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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2008

Actions Needed to Ensure Scientific and Technical Information is Adequately Reviewed at Goddard Space Flight Center, Johnson Space Center, Langley Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center

This audit was initiated in response to a hotline complaint regarding the review, approval, and release of scientific and technical information (STI) at Johnson Space Center. The complainant alleged that Johnson personnel conducting export control reviews of STI were not fully qualified to conduct those reviews and that the reviews often did not occur until after the STI had been publicly released. NASA guidance requires that STI, defined as the results of basic and applied scientific, technical, and related engineering research and development, undergo certain reviews prior to being released outside of NASA or to audiences that include foreign nationals. The process includes technical, national security, export control, copyright, and trade secret (e.g., proprietary data) reviews. The review process was designed to preclude the inappropriate dissemination of sensitive information while ensuring that NASA complies with a requirement of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (the Space Act)1 to provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information resulting from NASA research activities. We focused our audit on evaluating the STI review process: specifically, determining whether the roles and responsibilities for the review, approval, and release of STI were adequately defined and documented in NASA and Center-level guidance and whether that guidance was effectively implemented at Goddard Space Flight Center, Johnson Space Center, Langley Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center. Johnson was included in the review because it was the source of the initial complaint, and Goddard, Langley, and Marshall were included because those Centers consistently produce significant amounts of STI.

Information management↗
NASA NTRS2007

Electrostatic Evaluation of the SRB Velostat(Trademark) Pads

During RSRM Grain inspection, pads constructed of Velostat are grounded and installed in the RSRM bore enabling inspectors to move throughout the bore during the inspection. Velostat pads are installed by grounding the first pad installed and subsequent pads are installed overlapping the previously installed pad maintaining a conductive path to facility ground. Pads are removed upon completion of the inspection in a reverse fashion. As the pads are removed scanning of propellant surfaces is performed per OMRS. During PPICI Audit of B5308.006 (Forward Segment Grain Inspection) in October 07 one audit finding noted that electrostatic scanning of propellant surfaces was being performed during removal of conductive pads following grain inspection. ATK does not perform electrostatic scanning of propellant surfaces during pad removal following final inspection at the plant. The integrated team consisting of NASA SE, USA SE, USA QE, ATK LSS, ATK Systems Safety and ATK DE concurred that electrostatic scanning of propellant surfaces was unnecessary as the conductive pads are grounded. Additional time spent in bore performing scanning presents itself as additional risk. Technicians reported that they have never seen any voltage readings while scanning propellant surfaces during pad removal. USA Systems engineering has written KB 17530 in response to the finding which will delete the requirement (item 2 B47GEN.ll0) to scan propellant surfaces during pad removal. As a result of an E3 panel discussion on December 13, 2007, it was decided that verification of the electrical grounding of the Velostat pads be verified.

Buhler, Charles R.↗
NASA NTRS2011

GSFC Supplier Surveillance

Topics covered include: Develop Program/Project Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans The work activities performed by the developer and/or his suppliers are subject to evaluation and audit by government-designated representatives. CSO supports project by selecting on-site supplier representative s by one of several methods: (1) a Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) person via a Letter Of Delegation (LOD), (2) an independent assurance contractor (IAC) via a contract Audits, Assessments, and Assurance (A3) Contract Code 300 Mission Assurance Support Contract (MASC)

Kelly, Michael P.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Rapid Diagnostics of Onboard Sequences

Keeping track of sequences onboard a spacecraft is challenging. When reviewing Event Verification Records (EVRs) of sequence executions on the Mars Exploration Rover (MER), operators often found themselves wondering which version of a named sequence the EVR corresponded to. The lack of this information drastically impacts the operators diagnostic capabilities as well as their situational awareness with respect to the commands the spacecraft has executed, since the EVRs do not provide argument values or explanatory comments. Having this information immediately available can be instrumental in diagnosing critical events and can significantly enhance the overall safety of the spacecraft. This software provides auditing capability that can eliminate that uncertainty while diagnosing critical conditions. Furthermore, the Restful interface provides a simple way for sequencing tools to automatically retrieve binary compiled sequence SCMFs (Space Command Message Files) on demand. It also enables developers to change the underlying database, while maintaining the same interface to the existing applications. The logging capabilities are also beneficial to operators when they are trying to recall how they solved a similar problem many days ago: this software enables automatic recovery of SCMF and RML (Robot Markup Language) sequence files directly from the command EVRs, eliminating the need for people to find and validate the corresponding sequences. To address the lack of auditing capability for sequences onboard a spacecraft during earlier missions, extensive logging support was added on the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) sequencing server. This server is responsible for generating all MSL binary SCMFs from RML input sequences. The sequencing server logs every SCMF it generates into a MySQL database, as well as the high-level RML file and dictionary name inputs used to create the SCMF. The SCMF is then indexed by a hash value that is automatically included in all command EVRs by the onboard flight software. Second, both the binary SCMF result and the RML input file can be retrieved simply by specifying the hash to a Restful web interface. This interface enables command line tools as well as large sophisticated programs to download the SCMF and RMLs on-demand from the database, enabling a vast array of tools to be built on top of it. One such command line tool can retrieve and display RML files, or annotate a list of EVRs by interleaving them with the original sequence commands. This software has been integrated with the MSL sequencing pipeline where it will serve sequences useful in diagnostics, debugging, and situational awareness throughout the mission.

Starbird, Thomas W.↗
NASA NTRS2012

NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program

Recent Findings from Audits, New Technology Data Reviews a) Disabled Chip Burn-ins A recent audit for a QML device discovered that the chip was disabled during the static burn-in, thus it was not drawing any current. Recommendation: For new SMDs add a statement within the burn-in paragraphs stating that the parts shall be kept in their enabled state during the burn-in. b) Class Q 160-hr/125oC Burn-in This is being interpreted as a static burn-in (even for CMOS technology). Recommendation: Provide clarification in MIL-STD-883, Test Method 5004. c) At Frequency (Dynamic) Burn-ins Test equipment limitation is being cited for not doing burn-ins at the application frequency. Recommendation: The burn-in task group to discuss and provide guidance. When the SMD says that the part can be used at 200 MHz, then doing burn-in at 6 MHz (cited as burn-in equipment limitation frequency) is not going to be meaningful! d) Two Static Burn-ins Some manufacturers are doing electrical testing between the two static burn-ins, whereas others do electricals after completing both static burn-ins. Recommendation: Provide clarification in MIL-STD-883, Test Method 5004. e) Thermal Imaging For a device with hot spots, the thermal resistance, junction-to-case, would be much higher than the guidelines given in MIL-STD-1835. One of the suppliers used thermal imaging to find hot spots on the die. Recommendation: Assign a task group to evaluate the effectiveness of thermal imaging at the product development stage.

Class Y↗
NASA NTRS2008

Business Management System Support Analysis

The purpose of this research project was to develop a searchable database compiled with internal and external audit findings/observations. The data will correspond to the findings and observations from the date of Center-wide implementation of the ISO 9001-2000 standard to the present (2003-2008). It was derived and extracted from several sources and was in multiple formats. Once extracted, categorization of the findings/observations would be possible. The final data was mapped to the ISO 9001-2000 standard with the understanding that it will be displayed graphically. The data will be used to verify trends, associate risks, and establish timelines to identify strengths and weaknesses to determine areas of improvement in the Kennedy Space Center Business Management System Internal Audit Program.

Parikh, Jay↗
NASA NTRS2014

MAVEN Information Security Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance (GRC): Lessons Learned

As the first interplanetary mission managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) had three IT security goals for its ground system: COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION. In a multiorganizational environment in which government, industry and academia work together in support of the ground system and mission operations, information security governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) becomes a challenge as each component of the ground system has and follows its own set of IT security requirements. These requirements are not necessarily the same or even similar to each other's, making the auditing of the ground system security a challenging feat. A combination of standards-based information security management based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF), due diligence by the Mission's leadership, and effective collaboration among all elements of the ground system enabled MAVEN to successfully meet NASA's requirements for IT security, and therefore meet Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) mandate on the Agency. Throughout the implementation of GRC on MAVEN during the early stages of the mission development, the Project faced many challenges some of which have been identified in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to document these challenges, and provide a brief analysis of the lessons MAVEN learned. The historical information documented herein, derived from an internal pre-launch lessons learned analysis, can be used by current and future missions and organizations implementing and auditing GRC.

FISMA↗
NASA NTRS2016

Tailoring NIST Security Controls for the Ground System: Selection and Implementation -- Recommendations for Information System Owners

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) invests millions of dollars in spacecraft and ground system development, and in mission operations in the pursuit of scientific knowledge of the universe. In recent years, NASA sent a probe to Mars to study the Red Planet's upper atmosphere, obtained high resolution images of Pluto, and it is currently preparing to find new exoplanets, rendezvous with an asteroid, and bring a sample of the asteroid back to Earth for analysis. The success of these missions is enabled by mission assurance. In turn, mission assurance is backed by information assurance. The information systems supporting NASA missions must be reliable as well as secure. NASA - like every other U.S. Federal Government agency - is required to manage the security of its information systems according to federal mandates, the most prominent being the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 and the legislative updates that followed it. Like the management of enterprise information technology (IT), federal information security management takes a "one-size fits all" approach for protecting IT systems. While this approach works for most organizations, it does not effectively translate into security of highly specialized systems such as those supporting NASA missions. These systems include command and control (C&C) systems, spacecraft and instrument simulators, and other elements comprising the ground segment. They must be carefully configured, monitored and maintained, sometimes for several years past the missions' initially planned life expectancy, to ensure the ground system is protected and remains operational without any compromise of its confidentiality, integrity and availability. Enterprise policies, processes, procedures and products, if not effectively tailored to meet mission requirements, may not offer the needed security for protecting the information system, and they may even become disruptive to mission operations. Certain protective measures for the general enterprise may not be as efficient within the ground segment. This is what the authors have concluded through observations and analysis of patterns identified from the various security assessments performed on NASA missions such as MAVEN, OSIRIS-REx, New Horizons and TESS, to name a few. The security audits confirmed that the framework for managing information system security developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the federal government, and adopted by NASA, is indeed effective. However, the selection of the technical, operational and management security controls offered by the NIST model - and how they are implemented - does not always fit the nature and the environment where the ground system operates in even though there is no apparent impact on mission success. The authors observed that unfit controls, that is, controls that are not necessarily applicable or sufficiently effective in protecting the mission systems, are often selected to facilitate compliance with security requirements and organizational expectations even if the selected controls offer minimum or non-existent protection. This paper identifies some of the standard security controls that can in fact protect the ground system, and which of them offer little or no benefit at all. It offers multiple scenarios from real security audits in which the controls are not effective without, of course, disclosing any sensitive information about the missions assessed. In addition to selection and implementation of controls, the paper also discusses potential impact of recent legislation such as the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 - aimed at the enterprise - on the ground system, and offers other recommendations to Information System Owners (ISOs).

GOVERNANCE↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Modern Scientific Data Governance Framework

Science has entered the era of Big Data with new challenges related to data governance, stewardship, and management. The existing data governance practices must catch up to ensure proper data management. Existing data governance policies and stewardship best practices tend to be disconnected from operational data management practices and enforcement and mainly exist in well-meaning documents or reports. These governance policies are, at best, partially implemented and rarely monitored or audited. In addition, existing governance policies keep adding additional data management steps that require a human, ‘a data steward’, in the loop, and the cost of data management can no longer scale proportionately with the current and future increased data volume and complexity. The goal for developing an updated data governance framework is to modernize scientific data governance to the reality of Big data and align it with the current technology trends such as cloud computing and AI. The goals of this framework are two folds. One is to ensure thoroughness that the governance adequately covers the entire data life cycle. Two, provide a practical approach that offers a consistent and repeatable process for different projects. Three core principles ground this framework. First, focus on just enough governance and prevent data governance from becoming a roadblock toward the scientific process. Remove any unnecessary processes and steps. Second, automate data management steps where possible. Actively remove steps that require ‘human in the loop’ within the management process to be efficient and scale with increasing data. Third, all the processes should continually be optimized using quantified metrics to streamline the monitoring and auditing workflows.

Rahul Ramachandran↗
NASA NTRS1972

Failure analysis of solid rocket apogee motors

The analysis followed five selected motors through initial design, development, test, qualification, manufacture, and final flight reports. An audit was conducted at the manufacturing plants to complement the literature search with firsthand observations of the current philosophies and practices that affect reliability of the motors. A second literature search emphasized acquisition of spacecraft and satellite data bearing on solid motor reliability. It was concluded that present practices at the plants yield highly reliable flight hardware. Reliability can be further improved by new developments of aft-end bonding and initiator/igniter nondestructive test methods, a safe/arm device, and an insulation formulation. Minimum diagnostic instrumentation is recommended for all motor flights. Surplus motors should be used in margin testing. Criteria should be established for pressure and zone curing. The motor contractor should be represented at launch. New design analyses should be made of stretched motors and spacecraft/motor pairs.

Martin, P. J.↗
NASA NTRS1971

Logic design for dynamic and interactive recovery.

Recovery in a fault-tolerant computer means the continuation of system operation with data integrity after an error occurs. This paper delineates two parallel concepts embodied in the hardware and software functions required for recovery; detection, diagnosis, and reconfiguration for hardware, data integrity, checkpointing, and restart for the software. The hardware relies on the recovery variable set, checking circuits, and diagnostics, and the software relies on the recovery information set, audit, and reconstruct routines, to characterize the system state and assist in recovery when required. Of particular utility is a handware unit, the recovery control unit, which serves as an interface between error detection and software recovery programs in the supervisor and provides dynamic interactive recovery.

Carter, W. C.↗
NASA NTRS1976

A distributed data base management capability for the deep space network

The Configuration Control and Audit Assembly (CCA) is reported that has been designed to provide a distributed data base management capability for the DSN. The CCA utilizes capabilities provided by the DSN standard minicomputer and the DSN standard nonreal time high level management oriented programming language, MBASIC. The characteristics of the CCA for the first phase of implementation are described.

Bryan, A. I.↗
NASA NTRS1975

Intermodal transfer in temporal discrimination

This study determined if training for accuracy in temporal discrimination would transfer across sensory modalities. A fractionation method was used in which subjects bisected the durations of acoustic and visual signals at three standard intervals (6, 12, and 18 sec). Absolute error was the performance index. Half of the subjects were trained with acoustic stimuli and then tested in vision; the remainder were trained in vision and tested in audition. Similar negatively accelerated acquisition functions were noted for both modalities. Positive intermodal transfer, characterized by symmetry across modalities, was obtained at all standard durations. The results were considered to provide support for the notion that a common mechanism underlies temporal discriminations in different sensory systems.

Warm, J. S.↗
NASA NTRS1978

FORTRAN tools

An integrated set of FORTRAN tools that are commercially available is described. The basic purpose of various tools is summarized and their economic impact highlighted. The areas addressed by these tools include: code auditing, error detection, program portability, program instrumentation, documentation, clerical aids, and quality assurance.

Presser, L.↗
NASA NTRS1978

Standardized development of computer software. Part 2: Standards

This monograph contains standards for software development and engineering. The book sets forth rules for design, specification, coding, testing, documentation, and quality assurance audits of software; it also contains detailed outlines for the documentation to be produced.

Tausworthe, R. C.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Experimental investigation of a 0.15 scale model of a conformal variable-ramp inlet for the F-16 airplane

A 0.15 scale model of a proposed conformal variable-ramp inlet for the Multirole Fighter was tested from Mach 0.8 to 2.2 at a wide range of angles of attack and sideslip. Inlet ramp angle was varied to optimize ramp angle as a function of engine airflow, Mach number, angle of attack, and angle of sideslip. Several inlet configuration options were investigated to study their effects on inlet operation and to establish the final flight configuration. These variations were cowl sidewall cutback, cowl lip bluntness, boundary layer bleed, and first-ramp leading edge shape. Diagnostic and engine face instrumentation were used to evaluate inlet operation at various inlet stations and at the inlet/engine interface. Pressure recovery and stability of the inlet were satisfactory for the proposed application. On the basis of an engine stability audit of the worst-case instantaneous distortion patterns, no inlet/engine compatibility problems are expected for normal operations.

Hawkins, J. E.↗