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Detecting And Characterizing Archetypes of Unintended Consequences in Engineered Systems

When designing engineered systems, the potential for unintended consequences of design policies or design decisions exists despite best intentions. Conditions that might cause the formation of unintended consequences are often known only in hindsight. However, since these conditions are associated with a single event, it is difficult to uncover the general patterns of conditions leading to unintended consequences. In this research, patterns of conditions associated with unintended consequences are learned from historical data and represented in the form of archetypes. While previous work using systems theoretic modeling has identified high-level archetypes, this work leverages a self-organizing map to learn archetypes of unintended consequences from human-tagged risk factors in a large data set of lessons learned from adverse events at NASA. The sixty-six identified archetypes contain patterns of conditions such as complexity and human-machine interaction associated with the formation of unintended consequences. To validate the archetypes, a sample of the archetypes is represented using system dynamics in order to illustrate that the identified archetypes are specialized versions of known high-level archetypes of unintended consequences. While the research is based upon a specific dataset, the archetypes apply to any engineered system and the pattern of leading indicators open a new path to manage unintended consequences and mitigate the magnitude of potentially adverse outcomes.

Hannah S Walsh↗

A whole wilderness of warning: Assessing economic consequences of nuclear releases - 15494

The consequences of the Fukushima Dai-ichi disaster may provide a useful analogue for assessing the consequences of an accident involving the transport of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. An unexamined, to date, aspect of the Fukushima Dai-ichi disaster is the wide disagreement about the economic consequences of the release. There exist a variety of different estimates and different models and methods for performing these estimates, but not a systematic way to address the range of issues such a disaster generated. This paper examines the sources, methods, data, and assumptions used to prepare economic consequence estimates of the disaster. This paper compares and contrasts these estimates and evaluates them for their reliability. The wide dispersion of consequence assessments as defined by various media and agency impact reports in the post-Fukushima era are evidence that such variability does not serve the industry, regulators, government or researchers well. While a protocol exists to gauge the intensity of an incident (INES Scale) no pre-existing methodology exists to measure the various socioeconomic impacts associated with a radiological disaster, be it induced by a natural disaster incident or human initiated. This paper argues that an improved method will be necessary and suggests some parameters for such a method. Nevada has started the dialogue on such a comprehensive methodology (Ballard 2012, Ballard 2014). Despite this effort by a stakeholder, the regulatory agencies involved in nuclear waste shipments in the United States appear reluctant to begin a dialogue about how to address the full range and scope of issues. Resolution of this problem will be a necessary prerequisite to any large scale shipping program. It will be necessary to adopt a standardized methodology to assess consequences of a radiological emergency and incorporate this into the environmental impact statement process for the shipping program. This analytical deficiency should be addressed by these agencies/regulators and in preparation for the potential movement of nuclear waste in the quantities necessary to service the nuclear power industry and to address the existing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) stockpiles across the United States. It will be necessary to demonstrate to stakeholders that the benefits of shipping radioactive substances this dangerous outweigh the costs of a possible accident or terrorist incident. The nuclear energy industry should support funding for these assessment studies in order to provide a basis for discussions about the costs and benefits of the shipments. The studies would provide stakeholders with clarity about the possible consequences of the program. The studies will also assist Japan in its efforts to understand what their disaster means for that country. This paper will begin the dialogue on how such analytical protocols could be constructed to pre-stage the research necessary to assess such consequences. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Concept for Cyber-Physical Consequence Process

The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (DHS/OCIA) has a mission and vision that promotes innovation as central to expanding the organization’s capability to conduct consequence analysis. To pursue such innovation, OCIA is sponsoring a seedling effort with Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to leverage data from the proposed Automated Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) capability, which the DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate is developing through a separate INL effort. The first phase of this effort is to develop a process by which recognized vulnerabilities can be scored relative to importance, reflected primarily in the ability to initiate high consequence and potentially cascading events. This report documents a cyber-physical metrics process (CPMP) to tie physical impact to the malicious exploitation of cyber vulnerabilities in industrial control systems (ICS) with the potential for initiating consequence in the critical infrastructure. The scale of achieving any particular physical consequence is dependent upon the ICS Component the vulnerability exists on, the Level of Access that the exploit would allow to component function and the Physical Impact (CLAPI) to the power system that the component is tied. A modified common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) was detailed and demonstrated for the power sector with three case studies associated with a recognized vulnerability, with significant consequence detail provided to apply the process across the power sector. A detailed table that provides background on the power system components, ICS-enabled monitoring and control, potential consequence effects, and CVSS scoring is provided. To demonstrate the applicability of the CPMP, tables are provided as examples for other sectors that include chemical, water/wastewater and oil/gas.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Criticality Analysis of a Water Distribution System Considering Both Economic Consequences and Hydraulic Loss Using Modern Portfolio Theory

This study introduces an approach using Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) to consider hydraulic resilience and economic consequence resilience of a water distribution system (WDS) to identify critical assets. ECLIPS (Economic Consequence Linked to Interruption in Providing Service), a way to represent loss of water provision as economic loss, is used to measure economic consequence following a reduction of WDS functionality. The approach is demonstrated using a hypothetical WDS and tested for pipe breakage and replacement scenarios using EPANET hydraulic simulations. First, the correlation between hydraulic resilience and economic consequence resilience was investigated to assess differences between two resilience measures for identifying pipe’s criticality for replacement. The results confirmed the two resilience measures exhibited differing responses (covariance = 0.2), suggesting that use of both would provide complementary insight. Results of the MPT analysis identified the benefits of balancing hydraulic and economic consequence resilience measures to yield lower risk. This study provides a practical approach to incorporate economic consequence into planning, design, and research applications identifying critical WDS assets.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Drinking Water Consequences Tools. A Literature Review

In support of the goals of Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National Protection and Programs Directorate and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the DHS Office of Science and Technology is seeking to develop and/or modify consequence assessment tools to enable drinking water systems owner/operators to estimate the societal and economic consequences of drinking water disruption due to the threats and hazards. This work will expand the breadth of consequence estimation methods and tools using the best-available data describing water distribution infrastructure, owner/assetlevel economic losses, regional-scale economic activity, and health. In addition, this project will deploy the consequence methodology and capability within a Web-based platform. This report is intended to support DHS effort providing a review literature review of existing assessment tools of water and wastewater systems consequences to disruptions. The review includes tools that assess water systems resilience, vulnerability, and risk. This will help to understand gaps and limitations of these tools in order to plan for the development of the next-generation consequences tool for water and waste water systems disruption.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Low-Probability High-Consequence (LPHC) Failure Events in Geologic Carbon Sequestration Pipelines and Wells: Framework for LPHC Risk Assessment Incorporating Spatial Variability of Risk

If Carbon dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS) is to be effective in mitigating climate change, it will need to be carried out on a very large scale. This will involve many thousands of miles of dedicated high-pressure pipelines in order to transport many millions of tonnes of CO 2 annually, with the CO 2 delivered to many thousands of wells that will inject the CO 2 underground. The new CCS infrastructure could rival in size the current U.S. upstream natural gas pipeline and well infrastructure. This new infrastructure entails hazards for life, health, animals, the environment, and natural resources. Pipelines are known to rupture due to corrosion, from external forces such as impacts by vehicles or digging equipment, by defects in construction, or from the failure of valves and seals. Similarly, wells are vulnerable to catastrophic failure due to corrosion, cement degradation, or operational mistakes. While most accidents involving pipelines and wells will be minor, there is the inevitable possibility of accidents with very high consequences, especially to public health. The most important consequence of concern is CO 2 release to the environment in concentrations sufficient to cause death by asphyxiation to nearby populations. Such accidents are thought to be very unlikely, but of course they cannot be excluded, even if major engineering effort is devoted (as it will be) to keeping their probability low and their consequences minimized. This project has developed a methodology for analyzing the risks of these rare but high-consequence accidents, using a step-by-step probabilistic methodology. A key difference between risks for pipelines and wells is that the former are spatially distributed along the pipe whereas the latter are confined to the vicinity of the well. Otherwise, the methodology we develop for risk assessment of pipeline and well failures is similar and provides an analysis both of the annual probabilities of accident sequences of concern and of their consequences, and crucially the methodology provides insights into what measures might be taken to mitigate those accident sequences identified as of concern. Mitigating strategies could address reducing the likelihood of an accident sequence of concern, or reducing the consequences, or some combination. The methodology elucidates both local and integrated risks along the pipeline or at the well providing information useful to decision makers at various levels including local (e.g., property owners and town councils), regional (e.g., county and state representatives), and national levels (federal regulators and corporate proponents).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Chemical Consequence Analysis and Atmospheric Dispersion Coefficients under DOE-STD-3009-2014 Nuclear Safety Analysis

During preparation of non-reactor nuclear facility documented safety analyses (DSAs), chemical consequence analysis is an important contributor to correctly identifying and classifying nuclear safety controls. The Department of Energy (DOE) recently-issued DOE-STD-3009-2014, which increases the focus on chemical hazards within non-reactor nuclear facilities, and imposes additional requirements. Chemical consequence analysis can be significantly more complicated than radiological consequence analysis. Specifically, atmospheric dispersion factors used in chemical consequence analysis must consider several additional factors, such as the energy of the release, buoyancy, and initial chemical concentration. This paper describes the overall requirements of chemical consequence analysis under DOE-STD- 3009-2014, and provides specific guidance for determining an applicable atmospheric dispersion coefficient for use in chemical consequence analysis.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in high-temperature helium-cooled prismatic microreactors

Here, this study analyzes the radiological dose consequences of sabotage-induced accidents at three high-temperature helium-cooled prismatic microreactors (HTPMs) with thermal power ratings of 1, 10, and 50 MWt. Each HTPM employs uranium oxycarbide tristructural isotropic fuel enriched to 19.75 wt% high-assay low-enriched uranium. Simulations were conducted to estimate reactor core inventory at the point of fuel discharge––when the effective multiplication factor reduced to less than 1––representing peak radionuclide inventory. Postulated sabotage scenarios leading to reactor shutdown were analyzed at two intervals: immediately post-shutdown (0 h) and 3 days after shutdown using the SCALE code for radionuclide inventories and the RASCAL tool for dose consequences. Results show that although HTPMs benefit from inherent safety features and robust fuel design, radiological consequences scale with reactor power because of increased source term inventories. Smaller microreactors exhibited proportionally lower dose consequences. To support the economic and regulatory feasibility of microreactor deployment, this study emphasizes the value of a risk-informed, performance-based approach, as supported by regulations like 10 CFR Parts 100 and 53 in the United States. Microreactor developers should perform site-specific assessments of potential sabotage or low-probability, high-consequence events, especially when considering minimal on-site or full off-site emergency response.

Consequence↗

Extravehicular Activity on the Lunar Surface: Mapping Mitigation Risk Consequence for Crew Needing Assistance or Rescue

Extravehicular activity (EVA) on the lunar surface presents unique risks to crew with possibility for injury. Without appropriate assistance or rescue capability, inability to nominally ambulate and return to a lander, especially during early Artemis missions, could have catastrophic consequences. Mapping likelihood and consequence safety risk associated with identified injury scenarios establishes a baseline from which to assess potential mitigation solutions to ensure crew health and safety. Causes leading to the need for incapacitated crew rescue (ICR) during EVA on the lunar surface were previously identified and classified using an ICR/Acute Injury scenario spectrum. Severe scenarios are those when the affected astronaut requires either partial or full continuous assistance from the rescuer. Evaluation of these continual reliance conditions included calculating event probabilities (likelihoods) associated with an early Artemis mission and mapping them to established Exploration System Directorate (ESD) probability thresholds; safety consequences were analyzed and correlated to defined ESD personnel safety categories. These resulting likelihood and consequence values served as a baseline for assessing risk reduction of three mitigation capabilities: crew assistance (rescuer crew) only, walking assist devices, and a wheeled transport device. Of the twenty-five continual reliance conditions, ten were evaluated as “catastrophic” (Level 5, loss of life) during EVA on the lunar surface with probabilities ranging from moderate to very low during an early Artemis mission. Crew assistance only and walking assist devices showed similar potential for risk reduction, with four of the ten causes decreasing to Level 4. A wheeled transport device further increased risk reduction with six of the ten conditions decreasing to Level 4. Given the catastrophic consequence of several identified conditions, assessments should be performed to determine the feasibility of mitigation capabilities. It is currently unknown whether a rescuer astronaut could effectively provide continuous assistance to enable both crew to return safely to the lander from the standpoint of both suit geometry and human performance. Although resulting in an increase in resources, providing a wheeled transport provides the highest risk reduction potential, and walking assist devices may have prevention as well as mitigation benefits.

lunar surface↗

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Economic Consequence Analysis of Disasters: The ECAT Software Tool

This study develops a methodology for rapidly obtaining approximate estimates of the economic consequences from numerous natural, man-made and technological threats. This software tool is intended for use by various decision makers and analysts to obtain estimates rapidly. It is programmed in Excel and Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) to facilitate its use. This tool is called E-CAT (Economic Consequence Analysis Tool) and accounts for the cumulative direct and indirect impacts (including resilience and behavioral factors that significantly affect base estimates) on the U.S. economy. E-CAT is intended to be a major step toward advancing the current state of economic consequence analysis (ECA) and also contributing to and developing interest in further research into complex but rapid turnaround approaches. The essence of the methodology involves running numerous simulations in a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for each threat, yielding synthetic data for the estimation of a single regression equation based on the identification of key explanatory variables (threat characteristics and background conditions). This transforms the results of a complex model, which is beyond the reach of most users, into a "reduced form" model that is readily comprehensible. Functionality has been built into E-CAT so that its users can switch various consequence categories on and off in order to create customized profiles of economic consequences of numerous risk events. E-CAT incorporates uncertainty on both the input and output side in the course of the analysis.

Environmental Economics↗

Criticality Consequence Analysis Roadmap for Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister in a Repository

This report discusses an initial criticality consequence analysis approach of commercial spent fuel canisters in a repository that will be developed to support a performance assessment (PA) of a repository with criticality events. A repository PA with criticality events may be needed to support direct disposal of currently loaded dual-purpose canisters. The ultimate goal is to develop a criticality consequence analysis model that can interface with any repository PA model. The criticality consequence analysis approach describes multi-physics coupling between neutronics, thermal hydraulics, and mechanics analysis codes. This report also discusses the sensitivity and uncertainty analysis approach for quantifying conservatism in the criticality consequence outcomes, as well as a defensible multi-physics validation approach to support any future licensing effort. This criticality consequence analysis approach will be refined in the future to support specific regulatory frameworks for a specific repository PA if needed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radiological Consequences of Hydrogen Explosions in Vessels and Piping at the WTP

Hydrogen (along with other gases) is generated in process vessels and other components at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) due to the radiolysis of water and to the radiolysis and thermolysis of organics in WTP radioactive process wastes. In the absence of controls, the hydrogen may accumulate until a flammable or explosive concentration is reached. Once a buildup has occurred, ignition of the hydrogen causes an explosion that creates radioactive aerosols that could escape the confinement boundary and be released to the environment. Such a release could cause significant radiological exposures to a public receptor at the site boundary and to a co-located worker (CLW/) in the yard areas outside the physical facilities. Hydrogen explosion events therefore require evaluation as to the potential magnitude of their consequences. The WTP methodology for the evaluation of the potential radiological consequences due to hydrogen explosions in vessels and piping is a conservative approach that is defensible from a regulatory standpoint yet only results in the need for Safety controls for the most highly radioactive process vessels (generally those containing waste with significant quantities of solids). For WTP vessels with waste not containing significant quantities of solids, radiological dose consequences are sufficiently low such that neither Safety Class controls for the public receptor nor Safety Significant controls for the CLW are required. Similarly, the dose consequences for hydrogen explosions in piping and ancillary vessels are all very low to both receptors, again indicating that no Safety Class or Safety Significant controls are required. The WTP vessel and piping hydrogen explosion calculations are dependent on vessel and pipe sizes, hydrogen generation rates, operational requirements, and waste stream properties such as solids content, radioisotope concentration, and slurry density. Consequently, the WTP-specific results discussed above cannot be extrapolated directly to other facilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Consequence-driven cyber-informed engineering (CCE)

The Idaho National Lab (INL) is leading a high-impact, national security-level initiative to reprioritize the way the nation looks at high-consequence risk within the industrial control systems (ICS) environment of the country’s most critical infrastructure and other national assets. The Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) effort provides both private and public organizations with the steps required to examine their own environments for high-impact events/risks; identify implementation of key devices and components that facilitate that risk; illuminate specific, plausible cyber attack paths to manipulate these devices; and develop concrete mitigations, protections, and tripwires to address the high-consequence risk. The ultimate goal of the CCE effort is to help organizations take the steps necessary to thwart cyber attacks from even top-tier, highly resourced adversaries that would result in a catastrophic physical effect. CCE participants are encouraged to work collaboratively with each other and with key U.S. Government (USG) contributors to establish a coalition, maximizing the positive effect of lessons-learned and further contributing to the protection of critical infrastructure and other national assets.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Preventive Rad/Nuc Detection Equipment Categorization for Consequence Management

The overall objective of this project is to research, evaluate, and test first responder preventive radiological/nuclear detection equipment (PRND) to provide state and local agencies with guidance on how to best use this equipment for response after a radiological/nuclear release or detonation. While the equipment being tested in this effort has been specifically designed for detection and interdiction operations, the fleet of PRND equipment can help fill critical needs for radiological instrumentation should a consequence management response take place. This effort will provide scientific guidance on the best way to deploy and operate this class of equipment for consequence management missions. With the support of the US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), PRND equipment has been placed into service at federal, state, and local agencies throughout the nation. If the equipment capability and limitations are taken into account, this large inventory can be repurposed to support the emergency response in the aftermath of a radiological of nuclear event. This report evaluates PRND equipment to define key categories of equipment and the types of missions they can be used for. This is important because there are over 100 different types of PRND equipment, often with significantly different capabilities with respect to the consequence management mission. The current DNDO draft NIMS PRND equipment types were used as a foundation and expanded, when necessary, to address key characteristics important for the consequence mission. Table 1 provides a summary of the PRND instrument categories developed for this effort. Also included on the table are some common response mission detection equipment categories that will be used for capability comparisons.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Mission Analysis for Using Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detection Equipment for Consequence Management

The overall objective of this project is to research, evaluate, and test first responder preventive radiological/nuclear detection (PRND) equipment to provide state and local agencies with scientific guidance on how to effectively use this equipment for response after a radiological/nuclear release or detonation. While the equipment being tested in this effort has been specifically designed by technology manufacturers and purchased by responders for preventive detection and source interdiction operations, the fleet of PRND equipment can help fill critical needs for radiological instrumentation should a consequence management (CM) response take place, as it is currently the most widely available and fielded radiological instrumentation by state and local agencies. This effort will provide scientific guidance on the most effective way to utilize this class of equipment for consequence management missions. Gaining a better understanding of how PRND equipment can operate and perform for these missions will allow for recommendations on the tactical approach responders can use for consequence management operations. PRND equipment has been placed into service by federal, state, and local agencies throughout the nation. If the equipment capability and limitations are taken into account, this large inventory can be leveraged to support the emergency response in the aftermath of a radiological or nuclear event. With several hundred makes and models of PRND equipment, often with significantly different detection capabilities that do not align with their nominal PRND equipment type, development of a streamlined categorization scheme with respect to consequence management missions was the first step to identifying safe and effective uses of PRND equipment for radiological/nuclear incident response.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Mission Analysis for using Preventive Rad/Nuc Detection Equipment for Consequence Management

The overall objective of this project is to research, evaluate, and test first responder preventive radiological/nuclear detection equipment (PRND) to provide state and local agencies with guidance on how to best use radiological search and interdiction systems and equipment for consequence management and response after a radiological/nuclear release or detonation. While the equipment being tested in this effort has been specifically designed by technology manufacturers and purchased by responders for preventive detection and source interdiction operations, the fleet of PRND equipment will help fill the needs for radiological instrumentation should a consequence management response take place, as it is currently the most widely available and fielded radiological instrumentation by state and local agencies. This effort will provide scientific guidance on the best way to deploy and operate this class of equipment for consequence management missions. Gaining a better understanding of how PRND equipment can operate and perform for these missions will allow for recommendations on the tactical approach responders can use for consequence management operations. With the support of the US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), PRND equipment has been placed into service at federal, state, and local agencies throughout the nation. If the equipment capability and limitations are taken into account, this large inventory and capability can be repurposed to support the emergency response in the aftermath of a radiological of nuclear event.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

MACCS (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System) User Guide

The MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) is used by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and various national and international organizations for probabilistic consequence analysis of nuclear power accidents. This User Guide is intended to assist analysts in understanding the MACCS/WinMACCS model and to provide information regarding the code. This user guide version describes MACCS Version 3.10.0. Features that have been added to MACCS in subsequent versions are described in separate documentation. This User Guide provides a brief description of the model history, explains how to set up and execute a problem, and informs the user of the definition of various input parameters and any constraints placed on those parameters. This report is part of a series of reports documenting MACCS. Other reports include the MACCS Theory Manual, MACCS Verification Report, Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS, as well as documentation for preprocessor codes including SecPop, MelMACCS, and COMIDA2. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT The NUREG does not contain information collection requirements and, therefore, is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 USC 3501, et seq.). PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Contributions to this User Guide were received from NRC and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) project managers, technical experts, and code authors dedicated to the production of a valuable resource for the MACCS user community. Instructions and guidance included herein were developed over many years and include advancements in the code that provide users the ability to develop complex consequence modeling scenarios. WinMACCS and many of the early MACCS developments were due to vision of an earlier Project Manager, Jocelyn Mitchell. Jonathan Barr and AJ Nosek also contributed to the development of this report. The current NRC Project Manager, Salman Haq, provided the leadership to ensure this document was completed. Several other NRC and Sandia staff provided insights supporting development of the MACCS code and of this document.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗