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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Robust Restoration From Cyber-Physical Attacks in Active Distribution Grids With Grid-Edge IBRs

The inverter-based resources (IBRs) have enabled the integration of renewable energy at the grid edge with enhanced control capabilities to support the reliable operation of power grids. Different control frameworks, such as hierarchical or distributed architecture, have been proposed with the expansion of cyber networks for real-time monitoring and control. This evolution of critical infrastructure into cyber-physical systems also brings more vulnerabilities for the broadened attack surfaces, and significantly increases the possibility of physical system failures or outages caused by cyberattacks. Among tremendous efforts in the defense-in-depth approach, it remains challenging to provide prompt detection and accurate location of attack entry points or paths. Therefore, the prevailing restoration framework may struggle to fully consider the cyber-physical interdependence, successfully isolate the compromised cyber and physical components, and safely recover the systems without the potential risks leading to secondary outages. This paper is motivated to develop a cyber-physical restoration framework for distribution grids to recover from cyber attacks by harnessing grid-edge IBRs. The framework is first built on the operational guidelines of IBRs considering the compromised cyber layer. Then, an ambiguity set is established to represent the uncertainty of attack scenarios and their possibility levels. Next, a distributionally robust optimization model is developed to provide the optimal load restoration strategy across all scenarios. The effectiveness of the proposed model is demonstrated through various use cases on the modified IEEE 13-node and 123-node test systems. Finally, simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness and advancement of developed post-attack restoration strategies.

Cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2025

Analyzing Infrastructure Interdependencies Using Network-Of-Networks Modeling

Infrastructure networks play a crucial role in our day-to-day lives, and modeling these infrastructure networks can help decisionmakers prepare for and respond to disruptions such as natural disasters or cyberattacks. Because these infrastructure networks depend on each other, it is not sufficient to model a single network in isolation. We build on previous single-network-modeling techniques to develop a methodology for modeling infrastructure interdependencies as a Network-of-Networks. Using distributionlevel data from a real U.S. city on the power grid, road geometry, and hospital locations, we show how to apply this methodology to modeling three of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Healthcare, Transportation, and Energy. We also analyze three primary metrics before and after a simulated disaster: 1) impact on hospital access; 2) road network impact with the change in betweenness centrality; 3) electric customer outage. We simulate three different disruptions: 1) road flooding from nearby rivers; 2) a malicious actor targeting the road networks; 3) a malicious actor targeting the electric grid. Finally, we discuss how our methodology can be applied to additional infrastructure networks and types of disruption, and how Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques may be incorporated into this methodology for further research.

Scherrer, Evan [Drake University, Iowa]↗
DOE OSTI2026

Dynamic Disruption Resilience in Intermodal Transport Networks: Integrating Flow Weighting and Centrality Measures

Resilient intermodal freight networks are vital for sustaining supply chains amid increasing threats from natural hazards and cyberattacks. Transportation resilience has been widely studied; understanding how random and targeted disruptions affect structural connectivity and functional performance remains a key challenge. To address this, this study evaluates the robustness of the US intermodal freight network, which consists of rail and water modes, using a simulation-based framework that integrates graph-theoretic metrics with flow-weighted centrality measures. Disruption scenarios are examined, including random failures as well as targeted node and edge removals based on static and dynamically updated degree and betweenness centrality. To reflect more realistic conditions, flow-weighted degree centralities (WDC) and partial node degradation are considered. Two resilience indicators are used: (1) the size of the giant connected component to measure structural connectivity; and (2) flow-weighted network efficiency (NE) to assess freight mobility under disruption. The results show that progressively degrading nodes ranked by WDC to 60% of their original functionality causes a sharper decline in normalized NE, for up to approximately 45 affected nodes, than complete failure (100% loss of functionality) applied to nodes targeted by weighted betweenness centrality or selected at random. This highlights how partial degradation of high-tonnage hubs can produce disproportionately large functional losses. The findings emphasize the need for resilience strategies that go beyond network topology to incorporate freight flow dynamics.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Driver Identification Dataset

The ORNL Driver Identification Dataset was created to collect and analyze driving behavior data from 50 different drivers. Each driver operated a 2014 Kenworth T270 Class 6 truck around Fort Collins, Colorado while various data sources recorded their driving behavior and vehicle performance. The dataset includes CANbus (Controller Area Network) data, GPS data, inertial measurement data, and biometric data from a heart rate monitor. A cyberattack was executed during each drive, which caused multiple dashboard warning lights to illuminate and set the tachometer and speedometer to zero, regardless of actual speed. The attack was stopped either after one minute or if the driver pulled over. By downloading the dataset, you agree to the following: 1) I will not use or disclose the data for any purpose other than Research as that term is defined in 10 CFR 745.102. 2) I will not, under any circumstances, request or accept private or linking identifiers for the data used. 3) I will not attempt to determine the identity of the individuals associated with the data. 4) I will use appropriate safeguards to prevent the use or disclose of the data for any purpose other than Research.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Multilevel Cybersecurity for Photovoltaic Systems

The motivation behind this project is to protect critical infrastructure in electric power generation pertaining to solar photovoltaic (PV) systems. This growing renewable energy resource is becoming a more vital part of the nation’s energy portfolio, particularly since it has achieved grid-parity to existing generation methods in terms of cost. It is thus vital that steps be taken to ensure the cybersecurity of these assets. The project goal was to devise a multilevel cybersecurity solution to address PV security gaps at the inverter and system levels, and field test the solution under the supervision and review of a US-based solar inverter manufacturer and PV installer/operator. A two-level cyberattack defense approach was formulated whereby the first level, the solar inverter level, hardens individual devices and achieves a deeply cyber-secure inverter. The inverter level security involves a multi-layer defense-in-depth approach for securing the inverter while also providing data for the system level algorithms. The second level, the system level, addresses intrusion detection and restoration involving an ensemble of inverters and relevant systems.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Investigate the Security of Electric Vehicle (EV) Ecosystem Applications

Apps that run on mobile devices are one of critical components of the electric vehicle (EV) ecosystem and pose possible threat actor points of entry that may impact the trust and security of EV charging systems in the future. Mobile apps often rely on communication between cloud servers and users, thereby creating potential points of entry for cyberattacks. Although app stores such as Apple App Store or Google Play Store generally test the security of apps, the cyber aspects may not be sufficient for many entities including DOD, federal fleets, and commercial entities. A more thorough inspection and the ability to influence developers is imminently needed. This research studies security attributes and vulnerabilities of a sample of mobile applications that support key user functions in the EV ecosystem. The study shows that all analyzed apps have security risks, categorized as either high or medium or both and a comprehensive cybersecurity guideline for developing mobile apps is necessary.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Interconnected Risks in Electricity Systems: Understanding Research Challenges, Needs, and Partnerships

The U.S. federal government has a potential role in mitigating the most poorly addressed risks across electricity markets and interdependent systems. Electricity system risks stem from extreme acute shocks (e.g., cyberattacks, extreme weather, and supply chain disruptions) and chronic stressors (e.g., global economic competition, uncertainties surrounding emerging technologies, climate change, and related conflicts). These acute shocks and chronic stressors can result in dire consequences for society, underscoring the need for better information for decision makers in both public and private sectors. Best practices and a shared understanding of risk management and risk quantification must be rapidly developed and disseminated. Informed by a quantitative treatment of risk to electrical infrastructure and interdependent systems, decision makers can more prudently and efficiently prioritize mitigation initiatives to maximize benefits to government, businesses, and the public.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Sovereign Credit Rating Processes Adapted to Critical Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment

United States critical infrastructure entities are increasingly targeted by motivated and capable threat actors and must be prepared to assess and treat a diverse range of cyber risks. Consequently, this necessitates some form of analytical process to evaluate risks and inform cyber security investment decisions. A potential solution for structuring cyber risk evaluation exists within the field of sovereign credit ratings – where agencies employ mature approaches that integrate quantitative and qualitative data to produce a singular value of assessment. Adapting such approaches, we present a novel criterion and methodology for measuring and communicating the likelihood element of cyber risk. The methodology is composed of three sequential phases: a quantitative baseline organized by distinct capability frames, a bounded qualitative adjustment per frame, and a greater-bounded qualitative adjustment spanning the entire process. The process culminates in publication of a cyber capability rating that communicates a critical infrastructure entity’s ability and willingness to mitigate discontinuous function due to cyberattack.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cybersecurity Center for Offshore Wind Energy (Final Project Report)

This project establishes a Cybersecurity Center for Offshore Wind Energy with the objective of designing and operating a cyber-physical testbed for wind energy farms (WEFs) that enables comprehensive cybersecurity research. The testbed incorporates a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system connected to turbine models via industrial-grade programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and remote terminal units (RTUs). It supports side-channel data acquisition, implementation and analysis of various cyberattack scenarios, and development of attack detection, mitigation, and best-practice guidance tailored to wind energy systems. During the project, the team expanded the number and fidelity of mathematical turbine models (MTMs), integrated these models with SCADA infrastructure, and deployed a scaled physical turbine and associated sensors. High-resolution operational and side-channel data streams were collected and used to refine machine-learning (ML)-based attack detection systems and to extend the WindCRAFT framework to multi-turbine threat scenarios. The project demonstrated a realistic, scalable environment for evaluating cyber threats, validated attack detection approaches using enriched datasets, and identified new multi-turbine and inter-turbine communication attack vectors. The resulting testbed, models, and security mechanisms provide a foundation for ongoing R&D and deployment of cyber-resilient offshore wind energy systems.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Roadmap for Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Cybersecurity: A vision for improving cyber maturity of distributed and utility-scale solar energy installations

As the solar energy sector continues to expand, its integration into the broader energy infrastructure presents both unprecedented opportunities and new risks. The increasing reliance on digital technologies and interconnected systems in solar energy creates an expanded attack surface for motivated cyber adversaries. Cyberattacks have the potential to cause disruptions in energy production, damage to equipment, financial losses, and compromises in national security. Therefore, ensuring robust cybersecurity measures is paramount to protect the integrity, availability, confidentiality, and access control of solar energy systems. However, there are still key gaps and challenges to be addressed in industry and research, which stakeholders must race to address as they combat a growing number of real-world cyber incidents that affect solar energy systems and a growing number of vulnerabilities discovered and disclosed in key types of equipment. This roadmap explore the current state of solar PV cybersecurity and the gaps and challenges still to be addressed.

14 - SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Unsupervised Detection of SOC Spoofing in OCPP 2.0.1 EV Charging Communication Protocol Using One-Class SVM

The electric vehicles (EVs) market keeps growing globally; thus, it is critical to secure the EV charging communication protocols in order to guarantee reliable and fair charging operations among the customers. The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) 2.0.1 supports the communication between the Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) and Charging Station Management Systems (CSMSs); therefore, it becomes vulnerable to several types of attacks, which aim to jeopardize smart charging, billing, and energy management. Specifically, OCPP 2.0.1 allows the self-reporting of the State of Charge (SOC) values, which makes it vulnerable to spoofing-based cyberattacks, which target manipulating the scheduling priorities, distorting the load forecasts, and extending the charging sessions in an unfair manner. In this paper, we try to address this type of attack by providing a comprehensive analysis of the SOC spoofing attacks and introducing a novel unsupervised detection framework based on the One-Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) algorithm. Specifically, two types of attack scenarios are analyzed (i.e., priority manipulation and session extension) by deriving engineered features that capture the nonlinear relationships under normal charging behavior. Detailed simulation-based results are derived by utilizing the DESL-EPFL Level 3 EV charging dataset. Our results demonstrate high F1-score and recall in identifying spoofed SOC values and that the proposed OCSVM model demonstrates superior performance compared to alternative clustering and deep-learning based detectors.

EV charging↗
DOE OSTI2024

Network Security Challenges and Countermeasures for Software-Defined Smart Grids: A Survey

The rise of grid modernization has been prompted by the escalating demand for power, the deteriorating state of infrastructure, and the growing concern regarding the reliability of electric utilities. The smart grid encompasses recent advancements in electronics, technology, telecommunications, and computer capabilities. Smart grid telecommunication frameworks provide bidirectional communication to facilitate grid operations. Software-defined networking (SDN) is a proposed approach for monitoring and regulating telecommunication networks, which allows for enhanced visibility, control, and security in smart grid systems. Nevertheless, the integration of telecommunications infrastructure exposes smart grid networks to potential cyberattacks. Unauthorized individuals may exploit unauthorized access to intercept communications, introduce fabricated data into system measurements, overwhelm communication channels with false data packets, or attack centralized controllers to disable network control. An ongoing, thorough examination of cyber attacks and protection strategies for smart grid networks is essential due to the ever-changing nature of these threats. Previous surveys on smart grid security lack modern methodologies and, to the best of our knowledge, most, if not all, focus on only one sort of attack or protection. This survey examines the most recent security techniques, simultaneous multi-pronged cyber attacks, and defense utilities in order to address the challenges of future SDN smart grid research. The objective is to identify future research requirements, describe the existing security challenges, and highlight emerging threats and their potential impact on the deployment of software-defined smart grid (SD-SG).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Challenges in Securing UAM Operations

Urban air mobility (UAM) is a concept that proposes to develop short-range, point-to-point transportation systems in metropolitan areas using vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) or short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft to overcome increasing surface congestion. To realize the potential of UAM, an assurance of cybersecurity is critical for public acceptance. Cybersecurity has come to the forefront highlighting the need to protect these networks and systems from cyberattacks. The growth in the development of UAM systems, and the associated data exchange and service interactions will create abundant challenges due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. As these threats evolve, the UAM cybersecurity capabilities must adapt to these changes as well.

Urban Air Mobility,↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Challenges in Securing the Future of Air Travel

Urban air mobility (UAM) is a concept that proposes to develop short-range, point-to-point transportation systems in metropolitan areas using vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) or short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft to overcome increasing surface congestion. To realize the potential of UAM, an assurance of cybersecurity is critical for public acceptance. Cybersecurity has come to the forefront highlighting the need to protect these networks and systems from cyberattacks. The growth in the development of UAM systems, and the associated data exchange and service interactions will create abundant challenges due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. As these threats evolve, the UAM cybersecurity capabilities must adapt to these changes as well.

UAM↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Blockchain Case Study for Urban Air Mobility Operational Intent

The next generation of aerial passenger and cargo transportation may leverage the concept of Urban Air Mobility (UAM). UAM is a concept that proposes to develop short-range, point-to-point transportation systems in metropolitan areas using vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) or short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft to overcome increasing surface congestion [1]. The UAM concept leverages a decentralized service-based architecture for airspace solutions. Within the environment, UAM operators work collaboratively to manage aerial vehicles in the urban environment. Providers of Services for UAM (PSU), UAM operators, and Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSP) provide services to support flight operations within the UAM environment. Also, various views of UAM flight information are provided to the public and public safety entities [2]. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can coordinate flight information between the FAA controlled National Airspace System (NAS) and the UAM environments through the FAA-Industry Data Exchange Protocol (FIDXP). To realize the potential of UAM, an assurance of cybersecurity is critical for public acceptance. Cybersecurity has come to the forefront highlighting the need to protect these networks and systems from cyberattacks. The growth in the development of UAM systems, and the associated data exchange and service interactions will be at risk due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. As these threats evolve, the UAM cybersecurity capabilities must adapt to these changes as well [3]. This research focuses on the secure data exchange and storage of this decentralized UAM environment to address these challenges. This research intends to leverage a permissioned blockchain approach to address cybersecurity threats that may impact a UAM environment. Blockchain technologies can be used for tracking transactions and verifying negotiated agreements between stakeholders in the NAS environment. For example, the record of the submitted flight plan and the approved flight plan could be verified using the Blockchain-based immutable ledger.

UAM↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Secured Airspace for Urban Air Mobility (UAM)

The Urban Air Mobility (UAM) architecture is leveraged from the Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) concept of operations. Within the UAM environment, UAM operators work collaboratively to manage aerial vehicles in the urban environment. Providers of Services for UAM (PSU), UAM operators, and Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSP) provide services to support flight operations within that environment. As a recognized need, various views of UAM flight information are provided to the public and public safety entities. To accomplish this, among other goals, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can coordinate flight information between the FAA controlled National Airspace System (NAS) and the UAM environments through the FAA-Industry Data Exchange Protocol (FIDXP). This concept of UAM proposes to develop short-range, point-to-point transportation systems in metropolitan areas using vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) or short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft to overcome increasing surface congestion. To garner the support of UAM and to realize its potential, an assurance of cybersecurity is critical for public acceptance. Understanding the various components communicating with one-another cybersecurity, like in other industries, has come to the forefront highlighting the need to protect these networks and systems from cyberattacks. With the planned growth and reach of UAM systems, it’s clear that the associated data exchange and service interactions will be at risk due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. Consequently, as these threats evolve, the UAM cybersecurity capabilities must adapt to these changes as well. While learning is always the goal, the overall intent of this workshop is to make recommendations on the following: (1) how future UAM environments can be protected against cyber-attacks, and (2) what mechanisms should be put in place to detect attacks against UAM environments.

UAM↗