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NASA NTRS2001

Facility Concepts for Mars Returned Sample Handling

Samples returned from Mars must be held in quarantine until their biological safety has been determined. A significant challenge, unique to NASA's needs, is how to contain the samples (to protect the blaspheme) while simultaneously protecting their pristine nature. This paper presents a comparative analysis of several quarantine facility concepts for handling and analyzing these samples. The considerations in this design analysis include: modes of manipulation; capability for destructive as well as non-destructive testing; avoidance of cross-contamination; linear versus recursive processing; and sample storage and retrieval within a closed system. The ability to rigorously contain biologically hazardous materials has been amply demonstrated by facilities that meet the specifications of the Center for Disease Control Biosafety Level 4. The newly defined Planetary Protection Level Alpha must provide comparable containment while assuring that the samples remain pristine; the latter requirement is based on the need to avoid compromising science analyses by instrumentation of the highest possible sensitivity (among other things this will assure that there is no false positive detection of organisms or organic molecules - a situation that would delay or prevent the release of the samples from quarantine). Protection of the samples against contamination by terrestrial organisms and organic molecules makes a considerable impact upon the sample handling facility. The use of glove boxes appears to be impractical because of their tendency to leak and to surges. As a result, a returned sample quarantine facility must consider the use of automation and remote manipulation to carry out the various functions of sample handling and transfer within the system. The problem of maintaining sensitive and bulky instrumentation under the constraints of simultaneous sample containment and contamination protection also places demands on the architectural configuration of the facility that houses it.

Cohen, Marc M.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Cleanroom Robotics: Appropriate Technology for a Sample Receiving Facility?

NASA is currently pursuing a vigorous program that will collect samples from a variety of solar system environments. The Mars Exploration Program is expected to launch spacecraft that are designed to collect samples of martian soil, rocks, and atmosphere and return them to Earth, perhaps as early as 2016. International treaty obligations mandate that NASA conduct such a program in a manner that avoids cross-contamination both Earth and Mars. Because of this requirement, Mars sample curation will require a high degree biosafety, combined with extremely low levels inorganic, organic, and biological contamination.

Bell, M. S.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Persistent Seroconversion after Accidental Eye Exposure to Calcifying Nanoparticles

Biosafety of nanomaterials has attracted much attention recently. We report here a case where accidental human eye exposure to biogenic nanosized calcium phosphate in the form of calcifying nanoparticles (CNP) raised a strong IgG immune response against proteins carried by CNP. The antibody titer has persisted over ten years at the high level. The IgG was detected by ELISA using CNPs propagated in media containing bovine and human serum as antigen. The exposure incident occurred to a woman scientist (WS) at a research laboratory in Finland at 1993. CNP, also termed "nanobacteria", is a unique self-replicating agent that has not been fully characterized and no data on biohazards were available at that time. Before the accident, her serum samples were negative for both CNP antigen and anti-CNP antibody using specific ELISA tests (Nanobac Oy, Kuopio, Finland). The accident occurred while WS was harvesting CNP cultures. Due to a high pressure in pipetting, CNP pellet splashed into her right eye. Both eyes were immediately washed with water and saline. The following days there was irritation and redness in the right eye. These symptoms disappeared within two weeks without any treatment. Three months after the accident, blood and urine samples of WS were tested for CNP cultures (2), CNP-specific ELISA tests, and blood cell counts. Blood cell counts were normal, CNP antigen and culture tests were negative. A high IgG anti-CNP antibody titer was detected (see Figure). The antibodies of this person have been used thereafter as positive control and standard in ELISA manufacturing (Nano-Sero IgG ELISA, Nanobac Oy, Kuopio, Finland).

Ciftcioglu, Neva↗

NASA NTRS2002

Technology Development and Advanced Planning for Curation of Returned Mars Samples

NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) curates extraterrestrial samples, providing the international science community with lunar rock and soil returned by the Apollo astronauts, meteorites collected in Antarctica, cosmic dust collected in the stratosphere, and hardware exposed to the space environment. Curation comprises initial characterization of new samples, preparation and allocation of samples for research, and clean, secure long-term storage. The foundations of this effort are the specialized cleanrooms (class 10 to 10,000) for each of the four types of materials, the supporting facilities, and the people, many of whom have been doing detailed work in clean environments for decades. JSC is also preparing to curate the next generation of extraterrestrial samples. These include samples collected from the solar wind, a comet, and an asteroid. Early planning and R\&D are underway to support post-mission sample handling and curation of samples returned from Mars. One of the strong scientific reasons for returning samples from Mars is to search for evidence of current or past life in the samples. Because of the remote possibility that the samples may contain life forms that are hazardous to the terrestrial biosphere, the National Research Council has recommended that all samples returned from Mars be kept under strict biological containment until tests show that they can safely be released to other laboratories. It is possible that Mars samples may contain only scarce or subtle traces of life or prebiotic chemistry that could readily be overwhelmed by terrestrial contamination . Thus, the facilities used to contain, process, and analyze samples from Mars must have a combination of high-level biocontainment and organic / inorganic chemical cleanliness that is unprecedented. JSC has been conducting feasibility studies and developing designs for a sample receiving facility that would offer biocontainment at least the equivalent of current maximum containment BSL-4 (BioSafety Level 4) laboratories, while simultaneously maintaining cleanliness levels equaling those of state-of-the-art cleanrooms. Unique requirements for the processing of Mars samples have inspired a program to develop handling techniques that are much more precise and reliable than the approach (currently used for lunar samples) of employing gloved human hands in nitrogen-filled gloveboxes. Individual samples from Mars are expected to be much smaller than lunar samples, the total mass of samples returned by each mission being 0.5- 1 kg, compared with many tens of kg of lunar samples returned by each of the six Apollo missions. Smaller samples require much more of the processing to be done under microscopic observation. In addition, the requirements for cleanliness and high-level containment would be difficult to satisfy while using traditional gloveboxes. JSC has constructed a laboratory to test concepts and technologies important to future sample curation. The Advanced Curation Laboratory includes a new-generation glovebox equipped with a robotic arm to evaluate the usability of robotic and teleoperated systems to perform curatorial tasks. The laboratory also contains equipment for precision cleaning and the measurement of trace organic contamination.

Lindstrom, David J.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Mobile/Modular BSL-4 Facilities for Meeting Restricted Earth Return Containment Requirements

NASA robotic sample return missions designated Category V Restricted Earth Return by the NASA Planetary Protection Office require sample containment and biohazard testing in a receiving laboratory as directed by NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8020.12D - ensuring the preservation and protection of Earth and the sample. Currently, NPR 8020.12D classifies Restricted Earth Return for robotic sample return missions from Mars, Europa, and Enceladus with the caveat that future proposed mission locations could be added or restrictions lifted on a case by case basis as scientific knowledge and understanding of biohazards progresses. Since the 1960s, sample containment from an unknown extraterrestrial biohazard have been related to the highest containment standards and protocols known to modern science. Today, Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 standards and protocols are used to study the most dangerous high-risk diseases and unknown biological agents on Earth. Over 30 BSL-4 facilities have been constructed worldwide with 12 residing in the United States; of theses, 8 are operational. In the last two decades, these brick and mortar facilities have cost in the hundreds of millions of dollars dependent on the facility requirements and size. Previous mission concept studies for constructing a NASA sample receiving facility with an integrated BSL-4 quarantine and biohazard testing facility have also been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars. As an alternative option, we have recently conducted an initial trade study for constructing a mobile and/or modular sample containment laboratory that would meet all BSL-4 and planetary protection standards and protocols at a faction of the cost. Mobile and modular BSL-2 and 3 facilities have been successfully constructed and deployed world-wide for government testing of pathogens and pharmaceutical production. Our study showed that a modular BSL-4 construction could result in approximately 90% cost reduction when compared to traditional construction methods without compromising the preservation of the sample or Earth.

Calaway, M. J.↗

NASA NTRS2020

Advanced Curation of Astromaterials for Planetary Science Over the Next Decade

Advanced curation is a cross-disciplinary field of research and development aiming to improve curation and sample acquisition practices in existing astromaterials collections and to enable future sample return activities.The primary result of advanced curation is to both reduce and quantify contamination to astromaterials and preserve the scientific integrity of all samples from mission inception to scientific analysis. Over the next decade, NASA should support advanced curation research and monitoring efforts as they pertain to improving our current collections and preparing for samples from current and future astromaterials acquisition activities.We highlight here five advanced curation activities of critical importance for the success of sample science supported by NASA over the coming decade, including: 1) supporting efforts to build contamination knowledge collections as part of sample return missions, which requires curation involvement from the earliest stages of sample return mission planning;2) supporting Earth-based astromaterials collection campaigns of meteorites and cosmic dust as they represent relatively inexpensive sample acquisition activities that continue to grow NASA’s astromaterials collections and enable new discoveries;3) preparing to curate and process samples under “cold” conditions to enable return of samples from volatile-rich Solar System targets like permanently shadowed regions on the lunar surface orcomets;4) determining how best to combine clean room technology and biosafety technology into one infrastructure to support curation of samples from bodies designated as Category V:Restricted Earth Return; and 5) supporting real-time monitoring and testing of curation labs to verify that sample processing environments remain clean from the standpoint of inorganic, organic, and biological contamination

Francis M. McCubbin↗

NASA NTRS2020

Guidelines for Assessing the Toxic Hazard of Spacecraft Chemicals and Test Materials

This document describes the criteria and procedural guidelines used by the NASA/JSC Toxicology Office (JSCSTO), to perform toxicological evaluations. The JSCSTO is responsible for conducting toxicological assessments and assigning toxic hazard levels (THLs) for essentially all chemicals and test materials to be used in or transported to the habitable areas of U.S. spacecraft, non‐U.S. spacecraft inhabitaed by U.S. crew members or habitable areas of off‐Earth habitats where U.S. crew members would be present, including chemicals carried by visiting spacecraft(visiting vehicles) to and from the International Space Station (ISS). Biohazard assessments for biological materials used in payload experiments are performed by the NASA Biosafety Review Board. Radioactive materials are assessed by the Space Radiation Analysis Group for radiation hazards; the flammability rating on flammable materials is assessed by the JSC Materials and Processes Branch, ES4. This document will focus on the assessment of chemically‐induced toxicity hazards. The toxicological assessments, together with assessments on radioactive, biological, physical, and flammability hazards, are incorporated into a mission‐specific Hazardous Materials Summary Table (HMST).

Valerie Elizabeth Ryder↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Microbial Monitoring of New Cleanrooms Used to Curate Astrobiologically Relevant Asteroid Samples from Bennu and Ryugu

Introduction: NASA has constructed two new cleanrooms to house materials from the OSRIS-REx and Hayabusa2 missions to the asteroids Ryugu (162173) and Bennu (101955), respectively. In accordance with standard astromaterials curation practices, these cleanrooms will be monitored for particulate contamination and maintained to ISO 5 equivalent standards1. Since the samples in these collections are expected to contain prebiotic organic compounds that may help explain the origin of life on Earth, these labs will also be monitored for organic and biological contamination2. Samples from Ryugu arrived on Earth in December, 2020. After basic characterization in Japan, NASA received a subset of these samples at the astromaterials curation facility in Houston in December of 2021. OSIRIS-REx is expected to return samples in September, 2023. Here we present preliminary microbial monitoring results from monthly monitoring of these new labs and the connected microtomy and staging areas that support them, as they are being commissioned. We also compare these results to baseline values for other astromaterials curation labs. We will also briefly describe additional cleaning efforts employed to reduce the bioburden in these new cleanrooms. Methods: Microbial samples were collected from surfaces using a dry macrofoam swab (Puritan Brand 2518051PFRNDFD). Swabs were also opened in the lab but not touched to any surfaces to function as negative controls. Samples and controls were processed inside a class II biosafety cabinet to avoid inadvertent cross contamination. The swabs were suspended in 15 ml of PBS (Phosphate Buffered Saline) and vortexed for 20 seconds to remove cells from the swab surface. The PBS was used to inoculate Petri dishes filled with TSA (Tryptic Soy Agar), Blood Agar, or Reasoners 2 agar to check for microbial growth. Each plate was inoculated with 0.1 ml of PBS. The TSA and blood agar plates were incubated at 35˚C and the Reasoners 2 agar plates were incubated at 25˚C for seven days. Petri dishes filled with Potato dextrose agar, Saboraud dextrose agar, or Saboraud dextrose agar with 0.1 mg/ml of chloramphenicol, an antibiotic, were used to check for fungal growth. These plates were inoculated with 0.3 ml of PBS and incubated at 30˚C. The remaining PBS was frozen at -80 ˚C for DNA sequencing. After incubation, isolates were counted and reisolated for identification. Isolates were identified using the VITEK23 system or by sequencing a portion of the 16S rRNA gene for bacteria or the ribosomal internal transcribed spacer (ITS) for fungi. Sequencing was performed with an ABI 3500 Sanger sequencer. Results: During our initial sampling, six of the seven sites sampled (86%) displayed bacterial or fungal growth. Samples collected from the staging areas and microtomy labs are not included in this calculation since those areas are maintained at a lower ISO 7 equivalent cleanliness standard. A month later, only three of the seven sites (43%) displayed bacterial growth. No fungal growth was detected in the second sampling. Since new equipment had been introduced to the Hayabusa2 lab since the first round of sampling, an additional three sampling sites were included in the second round of sampling. None of these sites displayed microbial growth. These sites will be included in all future sampling efforts. Bacterial isolates have been identified from the following genera at multiple time points: Micrococcus, Staphylococcus, and Bacillus. Isolates from the genera: Microbacterium, Nocardioides, Methylocystis, and Microvirga were identified in the initial sampling, but were not present at later time points. Identification of fungal isolates is in progress. Results are summarized in Table 1. Discussion: The recovery rate or percentage of positive samples4 was initially 86%, which is higher than the median recovery rate for comparable ISO 5 equivalent curation labs like Stardust (33%), Hayabusa (33%), and Cosmic Dust (50%). However, after a month of operation, the recovery rate for these same sites decreased to 43%, which is similar to what we observe in comparable curation cleanrooms with no microbial control requirements. Adding in the new sampling sites further decreases the recovery rate to 30%. With the reduction in recovery rate, we also observed a decrease in microbial diversity. At the first time point, we observed at least 10 different bacterial species and at least two different fungi. This is a higher diversity than the median values for comparable ISO 5 equivalent labs (2-4 isolates per sampling event). After the second sampling, we observed at least 4 bacterial species and no fungi, which is more consistent with comparable labs. We expect the recovery rate and diversity in both labs to continue to decrease as routine operation continues. We will use ultrapure hydrogen peroxide to disinfect equipment and work areas prior to opening any sample containers. Most of the bacterial and fungal isolates were detected on samples from the cleanroom floors. This is consistent with baseline results from other curation labs. Organisms from the genera Bacillus, Staphylococcus, and Micrococcus that were repeatedly detected are common in cleanrooms and on human skin5,6. These organisms are generally thought to be introduced when people enter the cleanroom. Microbacterium, Nocardioides, and Microvirga have also previously been identified in astromaterials cleanrooms, but not as frequently as Bacillus, Staphylococcus, and Micrococcus. Methylocystis is a novel genus in the astromaterials cleanrooms, but it was identified with low accuracy (93% match in the sequenced region of the 16S rRNA gene) and further work is needed to confirm this identification. Microbacterium is a diverse genus with isolates identified from terrestrial and aquatic sediments. Some species of Microbacterium are capable of degrading complex organic compounds found in crude oil. The presence of these bacteria in the OSIRIS REx and Hayabusa2 cleanrooms should be closely monitored. Methylocystis is a genus of methanotrophic bacteria capable of oxidizing methane. If this identification proves to be correct and it is detected again, it should be closely monitored as well. Under nominal operating conditions, samples should not ever encounter the cleanroom floor or other high traffic areas. If we observe an increase in the bioburden in sensitive work areas that appears to be influenced by organism transfer from high traffic areas like the floors, we can employ additional hydrogen peroxide treatments to disinfect high traffic areas. Routine microbial monitoring of these labs will ensure that NASA’s astromaterials collections remain pristine and useful for scientific study. Table 1. Sampling Locations and Colony Counts Bacterial CFUa Fungal CFU Bacterial CFU Fungal CFU Lab - Location 11/2/2021 11/2/2021 12/13/2021 12/13/2021 H2b-Floor 4 8 1 0 H2-staging pass through 3 0 0 0 H2-microtomy pass through TNTCc 0 0 0 H2 Microscope 1 NA NA 0 0 H2 Microscope 2 NA NA 0 0 H2-Table NA NA 0 0 OREXd- microtomy pass through 0 0 6 0 OREX – Anteroom pass through 0 0 0 0 OREX – Floor 1 2 0 0 OREX Witness Foil Table 3 0 1 0 Staging-Floor 16 0 15 0 Microtomy-Floor 3 0 2 0 a: CFU = Colony Forming Unit b: H2 = Hayabusa2 Lab c: TNTC = too numerous to count d: OREX = OSIRIS-REx Lab References: 1. ISO 14644-1:2015 - Cleanrooms and associated controlled environments -- Part 1: Classification of air cleanliness by particle concentration. 37 (2015). 2. McCubbin, F. M. et al. Space Sci Rev 215, (2019). 3. Pincus, D. H. Encyclopedia of Rapid Microbiological Methods (2005). 4. The United States Pharmacopeial Convention. USP General Chapter <1116> 17, 784–794 (2013). 5. Sheraba, N. S., Yassin, A. S. & Amin, M. BMC Research Notes 3, 278 (2010). 6. Utescher, C. L. de A., Franzolin, M. R., Trabulsi, L. R. & Gambale, V. Brazilian Journal of Microbiology 38, 710–716 (2007).

A B Regberg↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Mars Sample Return (MSR) Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) Assessment Study (MSAS)

The Mars Sample Return (MSR) campaign, initiated in 2020 with the launch of the Per-severance Rover, is an international partnership be-tween NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA) to return Martian geological samples to Earth for scientific study in the early 2030s. Not only is MSR the first mission to bring samples back to Earth from an-other planet, it is the first time since Apollo 14to have a mission classified as a Category V: Restricted Earth Return by the NASA Planetary Protection Office due to the possibility that the samples could harbor extra-terrestrial life. As a result of this classification, the Sample Receiving Facility (SRF)must not only pro-vide a pristine environment to ensure samples are protected from terrestrial contamination for scientific investigations, it must also provide high-containment (biosafety level 4 [BSL-4]-equivalence)to isolate the samples from Earth’s biosphere until the samples are deemed safe for release and/or sterilized.

Mars Sample Return↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Mars Sample Receiving Facility Research and Development to Enable Preservation, Safe Containment, and Scientific Research of Martian Samples on Earth

NASA and ESA are working together to plan a joint campaign to potentially bring back the first Martian samples to Earth in the early 2030s. On the surface of Mars, the Mars 2020Perseverance Rover is selecting and packaging samples that could be returned to Earth for careful examination by an international team of scientists. In preparation for this historic sample return, advance planning is underway to design and build a Mars Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) in the mid-2020s. In 2022, a Mars Sample Receiving Facility Assessment Study(MSAS) will be conducted to further define construction modality and capability options for a facility in the conterminous United States. Since Mars Sample Return (MSR) is currently categorized as a planetary protection restricted Earth return, this new facility would feature biosafety level 4 (BSL-4)-like high containment to protect Earth’s biosphere from any potential hazard. In addition, the facility also requires integration of cleanroom technologies to mitigate against terrestrial contamination and preserve sample integrity for science investigations. The integration of both clean handling and high containment requires significant technology research and development (R&D) by the mid-2020s to support the definition and planning of a SRF before commencing the site specific design phase. The SRF project will need to solidify the inorganic, organic, and biological contamination control (CC) requirements for the facility. This could entail a translation of Mars 2020 mission CC requirements for geologic material to engineering requirements for surfaces and airborne molecular contamination inside isolators and cleanrooms. In tandem, the project will need to determine precision cleaning and sterilization approaches for cleanrooms, isolators, equipment, and tools. Initial material selections for the facility construction materials, cleanrooms, isolators, and BSL-4 suits/garments are an important activity. The recent construction of the OSIRIS-REx and Hayabusa2 curation cleanroom laboratories greatly benefited from early materials testing, before the design phase, to reduced organic outgassing and particulate shedding inside the laboratory. While the early biohazard investigations in the SRF may deem the samples safe to release to laboratories throughout the world, sterilization methods need to be defined to safely release Martian samples. One key aspect of enabling simultaneous sample containment and cleanliness is the concept of a Double-Walled Isolator (DWI) that ESA has been pursuing. Further R&D is needed about DWIs, sample handling, and instrumentation interfaces before beginning the SRF site specific design phase. A working isolator/DWI engineering model should be developed and fabricated. Isolator sizes, connections, pass-through antechambers, and configurations and basic interfaces with instruments and tools as well as the use of robotic, mechanical, and/or human manipulation need to be considered. Inert high purity gas supply (one-pass or recirculation) and other isolator utilities must be determined. Special accommodations for large instruments (e.g., XCT,SEM, etc.) need to be developed. Techniques for opening the sample tubes packaged by M2020and extracting the headspace gas while keeping samples pristine will be challenging, requiring additional R&D, and engagement of the M2020 project. In addition, careful micromanipulation for subdivision and packaging of samples will also need to be included. These combined R&D activities are important before commencing the SRF design phase to ensure safe biohazard containment, sample preservation, and science integrity for the samples that would be studied in the SRF and in laboratories around the world.

mars sample return↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Mars Sample Return (MSR) Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) Assessment Study (MSAS)

NASA, in partnership with the European Space Agency (ESA), is seeking to return Martian geological and atmospheric samples to Earth for scientific study in the early 2030s. Due to the possibility that the samples could contain extraterrestrial life, Mars Sample Return (MSR) is classified as a Category V: Restricted Earth Return mission by the NASA Planetary Protection Office. As a result of this classification, a MSR Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) must not only provide a pristine environment to ensure samples are protected from terrestrial contamination for scientific investigations, it must also provide high-containment (biosafety level 4 [BSL-4]-equivalence) to isolate the samples from Earth’s biosphere until the samples are deemed safe for release and/or sterilized. The nominal utilization period for a SRF is anticipated to be 2-5 years and is intended to enable curation activities, biohazard assessment, select early science activities, and the rapid release of samples to the scientific community. However, to account for possible delays in schedule or the identification of extant life, this anticipated period of time must be flexible to accommodate schedule extensions and contingency plans. Due to requirements for high-level biological containment and cleanliness, a traditional receiving/curation facility cannot be utilized for MSR. Therefore, beginning in 2022, NASA Johnson Space Center is performing a MSR SRF Assessment Study (MSAS) to investigate the most optimal facility modality for a MSR SRF, as well as start to define programmatic early estimate of costs and schedules before the initial design phase begins. NASA is partnering with industry contractors (architectural and engineering firms with BSL-4 and cleanroom technology experience, as well as other contracted infrastructure and construction specialists) along with selected experts from NASA, ESA, existing U.S. BSL-4 facilities, and other U.S. government agencies, to carry out the assessment study. The MSAS should also aid in the future refinement of the science requirements (e.g., contamination control, equipment accommodations) before site-specific design would commence. As part of the MSAS, NASA is planning to assess an array of possibilities for a MSR SRF. One of the main considerations is the facility modality and whether an existing BSL-4 facility can be utilized (for some or all functions); or, if new constructure would be required, would a traditional fixed facility or a modular facility the best choice. MSAS will also investigate the ability of the modalities to accommodate two different facility capability endmembers: 1) a minimal facility focusing on biohazard assessment and curation tasks with a small footprint, and 2) an enhanced facility with additional capabilities to enable expedited processing and the completion of time-sensitive and (some) sterilization-sensitive science. The assessment is intended to generate information that will inform the selection of facility modalities for high-level conceptual design development. While the assessment study will focus on SRF requirements for accommodating curation, science, and sample safety assessment infrastructure, it will also consider an array of other factors, such as ease of access for international users, decommissioning, repurposing, future sale or lease following MSR’s use of the facility, and uncontained preparatory laboratory spaces. Upon completion of the study, the preferred modality and refined requirements would be utilized for site-specific design but will not be finalized until NASA’s completion of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process.

A.D. Harrington↗

NASA NTRS2018

Detection of Antimicrobial Resistance Genes Associated With the International Space Station Environmental Surfaces

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a global health issue. In an effort to minimize this threat to astronauts, who may be immunocompromised and thus at a greater risk of infection from antimicrobial resistant pathogens, a comprehensive study of the ISS “resistome’ was conducted. Using whole genome sequencing (WGS) and disc diffusion antibiotic resistance assays, 9 biosafety level 2 organisms isolated from the ISS were assessed for their antibiotic resistance. Molecular analysis of AMR genes from 24 surface samples collected from the ISS during 3 different sampling events over a span of a year were analyzed with Ion AmpliSeq™ and metagenomics. Disc diffusion assays showed that Enterobacter bugandensis strains were resistant to all 9 antibiotics tested and Staphylococcus haemolyticus being resistant to none. Ion AmpliSeq™ revealed that 123 AMR genes were found, with those responsible for beta-lactam and trimethoprim resistance being the most abundant and widespread. Using a variety of methods, the genes involved in antimicrobial resistance have been examined for the first time from the ISS. This information could lead to mitigation strategies to maintain astronaut health during long duration space missions when return to Earth for treatment is not possible.

Antimicrobial resistance↗

NASA NTRS2024

ISS External Microorganisms: A Planetary Protection Experiment to Inform Requirements for Crewed Missions to Mars

We have developed, tested, and flown a caddy capable of collecting aseptic samples from external surfaces of the ISS (International Space Station). The sampling caddy is certified for use during US EVA (extra vehicular activity) and was launched to ISS in the summer of 2023. We are scheduled to collect samples from 6 locations outside ISS during an EVA in May of 2024. We will freeze these samples at -80°C on orbit and return them to Earth. We will then extract and sequence any DNA collected during the EVA using next generation sequencing technologies to characterize the community composition and function of each sample. Measuring the type and quantity of microbes present on the exterior of ISS will allow us to address knowledge gap 2B, “Acceptable levels of microbial/organic releases from humans and support systems” described in a 2019 COSPAR report. Collecting data about microbial release from current crewed vehicles will inform requirements for acceptable leak rates for future crewed missions to Mars. The sampling kit consists of eight commercially available, sterile, DNA free, macrofoam swabs ( 23 mm. diameter ) installed in custom aluminum end effectors. Each end effector is housed in and individual aluminum canister. Each canister contains a 0.2 μm Teflon filter to allow the interior volume to accommodate pressure changes without permitting microbial contaminants to enter the sterile interior volume. A handle repurposed from the space shuttle tile repair kit is used to remove the end effector from the sample canister, collect a sample by swabbing a surface and then replace the end effector in its canister. The canisters and end effectors were cleaned and assembled on Earth. Prior to installing the sterile swab the canisters and end effectors were sterilized in an autoclave at 134°C, 215 kPA, for 7 min.. The final assembly occurred in a sterilized class II biosafety cabinet. We will collect six samples from the 1) airlock vestibule, 2) airlock thermal cover, 3) a gap in the micrometeorite shielding near the airlock, 4) a handrail near the airlock, 5) the CDRA (Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly) vent, and 6) the VES (Vacuum Exhaust System) vent. The remaining two swabs will be reserved as controls. One swab will be exposed during the EVA without touching any surfaces to act as a blank. The final swab will remain sealed until the entire sampling kit is returned to earth. Based on previously published results from the Russian segment, we hypothesize that there will be detectable microbes at some or all of these locations. Ground-based testing of this sampling caddy confirms that the swabs remain sterile as the canisters transition in and out of vacuum. We were able to retrieve, viable bacterial and fungal cells as well as DNA from samples collected from US space suits during vacuum chamber tests lasting as long as seven hours. Based on these results and feedback from the test subjects the sampling caddy was modified to improve ergonomics and meet US EVA safety requirements. Bayonet probes were added to the sides of the sample kit as alternate mounting points. Additional locking features were added to the end effector and the filter stack to prevent inadvertent release during use. The opening mechanism was changed from one where the end effector was rocked laterally to defeat a ball detent to a twist-to-open threaded closure for similar reasons. Demonstrating, this sampling caddy’s effectiveness during a US EVA will allow us to address knowledge gaps identified in COSPAR reports and begin to define planetary protection requirements for life support systems on crewed missions to mars. This kit could also be used to collect contamination control samples during Artemis missions to verify requirements and could be easily modified for robotic sample collection.

Planetary Protection↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

ISS External Microorganisms: Collecting Planetary Protection Samples During Extravehicular Activity

Planetary Protection↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Cleanroom Microbes Survive Drying, Vacuum, and Proton Irradiation

Introduction : The goal of planetary protection at NASA is to mitigate the risk of contaminating sensitive target bodies with biological life. While many cleaning procedures have been put in place to reduce bioburden on spacecraft, microbes are experts at evolving to survive harsh conditions. Specifically, the dry, low-nutrient environment of a cleanroom (commonly used for assembly of spacecraft) can represent an environment where extremophiles can survive. Methods : Scientists at NASA MSFC wished to gather a snapshot of the microbial population within a variety of cleanrooms on site. A study was undertaken to collect air, surface, and floor samples from clean-rooms and isolate unique morphologies. From this study, 95 isolates were collected and saved in a microbial library. About 86% of these were identified at least to a genus level. Following identification, 24 microbes were selected, based on a literature review, as potential extremophiles. These were grown in liquid cultures, diluted to a set optical density, washed with water, and then applied to a sterilized Kapton coupon. Droplets were allowed to dry overnight in a biosafety cabinet. Coupons were then installed in a pelletron and pumped down to high vacuum (~1E-6 Torr). Samples were then subjected 100 keV protons at a fluence of 2x10 15 p+/cm 2 up to 4x10 15 p+/cm 2 . Following exposure, samples were returned to the microbiology lab where they were pro-cessed by submerging in water, vortexing, and then plating either droplets or spread plates. Recovery data collected was qualitative with a ranking or +, minor, or – for growth. Some selected radiotolerant strains were sequenced using the Illumina sequencing platform. The resulting genomes were annotated with the Rapid Annotations using Subsystems Technology (RAST) server and analyzed for conserved and unique stress response relevant genomic signatures to identify clues related to specific tolerances. Results and Discussion : After five rounds of proton radiation, we narrowed our isolates to five, non-spore forming bacteria that demonstrated survival: Arthrobacter koreensis, Paenarthrobacter nitroguajacolicus, Mycetocola manganoxydans , and an Erwinia sp. Furthermore, we exposed these four microbes to 254 nm wavelength light at an intensity of 80 W/m 2 at a distance of ~18 cm for 10 minutes. Only A. koreensis demonstrated survival following UV exposure. Finally, we performed whole genome sequencing on the four strains to look for genetic markers of stress resistance. When we compared the genomes of the four strains, we found that genes coding for GGDEF and EAL domains with PAS/PAC sensors were only found in A. koreensis . These domains, modulated by PAS/PAC sensors, are hypothesized to facilitate survival under drying, desiccation, and proton irradiation. Drying and Desiccation : PAS domains sense hydration changes and modulate GGDEF and EAL domain activity to adjust c-di-GMP levels, enhancing resistance to desiccation. For instance, in Pseudomonas aeruginosa , the PAS domain of RbdA modulates activity under varying hydration conditions, affecting stress responses [1]. Proton Irradiation : Proton irradiation causes oxidative stress, leading to ROS generation. PAS domains detect this stress and modulate GGDEF and EAL domains to manage oxidative stress responses. In Shewanella , EAL domain proteins modulated by PAS sensors help bacteria adapt to extreme conditions [2]. These genes upregulate other stress response genes, protecting membrane function, protein stability, DNA repair, and antioxidant defenses. The modulation of c-di-GMP by PAS domains is crucial for bacterial adaptation to stress conditions, enabling dynamic physio-logical adjustments [3]. Understanding these mechanisms provides insights into bacterial stress responses and strategies for controlling bacterial growth [4]. Conclusions : These findings indicate that clean-rooms harbor extremophile microbes that may be able to survive conditions in deep space. Furthermore, while we identified certain stress-response genes that may be at least partly responsible for the phenotypes observed in this study, there are likely unidentified genes or characteristics about A. koreensis , and other bacteria, that may allow them to survive in harsh environments. Future studies will focus on identifying these unknown genes and characteristics, further elucidating the mechanisms of extremophile survival and potentially informing the development of new biotechnologies for space exploration and other extreme environments.

Chelsi Cassilly↗

DOE OSTI2026

Beyond sequence similarity: toward function-based screening of nucleic acid synthesis

Synthetic nucleic acids are a key input to modern biotechnology, yet they represent dual-use materials that require robust screening to mitigate biosecurity risks. The prevailing screening paradigm, which identifies sequences of concern (SoCs) through sequence similarity to controlled pathogens and toxins, may not fully capture risks posed by AI tools that can decouple biomolecular function from reliance on known sequences. Rapidly advancing biodesign capabilities enable the generation of genes and proteins that might evade sequence-based detection. We highlight the critical need for function-based screening approaches that can detect sequences capable of hazardous biological functions, regardless of similarity to known SoCs. We examine the feasibility of function-based screening with an initial focus on proteins, arguing that, while protein sequence space is vast, biologically functional proteins are significantly constrained by biophysical and biochemical requirements that can be learned and modeled. We propose a concrete implementation framework organized along a continuum of complexity, starting with toxins as the most tractable targets before expanding to more complex pathogenic functions. We then discuss open challenges and describe a research and development strategy to address them.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

The Promise of Emergent Nanobiotechnologies for In Vivo Applications and Implications for Safety and Security

Nanotechnology, the multi-disciplinary field based on the exploitation of the unique physicochemical properties of nanoparticles (NPs) and nanoscale materials, has opened a new realm of possibilities for biological research and biomedical applications. The development and deployment of mRNA-NP vaccines for COVID-19, for example, may revolutionize vaccines and therapeutics. However, regulatory and ethical frameworks that protect the health and safety of the global community and environment are lagging, particularly for nanotechnology geared towards biological applications (i.e., bio-nanotechnology). Considering this, the following review, while not comprehensive, attempts to illustrate the breadth and promise of bionanotechnology developments, and how they may present future safety and security challenges. Specifically, we address current advancements to streamline the development of engineered NPs for in vivo applications and provide discussion on nano-bio interactions, NP in vivo delivery, nano-enhancement of human performance, nanomedicine, and the impacts of NPs on human health and the environment.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗