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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1999

Mars Observer Propulsion and Pyrotechnics Corrective Actions Test Program Status-1999

An extensive propulsion and pyrotechnic test program has been in progress at the NASA White Sands Test Facility since 1995. This program created the capabilities to: accurately measure and characterize pyrovalve combustion product blow-by into propellant systems; characterize valve operation using a Velocity Interferometer System for Any Reflector (VISAR); and evaluate hydrazine and monomethylhydrazine thermal decomposition initiated by blow-by. These capabilities were further utilized and refined this year. Low blow-by pyrovalves manufactured by Conax Florida Corporation continued to be evaluated as a potential corrective measure for blow-by induced propellant explosions. Development and testing of various advanced pyrovalves and investigation of explosion mechanisms also continued. Current and near-term testing includes: evaluation of 3/8 in. Conax pyrovalves and other commercially available valves; development and testing of advanced pyrovalve subcomponent technologies including a zero blow-by pyrovalve ram, composite overwrapped ram cylinder, and a zero particulate generating poppet; investigation of non-destructive evaluation techniques to evaluate pyrovalve ram seals; and testing and modeling of pyrotechnically induced explosive hydrazine decomposition. Evaluation of 3/8 in. Conax valves will include operational margin testing to be accomplished at NASA Langley Research Center. The test program also seeks to compile and format significant amounts of data from this and other pyrovalve test programs to generate a pyrovalve applications handbook. The handbook will facilitate formation of standards that ensure safe spacecraft applications. Current data and future plans are discussed, and community interaction is encouraged.

Saulsberry, Regor↗
DOE OSTI2024

Soil Gas Survey Results Supporting Groundwater Correction Action Plan (GCAP) Development for the Moab Site

A soil gas survey was performed at the Moab Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project Site during the week of November 6, 2023. Soil gas surveys are used to characterize residual subsurface sources of volatile contaminants, such as volatile organic compounds, as well as contaminants that generate a surrogate indicator gas or otherwise influence soil gas composition. The primary objective of the Moab soil gas survey was to confirm, identify, quantify, and refine secondary contaminant source area locations for uranium and ammonium/ammonia (NH 4 + /NH 3 ) in the vadose zone and shallow groundwater. The overarching goal was to provide information to assist in developing the technical basis for the Groundwater Compliance Action Plan (GCAP). Specifically, the soil gas data will support the deployment of source control technologies; e.g., where supplementary capping, removal actions, or amendments might be beneficial.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Non-Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Unit (CAU) Post-Closure Inspection Report, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2023

This report includes visual inspection results, descriptions of maintenance and repair activities, and recommendations for CY 2023 for URs at CASs located on the NNSS and on the NTTR that are accessed through the NNSS Main Gate. This document is formatted by project activity (i.e., Industrial Sites, Soils, and DTRA]; then by CAU; and then by CAS.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Soil Gas Survey Results Supporting Groundwater Correction Action Plan (GCAP) Development for the Moab Site

A soil gas survey was performed at the Moab Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project Site during the week of November 6, 2023. Soil gas surveys are used to characterize residual subsurface sources of volatile contaminants, such as volatile organic compounds, as well as contaminants that generate a surrogate indicator gas or otherwise influence soil gas composition. The primary objective of the Moab soil gas survey was to confirm, identify, quantify, and refine secondary contaminant source area locations for uranium and ammonium/ammonia (NH 4 + /NH 3 ) in the vadose zone and shallow groundwater. The overarching goal was to provide information to assist in developing the technical basis for the Groundwater Compliance Action Plan (GCAP). Specifically, the soil gas data will support the deployment of source control technologies; e.g., where supplementary capping, removal actions, or amendments might be beneficial.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2012

Stress Analysis and Testing at the Marshall Space Flight Center to Study Cause and Corrective Action of Space Shuttle External Tank Stringer Failures

After the launch scrub of Space Shuttle mission STS-133 on November 5, 2010, large cracks were discovered in two of the External Tank intertank stringers. The NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, as managing center for the External Tank Project, coordinated the ensuing failure investigation and repair activities with several organizations, including the manufacturer, Lockheed Martin. To support the investigation, the Marshall Space Flight Center formed an ad-hoc stress analysis team to complement the efforts of Lockheed Martin. The team undertook six major efforts to analyze or test the structural behavior of the stringers. Extensive finite element modeling was performed to characterize the local stresses in the stringers near the region of failure. Data from a full-scale tanking test and from several subcomponent static load tests were used to confirm the analytical conclusions. The analysis and test activities of the team are summarized. The root cause of the stringer failures and the flight readiness rationale for the repairs that were implemented are discussed.

Wingate, Robert J.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Integrated Issues and Risk Management: A Theoretical Framework Overview

The contractor requirements document for DOE O 226.1B, Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy, requires DOE/NNSA contractors to establish an assurance system that includes, among other things, “Rigorous, risk-informed, and credible self-assessment and feedback and improvement activities. Assessment programs must be risk-informed, formally described and documented, and appropriately cover potentially high consequence activities” and “Contains an issues management process that is capable of categorizing the significance of findings based on risk and priority and other appropriate factors….” However, the term “risk-informed” is not defined in this or any other DOE order, and no formal guidance on how to integrate the two concepts currently exists. The Risk Management Guide for Defense Programs released by NA-18, Office of Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I), states it is “a framework and general guidance to program office personnel on the effective management of program risks and issues”, however it then defines issues as “events with 100% likelihood of affecting program objectives” and states “unless specified otherwise, the term “risk” will also serve to represent issues for the remainder of this plan,” severally limiting its ability to provide adequate guidance on this topic. Outside of DOE scope, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) imposes similar requirements. ASME NQA-1-2015 Requirement 16 states “Conditions adverse to quality shall be identified promptly and corrected as soon as practicable. In the case of a significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition shall be determined, and corrective action taken to preclude recurrence. The identification, cause, and corrective action for significant conditions adverse to quality shall be documented and reported to appropriate levels of management. Completion of corrective actions shall be verified”. The purpose of this document is to provide a best-in-class framework for an integrated risk and issues management process. This process would provide a robust feedback loop between risk management and issues management to: Enhance risk identification and characterization, use risk handling principles to improve corrective action planning, and ensure regulatory compliance.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2025

Converter Compressor Building, SWMU 089 Monitoring Well 21 Area Implementation Work Plan Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This Implementation Work Plan (IWP) was prepared by Tetra Tech, Inc., for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) under Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) Contract 80KSC019D0011/80KSC019F0070, for the implementation of a bioremediation Interim Measure (IM) at the Converter Compressor Building (CCB) site located at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. The location of CCB within KSC is shown on Figure A-1. CCB has been designated as Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) 089 under KSC’s Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Corrective Action Program. The overall Corrective Action Objective (CAO) for CCB is to reduce concentrations of trichloroethene (TCE), cis-1,2-dichloroethene (cDCE), trans-1,2-dichloroethene (tDCE), and vinyl chloride (VC) to less than State of Florida Groundwater Cleanup Target Levels (GCTLs). The objective for the IM associated with this IM is to reduce groundwater concentrations for the contaminants of concern (COCs) to less than their Natural Default Attenuation Concentrations (NADCs) within the Monitoring Well 21 Area (herein referred to as MW21 Area) via bioremediation injections to support transition to long term monitoring (LTM). This IWP describes the activities that will be performed for the treatment of the MW21 Area. The Revision 1 CCB MW21 Area Interim Measure Work Plan (IMWP; NASA, 2024), which was approved by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) on December 26, 2024, was used as the design basis for this IWP.

Mark Jonnet↗
NASA NTRS1987

Flight problem evaluation for Space Shuttle Orbiter

The flight problems experienced with the reusable Space Shuttle Orbiter have decreased during subsequent flights of each vehicle. By comparison to first flights of previous vehicles, the problems encountered on the initial flight of each new vehicle entering the fleet decreased. This improvement in turn has reduced the turnaround time between flights significantly and thus greatly enhanced the increased Space Shuttle launch frequency. The reusable manned space vehicle concept necessitated the development of a flight problem recognition and resolution system which would enable a thorough and timely vehicle turnaround flow. Flight evaluation, testing, and repair of manned spacecraft to enhance reliability and to ensure mission success is a unique activity. Real-time recognition of the flight problem, prompt isolation of the cause, and timely implementation of the corrective action are the keys to maintaining an operational fleet. Examples of flight problems that have been encountered as well as the corrective actions implemented during the first 24 Space Shuttle missions are presented. The corrective actions taken to preclude problem recurrence include modifications of hardware designs, manufacturing processes, flight software, test methods, and operational procedures.

Mechelay, Joseph E.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Use Restriction (UR) Update Activity, Groups 23 and 31 URs Proposed for Downgrade or Removal

A White Paper document containing background information, rationale, and conclusion as justification for the downgrade or removal of use restrictions from various FFACO Corrective Action Sites (CASs) and their associated Corrective Action Units (CAUs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) [previously Nevada Test Site (NTS), as referred to throughout the white paper].

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗