Cybersecurity Resilience Demonstration for Wind Energy Sites in Co-Simulation Environment
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The term “Energy Transition” is an attempt to capture an elaborate set of activities related to the modernization and decarbonization of energy grids. Performed concurrently and often in an ad hoc manner across local, state, regional and national boundaries, it is bringing chaos to what should arguably be one of the most conservatively managed of all critical infrastructure sectors. What’s more, with climate change producing an increasing tempo of extreme events, confidence in the intended resilient and redundant structure of the electric grids is likely to ebb. Even without these climate induced stressors, the nation’s electric grid was built for an earlier century. In addition to a drive towards greater efficiency via digitization and a continuing price decline in distributed energy resources (DERs), one could argue that climate change concerns are the primary driver of the energy transition. Non-CO2 emitting generation sources like wind and solar have become an important part of the overall generation fleet, albeit ones that cannot be counted upon to provide dispatchable power. Current projections indicate deployment of even larger percentages of DERs in coming years. Until far better storage capabilities arrive, the variability of wind and solar, inconsistent performance of traditional thermal generation plants, and energy delivery failures associated with natural gas pipelines will reinforce mounting reliability concerns. This pertains to both electric transmission and distribution. The recent shuttering of nuclear power plants in Germany, Japan, the US and elsewhere are also putting more downward pressure on dispatchable generation. Russia’s attack on Ukraine has roiled energy markets worldwide and forced some countries to return to coal as a primary fuel. In view circumstances such as these, it is essential that significant changes be made to policies and planning criteria, and to the standards and code on which they are based. Given the accelerating pace of extreme weather events, this needs to occur as soon as possible.
Industries supporting the global nuclear infrastructure striving for cost savings, expansions in efficiency, and convenience are likely to adopt components (e.g., hardware, software) that comprise the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). These devices offer potential improvements along with security challenges. Modern conveniences achieved through application of technology have propagated through society in the form of interconnected devices, from doorbells to microwave ovens, commonly referred to as IoT. IoT devices are often Internet-connected devices that are designed to send data back to a cloud-based server, where a smart phone application then presents device status and control options. Home-based IoT applications carry a different set of risks when compared to a business or security environment, where there is also a history of convenience and interconnection. Industrial settings have long relied on specifically designed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for process control where IIoT devices are intended to inform business decisions and augment traditional processes. A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report provides a distinction between process control and IIoT in that traditional process control is not replaced by IIoT, but rather IIoT devices are intended to enhance industrial processes through additional monitoring of various sensors and application of data analytics models using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) (Fagan, Marron, et al. 2021) (Ross, et al. 2021).
Large, modern industrial facilities often incorporate thousands of digital assets in their operational technology. Regulated facilities, such as nuclear power plants (NPPs), maintain robust cybersecurity and configuration management programs that often use bills of materials (BOMs) for these assets, including make, model, and version of hardware, firmware, and software. However, these BOMs typically capture only first- or second-tier information provided by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). Unfortunately, as indicated by the increasing number and sophistication of software supply chain attacks, this level of detail is insufficient for identifying all the potential vulnerabilities and risks in software applications. Software BOMs (SBOMs) provide detailed enumeration of components and dependencies within the product or devices, including firmware. SBOMs can be combined with vulnerability data sources and vendor vulnerability attestations to improve vulnerability management and enable rapid identification of affected components when new software vulnerabilities are discovered. Ideally, SBOMs are created by the OEM prior to installation. However, since this practice is not yet commonplace and since NPPs are typically slow to adopt new technology, most NPPs do not incorporate SBOMs into their asset or configuration management programs. Fortunately, SBOMs can be generated by NPPs on existing digital assets to provide further insight into risk management decisions. This report provides an overview of the current SBOM ecosystem and recommends guidance on how to get started in a “crawl, walk, run” manner to develop and implement a sustainable SBOM program for digital assets in an NPP.
Cyber-Informed Engineering is a framework which allows engineers to build resiliency to the impacts of cyber attack into engineered systems starting in the early design phases. This article introduces the framework and provides a description of some of its principles and resources for learning more.
As nuclear reactors transition from analog to digital technology, the benefits of enhanced operational capabilities and improved efficiencies are potentially offset by cyber risks. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is an approach that can be used by engineers and staff to characterize and reduce new cyber risks in digital instrumentation and control systems. CIE provides guidance that can be applied throughout the entire systems engineering lifecycle, from conceptual design to decommissioning. In addition to outlining the use of CIE in nuclear reactor applications, this chapter provides a brief primer on nuclear reactor instrumentation and control and the associated cyber risks in existing light water reactors as well as the digital technology that will likely be used in future reactor designs and applications.
CCE Short Course Presentation for Society of American Military Engineers (SAME)
The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program is an essential pathway for innovation, capability growth, and research staff development at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). This program enables timely and agile response to national security, energy, and environmental challenges that motivate INL’s mission to discover and demonstrate innovative nuclear energy solutions and other clean energy options as well as securing our critical infrastructure. This report highlights INL’s LDRD projects concluding in fiscal year (FY) 2021 which included innovative research and development (R&D) across INL’s five science and technology initiatives: nuclear reactor sustainment and expanded deployment, integrated fuel cycle solutions, integrated energy systems, advanced design and manufacturing for extreme environments, and secure and resilient cyber-physical systems.
This presentation covers the interaction of the discipline of system operations with the discipline of cybersecurity. First, a common mental model for risk - both cybersecurity and all-hazards - is presented, followed by a discussion of high-level management strategies for different kinds of cyber harm facing system operators, based on the consequences and frequencies of the harm. The next section covers the importance of cybersecurity for a system operator organization and explains some general concepts to understand the relationships. Finally the role of system operators in the security of the grid as a larger system of systems is discussed over the framework of a resilience event.
The Biden Administration’s efforts to meet 100% clean electricity by 2035 and net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 has created opportunities to rebuild American supply chains create new jobs, strengthen community engagement, and spur U.S. economic growth. DOE’s strategy for success in the transition to a clean energy economy hinges on building and maintaining technology supply chains that are advanced, secure, and resilient to cyber threats. As the energy sector grows increasingly globalized, complex, and digitized, the supply chain for digital components of energy systems – including software, virtual platforms and services, and data – is facing greater threats. Nearly all digital components of U.S. energy sector systems are vulnerable to cyber supply chain instability, stemming from a variety of causes and shared among a broad set of interdependent stakeholders. Overall, supply chain risks for digital components in energy sector systems will continue to evolve and likely increase as these systems are increasingly interconnected, digitized, and remotely operated.
Seminar for the KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School (KINGS) in South Korea. The presentation will cover a brief introduction to INL, opportunities for advanced nuclear, and integrated energy systems.
Briefings provided to Duke Energy during their visit to INL on January 25, 2023. This is following the process to release the slides to Duke Energy.
Briefings provided to Duke Energy during their visit to INL on January 25, 2023. This is following the process to release the slides to Duke Energy.
This presentation covers the interaction of the discipline of system operations with the growing body of knowledge around Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). First is discussion of a number of fundamental concepts for system operators - organizational division of responsibilities, human and machine cooperation, goals, and priorities. The next section covers the reasons why CIE was developed, what it is, and the key design and operational, and organizational principles of CIE. Finally, some thoughts on how CIE can be applied to power system operations are offered, along with some examples of how an organization can approach applying CIE principles in their particular circumstances.
The US National Cybersecurity Strategy published March 2, 2023 uses plain language to communicate that the US is calling for a major change in how we prioritize the security of software systems used in critical infrastructure. It acknowledges that our current approach, which is essentially, “let the buyer beware,” leaves entities who are least able to assess or defend vulnerable software responsible for the impacts of designed-in weaknesses while the makers of the technology bear no liability. The strategy recommends a security-by-design approach, recommending that software vendors be held liable to uphold a “duty of care” to consumers and for systems to be designed to “fail safely and recover quickly” . For energy infrastructure, the strategy calls out the need to implement the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy to achieve higher confidence security for energy infrastructures. The Idaho National Laboratory, a pioneer in cyber-informed engineering concepts, is at the forefront of organizations educating others in industry, academia, and government on how to apply these concepts to real-world challenges. In this brief, we'll outline some of the basic principles of security-by-design and offer examples of how, in a water sector context, they're being put into successful practice.
A proper mental model of the concepts of cyber risk and its components of threat and exploitability and consequence is necessary to allocate limited resources to different security activities, especially when considered alongside reliability and regulatory and economic risks. Understanding the consequence and frequency different risks are realized also helps align the right mitigations to the right risks. Cyber-informed engineering (CIE) is an emerging method to “engineer out” cyber risk across product and system lifecycles, and INL has a portfolio of programs operationalizing CIE’s principles for the energy sector.
This brief presentation provides a status update on three Idaho National Laboratory energy cybersecurity programs of particular interest to NERC Reliability and Security Technical Committee annual in-person Security Groups summit. Public information on the following three programs is included: Cybersecurity for Operational Technology Environments (CyOTE™) program Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) program, and associated high-level information on the Energy Software Bill of Materials POC, Executive Order 14017, and the Energy Cyber Sense Act