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At least 55 records · Page 3

Reliability enhancement of APR + diverse protection system regarding common cause failures

The Advanced Power Reactor Plus (APR +) nuclear power plant design has been developed on the basis of the APR1400 (Advanced Power Reactor 1400 MWe) to further enhance safety and economics. For the mitigation of Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) as well as Common Cause Failures (CCF) within the Plant Protection System (PPS) and the Emergency Safety Feature - Component Control System (ESF-CCS), several design improvement features have been implemented for the Diverse Protection System (DPS) of the APR + plant. As compared to the APR1400 DPS design, the APR + DPS has been designed to provide the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) considering a large break LOCA accident concurrent with the CCF. Additionally several design improvement features, such as channel structure with redundant processing modules, and changes of system communication methods and auto-system test methods, are introduced to enhance the functional reliability of the DPS. Therefore, it is expected that the APR + DPS can provide an enhanced safety and reliability regarding possible CCF in the safety-grade I and C systems as well as the DPS itself. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Printed Circuit Board Inspection and Quality Control - PCB Failure Causes and Cures

This two day workshop will discuss a range of topics, including root cause analysis, physics-of-failure principles and failure mechanisms in printed circuit boards. Printed circuit boards (PCBs) are the baseline for electronics manufacturing upon which electronic components are mounted and formed into electronic systems. PCBs are used in a variety of electronic circuits from simple one-transistor amplifiers to large super computers. A PCB serves three main functions: 1) it provides the necessary mechanical support for the components in the circuit 2) it provides the necessary electrical interconnections, and 3) it bears some form of legend which identifies the components it carries. The failure modes on the PCBs can be categorized in a hierarchical structure, in which the mechanisms and causes are site or location dependant. Specimen preparation techniques, non-destructive and destructive analysis, and materials characterization will also be discussed. The first day of the workshop will present methodologies for identifying potential failure mechanisms in electronics based on the failure history and, systematic approaches to root cause analysis. The second day will cover failure analysis techniques geared towards various failure mechanisms, along with numerous component and PCB assembly failure analysis case studies that illustrate the techniques and analysis. Failure analysis case studies will be used to illustrate the techniques and analysis principles to arrive at the root cause(s) of field failures on printed circuit boards, active components, and assemblies.

Printed circuit boards↗

Update on Common-Cause Failure Experience and Mitigation Practices

Experience in other industries has shown that digital technology can provide substantial benefits in terms of performance and reliability. However, the U.S. nuclear power industry has been slow to adopt the technology extensively in its instrumentation and control (I&C) applications because of inhibiting factors such as regulatory uncertainty, insufficient technological experience base, implementation complexity, limited availability of nuclear-qualified products and vendors, and inadequate definition of modernization cost recapture. Although there have been examples of digital technology usage in the nuclear power industry, challenges to the qualification of digital technology for high-integrity nuclear power plant (NPP) applications have severely constrained more widespread progress in achieving the benefits that are possible through the transition to digital. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) established the Advanced Sensors and Instrumentation (ASI) technology area under the Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies (NEET) Program to coordinate the instrumentation and controls (I&C) research across DOE NE and to identify and lead efforts to address common needs. As part of the NEET ASI research program, the Digital Technology Qualification project was established. Under this project, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is leading the investigation into mitigation of digital common-cause failure (CCF) vulnerabilities for nuclear-qualified applications. This technical report documents updated and expanded findings from research activities by ORNL. Specifically, the report describes CCF experience in the nuclear and nonnuclear industries, identifies the state of the practice for CCF mitigation through key examples, and presents conclusions from the determination of knowledge gaps.

Wood, Richard Thomas↗

Nuclear power plant instrumentation and control cyber security common vector access leading to relational common cause failures - 340

Nuclear power plants and facilities have been implementing digital system upgrades into their previously analog systems for well over twenty years. New nuclear facilities' control, security, and emergency preparedness systems are almost exclusively built on digital architectures with a high degree of communication between the various systems that are often integrated together into a central control station to aid in operation or security of the facility. As digital systems become more widespread in nuclear facility control system architectures, cyber security related issues have become a significant concern to operators, regulators, governments, and other groups. Among the many concerns related to digital systems and cyber security is the area of common cause and common mode failures. This paper introduces, defines, and discusses some sources of common cause failure from a cyber security perspective: common vector access. This refers to specific access points that an adversary can exploit through a single attack sequence that have the potential to provide relational failures through common cause on multiple components, subsystems, systems, or plants. This paper will further discuss interconnected processes where these access points may exist, the importance of limiting or controlling these pinch points, and some methods of protecting common vector access points. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Pyrotechnic system failures: Causes and prevention

Although pyrotechnics have successfully accomplished many critical mechanical spacecraft functions, such as ignition, severance, jettisoning and valving (excluding propulsion), failures continue to occur. Provided is a listing of 84 failures of pyrotechnic hardware with completed design over a 23-year period, compiled informally by experts from every NASA Center, as well as the Air Force Space Division and the Naval Surface Warfare Center. Analyses are presented as to when and where these failures occurred, their technical source or cause, followed by the reasons why and how these kinds of failures persist. The major contributor is a fundamental lack of understanding of the functional mechanisms of pyrotechnic devices and systems, followed by not recognizing pyrotechnics as an engineering technology, insufficient manpower with hands-on experience, too few test facilities, and inadequate guidelines and specifications for design, development, qualification and acceptance. Recommendations are made on both a managerial and technical basis to prevent failures, increase reliability, improve existing and future designs, and develop the technology to meet future requirements.

Bement, Laurence J.↗

Common Cause Failure Mitigation Experience on Digital I and C System in NPP

CCF is failures of redundant or separate structures, systems, or components due to a shared root cause. The CCF includes those are resulted from severe environments, design errors, calibration and maintenance errors, and consequential failures. In addition, digital I and C systems can be vulnerable to CCF caused by software errors or software developed logic, which could defeat the redundancy achieved by the hardware architecture. Therefore, diversity and defense in-depth (D3) has become an important issue to overcome the CCF of the safety I and C system. The U.S. NRC has established regulatory guidance addressing a method for assessing D3 provided by the safety I and C system architecture at a NPP. This method enables determination of whether vulnerabilities to CCF have been adequately addressed. The guidance is included in BTP 7-19 and Chapter 7 of NUREG-0800. The regulatory guidance provides a methodology for designing diversity. APR1400 establishes the mitigating strategies that consider the characteristics of digital I and C system that contribute to the potential for CCF. The diversity strategies consist of a combination of diversity attributes and associated criteria to address potential CCF vulnerabilities in digital safety I and C system. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Engineering Prediction of Axial Wellbore Shear Failure Caused by Reservoir Uplift and Subsidence

Injection and production can cause significant regional uplift or settlement. We analytically evaluate the potential for cement-annulus failure in response to injection-induced deformation in a coupled casing/cement/rock poromechanical vertical-well system. Deformation is calculated with respect to the initial near-wellbore stress state, occurring immediately after cement curing. Tensile-failure and shear-failure lengths along this well are predicted using a stress-development-length method. The analytical model is verified by Abaqus modeling. Lastly, a sensitivity analysis identifies critical engineering-well-design parameters for ensuring wellbore-annulus integrity.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Adaptive Image-Guided Radiotherapy (IGRT) Eliminates the Risk of Biochemical Failure Caused by the Bias of Rectal Distension in Prostate Cancer Treatment Planning: Clinical Evidence

Purpose: Rectal distension has been shown to decrease the probability of biochemical control. Adaptive image-guided radiotherapy (IGRT) corrects for target position and volume variations, reducing the risk of biochemical failure while yielding acceptable rates of gastrointestinal (GI)/genitourinary (GU) toxicities. Methods and Materials: Between 1998 and 2006, 962 patients were treated with computed tomography (CT)-based offline adaptive IGRT. Patients were stratified into low (n = 400) vs. intermediate/high (n = 562) National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) risk groups. Target motion was assessed with daily CT during the first week. Electronic portal imaging device (EPID) was used to measure daily setup error. Patient-specific confidence-limited planning target volumes (cl-PTV) were then constructed, reducing the standard PTV and compensating for geometric variation of the target and setup errors. Rectal volume (RV), cross-sectional area (CSA), and rectal volume from the seminal vesicles to the inferior prostate (SVP) were assessed on the planning CT. The impact of these volumetric parameters on 5-year biochemical control (BC) and chronic Grades {>=}2 and 3 GU and GI toxicity were examined. Results: Median follow-up was 5.5 years. Median minimum dose covering cl-PTV was 75.6 Gy. Median values for RV, CSA, and SVP were 82.8 cm{sup 3}, 5.6 cm{sup 2}, and 53.3 cm{sup 3}, respectively. The 5-year BC was 89% for the entire group: 96% for low risk and 83% for intermediate/high risk (p < 0.001). No statistically significant differences in BC were seen with stratification by RV, CSA, and SVP in quartiles. Maximum chronic Grades {>=}2 and 3 GI toxicities were 21.2% and 2.9%, respectively. Respective values for GU toxicities were 15.5% and 4.3%. No differences in GI or GU toxicities were noted when patients were stratified by RV. Conclusions: Incorporation of adaptive IGRT reduces the risk of geometric miss and results in excellent biochemical control that is independent of rectal volume/distension while maintaining very low rates of chronic GI toxicity.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Restoration of nuclear-import failure caused by triple A syndrome and oxidative stress

Triple A syndrome is an autosomal recessive neurological disease, mimicking motor neuron disease, and is caused by mutant ALADIN, a nuclear-pore complex component. We recently discovered that the pathogenesis involved impaired nuclear import of DNA repair proteins, including DNA ligase I and the cerebellar ataxia causative protein aprataxin. Such impairment was overcome by fusing classical nuclear localization signal (NLS) and 137-aa downstream sequence of XRCC1, designated stretched NLS (stNLS). We report here that the minimum essential sequence of stNLS (mstNLS) is residues 239-276, downsized by more than 100 aa. mstNLS enabled efficient nuclear import of DNA repair proteins in patient fibroblasts, functioned under oxidative stress, and reduced oxidative-stress-induced cell death, more effectively than stNLS. The stress-tolerability of mstNLS was also exerted in control fibroblasts and neuroblastoma cells. These findings may help develop treatments for currently intractable triple A syndrome and other oxidative-stress-related neurological diseases, and contribute to nuclear compartmentalization study.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Common-Cause Failure Mitigation Practices and Knowledge Gaps

This technical report documents the findings from first phase of research activities by ORNL. Specifically, the report describes the results of the investigation of CCF mitigation practices and determination of knowledge gaps.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Common cause failure (CCF): a path to quantitative success - 134

In the development of I and C systems for nuclear plants it is critical to validate a defense in depth strategy through a thorough and complete reliability analysis program. An emerging issue is how to define and use a quantitative estimation of CCF in a system analysis. Industry standards provide insight but not necessarily a comprehensive approach. One solution is to leverage existing modeling techniques with a unique insertion of CCF probabilities. A relatively simple approach will be provided using reliability block diagrams. Three specific areas that will be explored include: 1. Definition of hardware CCF; 2. Quantitative estimation in a simple system; 3. Quantitative estimation in a complex system. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Causal CCF Parameter Estimations 2020

This report documents the quantitative results of the causal common-cause failure (CCF) parameter estimations for the failure cause groups “component,” “design,” “environment,” “human,” and “other,” based on CCF data through 2020 in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) CCF database: https://rads.inl.gov/Pages/CCF.aspx. This report utilizes the same data period (2006–2020) and CCF templates as INL/EXT-21-62940, Revision 1, CCF Parameter Estimations, 2020 Update. The 2015 causal CCF prior distributions for the specific failure cause groups (instead of the 2015 generic CCF prior distributions) were used in this report to estimate the associated causal CCF parameters. All the 2015 causal CCF prior distributions and generic CCF prior distributions were developed in INL/EXT-21-43723, Developing Generic Prior Distributions for Common Cause Failure Alpha Factors and Causal Alpha Factors, using CCF data from 1997 to 2015. These quantitative results were developed to support the causal alpha factor model and should be used as appropriate in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) studies such as the NRC Significance Determination Process for commercial nuclear power plants in the United States.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗