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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2023

Transmission and Distribution Real-Time Analysis Software for Monitoring and Control: Design and Simulation Testing

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2021

Directional Laplacian Centrality for Cyber Situational Awareness

Cyber operations is drowning in diverse, high-volume, multi-source data. To get a full picture of current operations and identify malicious events and actors, analysts must see through data generated by a mix of human activity and benign automated processes. Although many monitoring and alert systems exist, they typically use signature-based detection methods. We introduce a general method rooted in spectral graph theory to discover patterns and anomalies without a priori knowledge of signatures. We derive and propose a new graph-theoretic centrality measure based on the derivative of the graph Laplacian matrix in the direction of a vertex. To build intuition about our measure, we show how it identifies the most central vertices in standard network datasets and compare to other graph centrality measures. Finally, we focus our attention on studying its effectiveness in identifying important IP addresses in network flow data. Using both real and synthetic network flow data, we conduct several experiments to test our measure’s sensitivity to two types of injected attack profiles and show that vertices participating in injected attack profiles exhibit noticeable changes in our centrality measures, even when the injected anomalies are relatively small, and in the presence of simulated network dynamics.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2025

Modeling Cyber Supply Chain Incidents with Multilayered Graph Motifs

As noted within the literature, supply chain includes people and organizations---manufacturers, integrators, and third-party vendors---that are involved in one or more stages of a product lifecycle. Since supply chains, by definition, include organizations and people, supply chain risk management activities must consider dependencies between an organization's business processes and third-party resources. Just as adversarial tactics can be implemented via techniques implemented via networked computer systems, so can such tactics be expressed via legal business relationships. A cyber incident may have an exponential impact downstream, for example, by leveraging a product's distribution channel (e.g. malicious updates in SolarWinds, buggy updates in CrowdStrike). Similarly, legitimate and legal business relationships also affect the attack surface exposure of systems, enabling long-term persistence and/or unknown impacts to product quality that are hard to detect. This paper catalogs several recent digital supply chain incidents and applies a multilayered network formalism to develop structural indicators (graph motifs) that reflect potentially-adversarial behavior. Finally, we compare and contrast the characteristics of adversarial tactics (e.g. Loss of Availability, Data Collection) that leverage cyber-physical dependencies to those that leverage legal organizational relationships.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2022

Optimizing power system restoration with damaged communications

Utility procedures for power system blackstart and restoration typically assume that energization decisions can be reliably communicated across the grid. In reality, the communications and control network would likely also be affected in power outages, such as those caused by extreme weather events or cyber-attacks. This paper studies the effect of damage to the power system communications and control infrastructure on restoration operations following a blackout. We model the communications infrastructure as a graph, overlaying the power grid, and imposing the requirement that every energized element in the power grid be observable from a control center. We expand on a specialized branch-and-bound algorithm from the literature to optimize the restoration process and devise an initialization heuristic and a rounding heuristic to improve solution speed. We perform numerical experiments on synthetic systems for Illinois and Texas with outages based on a solar flare or hurricane. We compare the results of our specialized branch-and-bound algorithm to the results from (i) the initialization heuristic alone, (ii) a variation of this heuristic that we use as a baseline, and (iii) the restoration optimization for the power system without communications constraints. Here, we find that damage to the communications infrastructure significantly increases the time required to re-energize the grid. Moreover, by simultaneously optimizing communications repairs and grid energization decisions, we are able to re-energize the grid significantly faster than if communications repairs and energization decisions were made independently or with partial coordination, motivating improvements to current industry practice.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2025

A distributed voltage inference framework for cyber-physical attacks detection and localization in active distribution grids

The transition to active distribution grids with real-time monitoring and control depends on the proliferation of advanced communication networks and devices. This paradigm shift towards a cyber-physical architecture also introduces new vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit and launch sophisticated cyber-physical attacks targeting grid observability. Current research highlights the challenges in distinguishing attacks on voltage phasor or nodal injection measurements and isolating multi-source attack locations in a multiphase distribution grid. The attack detection and localization methods in literature face accuracy issues, applications across diverse attack scenarios, or scalability limits. Here, to bridge these gaps, this paper proposes a distributed Voltage Inference framework for real-time detection and localization of cyber-physical attacks, addressing scalability, adaptability, and accuracy challenges in state-of-the-art methods. The proposed methodology leverages the distributed nature of the Voltage Inference framework through a two-step process of prediction and correction, together with a tractable graph partitioning approach, providing a reliable solution to identify compromised measurement sources and facilitate isolation. Extensive testing on IEEE 13 and 123-node distribution feeders underscores the algorithm’s efficacy, enhancing the security and resilience of active distribution grids against evolving cyber threats. Additionally, Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) implementation validates the proposed strategy’s practical applicability in real-world scenarios.

active distribution grids↗

DOE OSTI2023

Faster-than-real-time Simulation with Demonstration for Resilient DER Integration

The US electric grid is facing operational, stability, and security challenges. Transmission system operators need some measure of visibility into distribution system renewable generation. Distribution system generation needs to support transmission system voltage. The grid is experiencing an expansion in measurement systems. How to take full advantage of this expansion and defend against attacks, both cyber and physical, poses additional challenges. The Faster-than-real-time Simulation with demonstration for Resilient DER Integration project set out to do the following: a. Flatten the voltage profile through the feeders and system for cost saving and voltage stabilization needs. b. Increase the amount of intermittent distributed energy resources (IDERs) that could be deployed on a utility feeder and provide 100% or more energy needed for the demands on that feeder, and c. based on an accurate model (Digital Twin) of the utilities system, be able to detect any abnormalities on the utilities distribution system. To manage the voltage and increase IDER penetration (a,b), Graph Trace Analysis is employed in a time-series, optimal power flow to coordinate the time-varying feedback control setpoints of a distribution feeder’s utility control devices. Under the coordinated control are a Load Tap Changing Transformer, a voltage regulator, and five switched capacitor banks. The feeder serves over 2000 customers, the feeder secondaries are modeled, and the feeder has 2.3 MW of PV generation, corresponding to a 17.4% penetration of PV generation. The feeder model has over 12,000 components, where every customer load bus and PV generator are modeled. The accuracy of the power flow solution is compared against historical meter voltage measurements, the improvement in conservation voltage reduction energy savings as a function of the coordinated control desired voltage profile is investigated, and the increase in PV penetration of the coordinated control over the existing control is presented. To achieve improved control performance while observing system operation constraints, bellwether Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) voltage measurements are used to adjust the desired voltage profile used by the optimal power flow analysis. To detect and alleviate or negate attacks or failures on the distribution and transmission utility grids (c) the grid needs to be resilient and self-healing. In this project software was designed to do just that. At the center of the software is an Integrated System Model (ISM) that spans from transmission to secondary distribution. The ISM is employed in real-time abnormality detection, voltage stability forecasting, and multi-mode control. Testing results are presented for: 1—attacks on utility infrastructure; 2—energy savings from optimal control; 3—distribution system control response during a low voltage transmission system event; 4—cyber-attacks on PV inverters, where physical inverters are used in hard-ware-in-the-simulation-loop studies. Contributions of this work include real-time analysis that spans from three-phase transmission through secondary distribution; an approach for detecting abnormalities that employs measurements from three independent measurement systems; and a multi-mode distribution system control that responds to cyber-attacks, physical attacks, equipment failures, and transmission system needs.

Integrated System Model, Graph Trace Analysis, Adv↗

DOE OSTI2022

CONGO²: Scalable Online Anomaly Detection and Localization in Power Electronics Networks

Rapid and accurate detection and localization of electronic disturbances simultaneously are important for preventing its potential damages and determining potential remedies. Existing anomaly detection methods are severely limited by the low accuracy, the expensive computational cost and the need for highly trained personnel. There is an urgent need for a scalable online algorithm for in-field analysis of large-scale power electronics networks. Here in this paper, we propose a fast and accurate algorithm for anomaly detection and localization of power electronics networks: stratified colored-node graph (CONGO2). This algorithm hierarchically models the change of correlated waveforms and then correlated sensors using the colored-node graph. By aggregating the change of each sensor with its neighbors’ inputs, we can spontaneously identify and localize the anomaly that cannot be detected by data collected from a single sensor. As our proposed method only focuses on the changes within a short time frame, it is highly computational efficient and only needs small data storage. Thus, our method is ideal for online and reliable anomaly detection and localization of large-scale power electronic networks. Compared to existing anomaly detection methods, our method is entirely data-driven without training data, highly accurate and reliable for wide-spectrum anomalies detection, and more importantly, capable of both detection and localization. Thus, it is ideal for infield deployment for large-scale power electronic networks. As illustrated by a distributed energy resources (DERs) power grid with 37-node, our method can effectively detect and localize various cyber and physical attacks.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2021

Systematic planning of moving target defence for maximising detection effectiveness against false data injection attacks in smart grid

Abstract Moving target defence (MTD) has been gaining traction to thwart false data injection attacks against state estimation (SE) in the power grid. MTD actively perturbs the reactance of transmission lines equipped with distributed flexible AC transmission system (D‐FACTS) devices to falsify the attacker's knowledge about the system configuration. However, the existing literature has not systematically studied what influences the detection effectiveness of MTD and how it can be improved based on the topology analysis. These problems are tackled here from the perspective of an MTD plan in which the D‐FACTS placement is determined. We first exploit the relation between the rank of the composite matrix and the detecting effectiveness. Then, we rigorously derive upper and lower bounds on the attack detecting probability of MTDs with a given rank of the composite matrix. Furthermore, we analyse existing planning methods and highlight the importance of bus coverage by D‐FACTS devices. To improve the detection effectiveness, we propose a novel graph theory–based planning algorithm to retain the maximum rank of the composite matrix while covering all necessary buses. Comparative results on multiple systems show the high detecting effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in both DC‐ and AC‐SE.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Collection And Analysis Of Telemetry For The Cyote Heuristic

CATCH CLI focuses on gathering telemetry data, storing it in the Neo4j database, querying for Mitre ATT&CK patterns, and creating STIX 2.1 reports. Key Components: Analysis Modules: Analyze data to detect attack patterns. GoSTOTS Collection Engines: Collect telemetry data. These tools can be used together or individually. Analysis modules rely on data from specific engines to identify attack patterns. Source Code Organization: Engines: CATCH/catch/cmd/collection Modules: CATCH/catch/cmd/analysis CGUI Overview CATCH Graphical User Interface (CGUI) offers a graphical shell to execute CATCH CLI, allowing easy editing of: Analysis Modules Database configurations Profiles (collection and device settings) Neo4j Overview Neo4j is a graph database using the Cypher query language, storing data in JSON. It seamlessly integrates with STIX 2.1 data for: Data Submission: CATCH Collection Engines Data Querying: Analysis Modules CATCH modifies STIX 2.1 data for Neo4j submission and reverts it back during querying. STIG Overview Structured Threat Intelligence Graph (STIG) is a tool for creating, editing, querying, analyzing, and visualizing threat intelligence using STIX 2.1 and storing data in Neo4j. Usage Tools can be run: Manually (CLI): Refer to CATCH documentation User Interface: Run ./cgui/CGUI or go run ./cgui/ Additional Information Logging System: Detailed in the config documentation Further Documentation: Available for CATCH and CGUI

Madsen, MichaelJ. [Idaho National Laboratory (INL)↗

DOE OSTI2021

Optimal Planning and Operation of Hidden Moving Target Defense for Maximal Detection Effectiveness

Not provided.

Engineering↗

DOE OSTI2025

GridSTIX

SF-25-112 Grid-STIX is a comprehensive extension of the STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) 2.1 ontology specifically designed for electrical grid cybersecurity applications. This ontology provides a standardized, machine-readable framework for modeling grid assets, operational technology devices, threats, vulnerabilities, supply chain risks, and security relationships in electrical power systems. ## Key Features - **Comprehensive Grid Coverage**: Physical assets, OT devices, grid components, sensors, and energy storage systems - **Zero Trust Architecture**: Policy decision points, enforcement points, trust brokers, and continuous monitoring - **AMI Infrastructure**: Advanced metering networks, head-end systems, mesh gateways, and MDM systems - **Advanced Security Modeling**: Attack patterns, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and supply chain risks - **Critical Grid Relationships**: Power flow, protection, control, and synchronization relationships - **Supply Chain Security**: Supplier modeling, country of origin tracking, and risk assessment - **Protocol Support**: DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-104, OPC-UA, and IEEE standards - **Python Code Generation**: Automated STIX-compliant Python class generation from ontologies - **Interactive Visualization**: Enhanced HTML network graphs with grid-specific categorization - **STIX 2.1 Compliance**: Full compatibility with STIX threat intelligence ecosystem

Blakely, Benjamin [Argonne National Laboratory (AN↗

DOE OSTI2024

A Novel Framework to Quantify Power Grid Resilience

The quantification of an operating power grid’s resilience is highly significant today, given its criticality as an enabler of other infrastructures, complexity, and the threat it faces due to a wide range of detrimental events, from extreme climate to cyber attacks. Currently, there exist no standardized definitions and metrics for measuring the resilience of an operating grid. In this paper, we introduce a novel resilience quantification framework and demonstrate a method to measure the flexibility towards topological/structural changes due to potential failures in the power grid to assess operational resilience. We start with the state estimation data from a large utility and use the graph analysis methods and power flow simulation tools to compute the identified resilience parameters.

Yoginath, Srikanth↗

DOE OSTI2023

Visualizing Comparisons of Bill of Materials

Protecting critical infrastructure from cyber attacks, natural disasters, and other disruptions is a priority of the U.S. Government. Critical infrastructure includes providing electricity to homes and businesses, supplying natural gas for heating, and producing renewable energy sources. A loss of these services, as seen in the Solarwinds supply chain attack in 2020 , Texas snowstorm of 2021, the Colonial Pipeline cyber incident of 2021, and the Washington power substation attacks in 2022 result in high costs to consumers, disruption of everyday life, and even death. To protect the infrastructure, we first have to know what equipment we are protecting. The complexity of distributed manufacturing and development coupled with the increasing prevalence of cyber and supply chain attacks necessitates a greater understanding of the hardware and software components that comprise equipment in critical infrastructure. When a vulnerability in a single software library can have disastrous consequences, it is vital to understand critical equipment and systems at a granular level. This need has led to increased energy around the development and incorporation of bill-of-materials (BOM) into existing asset management practices to aid in mitigating, and responding to future attacks \cite{noauthor_software_nodate}. While much of the current research is devoted to creating BOMs, it is equally important to develop methodologies for leveraging BOMs to answer questions, such as: How has my software changed? Are two pieces of equipment equivalent? Does this piece of equipment that just arrived match my historical information? In this work, we demonstrate how BOMs can be represented by graph structures. We then describe how these structures can be fed into a graph comparison algorithm to produce a novel interactive visualization that allows us to not only identify differences in BOMs, but show exactly where they are in the product.

Jones, Rebecca D.↗

DOE OSTI2024

Efficient Anomaly Detection Driven By Different Machine Learning Architectures And Models

The rapid growth and ubiquitous adoption of the internet and cyber-physical systems (CPS) have fundamentally transformed modern communication, work, and human-system interactions. While networks now form the backbone of critical digital ecosystems, enabling seamless data transmission across diverse, interconnected systems, this increased connectivity also expands the attack surface, making real-time detection of network intrusions and anomalies a pressing challenge. Detecting unusual activities within network infrastructure requires advanced data traffic analysis to differentiate between legitimate and malicious interactions. Traditional approaches to network anomaly detectionâ??such as rule-based and signature-based systemsâ??often depend on predefined patterns to identify known anomalies, limiting their effectiveness against emerging, stealthy, or previously unseen threats. These conventional methods suffer from high false alarm rates and fail to adapt to the ever-evolving nature of network traffic, particularly in large-scale, decentralized environments where data volume, velocity, and variety are constantly increasing. This dissertation presents artificial intelligence (AI)-driven approaches to anomaly detection that leverage graphics processing unit (GPU)-enabled high-performance computing (HPC) platforms for processing massive network traffic data and monitoring the components of cyber-physical systems (CPS) for potentially hazardous conditions. The research advances several key contributions: (1) Designing efficient machine learning techniques for CPS condition monitoring and anomaly detection; (2) enabling federated learning (FL) frameworks that enable distributed detection while preserving data privacy and system resilience; (3) exploring graph-based methodologies combining graph neural networks (GNN) and graph machine learning (ML) approaches for the Internet of Things (IoT) and automotive network security, and (4) performing distributed edge computing optimizations that integrate FL with scalable technologies for reduced communication overhead. Through extensive experiments, these methodologies demonstrate that complex anomaly detection and condition monitoring tasks can be achieved while balancing computational efficiency and detection accuracy through fine-grained network information processing. The frameworks developed in this research establish a robust foundation for network anomaly detection, providing scalable, adaptive, and privacy-preserving solutions for safeguarding CPS and IoT networks in an increasingly interconnected digital landscape. The practical implications of these research findings are significant, as they can inform the development of next-generation network security systems and contribute to the protection of critical infrastructure against sophisticated cyber attacks.

Marfo, William↗

DOE OSTI2020

Graph interpolating activation improves both natural and robust accuracies in data-efficient deep learning

Improving the accuracy and robustness of deep neural nets (DNNs) and adapting them to small training data are primary tasks in deep learning (DL) research. In this paper, we replace the output activation function of DNNs, typically the data-agnostic softmax function, with a graph Laplacian-based high-dimensional interpolating function which, in the continuum limit, converges to the solution of a Laplace–Beltrami equation on a high-dimensional manifold. Furthermore, we propose end-to-end training and testing algorithms for this new architecture. The proposed DNN with graph interpolating activation integrates the advantages of both deep learning and manifold learning. Compared to the conventional DNNs with the softmax function as output activation, the new framework demonstrates the following major advantages: First, it is better applicable to data-efficient learning in which we train high capacity DNNs without using a large number of training data. Second, it remarkably improves both natural accuracy on the clean images and robust accuracy on the adversarial images crafted by both white-box and black-box adversarial attacks. Third, it is a natural choice for semi-supervised learning. This paper is a significant extension of our earlier work published in NeurIPS, 2018. For reproducibility, the code is available at https://github.com/BaoWangMath/DNN-DataDependentActivation .

Mathematics↗

DOE OSTI2025

Detection of False Data Injection Attacks (FDIA) on Power Dynamical Systems With a State Prediction Method

Not Available

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Flexible visualization of a 3rd party Intrusion Prevention (Security) tool: A use case with the ELK stack

A difficult aspect of cyber security is the ability to achieve automated real time intrusion prevention across various sets of systems. To this extent, several companies are offering comprehensive solutions that leverage an "accuracy of scale" and moving much of the intelligence and detection on the Cloud, relying on an ever-growing set of data and analytics to increase decision accuracy. Often, they provide tools to visualize the decision workflows in attack prevention (as well as tune the algorithm) but those solutions are not always practical as companies see the problem as "global" that is, from a unified Cyber-security standpoint. However, a key to a successful Cyber-security program is transparency and trust: from an experimental team viewpoint, this specifically means having the ability to immediately see what and from where, who has been blocked and being able to inform the community in case of a revoked access without the need for filing a "ticket" (that may eventually be answered) – in other words, rapid response to their user-base is essential but solutions targeting "sub-groups" in an organization are not often available. We have come up with a versatile solution leveraging the ELK stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, & Kibana) and an IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) based WAF (Web Application Firewall) from Signal Sciences. Signal Science allows the streaming of detailed logs in a Logstash format suitable for custom solutions for visualization. By combining these two tools, we have strengthened our security posture and enabled individual experiments to monitor their own traffic. Specifically, the IPS WAF provides unique data such as country of origin, protocol, response code, source IP, and paths accessed. In this contribution, we will show how we engineered a visualization solution so experiment groups could access a dashboard with predefined graphs but also, where they can create individual customizable dashboards used to display blocked traffic and troubleshoot latency issues. We will discuss the details and procedures for developing and configuring these tools and how it benefits cyber security postures across our scientific based environment.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Comparison of Socio-Technical Threat Models

Given the adoption of emerging technologies and the increasing complexity of managing such systems with a lifecycle much shorter than that of critical infrastructure systems, there is a practical need to be able to analyze sociotechnical dependencies and their associated evolving risks. Threat models based on social influence techniques can be used to implement adversarial tactics analogous to the cyber kill chain and attested to within the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS framework including Initial Access, Persistence, Collection, and Impact. Furthermore, as with cyber disruptions, the impact of social influence threat models can have an asymmetric impact that is not spatially-localized. Finally, unlike cyber attacks with a reasonably short duration (ransomware takes days to months), social influence based attacks have the potential to persist for much longer as they are based on long-term strategic infrastructure investments within the private sector. Given the increased importance of electric vehicle charging stations as a long-term, strategic infrastructure investment within the Energy and Transportation Sectors, we provide initial results that compare the impact of a Loss of Availability (T0826) realized through cyber and social influence based threat models. The analysis employs techniques from automated reasoning and measures of network complexity to understand evolving dominance of EV payment and charging networks within geographic region of interest. Within this context, we compare the impact of a loss of availability due to ransomware versus that of loss of support due to a merger and acquisition. Results across several different metro areas will be provided.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗