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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1986

Technical evaluation report of AGARD Technical Evaluation Meeting on Unsteady Aerodynamics: Fundamentals and Applications to Aircraft Dynamics

From May 6 to 9, 1985, the Fluid Dynamics Panel and Flight Mechanics Panel of AGARD jointly arranged a Symposium on Unsteady Aerodynamics-Fundamentals and Applications to Aircraft Dynamics at the Stadthall, Goettingen, West Germany. This Symposium was organized by an international program committee chaired by Dr. K. J. Orlik-Ruckemann of the Fluid Dynamics Panel. The program consisted of five sessions grouped in two parts: (1) Fundamentals of Unsteady Aerodynamics; and (2) Applications to Aircraft Dynamics. The 35 papers presented at the 4 day meeting are published in AGARD CP 386 and listed in the Appendix. As the papers are already available and cover a very wide field, the evaluators have offered brief comments on every paper, followed by an overall evaluation of the meeting, together with some general conclusions and recommendations.

Mabey, D. G.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Space Station Furnace Facility Core. Requirements definition and conceptual design study. Volume 2: Technical report. Appendix 6: Technical summary reports

The Space Station Furnace Facility (SSFF) is a modular facility for materials research in the microgravity environment of the Space Station Freedom (SSF). The SSFF is designed for crystal growth and solidification research in the fields of electronic and photonic materials, metals and alloys, and glasses and ceramics and will allow for experimental determination of the role of gravitational forces in the solidification process. The facility will provide a capability for basic scientific research and will evaluate the commercial viability of low-gravity processing of selected technologically important materials. The facility is designed to support a complement of furnace modules as outlined in the Science Capabilities Requirements Document (SCRD). The SSFF is a three rack facility that provides the functions, interfaces, and equipment necessary for the processing of the furnaces and consists of two main parts: the SSFF Core Rack and the two Experiment Racks. The facility is designed to accommodate two experimenter-provided furnace modules housed within the two experiment racks, and is designed to operate these two furnace modules simultaneously. The SCRD specifies a wide range of furnace requirements and serves as the basis for the SSFF conceptual design. SSFF will support automated processing during the man-tended operations and is also designed for crew interface during the permanently manned configuration. The facility is modular in design and facilitates changes as required, so the SSFF is adept to modifications, maintenance, reconfiguration, and technology evolution.

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NASA NTRS1995

Advanced transportation system studies. Technical area 2: Heavy lift launch vehicle development: Technical Results - Volume 2

Sections 10 to 13 of the Advanced Transportation System Studies final report are included in this volume. Section 10 contains a copy of an executive summary that was prepared by Lockheed Space Operations Company (LSOC) to document their support to the TA-2 contract during the first-year period of performance of the contract, May 1992 through May 1993. LSOC participated on the TA-2 contract as part of the concurrent engineering launch system definition team, and provided outstanding heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV) ground operations requirements and concept assessments for Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC) through an intercompany work transfer as well as providing specific HLLV ground operations assessments at the direction of NASA KSC through KSC funding that was routed to the TA-2 contract. Section 11 contains a copy of a vehicle-independent, launch system health management requirements assessment. The purpose of the assessment was to define both health management requirements and the associated interfaces between a generic advanced transportation system launch vehicle and all related elements of the entire transportation system, including the ground segment. Section 12 presents the major TA-2 presentations provided to summarize the significant results and conclusions that were developed over the course of the contract. Finally, Section 13 presents the design and assessment report on the first lunar outpost heavy lift launch vehicle.

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NASA NTRS1995

Advanced Transportation System Studies Technical Area 2 (TA-2) Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle Development Contract: Technical Results - Volume 2

The sections in this report include: Single Stage to Orbit (SSTO) Design Ground-rules; Operations Issues and Lessons Learned; Vertical-Takeoff/Landing Versus Vertical-Takeoff/Horizontal-Landing; SSTO Design Results; SSTO Simulation Results; SSTO Assessment Results; SSTO Sizing Tool User's Guide; SSto Turnaround Assessment Report; Ground Operations Assessment First Year Executive Summary; Health Management System Definition Study; Major TA-2 Presentations; First Lunar Outpost Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle Design and Assessment; and the section, Russian Propulsion Technology Assessment Reports.

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NASA NTRS2012

Leveraging Independent Management and Chief Engineer Hierarchy: Vertically and Horizontally-Derived Technical Authority Value

In the development of complex spacecraft missions, project management authority is usually extended hierarchically from NASA's highest agency levels down to the implementing institution's project team level, through both the center and the program. In parallel with management authority, NASA utilizes a complementary, but independent, hierarchy of technical authority (TA) that extends from the agency level to the project, again, through both the center and the program. The chief engineers (CEs) who serve in this technical authority capacity oversee and report on the technical status and ensure sound engineering practices, controls, and management of the projects and programs. At the lowest level, implementing institutions assign project CEs to technically engage projects, lead development teams, and ensure sound technical principles, processes, and issue resolution. At the middle level, programs and centers independently use CEs to ensure the technical success of their projects and programs. At the agency level, NASA's mission directorate CEs maintain technical cognizance over every program and project in their directorate and advise directorate management on the technical, cost, schedule, and programmatic health of each. As part of this vertically-extended CE team, a program level CE manages a continually varying balance between penetration depth and breadth across his or her assigned missions. Teamwork issues and information integration become critical for management at all levels to ensure value-added use of both the synergy available between CEs at the various agency levels, and the independence of the technical authority at each organization.

Barley, Bryan↗
DOE OSTI2025

LAMP Technical Readiness Evaluation Report

An internal preliminary evaluation of Critical Technology Elements (CTEs) for the LANSCE Modernization Project (LAMP) was completed in 2023. This included determining corresponding Technical Readiness Levels (TRLs) for all subsystems using the criteria of DOE G 413.3-4A, Technical Readiness Assessment Guide. This revised report includes a summary of the recent design modifications required to meet the project Key Performance Requirements (KPPs), some of which may reduce technical risk to the project. These recent design modifications include: • Further optimization of the low-energy and medium-energy beam transport regions (LEBT and MEBT, respectively), including relocation of various functional elements (ie choppers, kickers, and bunchers). • An additional H - ion source to separate ion-source function based on beam delivery requirements. • A high-repetition-rate pulsed kicker magnet to select/merge the two H ion beams into a common low-energy beam transport. • Modification and further optimization to a more conventional RFQ design. Performance of the RFQ has been optimized to deliver the required three types of beams while meeting the project KPPs. • The addition of a second chopper in the medium-energy beam transport (MEBT) line to reduce the required pulser voltages. The scope of the evaluation was limited to the project Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) elements as defined for the RFQ Injector and Drift Tube Linac (DTL) systems only. Integration of Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) and Safety Systems was not considered, although specific technologies as related to the RFQ and DTL systems were included. Other elements of the project such as Shielding, System Design, Technical Management, and additional facility integration needed to enable off-line testing and pre-installation commissioning were also not evaluated. Each technical subsystem element was evaluated for technical readiness, however, not all were found to meet the criteria for a CTE. Three subsystem elements were determined to meet the CTE criteria. Their associated TRLs are summarized in the table below. These subsystem elements of the project have the lowest technical readiness due to either being new, novel or modified, requiring additional R&D before being capable of meeting the project Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and subsystem requirements, or present technology exists but has not yet been demonstrated in a relevant environment. All other subsystems were determined to have a TRL of 8, indicating that actual operating systems exist having similar performance requirements as needed for LAMP. Details of the technical readiness evaluation for each subsystem is given in the following sections of this report.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
NASA NTRS1991

NASA/DOD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion Research Project. Paper 21: Technological innovation and technical communications: Their place in aerospace engineering curricula. A survey of European, Japanese, and US Aerospace Engineers and Scientists

Aerospace engineers and scientists from Western Europe, Japan, and the United States were surveyed as part of the NASA/DoD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion Research Project. Questionnaires were used to solicit their opinions regarding the following: (1) the importance of technical communications to their profession; (2) the use and production of technical communications; and (3) their views about the appropriate content of an undergraduate course in technical communications. The ability to communicate technical information effectively was very important to the aerospace engineers and scientists who participated in the study. A considerable portion of their working week is devoted to using and producing technical information. The types of technical communications used and produced varied within and among the three groups. The type of technical communication product used and produced appears to be related to respondents' professional duties. Respondents from the three groups made similar recommendations regarding the principles, mechanics, and on-the-job communications to be included in an undergraduate technical communications course for aerospace majors.

Pinelli, Thomas E.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Development of NASA Technical Standards Program Relative to Enhancing Engineering Capabilities

The enhancement of engineering capabilities is an important aspect of any organization; especially those engaged in aerospace development activities. Technical Standards are one of the key elements of this endeavor. The NASA Technical Standards Program was formed in 1997 in response to the NASA Administrator s directive to develop an Agencywide Technical Standards Program. The Program s principal objective involved the converting Center-unique technical standards into Agency wide standards and the adoption/endorsement of non-Government technical standards in lieu of government standards. In the process of these actions, the potential for further enhancement of the Agency s engineering capabilities was noted relative to value of being able to access Agencywide the necessary full-text technical standards, standards update notifications, and integration of lessons learned with technical standards, all available to the user from one Website. This was accomplished and is now being enhanced based on feedbacks from the Agency's engineering staff and supporting contractors. This paper addresses the development experiences with the NASA Technical Standards Program and the enhancement of the Agency's engineering capabilities provided by the Program s products. Metrics are provided on significant aspects of the Program.

Gill, Paul S.↗
NASA NTRS2020

History and Logic Model NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Instrument and Payload Systems Engineering Technical Performance Study

Historically, some NASA missions have exceeded schedule and cost commitments. Studies suggest technical performance is a contributor. The 1980 NASA Project Management Study concluded, "one of the most significant contributors to cost and schedule growth is inadequate definition of technical and management aspects of a program..." (as cited in GAO/NSIAD-93-97, p. 11). The 1991 NASA Roles and Missions Report identified a "need for increased emphasis on technological readiness and requirements on the front end of a program" (as cited in GAO/NSIAD-93-97, p. 11). The 1992 NASA Program Costs Report stated that NASA officials identified, among other things, "insufficient definition studies... [and] program redesigns and technical complexities" as reasons for cost and schedule overruns (GAO/NSAID-93-97, p. 11). The 2002 Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs found "requirements definition and control issues, unhealthy cost bias in proposal evaluation, widespread lack of budget reserves required to implement high risk programs on schedule, and an overall underappreciation of the importance of appropriately staffed and trained system engineering staff to manage the technologically demanding and unique aspects of space programs" (DoD, 2003, p.i.) In 2007, The NASA Office of the Chief Engineer chartered the NASA Instrument Capability Study (NICS) “to determine whether NASA instrument developers are facing challenges that impact the capability to design and build quality instruments or whether there are flaws in the acquisition strategy evidenced by schedule delays, cost overruns, and increased technical risk via design deficiencies. The... team was also chartered to determine if occurrences [are]... isolated cases or if there are generic issues... If the issues [are] found to be generic, the team [is] to offer solutions to recover such capability" (NICS Report, 2008, p. vi). The 2008 NICS Report, led by Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), identified challenges to instrument technical performance consistent with findings from previous reports. In 2017, the Instrument Project Division (IPD) Implementation Study was initiated to determine if there was a change in meeting schedule and cost commitments after implementing certain NICS recommendations. In 2018, the Instrument Technical Performance Study was initiated to determine the current state of Instrument Technical Performance in the GSFC Payload & Instrument Systems Engineering Branch. The purpose of the combined studies is to answer the question, "Is there a relationship between meeting NASA scientific instrument technical success and meeting schedule and cost commitments? If yes, what is the relationship?" References Department of Defense Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. (2003). The report of the defense science board/ air force scientific advisory board joint task force on acquisition of national security space programs. Washington DC. Government Accounting Office. (1992). NASA program costs: Space missions require substantially more funding than initially estimated. GAO/NSIAD-93-97. Washington DC. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, Department of Defense. (2008). The NASA instrument capability study final report. NP-2008-11-058-GSFC. Washington DC.

Robbins, Geraldine↗
DOE OSTI2024

Northwest Combined Heat and Power Technical Assistance Partnership: Final Scientific/Technical Report

During the years of 2018 through 2023, The Washington State University Energy Program (WSU EP) operated the Northwest Combined Heat and Power Technical Assistance Partnership under contract to the US Department of Energy’s Advanced Manufacturing Office (AMO), a part of DOE’s larger Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. This contract provided direction and funding for providing technical outreach, information and technical/economic analysis services in support of expanding development of Combined Heat and Power (CHP) over a four state region in the Pacific Northwest. The states served included Alaska, Idaho, Oregon and Washington. During the duration of this contract, the WSU EP delivered performed specific assigned tasks and provided services of various generally prescribed types, with the overall goal of increasing adoption of CHP as an efficient heat and power supply in the region. Indications – though not formally evaluated to our knowledge – are that this goal was achieved. Over many years, the WSU team has provided support for CHP developments in these states under similar previous Department of Energy contracts, and many such projects have been built. While the early-phase outreach, education and techno-economic assessments that the NW CHP TAP provides rarely immediately result in project construction, there is no doubt that the WSU EP team has had substantial influence in the construction of a number of important CHP projects in the region. Examples of projects implemented directly under the current team’s guidance and services during this contract cycle include an 875 kilowatt biomass fueled CHP system installed at the University of Idaho, and 5 megawatt natural gas fueled CHP system at the University of Montana ( UM Breaks Ground on New Power Facility, Slashes Emissions 30% (umt.edu) ). Many other CHP systems recently installed are also either directly or at least partially the result of information and technical services provided by the team. Finally, though much more difficult to quantify and less glamorous, the team has helped countless organizations to understand CHP and determine whether and how CHP may be a fit for them, before they consider paying for engineering services. Whether the ultimate outcome has been to include CHP or not, the expert skills provided by the NW CHP TAP team have provided real value to these organizations considering this relatively complex technology. Over the duration of the contract our team provided 71 Initial Technical Assessments and 17 Advanced Technical Assessments; 53 End-User Engagements and 33 Stakeholder Engagements of various types; 42 Technical Profiles (Project Profiles, Program Profiles and Policy Profiles), and produced 14 technical articles for the Department of Energy. Unfortunately, these quantities provide no measure of the value that the team has provided. Only our clients can judge that, and we are confident that they are pleased with the benefits we have offered them.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗