based protection elements. This paper presents a sensitivity analysis of transmission line distance protection elements during phase-to-ground and phase-to-phase faults for different inverter controllers and power system conditions. It also summarizes which line protection elements remain secure near IBR terminations and identifies the ones affected by the inverter-based response. The paper concludes by highlighting that regulating negative-sequence current injection during the fault aids correct protection decisions, but does not address the entire challenge. Finally, alternative protection elements to those affected by the inverter fault response are discussed.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS1982

Log-Output Signal Processor Scans Eight Decades

Processor has automatic range switching and continuous readout over eight decades. Comparator output switches logarithmic converter to detector of interest and enables blinder grid to protect more-sensitive detector when operating in high-input range. Could be used to process any wide-varying signal that is to be read on a limited-range recording device such as a strip-chart recorder.

Hayden, J. L.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Microgrid Training Session 5: Alternative Solutions to Microgrids

This presentation is the second session of a microgrid training series for the Air Force. Microgrids have advantages over other solutions; however, microgrids have their own costs in terms of finance and operations. This session will help attendees identify alternative solutions to specific issues.

Air Force↗
DOE OSTI2024

Grid Forming Inverter With Increased Short-Circuit Contribution to Address Inverter-Based Microgrid Protection Challenges

Substantial differences in fault levels between grid-tied and islanded modes is one of the primary challenges of microgrid protection. During grid-tied mode, the bulk grid provides significant short-circuit, while during islanded operation the short-circuit magnitude is small due to inverter-based resources limiting their current output close to nominal ratings. Consequently, conventional distribution protection strategies based on overcurrent cannot reliably protect microgrids when operating in islanded mode. Fuses and circuit breakers are particularly affected because of their inverse characteristics. Presently, the absence of affordable solutions for protecting microgrids in islanded mode leads to microgrids shutting down during electrical faults. The contribution of this article is two-fold. The first innovation proposes specific hardware modifications to grid-forming inverters to increase their short-circuit current during electrical faults. The second innovation introduces a novel control strategy designed to preserve control stability margins even when the grid-filter saturates, ensuring sinusoidal output currents under normal and fault conditions. Through experimental results, the inverter with the proposed modifications can provide more than three-times its nominal current during electrical faults. For the prototype testbed, this was sufficient to enable the use of traditional legacy overcurrent protection, achieving the fuse-to-relay and relay-to-relay minimum coordination time for the line-to-ground, line-to-line to ground, and three-phase electrical faults.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Adaptive Protection and Control for High Penetration PV and Grid Resilience (Final Technical Report)

The report summarizes the work and accomplishments of DOE SETO funded project 36533 “Adaptive Protection and Control for High Penetration PV and Grid Resilience”. In order to increase the amount of distributed solar power that can be integrated into the distribution system, new methods for optimal adaptive protection, artificial intelligence or machine learning based protection, and time domain traveling wave protection are developed and demonstrated in hardware-in-the-loop and a field demonstration.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Evaluating Protection System Performance for a Real-World Weak Grid Area With High Inverter-Based Resources

This paper evaluates an existing protection scheme implemented in a real-world weak grid area with a high penetration of inverter-based resources (IBRs). The study aims to assess the reliability and adequacy of protection schemes originally designed for traditional synchronous machine systems and determine whether they can continue to operate reliably in systems with high levels of IBRs. Hardware relays are tested using a controller-hardware-in-the-loop setup. PSCAD electromagnetic transient simulation with an IBR original equipment manufacturer black-box model is used to perform fault studies and generate COMTRADE data, which are replayed by a realtime digital simulator (RTDS) to feed input to the hardware relays. Three scenarios are analyzed: normal operation, an N-1 contingency, and an IBR-only scenario. The evaluation results reveal the following: 1) the protection scheme remains reliable under normal conditions and N-1 contingencies and 2) in IBRonly scenarios, differential protection (87L) continues to operate reliably, whereas local protection elements, such as distance and directional elements, fail because of the lack of regulated negative sequence current contributed by IBRs. These findings provide utilities with valuable insights for improving their protection systems in high-IBRs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Assessment of the Electrical Substation-Grid Testbed with Inside/Outside Devices and Distributed Ledger Technology

The electrical substation-grid testbed was created to integrate the GOOSE and/or DNP (Distributed Network Protocol) messages with time synchronized sources and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT). The objective was to study the impact of faults and cyber-events at an electrical substation with inside (protective relays) and outside (power meters) substation devices. The electrical substation-grid testbed was based on the design of a 34.5/ 12.47 kV electrical substation (sectionalized bus configuration) with two power transformers, connected to radial power lines and load feeders. The electrical substation-grid testbed was installed at 252 lab space (Advanced Power System Protection), Grid Research Integration and Deployment Center (GRID-C), Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This testbed was created for Task 5, DarkNet project. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created to simulate fault and/or cyber events that could potentially result in damage to the electrical infrastructure. In addition, tests were run that are usually not allowed to be performed in an operational electrical power grid, because these test scenarios could trip breakers and/or generate fault situations that could potentially damage equipment. The number of tests performed in the electrical substation-grid testbed were executed in a better way than in a real electrical substation and/or power grid, because multiple tests could be run in a short period of time, and complex permits, and safety/ schedule restrictions like in a real electrical substation environment were not needed. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created using real measurement, communication, and protection devices that are used by electrical utilities, to have same conditions that we could observe in a real power grid or electrical substation. The electrical substation-grid testbed was based on using a real time simulator and expansion box with amplifiers that were wired to electrical substation-grid devices. This hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) was provided by protective relays, power meters, ethernet switches, remote terminal units, synchronized timing network clock, DLT devices, workstations, and servers. This report includes the design, installation, and assessment of the electrical substation-grid testbed that was similar to an operational electrical substation, integrating the power system protection, communication, and control systems. The results for the electrical substation-grid testbed were based on:• verifying the analog signals for protective relays and power meters, • observing the synchronized time source frame at devices, • authenticating the GOOSE (IEC 61850) and DNP messages from power meters and protective relays, and • verifying the trip conditions of protective relays at fault tests with the power system fault event detection, using DLT devices. For future work, the electrical substation-grid testbed with protective relays and power meters, using DLT and synchronized time source from DarkNet, will be used to study the impact of cyber-events at inside and outside substation devices. Advanced algorithms for detecting cyber-events produced by non-desired protective relay settings will be studied, to improve the detection and reliability of protection, control, and communication systems at power grids.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Discovery of False Data Injection Attacks on Power Grid Frequency Controllers with Reinforcement Learning [Poster]

While inverter-based DER (distributed energy resources) are instrumental to integrating renewable energy into the power grid, they reduce the grid's mechanical inertia, thereby increasing the risk of frequency instabilities. To compensate for frequency instability risks, the grid must also undergo a transformation to include digital technologies that allow for two-way communication between the utility and customers. The current and future state of the power grid allows for building a cleaner energy landscape. However, the grid may also become vulnerable to novel cyber threats. To preemptively protect the power grid against elaborate cyber-attacks, we propose to discover potential threats via reinforcement learning. In this work, the focus is on studying false data injection attacks that target the control logic of frequency controllers. We show that a reinforcement learning agent can successfully discover how to best inject false data into linear droop controllers.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Evaluating Protection System Performance for a Real-World Weak Grid Area With High Inverter-Based Resources: Preprint

This paper evaluates an existing protection scheme implemented in a real-world weak grid area with a high penetration of inverter-based resources (IBRs). The study aims to assess the reliability and adequacy of protection schemes originally designed for traditional synchronous machine systems and determine whether they can continue to operate reliably in systems with high levels of IBRs. Hardware relays are tested using a controller-hardware-in-the-loop setup. PSCAD electromagnetic transient simulation with an IBR original equipment manufacturer black-box model is used to perform fault studies and generate COMTRADE data, which are replayed by a real-time digital simulator (RTDS) to feed input to the hardware relays. Three scenarios are analyzed: normal operation, an N-1 contingency, and an IBR-only scenario. The evaluation results reveal the following: 1) the protection scheme remains reliable under normal conditions and N-1 contingencies and 2) in IBR-only scenarios, differential protection (87L) continues to operate reliably, whereas local protection elements, such as distance and directional elements, fail because of the lack of regulated negative sequence current contributed by IBRs. These findings provide utilities with valuable insights for improving their protection systems in high-IBRs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗