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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Overview of the U.S.-U.K. Portal Monitor for Authentication and Certification (PMAC) Project [Slides]

The PM designed and demonstrated under the PMAC project is a significant improvement from other existing PMs in terms of the joint host / inspector confidence provided and usability in a future hypothetical arms control regime. Based on these results, the PMAC system would be the best option currently available for a boundary control use case in a hypothetical arms control regime.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verifying Deep Reductions in the Nuclear Arsenals: Development and Demonstration of a Motion-detection Subsystem for a “Buddy Tag” Using Non-export Controlled Accelerometers

Future nuclear arms-control agreements may place numerical limits on items that are difficult to monitor with national technical means, even when complemented with onsite inspections. Such items could include small objects and mobile assets, such as non-deployed nuclear warheads and mobile missile launchers. Typically, this verification task can be addressed with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. First proposed in the late 1980s and partially developed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s, the “Proximity Tag” or “Buddy Tag” concept seeks to overcome these concerns by separating the tag from the treaty accountable item itself. A buddy tag has two key elements: a tamper-indicating enclosure and a motion-detection system designed to detect illicit movements in a stand-down period. As part of this project, we have built a buddy-tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. This paper reviews the design choices and functionalities of the tag’s motion-detection subsystem.We pursue a modular approach for the tag’s hardware, built around an Arduino-class microcontroller and a non-export-controlled low-noise accelerometer, and use open-source algorithms for the motion-detection software. Finally, we discuss the results of an extensive experimental campaign involving both indoor and outdoor measurements assessing the performance of the tag under real-world environmental conditions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Cooperation on Verification and its role in Trust Building [Slides]

Technical cooperation is a low-cost way to initiate movement in the arms control sphere and offers an operational path forward for the reestablishment of working relationships built on trust not freely given, but gained through experience, and a shared vision of the future; Political will alone, though necessary for cooperation to take place, is insufficient in the face of structural obstacles. For effective cooperation to have a future, countries must have both political will and complementary and conducive institutional structures; Cooperation at the intergovernmental level seems unlikely at this time. However, if relationships with international partners continue to be strained as development of new offensive technologies continues, it is very possible that future movement in technical arms control cooperation could again be initiated in the nongovernmental sphere; As the stewards of the majority of the world’s nuclear stockpile, the United States and the Russian Federation have a unique role to play in shaping global norms on arms control verification and cooperation; it is in their mutual interest now to begin to find technical solutions to the question of verification as other countries ramp up production.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Reconceptualizing Off-Ramps as a Tool of U.S.-China Escalation Management

Great power rivalry, at any point on the competition spectrum, involves assessments of risks and decisions on where to take them. Assessing risk versus reward is also integral to the decision to cooperate in the form of arrangements like arms control. As Donald Brennan wrote more than sixty years ago, the value in arms control lies in whether it “reduce[s] the hazards of the present armament policies by a factor greater than the amount of risk introduced by the control measures themselves.” 2 States can assume in peacetime the risks inherent in cooperating with an adversary, to attempt to mitigate risks likely to arise in crisis or conflict. Or they can choose to forgo cooperation and assume risks later, which will complicate their ability to manage crises, war, and war termination.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Confirming the absence of nuclear warheads via passive gamma-ray measurements

Arms-control agreements between the United States and Russia negotiated after the end of the Cold War have imposed limits on the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Verification of these agreements has relied on onsite inspections, sometimes supported by radiation detection techniques to confirm the absence of a nuclear warhead when ambiguities arise. So far, these measurements have sought to detect neutron emissions associated with the presence of plutonium, but they would be inadequate for uranium devices. In an effort to offer instruments that could be used to confirm the absence of both plutonium and uranium weapons, here we propose an inspection system that uses only passive gamma radiation detection techniques. Such a system would be particularly valuable for next-generation arms-control agreements that limit total numbers of weapons and would involve containerized items in storage. We conducted extensive Monte Carlo simulations to support the development of a verification protocol and detection algorithm. Here, we demonstrate the viability of the technique using standard laboratory check sources and MCNP simulations for simplified configurations of special nuclear material.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Radiation Detection Technologies

When governing bodies seek to reduce the spread and development of nuclear material and weapons, arms control and safeguards technologies play an important role in preventing proliferation within a state that has already developed a nuclear weapon. Arms control treaties work to control the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, distribution, or the usage of a certain weapon type or delivery system. Treaty guidelines are met using combinations of monitoring, detection, and verification technologies. 1 To verify compliance, a country must determine if the activities of another country are within the limits and obligations established by the treaty. A verifiable treaty contains an interlocking web of constraints and provisions designed to deter cheating, to make cheating more complicated and more expensive, or to make its detection timelier. In the past, the U.S. has deemed treaties to be effectively verifiable if there is confidence that significant violations can be detected in time to respond and offset any threat that the violation may create for the U.S.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2021

History of and Aftermath from the Withdrawal of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

On February 1, 2019, the United States and Russia withdrew from the three-decades old Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Events precipitating the withdrawal were allegations by both the United States and Russia of a variety of treaty violations. Until that point, the treaty had been a centerpiece of arms control and a key agreement of the global security architecture. The absence of such a pillar has the potential destabilize the status quo of arms control, creating significant uncertainty in global nuclear stability and security. In this paper, we present a historical review as overture to an analysis on the impacts of this development on force structure. This analysis examines the changes in U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear forces which may occur as a result of the treaty's demise. The article concludes with commentary on potential actions to preserve stability in a post-INF world.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Defending Weapons Inspections from the Effects of Disinformation

The intentional spread of disinformation is not a new challenge for the scientific world. We have seen it perpetuate the idea of a flat earth, convince communities that vaccines are more dangerous than helpful, and even suggest a connection between the “5G” communication infrastructure and COVID-19. Nor is disinformation a new phenomenon in the weapons inspection arena. Weapons inspectors themselves are often forced to sift through alternative narratives of events and inconsistent reporting, and they regularly see their credibility and conclusions questioned in the face of government politics or public biases. But certain recent disinformation campaigns have become so overwhelmingly comprehensive and effective that they constitute a new kind of threat. By preventing accountability for clear violations of international law, these campaigns have created a challenge to the survival of arms control treaties themselves. If weapons inspectors cannot regain the trust of the international community in the face of this challenge, it will be increasingly difficult to ensure compliance with arms control and disarmament treaties going forward. In this essay, I will briefly discuss one of the most comprehensive disinformation efforts of the past decade: the disinformation campaign used to prevent accountability for Syria's repeated use of chemical weapons. After this discussion, I will propose one possible approach to help protect the credibility of disarmament experts and weapons inspectors in the face of pervasive disinformation. This approach will require a concerted effort to connect and support compliance experts and to understand and explain their expertise across cultural, political, national, economic, and religious divides.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Adapting to a Changing World: Managing the Promise and Peril of Emerging Technologies and the Nuclear Nexus

This paper is focused on emerging technologies in three areas: outer space, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence. Technologies in each of these areas share a number of characteristics that make them a challenge for legally-binding approaches to arms control. For example, they each have significant definitional challenges. They are also dual use and within the reach of non-state actors. Verifying compliance with any legally-binding agreements in these areas poses significant challenges, at least at this time. Moreover, the rapid pace of technological change also contributes to the difficulty of crafting legally-binding arms control measures. The United States has generally championed a more normative approach to the governance of emerging technologies—the idea being that international agreement on norms serves as the basis for collective action to respond to activities that deviate from those norms.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Feasibility study of a compact neutron resonance transmission analysis instrument

Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) uses resonant absorption of neutrons to infer the absolute isotopic composition of a target object, enabling applications in a broad range of fields such as archaeology, enrichment analysis of nuclear fuel, and arms control treaty verification. In the past, NRTA involved large user facilities and complex detector systems. However, recent advances in the intensity of compact neutron sources have made compact neutron imaging designs increasingly feasible. This work describes the Monte Carlo (MC) based design of a compact epithermal NRTA radiographic instrument which uses a moderated, compact deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron source and an epithermal neutron detector. Such an instrument would have a wide range of applications, and would be especially impactful for such scenarios as nuclear inspection and arms control verification exercises, where system complexity and mobility may be of critical importance. The MC simulations presented in this work demonstrate accurate time-of-flight (TOF) reconstructions for transmitted neutron energies, capable of differentiating isotopic compositions of nuclear material with high levels of accuracy. A new generation of miniaturized and increasingly more intense neutron sources will allow this technique to achieve measurements with greater precision and speed, with significant impact on a variety of engineering and societal problems.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Connecting Nuclear Security to International Frameworks on Gender and Security

The international community is slowly beginning to recognize the intersections between the law and policy on international security – particularly arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament – and the body of human rights law that addresses gender equality. Notably absent from this discussion is the field of nuclear security. Despite its historical underpinnings as an inherently domestic activity, nuclear security is thoroughly grounded in international treaty law. Yet, nuclear security is often overlooked in the international security context and has not been well situated with international instruments that address gender equality. We argue that gender equality in nuclear security should be understood as an important component of broader efforts to achieve equal opportunities for women in work and critical to ensuring women are included in conflict prevention efforts. Linking nuclear security to broader international efforts to increase gender equality in security and conflict prevention will provide a clearer structure and framework for gender equality initiatives in the nuclear security field. This is critically important given that estimates indicate that women comprise only twenty percent of the nuclear security workforce. Moreover, situating nuclear security in a broader international legal framework will simultaneously help states meet their gender equality commitments emanating from other instruments. This paper will first analyze the relationship between nuclear security and broader international security efforts, in particular arms control treaties and non-proliferation regimes. It will then survey the relevant international and regional frameworks for gender equality, particularly those that have applicability in the security context. This paper will next explore the relationship between nuclear security and these frameworks on gender. We find that some instruments provide support for gender equality initiatives in nuclear security because of their mandate to states to provide structural gender equality, and others are particularly relevant where they call for women's participation in conflict prevention. This paper concludes with recommendations to states that are concerned about the underrepresentation of women in nuclear security.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Cooperation on Verification and its Role in Trust Building

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it will demonstrate how technical cooperation on verification contributed to the softening of tensions and the improvement of trust between the United States and the Soviet Union. Because the scope of this endeavor is too broad to be adequately considered in the length of this work, the primary focus will be on the private and public partnerships on seismic and hydroacoustic test ban treaty verification that were forged between Soviet and American scientists from 1986-1988. In order to orient the analysis within the political-scientific landscape of the time, the discussion begins with a brief description of the arms control landscape in the early 1980s, including both the stances of the Reagan and Gorbachev administrations vis a vis nuclear test ban verification. The section concludes with an analysis of the two primary US-USSR collaborative projects in this key sphere – the test ban verification project conducted by the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Soviet Academy of Sciences (SAS) and the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) between the US and Soviet National Laboratories.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Laser Based Ultrasound for Verification of Circuit Card Assemblies

This IR is a follow-up conference Paper to the IR approved abstract; PNNL-SA-194096. --- Verification that equipment is authentic and not changed; even at the circuit card assembly (CCA) level will likely be an important component of future arms control treaties. This effort was an initial evaluation of the potential for laser-based ultrasound (LBU) as an inspection tool for Unique Identification (UID) of Circuit Card Assembly (CCA) boards and CCA components. The LBU system used a laser pulse for ultrasound generation and an Optical Microphone for ultrasound detection to image subsurface structures without physical contact and in a dry state. This paper described the selected CCA surrogate, CCA components that were examined, the LBU system, LBU images of the CCA components, and the initial development of UID algorithms. Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves indicated good performance for two algorithms as a potential means for UID of CCA boards and CCA components.

Laser Ultrasound, Equipment Verification, Arms Con↗
DOE OSTI2024

Passive high explosive neutron inspection (PHENIX): a new method to confirm the presence or absence of high explosives for nuclear treaty verification

Advanced instruments and methods need to be developed now to create a technical basis to support the negotiation of future nuclear arms control treaties. One new capability that is anticipated is the ability to confirm either the declared presence or declared absence of high explosive (HE) material in the presence of special nuclear material (SNM). Towards this goal, Passive HE Neutron Inspection (PHENIX) has been developed and demonstrated as a method for confirming the presence or absence of HE in the presence of plutonium. The method exploits the inherent presence of neutrons associated with the decay of plutonium as an internal probe source for performing prompt gamma-ray neutron activation analysis (PGNAA), searching for the presence of HE as revealed by the emission of characteristic gamma rays following neutron absorption in hydrogen and nitrogen which are building blocks of present-day, military-grade HE. Tests using stoichiometrically-correct hemishells of mock HE with plutonium show that a system can be expected to positively confirm the presence or absence of these signatures, supporting determination of HE presence or absence with Pu, in a few hours. To protect other potentially sensitive gamma-ray signatures from a treaty accountable item, an analog information barrier has been conceptualized and tested which physically prevents the collection of gamma-ray spectral data outside of user selected energy windows strategically chosen to view only narrow spectral regions corresponding to the hydrogen (2223.2 keV) and nitrogen (9807.2 keV, 10,318.2 keV, and 10,829.2 keV) PGNAA signatures.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2025

Optimizing a detection system for fissile material in nuclear disarmament verification

In arms control treaties, verification plays a crucial role in detecting non-compliance, deterring future violations, and building trust between state parties. Neutron interrogation that induces fission reactions in fissile isotopes and measures the resulting fission neutrons, could be employed for this purpose. This study aims to develop a system which can determine the presence of fissile material while intrinsically protecting information. In this paper, we focus on optimizing the system for discriminating between an enriched uranium block from a depleted uranium (DU) block. The system was built and we report on benchmark measurements with DU and 16% enriched uranium blocks. Furthermore, the Excalibur (Experiment for Calibration with Uranium) neutron source, a neutron spectrometer (redBubble Technology Industries (BTI) N-Probe), and superheated droplet detectors were used for these measurements. MCNP simulations provided insights into detector responses to fissile materials with varying isotopic compositions, confirming that the system functioned as designed.

Active neutron interrogation↗
DOE OSTI2025

PROACTIVE FA4: Progress Update 2024

The Priority Research Objectives for Arms Control Technology Innovation, Verification, and Evaluation (PROACTIVE) venture’s overall goal is to address the technical challenges that will “enable the negotiation and implementation of future nuclear arms limitation/reduction treaties with verification at the level of individual warheads by advancing the state of the art in verification and monitoring capabilities.” One of the four focus areas of the venture, Focus Area 4 (FA4), is a system-of-systems effort to establish methodologies for the integration of monitoring and verification (M&V) technologies into verification systems that support treaty objectives.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Discrete Event Simulation Approach to Nuclear Arms Enterprise Modeling and Analysis

We overview a discrete event simulation of an arms control enterprise developed to familiarize individuals with the challenges of verification and monitoring at the enterprise level. We will review the design of the simulation applied to a notional country’s nuclear arms enterprise. This simulation models how these nuclear weapons move over their lifetime from deployment, storage, maintenance, and dismantlement. With this output information, we then characterize the “ground truth” of the enterprise. Next, based on these data, we built a sophisticated analysis engine designed to provide treaty monitoring and verification information to support partner country inspectors and their evaluation. This tool was designed to be used as a game, enabling teams to compete on developing the best inspection plan to determine if the host country is complying with the conceptual treaty developed for this effort.

Pulliam, Rachel M.↗