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At least 55 records · Page 3

Manual Torque Data Study

At the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, TX, Production Technicians (PTs) build and disassemble nuclear weapon systems. The weapons are held in an integrated work stand for stability and to increase the safety environment for the workers and for the materials being processed. There are many occasions in which a knob must be turned to tighten an assembly part. This can help to secure or manipulate pieces of the system. As there are so many knobs to turn, the instructions given to the PTs are to twist the knob to a hand-tight setting, without the aid of a torque wrench. There are inherent risks in this procedure as the knobs can be tightened too loosely such that the apparatus falls apart or too tightly such that the force can crush or pinch components in the system that contain energetic materials. We want to study these operations at Pantex. Our goal is to collect torque data to assess the safety and reliability of humantooling interfaces.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Application of RAM to Facility/Laboratory Design

Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) studies are extensively used for mission critical systems (e.g., weapons systems) to predict the RAM parameters at the preliminary design phase. A RAM methodology is presented for predicting facility/laboratory inherent availability (i.e., availability that only considers the steady-state effects of design) at the preliminary design phase in support of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 430.1A (Life Cycle Asset Management) and DOE Order 420.1B (Facility Safety). The methodology presented identifies the appropriate system-level reliability and maintainability metrics and discusses how these metrics are used in a fault tree analysis for predicting the facility/laboratory inherent availability. The inherent availability predicted is compared against design criteria to determine if changes to the facility/laboratory preliminary design are necessary to meet the required availability objective in the final design.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Developing Probabilistic Safety Performance Margins for Unknown and Underappreciated Risks

Probabilistic safety requirements currently formulated or proposed for space systems, nuclear reactor systems, nuclear weapon systems, and other types of systems that have a low-probability potential for high-consequence accidents depend on showing that the probability of such accidents is below a specified safety threshold or goal. Verification of compliance depends heavily upon synthetic modeling techniques such as PRA. To determine whether or not a system meets its probabilistic requirements, it is necessary to consider whether there are significant risks that are not fully considered in the PRA either because they are not known at the time or because their importance is not fully understood. The ultimate objective is to establish a reasonable margin to account for the difference between known risks and actual risks in attempting to validate compliance with a probabilistic safety threshold or goal. In this paper, we examine data accumulated over the past 60 years from the space program, from nuclear reactor experience, from aircraft systems, and from human reliability experience to formulate guidelines for estimating probabilistic margins to account for risks that are initially unknown or underappreciated. The formulation includes a review of the safety literature to identify the principal causes of such risks.

Safety Performance Margin↗

Tommy Morris’ Comments on Nuclear Explosive Safety

Nuclear explosives and weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident. The special consideration translates into specific requirements promulgated by Department of Energy (DOE) O 452.1E “Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety,” and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.02 “DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) W-Division Nuclear Explosive Safety Office mission is to coordinate LANL participation in Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies (NESS) and Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies (NWSS); to provide qualified members and advisors to the studies; to liaise with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the DoD, other national laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and Pantex Plant with regards to nuclear explosive and weapon system safety. These orders and directives define nuclear detonation as an energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of time on the order of 1 microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating 4 or more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Reverberation Chamber Characterization

In this study, we characterized and quantified the behavior of Sandia National Laboratories' electromagnetic reverberation chamber owned by department 1353. The primary purpose of the chamber is to measure the response of a test object to electromagnetic stimuli. The primary chamber application is qualification of nuclear weapons systems and components for the nuclear weapon qualification programs. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) requires a comprehensive understanding of any measurement used to qualify a nuclear weapon. Understanding includes the accuracy of every measurement used to qualify the weapon. Knowing the uncertainty of any measurement gives the information needed to estimate boundaries and tolerances of the measurement. By proper application of these measurement tolerances, weapon qualification programs can comply with uncertainty requirements. This document reports our findings. Weapons Systems Engineering Assessment Technology (WSEAT) commissioned this effort to provide support to Nuclear Weapons qualification in accordance with Realize Product Sub System (RPSS). Motivation for this effort stems from four qualification programs: B61 LEP, W88 ALT370, W80-4 LEP, and the Mk21 fuze program.

42 ENGINEERING↗

B-70 Aircraft Study

Volume 2 of the final report on the B-70 aircraft study is presented here. The B-70 Program, at the onset, was a full weapon system capable of sustained Mach 3 flight for the major portion of its design missions. The weapon system was to enter the SAC inventory as an RS-70 with the first intercontinental resonnaissance/bomber wing scheduled to go operational in July, 1964. After several redirections, a two XB-70 air vehicle program emerged with its prime objective being to demonstrate the technical feasibility of sustained Mach 3 flight. This section describes the original Weapon System 110A concepts, the evolution of the RS-70 design, and the XB-70 air vehicles which demonstrated the design, fabrication, and technical feasibility of long range Mach 3 flights at high altitude. The data presented shows that a very large step forward in the state-of-the-art of manned aircraft design was achieved during the B-70 development program and that advances were made and incorporated in every area, including design, materials application, and manufacturing techniques.

Source record↗

Diagnostics in the Extendable Integrated Support Environment (EISE)

Extendable Integrated Support Environment (EISE) is a real-time computer network consisting of commercially available hardware and software components to support systems level integration, modifications, and enhancement to weapons systems. The EISE approach offers substantial potential savings by eliminating unique support environments in favor of sharing common modules for the support of operational weapon systems. An expert system is being developed that will help support diagnosing faults in this network. This is a multi-level, multi-expert diagnostic system that uses experiential knowledge relating symptoms to faults and also reasons from structural and functional models of the underlying physical model when experiential reasoning is inadequate. The individual expert systems are orchestrated by a supervisory reasoning controller, a meta-level reasoner which plans the sequence of reasoning steps to solve the given specific problem. The overall system, termed the Diagnostic Executive, accesses systems level performance checks and error reports, and issues remote test procedures to formulate and confirm fault hypotheses.

Brink, James R.↗

Precision linear shaped charge severance of graphite-epoxy materials

This paper presents Precision Linear Shaped Charge (PLSC) components designed to sever a variety of target materials. Recent data for the severance of graphite-epoxy panels or targets with PLSC's are presented. A brief history of the requirement to originate the development of PLSC's for weapon components at Sandia National Laboratories is presented. The Department of Energy's (DOE) nuclear weapon systems have continually decreased in size. Today's relatively small weapons require the design of much more efficient, lighter, and smaller explosive components because fragments, air shocks, and pyro-shocks associated with the function of these components can damage electrical and other sensitive components located nearby. The DOE requirements for PLSC's are listed. Therefore, linear shaped charge (LSC) components for weapon systems can no longer be empirically or experimentally designed for a given application. Many of today's designs require severing concentric cylinders, for example, where the LSC jet is designed to sever only one of the two cylinders as was the case for the B90/Nuclear Depth Strike Bomb. Therefore, code modeling and simulation technology must be utilized to obtain a better understanding of the LSC jet hydrodynamic penetration, fracture, shear, and spall mechanisms associated with the severance of metallic as well as composite targets.

Vigil, Manuel G.↗

A differential game solution to the Coplanar tail-chase aerial combat problem

Numerical results obtained in a simplified version of the one on one aerial combat problem are presented. The primary aim of the data is to specify the roles of pursuer and evader as functions of the relative geometry and of the significant physical parameters of the problem. Numerical results are given in a case in which the slower aircraft is more maneuverable than the faster aircraft. A third order dynamic model of the relative motion is described, for which the state variables are relative range, bearing, and heading. The ranges at termination are arbitary in the present version of the problem, so the weapon systems of both aircraft can be visualized as forward firing high velocity weapons, which must be aimed at the tail pipe of the evader. It was found that, for the great majority of the ralative geometries, each aircraft can evade the weapon system of the other.

Merz, A. W.↗

Los Alamos Explosives Performance Key to Stockpile Stewardship

As the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent ages, one essential factor in making sure that the weapons will continue to perform as designed is understanding the fundamental properties of the high explosives that are part of a nuclear weapons system. As nuclear weapons go through life extension programs, some changes may be advantageous, particularly through the addition of what are known as "insensitive" high explosives that are much less likely to accidentally detonate than the already very safe "conventional" high explosives that are used in most weapons. At Los Alamos National Laboratory explosives research includes a wide variety of both large- and small-scale experiments that include small contained detonations, gas and powder gun firings, larger outdoor detonations, large-scale hydrodynamic tests, and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, underground sub-critical experiments.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Techniques to evaluate the importance of common cause degradation on reliability and safety of nuclear weapons.

As the nuclear weapon stockpile ages, there is increased concern about common degradation ultimately leading to common cause failure of multiple weapons that could significantly impact reliability or safety. Current acceptable limits for the reliability and safety of a weapon are based on upper limits on the probability of failure of an individual item, assuming that failures among items are independent. We expanded the current acceptable limits to apply to situations with common cause failure. Then, we developed a simple screening process to quickly assess the importance of observed common degradation for both reliability and safety to determine if further action is necessary. The screening process conservatively assumes that common degradation is common cause failure. For a population with between 100 and 5000 items we applied the screening process and conclude the following. In general, for a reliability requirement specified in the Military Characteristics (MCs) for a specific weapon system, common degradation is of concern if more than 100(1-x)% of the weapons are susceptible to common degradation, where x is the required reliability expressed as a fraction. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon subsystem if more than 0.1% of the population is susceptible to common degradation. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon component or overall weapon system if two or more components/weapons in the population are susceptible to degradation. Finally, we developed a technique for detailed evaluation of common degradation leading to common cause failure for situations that are determined to be of concern using the screening process. The detailed evaluation requires that best estimates of common cause and independent failure probabilities be produced. Using these techniques, observed common degradation can be evaluated for effects on reliability and safety.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Non-nuclear Component Signatures for Warhead Dismantlement Confirmation

The verification of warhead dismantlement is expected to be an important component in future arms reduction treaties. Historic approaches developed with future arms control treaty verification in mind often involve intrusive measurements, process monitoring, and/or inspector presence to provide confidence that an authentic warhead has been dismantled. This work explores the possibility of reducing the negative impacts of these invasive approaches while also delivering a method that is more likely to provide non-sensitive data that can be shared with not only other nuclear weapons states but also non-nuclear weapons states partners. This work explores a novel approach for verifying dispositioned non-nuclear weapon components, providing confidence post-dismantlement that a treaty accountable item that was dismantled was in fact a treaty-relevant nuclear weapon system as declared. This method provides an alternative to intrusive inspection processes in nuclear weapons production environments, which would require significant changes to the host’s operational behaviors. It achieves this by identifying intrinsic neutron-induced signatures of non-nuclear components to determine their authenticity and estimate the duration they were exposed within a nuclear weapons system using technologies that are already in use for other national security applications. Intrinsic radiation effects studies are already a part of the stockpile aging and surveillance evaluations. However, none of these technologies and approaches have been previously considered for verification applications of non-nuclear component disposition. In this report, we introduce modeling studies that have been used to identify the most promising candidate parts and materials with signatures that are measurable and actionable. These models have been validated with laboratory measurements of signatures induced by the exposure of candidate materials to neutrons over a range of times. Predictive modeling then demonstrates the methodology for estimating exposure times and/or limits. Laboratory measurements of authentic non-nuclear parts from a dismantled warhead demonstrate the feasibility of employing these signature measurements. And finally, a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the potential use of this methodology is presented.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

High Density, Insensitive Oxidizer with RDX Performance (Final CRADA Report)

This was a collaborative effort between Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC as manager and operator of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Physical Sciences, Inc. (PSI), to develop a synthesis and evaluate a novel high density, insensitive oxidizer with RDX performance. This CRADA resulted from the award of a Phase I STTR ("STTR") from DOD. In recent years, the synthesis of new energetic heterocyclic compounds to replace the energetic materials currently in the stockpile has received a great amount of attention. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has identified that there is a need to incorporate new energetic materials in current and future weapon systems in an effort to increase performance and decrease sensitivity. For many of the future weapon systems, incorporation of energetic compounds currently in the stockpile will not provide the desired performance and sensitivity goals. The success of this CRADA may lead to a Phase I option STTR from DOD and to a Phase II STTR from DOD. The goal of this CRADA was to produce and test a novel oxidizer, 2,5,8-trinitroheptazine (TNH). PSI was to synthesize 5 g of the novel oxidizer, 2,5,8-trinitroheptazine (TNH) using a two- step synthetic protocol. If significant synthetic hurdles were encountered during these initial attempts, PSI and LLNL would use alternate synthetic routes. PSI was to synthesize precursor compounds and deliver them to LLNL for conversion to TNH. LLNL was to complete the synthesis of TNH, if PSI failed in their attempts. The goal was to execute an overall reaction scheme with fewer than 5 reaction steps and to synthesize 5 g of TNH (>97% purity). TNH would be evaluated at LLNL for sensitivity characteristics including impact, ESD, VTS and friction and energetic performance properties (melting and decomposition point, heat of formation and density measurements).

Pagoria, Philip F.↗

Automated Assembly Center (AAC)

The objectives of this project are as follows: to integrate advanced assembly and assembly support technology under a comprehensive architecture; to implement automated assembly technologies in the production of high-visibility DOD weapon systems; and to document the improved cost, quality, and lead time. This will enhance the production of DOD weapon systems by utilizing the latest commercially available technologies combined into a flexible system that will be able to readily incorporate new technologies as they emerge. Automated assembly encompasses the following areas: product data, process planning, information management policies and framework, three schema architecture, open systems communications, intelligent robots, flexible multi-ability end effectors, knowledge-based/expert systems, intelligent workstations, intelligent sensor systems, and PDES/PDDI data standards.

Stauffer, Robert J.↗

Using Modeling and Simulation to Complement Testing for Increased Understanding of Weapon Subassembly Response.

As part of Sandia’s nuclear deterrence mission, the B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) aims to modernize the aging weapon system. Modernization requires requalification and Sandia is using high performance computing to perform advanced computational simulations to better understand, evaluate, and verify weapon system performance in conjunction with limited physical testing. The Nose Bomb Subassembly (NBSA) of the B61-12 is responsible for producing a fuzing signal upon ground impact. The fuzing signal is dependent upon electromechanical impact sensors producing valid electrical fuzing signals at impact. Computer generated models were used to assess the timing between the impact sensor’s response to the deceleration of impact and damage to major components and system subassemblies. The modeling and simulation team worked alongside the physical test team to design a large-scale reverse ballistic test to not only assess system performance, but to also validate their computational models. The reverse ballistic test conducted at Sandia’s sled test facility sent a rocket sled with a representative target into a stationary B61-12 (NBSA) to characterize the nose crush and functional response of NBSA components. Data obtained from data recorders and high-speed photometrics were integrated with previously generated computer models in order to refine and validate the model’s ability to reliably simulate real-world effects. Large-scale tests are impractical to conduct for every single impact scenario. By creating reliable computer models, we can perform simulations that identify trends and produce estimates of outcomes over the entire range of required impact conditions. Sandia’s HPCs enable geometric resolution that was unachievable before, allowing for more fidelity and detail, and creating simulations that can provide insight to support evaluation of requirements and performance margins. As computing resources continue to improve, researchers at Sandia are hoping to improve these simulations so they provide increasingly credible analysis of the system response and performance over the full range of conditions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Approach to reliability when applying new technologies

Tactical weapon systems, while different in many respects from PTTI applications, face similar risks in achieving reliability in development. General principles derived from experience in achieving high reliability in tactical weapon systems are selectively summarized for application to new technologies in unusual environments.

Bear, J. C.↗

Feasibility of High-Power Diode Laser Array Surrogate to Support Development of Predictive Laser Lethality Model

Predictive modeling and simulation of high power laser-target interactions is sufficiently undeveloped that full-scale, field testing is required to assess lethality of military directed-energy (DE) systems. The cost and complexity of such testing programs severely limit the ability to vary and optimize parameters of the interaction. Thus development of advanced simulation tools, validated by experiments under well-controlled and diagnosed laboratory conditions that are able to provide detailed physics insight into the laser-target interaction and reduce requirements for full-scale testing will accelerate development of DE weapon systems. The ultimate goal is a comprehensive end-to-end simulation capability, from targeting and firing the laser system through laser-target interaction and dispersal of target debris; a 'Stockpile Science' - like capability for DE weapon systems. To support development of advanced modeling and simulation tools requires laboratory experiments to generate laser-target interaction data. Until now, to make relevant measurements required construction and operation of very high power and complex lasers, which are themselves costly and often unique devices, operating in dedicated facilities that don't permit experiments on targets containing energetic materials. High power diode laser arrays, pioneered by LLNL, provide a way to circumvent this limitation, as such arrays capable of delivering irradiances characteristic of De weapon requires are self-contained, compact, light weight and thus easily transportable to facilities, such as the High Explosives Applications Facility (HEAF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) where testing with energetic materials can be performed. The purpose of this study was to establish the feasibility of using such arrays to support future development of advanced laser lethality and vulnerability simulation codes through providing data for materials characterization and laser-material interaction models and to validate the accuracy of code predictions. This project was a Feasibility Study under the LLNL Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Reductions without Regret: Defining the Needed Capabilities

This is the second of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as some closing thoughts for the future. This paper begins with a discussion of the current nuclear force and the plans and procurement programs for the modernization of that force. Current weapon systems and warheads were conceived and built decades ago, and procurement programs have begun for the modernization or replacement of major elements of the nuclear force: the heavy bomber, the air-launched cruise missile, the ICBMs, and the ballistic-missile submarines. In addition, the Nuclear Weapons Council has approved a new framework for nuclear-warhead life extension not fully fleshed out yet that aims to reduce the current number of nuclear explosives from seven to five, the so-called "3+2" vision. This vision includes three interoperable warheads for both ICBMs and SLBMs (thus eliminating one backup weapon) and two warheads for aircraft delivery (one gravity bomb and one cruise-missile, eliminating a second backup gravity bomb). This paper also includes a discussion of the current and near-term nuclear-deterrence mission, both global and regional, and offers some observations on future of the strategic deterrence mission and the challenges of regional and extended nuclear deterrence.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗