BASIS FOR FISSILE EXEMPTION 10CFR71.15(B)
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Lang, Alex↗
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DESIGN AND PROTOYPING OF A FISSILE-BEARING CHLORIDE SALT IRRADIATION EXPERIMENT
Limited data exists on the properties of irradiated fueled chloride-based salts for use in advanced nuclear reactors. The design and prototyping of a salt irradiation experiment is underway. Mechanical design will integrate the experiment into existing assemblies in TRIGA type cores. Neutronics modeling demonstrated how targeted power densities can be reached and provide insight on radionuclide source term generation within the experiment. Thermal-hydraulic and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis indicated that temperature ranges in the salt can satisfy both safety and programmatic requirements. Initial prototyping tests provided confidence in the ability to extract the salt post-irradiation, and in the heater performance. Future planned prototyping will provide an integral assessment of the proposed design prior to insertion in the reactor.
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Verification of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) using Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) and a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) Detector
SNM verification can be accomplished via two methods i.e. destructive analysis (DA) or nondestructive analysis (NDA). The DA modes are much more accurate compared to NDA modes; nevertheless, the sample's physical integrity is destroyed in the process. Techniques such as ICP-MS, ID-ICP-MS, TI-MS are few examples of DA, where a bulk material is ground and mixed with a solution (some form of acid) to acquire a homogenous sample. In contrast, NDA modes utilize signals emitted by the sample such as gamma, neutrons, light, or heat to analyze samples under investigation. HPGe detectors are some of the most frequently used gamma detectors to assay SNM. However, in a high activity scenario it provides a large uncertainty and sometimes becomes unfeasible to measure low energy gamma rays. Meanwhile, neutron detectors are not affected by the gamma background, therefore they can be used in addition to the gamma detectors to verify total fissile mass ({sup 235}U + {sup 239}Pu) of SNM. The AWCC is one of the thermal neutron NDA systems developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It consists of 42 {sup 3}He detectors to measure gross neutrons (singles), coincidence neutrons (doubles), higher order multiplicity counting (triples, quadruples, etc.). It can effectively operate in both active and passive neutron interrogation modes. It can utilize AmLi, AmBe, or {sup 252}Cf active interrogation neutron sources. It is used to verify declared fissile mass ({sup 235}U or {sup 239}Pu) present in SNM. Objectives: Calibrate HPGe and AWCC for lightly irradiated (with enough {sup 137}Cs gamma background) ∼93% enriched HEU fuels; Verify fissile mass ({sup 235}U +{sup 239}Pu) content using AWCC and HPGe; Model and benchmark AWCC in MCNP6. Neutron coincidence and multiplicity counting: Two or more neutrons are coincident if they are detected by the system within the specified gate window; In AWCC: Gate window is 128 μsec; Induced fission in fissile material such as {sup 235}U and {sup 239}Pu - emission of time correlated neutrons - Singles, Doubles, Triples, or Quadruples; No induced fission in non-fissile materials- no correlated neutrons - only singles. SNM can be verified with high accuracy and precision using gamma and neutron NDA instruments such as HPGe and AWCC. Interaction with thermal neutrons. Non-fissile atoms - do not emit correlated neutrons. Fissile atoms - emit correlated neutrons during induced fission events. The time correlated neutrons can be detected by using coincidence or multiplicity counters such as AWCC. Likewise, {sup 235}U produces 186 keV gamma peak that can be measured by a HPGe gamma detector. Counts under 186 keV gamma peak provide information about {sup 235}U content. Combining AWCC and HPGe results can provide better understanding of special nuclear material under investigation.
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Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.
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Experimental Steps toward a Density Law for Chlorine-Crediting Criticality Models of Aqueous Plutonium solutions
Criticality accident prevention is an essential safety consideration for all operations involving fissionable and fissile materials. Predictive criticality calculations using advanced neutron transport codes, such as Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport (MCNP), are invaluable tools for designing and implementing operational limits. While indispensable, these tools are limited by the quality and accuracy of the inputs that the user provides to define the modeled system. Parameters such as atomic composition, shape, and material density must be accurately defined to obtain a meaningful result. In the case of material property details for a plutonium model, accurate material characterization data is sometimes sparse. Thus limitations in calculation accuracy can be reduced by improving our knowledge of material properties in the targeted fissile systems. One of the biggest remaining challenges to accurately defining fissile systems is the description of aqueous fissile solutions. Even simple properties, such as density, are not well-known for fissile solutions relevant to nuclear energy and security. Described here are initial efforts undertaken to improve criticality calculation inputs for fissile plutonium chloride solutions in water. This effort is focused on experimentally determining accurate solution characteristics for ternary plutonium chloride/hydrochloric acid/water systems, by measurement of water activity and solution density. The effect of inputting experimental densities for these solutions into MCNP criticality calculations is compared to the traditional approach of modeling an idealized (and fictitious) plutonium-water mixture. Expansion of these efforts to a working density law for aqueous plutonium chloride solutions is also discussed.
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A High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Transportation Concept
The uranium 235U enrichment commonly used in fuel production for U.S. light water nuclear reactors typically does not exceed 5 wt%. In contrast, many of the currently investigated advanced reactor concepts demand fuel with higher enrichments. This includes high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), characterized by a 235U enrichment of 5 to 20 wt%. The necessity of HALEU transportation in the fuel production cycle leads to new challenges caused by various technical and regulatory hurdles. Current U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission–approved transportation package designs for UF6 with enrichments above 5 wt% provide relatively small payloads [=116 kg (250 lb)]. Furthermore, in accordance with 10 CFR 71.55, package design activities for fissile material enriched above 5 wt% need to consider water infiltration in the containment as part of the criticality safety evaluations. This study presents a transportation package concept for HALEU advanced nuclear reactor fuel with a significantly higher payload of up to 376 kg (830 lb) of fissile material per package and up to 1881 kg (4149 lb) of HALEU per legal weight truck. The anticipated chemical form of the transported material is UO2 downblended from available highly enriched uranium. The concept utilizes a combination of existing transportation packaging, 18 inner canisters, and a novel basket design that includes a borated aluminum flux trap. Criticality and shielding evaluations; fundamental structural, confinement, and thermal assessments; and studies on package operations are presented. The results of this study build significant confidence in the technical feasibility of a high-capacity HALEU transportation package concept while demonstrating the concept’s potential to meet U.S. regulatory requirements.
Eidelpes, Elmar↗
Gandolinium poison solubility testing for the downstream impacts from accelerated basin de-inventory
The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) Program at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is designed to accelerate the de-inventory of L-Basin and accelerate the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Disposition mission. Spent fuel will be dissolved in H-Canyon without recovery of uranium. The dissolver solutions will be temporarily stored, pH-adjusted to excess hydroxide (which will facilitate precipitation of metal oxides/hydroxides), transferred to the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF), and subsequently immobilized in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) during planned sludge batch campaigns. ABD accelerates basin closure, significantly reduces programmatic risk, and greatly reduces the lifecycle budget requirements for the site by eliminating the need for a SNF drying and packaging capability. The ABD approach represents a significant change to the clean-up approach for the SRS. However, the increased fissile loading in sludge batches, due to the dissolver solutions, requires investigation to ensure fissile limits are efficiently and safely managed; higher fissile loadings in the glass are projected to be two to three times higher than the current fissile concentration limit of 897 g/m 3 and will be addressed in a future report.
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Improbability of Nuclear Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Based on the rationale presented, nuclear criticality is improbable after salt creep causes compaction of criticality control overpacks (CCOs) disposed at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality potential has been updated here because of the introduction of CCOs, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCOs during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual salt compaction (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure). Geomechanical models of rock fall demonstrate three tiers of CCOs are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Criticality models of spheres and cylinders of 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular spacing demonstrate that an array of CCOs is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the amount of hydrogenous material shipped in the CCO (usually water and plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.
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Post-closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.
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Technical Evaluation of Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Material Addition to Sludge Batch 11 (Rev. 1)
The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program involves discarding spent nuclear fuel that is currently stored in L-Basin to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. The first ABD discards will occur during the preparation of Sludge Batch (SB) 11. Savannah River Mission Completion has requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory assess the technical gaps related to the increased gadolinium poisoning requirement and the impacts of performing the Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) process in Tank 51 with H-Canyon discards present. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of increasing the quantity of gadolinium (and related topics) from what was previously evaluated in the SRNL studies of gadolinium-poisoned ABD material solubility, the overall ABD flowsheet review, and increasing the fissile mass loading in glass: 1) Based on literature surveys, there is no indication that organic interactions with gadolinium will be significant at the high pH (typically >13) conditions of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities. Any interactions of gadolinium with organics in DWPF are not expected to adversely impact DWPF or downstream facilities. Thus, there is little-to-no residual risk from organic interactions with gadolinium [Gap closed]; 2) Adding depleted uranium to ABD material, targeting 235 U enrichment of 4.90% within each transfer window, will mitigate potential impacts from an increase in soluble 235 U enrichment during sludge washing and LTAD. The plan to take advantage of previous transfers and allow 235 U enrichment of >5% during the final transfer window carries a risk that Tank 51 supernate will have a 235 U enrichment of >5%, which should be evaluated for acceptance; 3) Increasing the gadolinium mass ratio to 3.0:1 Gd: 235 U(eq SLU ) should lead to the same or higher partitioning of gadolinium into the solid phase within the DWPF Chemical Process Cell, resulting in both liquid and solid phases with expected partitioning of Gd consistent with the prior solubility study [Gap closed for SB11]; 4) There are no expected impacts on DWPF melt temperature and melter operations due to the minimal ~0.2 weight percent (wt%) increase in Gd concentration relative to previous sludge batches [Gap closed for SB11]; 5) As observed previously, Gd is expected to enter the off-gas system via physical entrainment, but at a slightly higher concentration than what was observed for SB9 melter off-gas pluggage deposits (0.07 wt%) [Gap closed for SB11] ; 6) There are no expected impacts on DWPF recycle or the Recycle Collection Tank glycolate destruction process. [Gap closed for SB11]; 7) Gd is projected to be a trace component in the SB11 glass (<0.5 wt%) and can be ignored for process control. Trace components do not significantly impact glass durability, thus the conclusions of the previous Product Consistency Test evaluation at a fissile mass loading of 2,500 g fissile/m3 glass still applies to SB11. The ~0.1 wt% increase in Gd2O3 concentration relative to the previous study will not impact the predictability of SB11 glass with the DWPF Product Composition Control System (PCCS) models for durability or the acceptability of glass according to the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS) criterion for product consistency [Gap closed for SB11]; 8) No additional Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure testing is necessary for SB11 and the hazardous waste specification of the SB11 DWPF waste form is unchanged after the addition of the ABD stream [Gap closed for SB11]. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of adding two-thirds of the ABD material to Tank 51 prior to LTAD: 1) The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall aluminum mass from 1.39×10 4 kg to 1.64×10 4 kg (15.5% ABD Al). The form of the insoluble portion of the Al resulting from ABD addition should be the more readily dissolved Al(OH) 3 and amorphous forms. The portion of the ABD aluminum that is processed by LTAD is expected to be completely soluble, thus requiring that less of the boehmite in the sludge be dissolved to reach the same Al target in the SB. [Gap closed for SB11]; The expected LTAD impact on other components, as related primarily to the components in ABD, are discussed. Gd is expected to remain insoluble during LTAD and not impact the solubility of other components. [Gap closed for SB11]; The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 13,100 kg (63% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 89.5 kg (3.9% ABD Pu). The addition of all of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 16,100 kg (70% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 90.4 kg (5.3% ABD Pu). The 235 U enrichment will be ≤5%. The fissile uranium will be adequately poisoned by Gd and the fissile Pu will be adequately poisoned by Fe from the sludge. [Gap closed for SB11]; There is a low risk that ABD addition will impact the rheology or pumpability of the slurry. There is a low but higher risk of ABD addition prior to LTAD impacting the settling rate; Based on the evaluation of adding two-thirds of the ABD material and all of the ABD material prior to the LTAD process, there is no volume or mass limit that would need to be imposed on ABD additions prior to LTAD. [Gap closed for SB11]. Revision 1 of this report addresses a variation on the ABD additions and LTAD strategy where sodium hydroxide additions for LTAD may be performed intermittently or concurrently with an ABD addition window. The proposed change does not alter the conclusions of this evaluation.
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Hand Calculation Methods for Nuclear Criticality Safety
This primer provides an overview of the most common hand calculation methods used for criticality safety calculations. The most widely used tools available to a nuclear criticality safety (NCS) practitioner are probably the common Monte Carlo or deterministic criticality safety codes, which can be used to model very complex systems. However, use of these codes can obscure the parameters to which a particular fissile system may be sensitive, whereas the hand calculation methods can be used to delve into the ways each parameter may affect the reactivity of a fissile material system. Furthermore, practitioners must avoid using computer codes as devices that take inputs and simply provide outputs (i.e., a “black box”). Many years ago, pioneers such as Joe Thomas, David Smith, and Hugh Paxton, among others in the field of nuclear criticality safety, took the time before the advent of high-speed desktop computers to create simple hand methods for criticality safety analyses. Some of the methods can be used for single fissile units; others are applicable to fissile units arranged into simple array configurations. This primer discusses the applicability of the various methods, illustrates how they are used, and provides an interpretation of the various results. The NCS practitioner will need to spend time to master the methods that could be most useful; however, they can provide the practitioner with fast and accurate answers to criticality safety problems if they are used correctly and if critical data exist for the problem at hand. Hand calculation methods can be used as a starting point for more advanced calculations, and in many circumstances, they can provide sensitivity and perturbation information more quickly than using a criticality code.
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Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
As part of its periodic re-certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities, the United States Environmental Protection Agency expects a re-evaluation of features, events, and processes, such as post-closure nuclear criticality. Although salt creep beneficially encapsulates the TRU waste in the closed WIPP repository, the spacing between an array of waste packages is disrupted as the salt creep closes disposal rooms and containers lose structural integrity. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality evaluation was updated, however, because of the introduction of criticality control overpack (CCO) containers, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCO containers during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual disposal room closure from salt creep. Geomechanical models of roof fall demonstrate three tiers of CCO containers are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure) were used to predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Models of spheres or cylinders with 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular compacted spacing demonstrate that an array of CCO containers is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the mass of hydrogenous material shipped in CCO containers (usually plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.
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Molten Salt Lattice Confinement Fusion (LCF) Fast Fission Reactor for Lunar and Planetary Surface Power
Molten salt fission reactors (MSR) have been suggested for lunar and planetary surface power systems. They have the advantage of operating at high temperature, for efficient thermal-electrical conversion, low pressure, long-lived with high nuclear fuel burnup. MSR are often designed to breed fissile 233U from natural 232Th by neutron capture and decay via: 232Th(n,)233Th(,)233Pa(,)233U Unfortunately, this process requires 233Pa isotope separation and segregation to decay to 233U. This requirement prevents additional neutron capture that interferes with 233U breeding. Instead, Wooley’s sub-critical, fast fission, molten salt reactor would use externally generated tokamak fusion neutrons1,2 to fission all actinides.We propose a simpler fusion-fast-fission sub-critical reactor that generates fast neutrons in situ from lattice confinement fusion (LCF) to fission fertile and fissile actinides. This hybrid reactor doesn't require enriched 235U fissile pins to initiate fis-sion reactions, nor 233Pa separation and segregation during operation. Like Wooley’s, this hybrid reactor “burns” natural uranium (238U) or thorium (232Th) which avoids uranium enrichment and additional fissile material launch safety and security costs. The LCF neutron source is initiated by bremsstrahlung photoneutrons (Fig. 1)3 or isotopic neutron sources in electron-screened lattices (Fig. 2)4,5. Alternatively, the electrolytic Pd-deuterium co-deposition6protocol fast fissions7 both 232Th and 238U. However, an aqueous electrolyte-based system, without pressurization similar to conventional pressurized water fission reactors, is incapable of high temperatures due to the boiling point of the electrolyte slightly over 100 C. Molten salts can be used instead as was demonstrated at the University of Hawaii8 using a variety of Ni and Pd cathodes in lithiated, hydrided and deuterated salts. These salts have melting points often exceeding 500C making them suitable to efficiently produce electrical power9 through either Advanced Stirling Genera-tors (< 100 kWe) or closed-Brayton Cycle (> 100 kWe). This hybrid reactor could power a wide range of lunar or Martian applications from unmanned in-struments, to charging vehicles and entire facilities such as human habitats or in situ resource utilization. The power conversion cycles are Carnot Cycle limited, but generally 30% efficient at best. However, waste heat on the moon or Mars is important to surviving either two-week lunar nights or Martian nights as well as providing process heat for mineral extraction and “living off the land”
Lawrence Forsley↗
Grain boundary enhanced UN and U3Si2 pellets with improved oxidation resistance
A method of forming a water resistant boundary on a fissile material for use in a water cooled nuclear reactor is described. The method comprises mixing a powdered fissile material selected from the group consisting of UN and U 3 Si 2 with an additive selected from oxidation resistant materials having a melting or softening point lower than the sintering temperature of the fissile material, pressing the mixed fissile and additive materials into a pellet, sintering the pellet to a temperature greater than the melting point of the additive. Alternatively, if the melting point of the oxidation resistant particles is greater than the sintering temperature of UN or U 3 Si 2 , then the oxidation resistant particles can have a particle size distribution less than that of the UN or U 3 Si 2 .
Lahoda, Edward J.↗
A Comparison of Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Uranium Metal-Water Systems using Calculated and Experimental Critical Data
Heterogeneous effects of fissile units latticed in water has been documented in several forms in commonly referenced handbooks and guides. Many of these documents provide guidance for when heterogeneous systems are more reactive than their homogenous counterparts if controlling fissile mass or volume. This information provides insight into when heterogeneity should be considered for conservatism, however this information is not always displayed in a manner that is comparable to commonly referenced data, such as critical curves based on spherical systems. This paper aims to provide a juxtaposition of homogenous and heterogeneous uranium metal-water systems using both experimental and calculated critical data displayed in the format of commonly referenced critical curves. This format allows for easy comparison between the two systems against parameters that are often considered for single unit analysis such as: uranium density, fissile mass, system volume, and total system mass (fissile mass plus moderator mass). Calculated critical spherical systems provide an equal comparison between latticed geometry types as the latticed array can be cut off or restricted in the same manner in each series of models, which is not true for experimental values. Additionally, enrichment of the latticed units can be made uniform in the calculated systems, which is also difficult to achieve when referencing experimental data of varying latticed geometries. A comparison of calculated critical values and available experimental values is provided to show how these parameters can impact the critical spherical system result.
36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
A Comparison of Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Uranium Metal-Water Systems using Calculated and Experimental Critical Data
Heterogeneous effects of fissile units latticed in water has been documented in several forms in commonly referenced handbooks and guides. Many of these documents provide guidance for when heterogeneous systems are more reactive than their homogenous counterparts if controlling fissile mass or volume. This information provides insight into when heterogeneity should be considered for conservatism, however this information is not always displayed in a manner that is comparable to commonly referenced data, such as critical curves based on spherical systems. This paper aims to provide a juxtaposition of homogenous and heterogeneous uranium metal-water systems using both experimental and calculated critical data displayed in the format of commonly referenced critical curves. This format allows for easy comparison between the two systems against parameters that are often considered for single unit analysis such as: uranium density, fissile mass, system volume, and total system mass (fissile mass plus moderator mass). Calculated critical spherical systems provide an equal comparison between latticed geometry types as the latticed array can be physically cut off or restricted in the same manner in each series of models, which is not true for experimental values. Additionally, enrichment of the latticed units can be made uniform in the calculated systems, which is difficult to achieve when referencing experimental data of varying latticed geometries. A comparison of calculated critical values and available experimental values is provided to show how these parameters can impact the critical spherical system result.
36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
Grain boundary enhanced UN and U 3 Si 2 pellets with improved oxidation resistance
A method of forming a water resistant boundary on a fissile material for use in a water cooled nuclear reactor is described. The method comprises mixing a powdered fissile material selected from the group consisting of UN and U3Si2 with an additive selected from oxidation resistant materials having a melting or softening point lower than the sintering temperature of the fissile material, pressing the mixed fissile and additive materials into a pellet, sintering the pellet to a temperature greater than the melting point of the additive. Alternatively, if the melting point of the oxidation resistant particles is greater than the sintering temperature of UN or U3Si2, then the oxidation resistant particles can have a particle size distribution less than that of the UN or U3Si2.
Lahoda, Edward J.↗
Strategies for thorium fuel cycle transition in the SD-TMSR
Liquid-fueled Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) systems represent advances in safety, economics, and sustainability. The MSR has been designed to operate with a Th/ 233 U fuel cycle with 233 U used as startup fissile material. Since 233 U does not exist in nature, we must examine other available fissile materials to start up these reactor concepts. This work investigates the fuel cycle and neutronics performance of the Single-fluid Double-zone Thorium-based Molten Salt Reactor (SD-TMSR) with different fissile material loadings at startup: High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) (19.79%), Pu mixed with HALEU (19.79%), reactor-grade Pu (a mixture of Pu isotopes chemically extracted from Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) with 33 GW d/tHM burnup), transuranic elements (TRU) from Light Water Reactor (LWR) SNF, and 233 U. The MSR burnup routine provided by SERPENT-2 is used to simulate the online reprocessing and refueling in the SD-TMSR. The effective multiplication factor, fuel salt composition evolution, and net production of 233 U are studied in the present work. Additionally, the neutron spectrum shift during the reactor operation is calculated. The results show that the continuous flow of reactorgrade Pu helps transition to the thorium fuel cycle within a relatively short time (≈ 4.5 years) compared to 26 years for 233 U startup fuel. Finally, using TRU as the initial fuel materials offers the possibility of operating the SD-TMSR for an extended period of time (≈ 40 years) without any external feed of 233 U.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗