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DOE OSTI2025

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 116: Area 25 Test Cell C Facility, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC-1

CR loaded to this OSTI record. Just adding new file which includes CR plus new ROTC 1 and update the metadata to the following: This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 116, Area 25 Test Cell C Facility. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]). CAU 116 consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 25-23-20, Nuclear Furnace Piping and (2) CAS 25-41-05, Test Cell C Facility. CAS 25-41-05 consisted of Building 3210 and the attached concrete shield wall. CAS 25-23-20 consisted of the nuclear furnace piping and tanks. Closure activities began in January 2007 and were completed in August 2011. Activities were conducted according to Revision 1 of the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 116 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2008). This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provides data confirming that closure objectives for CAU 116 were met. Site characterization data and process knowledge indicated that surface areas were radiologically contaminated above release limits and that regulated and/or hazardous wastes were present in the facility. The Record of Technical Change 1 updated the use restriction information.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2024

Underground Test Area Activity Quality Assurance Plan Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev.1)

This QAP was revised to focus on requirements to ensure quality planning, performance, review, and documentation of work performed for the UGTA activity CAUs, which are now in the corrective action decision document CADD)/CAP and CR stages.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2024

Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order: Nevada National Security Site Use Restriction Management Plan with ROTC 1

This Use Restriction Management Plan (URMP) provides the information needed to create, modify, and manage use restrictions (URs) for sites on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), and sites accessed through the NNSS main gate, that were closed using the corrective action alternative (CAA) of closure in place under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). (Note: This pertains to those FFACO sites not managed by the U.S. Department of Energy [DOE], Legacy Management.) The closure in place alternative is used for sites closed with residual contamination at levels requiring corrective action as determined using the FFACO process. The URs contain and control all requirements for long-term monitoring. This URMP also serves as the single repository of the URs implemented under the FFACO that identify use restricted areas and contain the current requirements for inspections, maintenance, and monitoring of the UR. The requirements in these URs replace all requirements listed in previous documentation. This consolidates post-closure monitoring requirements into a single source that ensures completeness and consistency of UR requirements and information. Standardized UR forms were developed to clearly document post-closure requirements that are consistent with current protocols and to ensure consistent information is contained in the URs. Standard notification, summary, and site controls statements were developed for all URs with provisions to insert site-specific options in the text. Current protocols for Industrial Sites and Soils URs are defined in this document and in the Soils Risk-Based Corrective Action (RBCA) Evaluation Process (DOE/EMNV, 2018). The standardized UR forms that have been approved to date are listed in Appendix A. Additional UR forms will be added once the review and approval process has been completed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2020

Underground Test Area (UGTA) Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Closure Report)

This CR describes the selected corrective action to be implemented during closure to protect human health and the environment from groundwater impacted by the underground nuclear testing within the YF/CM CAU. The purpose of the CR is to describe the selected corrective action. Summarize previous activities and conclusions that support CAU closure. Present final contaminant boundaries, use restriction (UR) boundaries, and regulatory boundaries. Provide an implementation plan for long-term monitoring and well network maintenance and identify the approaches and policies for institutional controls.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2023

2020 Postclosure Groundwater Monitoring and Inspection Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

This report presents the groundwater monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) from the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). The CNTA is the site of an underground nuclear test in 1968 that resulted in residual contamination near the detonation depth of 3200 feet (ft); the contamination requires long-term monitoring. Responsibility for the environmental restoration and long-term monitoring was transferred from DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office, to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration and site closure process were completed in 2015 in accordance with the amended 1996 Nevada Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (State of Nevada et al. 1996, as amended) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The Closure Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action, Unit 443 (DOE 2018), also called the Closure Report, originally was completed in January 2016 and revised in October 2018; it describes LM’s plan for long-term postclosure monitoring. This includes monitoring of the radioisotopes of interest and water elevations, inspecting the site and maintaining the institutional controls (ICs), evaluating and reporting data, and documenting the site’s records and data management processes (DOE 2018).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order Nevada National Security Site Use Restriction Management Plan

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2020

Corrective Action Management Unit Report of Post-Closure Care Activities Calendar Year 2019

The Corrective Action Management Unit (CAMU) at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) consists of a containment cell and ancillary systems that underwent closure in 2003 in accordance with the Closure Plan in Appendix D of the Class 3 Permit Modification (SNL/NM September 1997). The containment cell was closed with wastes in place. On January 27, 2015, the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) issued the Hazardous Waste Facility Operating Permit (Permit) for Sandia National Laboratories (NMED January 2015) to the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and its Management and Operating (M&O) contractor. The current M&O contractor is National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS). The Permit became effective February 26, 2015. The CAMU is undergoing post-closure care in accordance with the Permit, as revised and updated. This CAMU Report of Post-Closure Care Activities documents all activities and results for calendar year (CY) 2019, as required by the Permit.

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DOE OSTI2021

Corrective Action Management Unit Report of Post-Closure Care Activities. Calendar Year 2020

he Corrective Action Management Unit (CAMU) at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) consists of a containment cell and ancillary systems that underwent closure in 2003 in accordance with the Closure Plan in Appendix D of the Class 3 Permit Modification (SNL/NM September 1997). The containment cell was closed with wastes in place. On January 27, 2015, the New Mexico Environment Department issued the Hazardous Waste Facility Operating Permit (Permit) for Sandia National Laboratories (NMED January 2015) to the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and its Management and Operating (M&O) contractor. The current M&O contractor is National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS). The Permit became effective February 26, 2015. The CAMU is undergoing post-closure care in accordance with the Permit, as revised and updated. This CAMU Report of Post-Closure Care Activities documents all activities and results for calendar year (CY) 2020, as required by the Permit.

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DOE OSTI2020

Post-Closure Inspection and Monitoring Report for Surface Corrective Action Unit 417 at the Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Site

This report documents the biennial postclosure site inspections conducted in June 2018 at the surface Corrective Action Unit (CA U) 417 at the Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Site. The UC-I, UC-3, and UC-4 sites are inspected every 2 years, in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan provided in the CAU 417 Closure Report published in 2001. The requirements for postclosure monitoring have been modified over the years through negotiations with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Modifications were documented through three separate Records of Technical Change to the Closure Report, which were approved by NDEP in 2003, 2011, and 2015. The UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4 sites were all observed as being in good condition during the 2018 inspections. A few minor cracks on the UC-1 Central Mud Pit cover were repaired during the UC- I inspection. A concrete monument at the northeast corner of Mud Pit U3E at the UC-3 site had some damage near the top of the monument, but the damage has not impacted the functionality of the monument or survey pin on top of the monument. No issues were identified at the UC-4 site. No maintenance or additional repair activities are recommended at the UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4 sites.

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DOE OSTI2025

Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order Nevada National Security Site Use Restriction Management Plan, Revision 2

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

Acceptance Test of WCTC with LEU Fuel at the IVG.1M Research Reactor Site in Kazakhstan

The water-cooled technological channels (WCTC) with low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, in the amount required for conversion, were delivered to the IVG.1M site by the manufacturer in February 2021 and thereafter the site acceptance test (SAT) of the WCTCs and the fuel elements started immediately. The paper provides an overview of the SAT conducted between March and November 2021 by the designated experts of the reactor operator and the manufacturer. It includes the introduction of the IVG.1M reactor and its unique WCTCs, and the inspection methodology to verify the conformity of the quality of the LEU fuel with the Technical Design (reference document). The paper presents results of the non-destructive and destructive tests, the outcomes of the thermohydraulic measurements, as well as the evaluation and corrective actions (if any), including the amendments (modifications) of the Technical Design initiated by the manufacturer based on the test results. Finally, the paper draws conclusions on the effectiveness of the SAT method used, captures consolidated experiential knowledge and shares lessons learned that can be used in general when planning and performing fuel verification.

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DOE OSTI2026

Agentic Diagrammatica: Towards Autonomous Symbolic Computation in High Energy Physics

We present Diagrammatica, a symbolic computation extension to the HEPTAPOD agentic framework, which enables LLM agents to plan and execute multi-step theoretical calculations. Symbolic computation poses a distinctive reliability challenge for LLM agents, as correctness is governed by implicit mathematical conventions that are not encoded in a form that can be easily checked in the computational backend. We identify two complementary remedies, tool-constrained computation and targeted knowledge grounding, and pursue the first as the primary architecture. Concretely, we concentrate the agent's action distribution onto tool calls with convention-fixing semantics, in which the agent specifies a compact, human-auditable diagram specification and a trusted backend performs the symbolic or numerical manipulations exactly. The toolkit provides two complementary calculation paths consuming a shared diagram specification: Naive Dimensional Analysis (NDA) for order-of-magnitude rate estimates and Exact Diagrammatic Analysis (EDA) for tree-level symbolic calculations via automatic FeynCalc code generation, both supplemented by automatic Feynman diagram enumeration and a navigable theory knowledge base. The architecture is validated on two benchmarks: (1) an exhaustive catalog of all tree-level, single-vertex $1\to 2$ partial decay widths across scalar, fermion, and vector parents, with complete massless and threshold limits and Standard Model validation; and (2) an NDA sensitivity study of the muon decay multiplicity $μ^+ \to ν_μ\barν_e + n(e^+e^-) + e^-$, determining the maximum observable $n$ at current and planned muon experiments.

Menzo, Tony [Alabama U.; Fermilab] (ORCID:00000002↗

DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Long-Term Environmental Monitoring Systems (ALTEMIS) Artificial Intelligence Data Management Plan

Across the Department of Energy’s Environmental and Legacy Management sites, complex groundwater plumes exist that will require long-term monitoring to ensure remedial actions that have been put in place remain effective decades into the future. The current monitoring paradigm predominantly consists of groundwater well sampling, whereby samples are collected, concentrations analyzed, and plume anomalies are detected after they have occurred. The Advanced Long Term Environmental Monitoring Systems (ALTEMIS) program is a multi-lab, multi-institution team of researchers that is deploying spatially integrative technologies (i.e., real-time in situ sensor networks), coupled with artificial intelligence and machine learning, to establish a more proactive monitoring paradigm. Within this approach, plume anomalies can be predicted, and corrective actions can be established prior to the occurrence, offering a more cost-effective and robust approach to long-term monitoring. The team has deployed a variety of different in situ sensing technologies at the Savannah River Site’s F-Area Hazardous Waste Management Facility around the F-Area Seepage Basins, which are unlined basins that received 7 billion liters of acidic low-level radioactive waste from the 1950s until the late 1980s. The technologies and techniques that the team is deploying are intended to ensure that the remedial actions that have been taken by the site remain effective decades into the future. Foundational to this approach is a robust, integrated data management and analysis plan to ensure accurate and timely reporting from the variety of sensor systems that are in place. This report will outline the data management plan that has been implemented by the ALTEMIS team at the Savannah River Site and will serve as a blueprint as the technology is translated to new sites across the DOE Complex.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

A Hybrid Dynamic/Steady-State Tool With Protection Simulation for Cascading-Outage Analysis of Extreme Events in Power Systems

The bulk electric power grid is subject to vulnerabilities from component outages, which in certain combinations (extreme events) might lead to cascading outages. Some of these outages can be severe enough to trigger brownouts and blackouts. Much is known about mitigating the first few failures near the beginning of a cascade, but there are few established methods and tools for directly analyzing the risks of cascading component outages over a longer time scale. Current power system tools have limited ability to perform detailed and accurate cascading-outage analysis, which could be computationally intensive. The Dynamic Contingency Analysis Tool (DCAT) enables power system planning engineers to more realistically assess the consequences of extreme contingencies and potential cascading events across their systems and interconnections. DCAT has several unique features: (i) detailed hybrid dynamic and steady-state analysis of power systems to mimic real-world cascading outages, (ii) detailed modeling of protection systems embedded in the dynamic simulation, (iii) simulation of corrective action after transients, (iv) simulation of islanding , and (v) high-performance computing capability to simulate a large number of contingencies in a reasonable time. DCAT outputs will help find technically sound solutions to reduce the risk of cascading outages. This paper provides details of DCAT methodology and shows its capabilities with extreme events on real-world cases.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Pantex Plant Ogallala Aquifer and Perched Groundwater Contingency Plan

The Pantex Plant Ogallala Aquifer and Perched Groundwater Contingency Plan has been developed in accordance with the requirements identified in the: • Interagency Agreement for the Pantex Superfund Site, Article 8.5 Work to be Performed, • Compliance Plan Provision of Hazardous Waste Permit No. 50284, and • Record of Decision for Groundwater, Soil, and Associated Media, Pantex Plant. A Long‐Term Monitoring System Design has been designed to monitor conditions in the perched groundwater including changes in the perched aquifer as a result of implementing the response actions. Monitoring is required for verifying the effectiveness of perched groundwater response actions (i.e., conditions in the perched aquifer are being affected as intended) and for confirming that the perched aquifer and Ogallala Aquifer characterization as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Investigation Report and the Corrective Measure Studies/Feasibility Study remains accurate. If monitoring results obtained through the monitoring network identify an unexpected condition or deviation, contingent actions will be considered and implemented as necessary to ensure continued protection of the Ogallala Aquifer and human health and the environment. Potential deviations to expected technology performance may be encountered for each of the four primary response actions that compose the selected remedy for perched groundwater; Playa 1 Pump and Treat System, Southeast Area Pump and Treat System, Southeast Area In‐Situ Bioremediation System (comprised of the Southeast In‐Situ Bioremediation System Original System, Southeast Area In‐Situ Bioremediation System Extension System, Offsite In‐Situ Bioremediation System, Perchlorate/Chromium ISB, Northeast ISB and County Road 8 ISB), and Zone 11 In‐Situ Bioremediation System. Monitoring will also be conducted to determine if there are deviations to the expected characterization, e.g., contaminants not expected as a result of the RCRA Facility Investigation characterization. Deviations to expected conditions in the Ogallala Aquifer could also be encountered if the response actions in the perched groundwater are not performing as expected, i.e., preventing contaminants from migrating to the Ogallala Aquifer. Currently, Pantex has begun investigation of detections of high explosives above groundwater protection standards in wells on the Texas Tech University property and a plume that is moving to the northeast from that area. Due to those detections, this Plan recognizes the fact that future detections in the Ogallala will be focused on first‐ time detections of analytes. After a remedy is determined, this Plan will require modification to address-deviations and contingent actions. This Plan was developed to identify the contingent actions necessary to mitigate impacts resulting from deviations to site conditions or response action performance. The Plan defines the environmental problem being addressed by the response actions, clarifies the expected conditions and objectives of the response actions, and identifies the potential deviations to the response actions (due to site conditions or technology performance) that could be encountered. The deviations were evaluated to determine the likelihood of occurrence, potential impact, and time to respond to avoid impact. The Plan also identifies the monitoring outlined in the Long‐Term Monitoring System Design Report (Consolidated Nuclear Security, 2024) and Sampling Analysis Plan (PanTeXas Deterrence, 2024) that will be used to detect the deviations. Lastly, the Plan specifies the contingent actions that could be implemented in response to the deviations. Because each response focuses on a discrete portion of the perched aquifer and contaminant plume, each response action has a different set of expected conditions, and therefore differing impacts from deviations to the site and technology expectations. As a result, the contingent actions are identified for each response action and potential deviation including specific constituents, location, and conditions. If deviations are encountered that impact the ability of the response action to meet performance objectives, the contingent actions will be focused on ensuring the response action can meet the performance objective. Contingent actions may be implemented as interim actions (ISMs/removal actions) in accordance with the Record of Decision, Interagency Agreement, and Hazardous Waste Permit‐50284, if warranted by the specific circumstances. For deviations to site characterization expected conditions, the contingent action will focus on determination of the source of the deviation, determination of the appropriate response, and evaluation of additional work to be completed. However, if the deviation to characterization impacts the performance of the response action, the contingent action will again focus on ensuring performance objectives can be met. Early source term removals and cleanup actions have been implemented to protect the Ogallala Aquifer. Because of these actions and based on modeling results, the expected conditions in the Ogallala Aquifer are that constituents of concern will not be detected above the Groundwater Protection Standards (GWPSs) nor will they reach potential points of exposure above the GWPS. The primary deviation of concern for the Ogallala is if constituents are detected in the Ogallala Aquifer near or above GWPSs. If it occurs, this change in expected conditions would require further evaluation of site and contaminant characteristics to determine an appropriate course of action. The evaluation would include additional monitoring, source identification, implementation of interim protective measures (if necessary), and delineation of extent. These evaluations are necessary to determine an appropriate response action for the Ogallala. The primary goal of the Plan is to provide for the continued protection of the Ogallala Aquifer and the health of its consumers. In recognition, this Plan presents a flexible and rational approach for making future decisions associated with confirming the change in perched and Ogallala aquifer conditions and identifying a response (technical activities, changes to response actions, regulatory oversight, and public involvement).

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DOE OSTI2026

An agentic artificially intelligent X-ray scientist

Executing experimental tasks in both normal research laboratories and large-scale scientific facilities often requires extensive human supervision and remains a key challenge on the path to fully autonomous, artificial intelligence (AI)-driven science. Here we demonstrate a large language model-driven agent that autonomously performs X-ray sample alignment on a synchrotron beamline by planning actions, executing instrumental commands, interpreting observations and iterating towards experimental goals. Based on existing large language models with structured tool-use via the model context protocol, our AI X-ray scientist was guided and tested using an in-house-built virtual experimental setup that mirrors a six-circle diffractometer at an operational synchrotron beamline. The agentic workflow developed in the virtual environment was directly deployed on a real beamline, where it correctly identified reference reflections and determined the orientation matrix, an essential first step in any type of single-crystal scattering experiment. Our AI X-ray scientist responded effectively to unexpected experimental conditions, demonstrating adaptive problem-solving and readiness for addressing practical experimental situations. Our study provides a step towards autonomous operation across diverse experimental environments at large-scale scattering facilities.

Chen, Zhantao (ORCID:0000000319543868)↗

DOE OSTI2021

The case for digital twins in metal additive manufacturing

The digital twin (DT) is a relatively new concept that is finding increased acceptance in industry. A DT is generally considered as comprising a physical entity, its virtual replica, and two-way digital data communications in-between. Its primary purpose is to leverage the process intelligence captured within digital models—or usually their faster-solving surrogates—towards generating increased value from the physical entities. The surrogate models are created using machine learning based on data obtained from the field, experiments and digital models, which may be physics-based or statistics-based. Anomaly detection and correction, and diagnostic closed-loop process control are examples of how a process DT can be deployed. In the manufacturing industry, its use can achieve improvements in product quality and process productivity. Metal additive manufacturing (AM) stands to gain tremendously from the use of DTs. This is because the AM process is inherently chaotic, resulting in poor repeatability. However, a DT acting in a supervisory role can inject certainty into the process by actively keeping it within bounds through real-time control commands. Closed-loop feedforward control is achieved by observing the process through sensors that monitor critical parameters and, if there are any deviations from their respective optimal ranges, suitable corrective actions are triggered. The type of corrective action (e.g. a change in laser power or a modification to the scanning speed) and its magnitude are determined by interrogating the surrogate models. Because of their artificial intelligence (AI)-endowed predictive capabilities, which allow them to foresee a future state of the physical twin (e.g. the AM process), DTs proactively take context-sensitive preventative steps, whereas traditional closed-loop feedback control is usually reactive. Apart from assisting a build process in real-time, a DT can help with planning the build of a part by pinpointing the optimum processing window relevant to the desired outcome. Again, the surrogate models are consulted to obtain the required information. In this article, we explain how the application of DTs to the metal AM process can significantly widen its application space by making the process more repeatable (through quality assurance) and cheaper (by getting builds right the first time).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2023

Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low-Level Waste in the 200 West Area Burial Grounds (Annual Status Report FY 2022)

This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the active 200 West Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. These estimates are calculated using the original dose methodology developed in the performance assessment (PA) analysis (WHC-EP-0645). The estimates are compared with the performance objectives defined in U.S. Department of Energy requirements (DOE O 435.1 and its companion documents DOE M 435.1-1 and DOE-STD-5002-2017). All performance objectives are currently satisfied, and operational waste acceptance criteria (HNF-EP-0063) and waste acceptance practices continue to be sufficient to maintain compliance with performance objectives. Inventory estimates and associated dose estimates from future waste disposal actions are unchanged from previous years’ evaluations that indicate potential impacts well below performance objectives; therefore, future compliance with DOE O 435.1 is expected. Within the active burial grounds, low-level and mixed low-level waste currently may be disposed only in two lined trenches in the 218-W-5 Burial Ground (Trenches 31 and 34) until they are either filled or a decision is made to close these trenches. Some mixed low-level waste is also disposed at the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility in the 200 West Area (which is covered under a separate PA). During this (fiscal year 2022) reporting period (October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2022), waste was disposed to the 200 West Area LLBGs. Continued groundwater monitoring of the 200 West Area LLBGs indicates no groundwater contamination due to LLBG waste. Current assumptions about future land use at the Hanford Site are consistent with PA analysis assumptions of a postclosure facility that will not be degraded by human activity. The LLBGs are in an area identified for waste management and containment of residual contamination (DOE/EIS-0391). The current closure plan for the LLBGs (DOE/RL-2000-70) estimates that the 200 West LLBGs will be closed in the 2050 timeframe. The Disposal Authorization Statement, other technical basis documents, and the radioactive waste management basis are of continued adequacy to meet the performance objectives of DOE O 435.1. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions and no changes to the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 and the Disposal Authorization Statement is maintained. A new PA to evaluate the long-term impacts of three disposal trenches that are currently active within the 200 East and 200 West Areas (Trench 94 in the 200 East Area and Trenches 31 and 34 in the 200 West Area) was initiated in fiscal year 2019 and completed in fiscal year 2022. Corrective actions addressing 3 key issues and 31 secondary issues identified during the review process were developed and submitted to the Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review Group Co-Chairs for review and approval. This PA provides additional technical basis for the continued adequacy of the existing Operating Disposal Authorization Statement.

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