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At least 55 records · Page 3

VIOLENT FRAMES IN ACTION

We present a computational approach to radical rhetoric that leverages the co-expression of rhetoric and action features in discourse to identify violent intent. The approach combines text mining and machine learning techniques with insights from Frame Analysis and theories that explain the emergence of violence in terms of moral disengagement, the violation of sacred values and social isolation in order to build computational models that identify messages from terrorist sources and estimate their proximity to an attack. We discuss a specific application of this approach to a body of documents from and about radical and terrorist groups in the Middle East and present the results achieved.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Impact of post-event avoidance behavior on commercial facilities sector venues-literature review.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), focused a great deal of interest and concern on how individual and social perceptions of risk change behavior and subsequently affect commercial sector venues. Argonne conducted a review of the literature to identify studies that quantify the direct and indirect economic consequences of avoidance behaviors that result from terrorist attacks. Despite a growing amount of literature addressing terrorism impacts, relatively little is known about the causal relationships between risk perception, human avoidance behaviors, and the economic effects on commercial venues. Nevertheless, the technical and academic literature does provide some evidence, both directly and by inference, of the level and duration of post-event avoidance behaviors on commercial venues. Key findings are summarized in this Executive Summary. Also included as an appendix is a more detailed summary table of literature findings reproduced from the full report.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Over the next 10-20 years, the probability of a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) on the United States is projected to increase. At some point over the next few decades, it may be inevitable that a terrorist group will have access to a WMD. The economic and social impact of an attack using a WMD anywhere in the world would be catastrophic. For weapons developed overseas, the routes of entry are air and sea with the maritime vector as the most porous. Providing a system to track, perform a risk assessment and inspect all inbound marine traffic before it reaches US coastal cities thereby mitigating the threat has long been a goal for our government. The challenge is to do so effectively without crippling the US economy. The Portunus Project addresses only the maritime threat and builds on a robust maritime domain awareness capability. It is a process to develop the technologies, policies and practices that will enable the US to establish a waypoint for the inspection of international marine traffic, screen 100% of containerized and bulk cargo prior to entry into the US if deemed necessary, provide a palatable economic model for transshipping, grow the US economy, and improve US environmental quality. The implementation strategy is based on security risk, and the political and economic constraints of implementation. This article is meant to provide a basic understanding of how and why this may be accomplished.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A modeling framework for investment planning in interdependent infrastructures in multi-hazard environments.

Currently, much of protection planning is conducted separately for each infrastructure and hazard. Limited funding requires a balance of expenditures between terrorism and natural hazards based on potential impacts. This report documents the results of a Laboratory Directed Research & Development (LDRD) project that created a modeling framework for investment planning in interdependent infrastructures focused on multiple hazards, including terrorism. To develop this framework, three modeling elements were integrated: natural hazards, terrorism, and interdependent infrastructures. For natural hazards, a methodology was created for specifying events consistent with regional hazards. For terrorism, we modeled the terrorist s actions based on assumptions regarding their knowledge, goals, and target identification strategy. For infrastructures, we focused on predicting post-event performance due to specific terrorist attacks and natural hazard events, tempered by appropriate infrastructure investments. We demonstrate the utility of this framework with various examples, including protection of electric power, roadway, and hospital networks.

Brown, Nathanael J. K.↗

Radiological/Nuclear (RN) Terrorism: Global Assessment of Threat Intention Drivers.

There is a pressing need in international security policy to better understand the future landscape of radiological and nuclear (RN) dangers and how best to target resources to affect their reduction. The highly dynamic nature of the global geopolitical, social and technological environments means that ther e are many potential forces that might influence the magnitude of current RN dangers, especially those emanating from non-state actors like terrorists. These include: the spread of radical ideology, the growth of civilian nuclear energy in politically unstable regions of the world, the potential for increased nuclear proliferation in those regions, the continued dissemination of WMD information in open sources, and advances in technology that may facilitate VNSA violent non-state actor (VNSA) RN programs. Therefore, this study’s main purpose is to provide an overview of the high level future drivers of RN terrorism as they pertain to the motives and intentions1 of known and potential adversaries. A central approach of this study is to ask the question: Why have there not been more attempts to engage in RN terrorism and, particularly in the case of radiological terrorism, why have those attempts that have been made not been more successful? Once the probable factors that have curtailed the RN terrorist threat thus far have been identified, the study will consider whether there are extant and emerging drivers that might bring about changes in these mitigating factors over the next 10 years. Finally, the study attempts to assess the future dangers of RN terrorism based on these potential changes and what policy approaches can be implemented to reduce the threat, particularly the role of deterrence and dissuasion.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Assessing Detecting and Deterring the Threat of Maritime Nuclear and Radiological Smuggling in the Western Indian Ocean Region

This paper proposes that current maritime smuggling routes in the western Indian Ocean region are similar to those in the past and that the motivations of terrorist groups and the presence of radioactive sources in the Indian Ocean littoral and other states present a significant security threat. The majority of regional terrorist groups have a hybrid structure, piggybacking on criminal activity to fund their terror activities. Additionally, states have used maritime routes in the Indian Ocean region to transport nuclear materials and missiles. Thus, the maritime dimension of such threats remains, and may be increasing. This paper focuses on issues, motivations, pathways, and methods to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological trafficking. It analyzes the potential use of maritime technology applications for radiation detection and presents recommendations for states and multinational nonproliferation advocacy organizations to address the threat in the Indian Ocean region.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Radiological and WMD Threat Posed to National Security By Hezbollah in Latin America

Beginning in the 1980s, Hezbollah and other international terrorist organizations took root in unstable portions of Latin America. Over the years, they have built up considerable capabilities that threaten US national security and the security of allies in the region. However, Hezbollah has separated itself from its counterparts through its actions in Latin America, namely the Israeli Embassy and AMIA bombings in the early 1990s, and continues to do so. While it mainly operates out of the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina in South America, Hezbollah commands cells that span the Western Hemisphere. In the modern-day, Hezbollah conducts drug, weapons, and contraband trafficking and smuggling operations, in addition to its violent attacks. New revelations, involving the increased trafficking and stealing of nuclear and WMD material, populate the world’s nonproliferation roundtables. Latin America is no exception to this trend. It is possible that terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, could acquire, develop, and use stolen or illegally obtained nuclear material in a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or some form of WMD. In light of these revelations, the United States should focus more on Hezbollah’s illicit activities in Latin America in the interests of its own national security and its allies’.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Computational Enzymology and Organophosphorus Degrading Enzymes: Promising Approaches Toward Remediation Technologies of Warfare Agents and Pesticides

The re-emergence of chemical weapons as a global threat in hands of terrorist groups, together with an increasing number of pesticides intoxications and environmental contaminations worldwide, has called the attention of the scientific community for the need of improvement in the technologies for detoxification of organophosphorus (OP) compounds. A compelling strategy is the use of bioremediation by enzymes that are able to hydrolyze these molecules to harmless chemical species. Several enzymes have been studied and engineered for this purpose. However, their mechanisms of action are not well understood. Theoretical investigations may help elucidate important aspects of these mechanisms and help in the development of more efficient bio-remediators. In this review, we point out the major contributions of computational methodologies applied to enzyme based detoxification of OPs. Furthermore, we highlight the use of PTE, PON, DFP, and BuChE as enzymes used in OP detoxification process and how computational tools such as molecular docking, molecular dynamics simulations and combined quantum mechanical/molecular mechanics have and will continue to contribute to this very important area of research.The re-emergence of chemical weapons as a global threat in hands of terrorist groups, together with an increasing number of pesticides intoxications and environmental contaminations worldwide, has called the attention of the scientific community for the need of improvement in the technologies for detoxification of organophosphorus (OP) compounds. A compelling strategy is the use of bioremediation by enzymes that are able to hydrolyze these molecules to harmless chemical species. Several enzymes have been studied and engineered for this purpose. However, their mechanisms of action are not well understood. Theoretical investigations may help elucidate important aspects of these mechanisms and help in the development of more efficient bio-remediators. In this review, we point out the major contributions of computational methodologies applied to enzyme based detoxification of OPs. Furthermore, we highlight the use of PTE, PON, DFP, and BuChE as enzymes used in OP detoxification process and how computational tools such as molecular docking, molecular dynamics simulations and combined quantum mechanical/molecular mechanics have and will continue to contribute to this very important area of research.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Abramovo Counterterrorism Training Center

The U.S. government has been assisting the Russian Federation (RF) Ministry of Defense (MOD) for many years with nuclear weapons transportation security (NWTS) through the provision of specialized guard escort railcars and cargo railcars with integrated physical security and communication systems, armored transport vehicles, and armored escort vehicles. As a natural continuation of the NWTS program, a partnership has been formed to construct a training center that will provide counterterrorism training to personnel in all branches of the RF MOD. The Abramovo Counterterrorism Training Center (ACTC) is a multinational, multiagency project with funding from Canada, RF and the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy. ACTC will be a facility where MOD personnel can conduct basic through advanced training in various security measures to protect Category IA material against the threat of terrorist attack. The training will enhance defense-in-depth principles by integrating MOD guard force personnel into the overall physical protection systems and improving their overall response time and neutralization capabilities. The ACTC project includes infrastructure improvements, renovation of existing buildings, construction of new buildings, construction of new training facilities, and provision of training and other equipment. Classroom training will be conducted in a renovated training building. Basic and intermediate training will be conducted on three different security training areas where various obstacles and static training devices will be constructed. The central element of ACTC, where advanced training will be held, is the 'autodrome,' a 3 km road along which various terrorist events can be staged to challenge MOD personnel in realistic and dynamic nuclear weapons transportation scenarios. This paper will address the ACTC project elements and the vision for training development and integrating this training into actual nuclear weapons transportation operations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Preliminary Evaluation of the Field and Laboratory Emission Cell (FLEC) for Sampling Attribution Signatures from Building Materials

This study provides a preliminary evaluation of the Field and Laboratory Emission Cell (FLEC) for its suitability for sampling building materials for toxic compounds and their associated impurities and residues that might remain after a terrorist chemical attack. Chemical warfare (CW) agents and toxic industrial chemicals were represented by a range of test probes that included CW surrogates. The test probes encompassed the acid-base properties, volatilities, and polarities of the expected chemical agents and residual compounds. Results indicated that dissipation of the test probes depended heavily on the underlying material. Near complete dissipation of almost all test probes occurred from galvanized stainless steel within 3.0 hrs, whereas far stronger retention with concomitant slower release was observed for vinyl composition floor tiles. The test probes displayed immediated permanence on Teflon. FLEC sampling was further evaluated by profiling residues remaining after the evaporation of 2-chloroethyl ethyl sulfide, a sulfur mustard simulant. This study lays the groundwork for the eventual goal of applying this sampling approach for collection of forensic attribution signatures that remain after a terrorist chemical attack.

Harvey, Scott D↗

Airport baggage scanning technology makes flying safer for Americans

Each time you step on a commercial flight, you can feel safer because of a researcher you've probably never heard of. His name is Harry Martz. He's a veteran scientist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) who wakes up every day thinking how his research can advance X-ray imaging technology to thwart the next terrorist attack. "My job is to improve national security" Martz said. "That's why my research team exists. We have to outsmart the terrorists. It's a constant battle."

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Computer Modeling of Violent Intent: A Content Analysis Approach

We present a computational approach to modeling the intent of a communication source representing a group or an individual to engage in violent behavior. Our aim is to identify and rank aspects of radical rhetoric that are endogenously related to violent intent to predict the potential for violence as encoded in written or spoken language. We use correlations between contentious rhetoric and the propensity for violent behavior found in documents from radical terrorist and non-terrorist groups and individuals to train and evaluate models of violent intent. We then apply these models to unseen instances of linguistic behavior to detect signs of contention that have a positive correlation with violent intent factors. Of particular interest is the application of violent intent models to social media, such as Twitter, that have proved to serve as effective channels in furthering sociopolitical change.

Sanfilippo, Antonio P.↗

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Orphan Source Recovery Project in the Russian Federation

After 9/11, officials at the United States Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) grew more concerned about radiological materials that were vulnerable to theft and illicit use around the world. The concern was that terrorists could combine stolen radiological materials with explosives to build and detonate a radiological dispersal device (RDD), more commonly known as a “dirty bomb.” In response to this and other terrorist threats, the DOE/NNSA formed what is now known as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) to consolidate and accelerate efforts to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. Although a cooperative program was already underway in the Russian Federation to secure nuclear materials at a range of different facilities, thousands of sealed radioactive sources remained vulnerable at medical, research, and industrial sites. In response, GTRI began to focus efforts on addressing these materials. GTRI’s Russia Orphan Source Recovery Project, managed at the Nevada National Security Site’s North Las Vegas facility, was initiated in 2002. Throughout the life of the project, Joint Stock Company “Isotope” has served as the primary Russian subcontractor, and the organization has proven to be a successful partner. Since the first orphan source recovery of an industrial cobalt-60 irradiator with 647 curies (Ci) at an abandoned facility in Moscow in 2003, the GTRI Orphan Source Recovery Project in the Russian Federation has accomplished substantial levels of threat reduction. To date, GTRI has recovered and securely disposed of more than 5,100 sources totaling more that 628,000 Ci. This project serves as an extraordinary example of how international cooperation can be implemented by partners with mutual interests to achieve significant goals.

GTRI, Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Russian ↗

Stopping Illicit Procurement: Lessons from Global Finance

Government regulators and the financial sector cooperate to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. This information-sharing relationship is built upon a strong legislative foundation and effective operational procedures. As with money-laundering and terrorist financing, halting the illicit procurement of dual-use commodities requires close coordination between government and industry. However, many of the legal and operational features present in financial threat cooperation do not exist in the export control realm. This article analyzes the applicability of financial industry cooperative measures to nonproliferation.

Finance↗

Obama Signs New START Treaty With Russians

Prague, Czech Republic President Obama: Finally, this day demonstrates the determination of the United States and Russia -- the two nations that hold over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons -- to pursue responsible global leadership. Together, we are keeping our commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which must be the foundation for global non-proliferation. While the New START treaty is an important first step forward, it is just one step on a longer journey. As I said last year in Prague, this treaty will set the stage for further cuts. And going forward, we hope to pursue discussions with Russia on reducing both our strategic and tactical weapons, including non-deployed weapons. President Medvedev and I have also agreed to expand our discussions on missile defense. This will include regular exchanges of information about our threat assessments, as well as the completion of a joint assessment of emerging ballistic missiles. And as these assessments are completed, I look forward to launching a serious dialogue about Russian-American cooperation on missile defense. But nuclear weapons are not simply an issue for the United States and Russia -- they threaten the common security of all nations. A nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist is a danger to people everywhere -- from Moscow to New York; from the cities of Europe to South Asia. So next week, 47 nations will come together in Washington to discuss concrete steps that can be taken to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years. And the spread of nuclear weapons to more states is also an unacceptable risk to global security -- raising the specter of arms races from the Middle East to East Asia. Earlier this week, the United States formally changed our policy to make it clear that those non-nuclear weapons states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and their non-proliferation obligations will not be threatened by America’s nuclear arsenal. This demonstrates, once more, America’s commitment to the NPT as a cornerstone of our security strategy. Those nations that follow the rules will find greater security and opportunity. Those nations that refuse to meet their obligations will be isolated, and denied the opportunity that comes with international recognition. That includes accountability for those that break the rules -- otherwise the NPT is just words on a page. That’s why the United States and Russia are part of a coalition of nations insisting that the Islamic Republic of Iran face consequences, because they have continually failed to meet their obligations. We are working together at the United Nations Security Council to pass strong sanctions on Iran. And we will not tolerate actions that flout the NPT, risk an arms race in a vital region, and threaten the credibility of the international community and our collective security. While these issues are a top priority, they are only one part of the U.S.-Russia relationship. Today, I again expressed my deepest condolences for the terrible loss of Russian life in recent terrorist attacks, and we will remain steadfast partners in combating violent extremism. We also discussed the potential to expand our cooperation on behalf of economic growth, trade and investment, as well as technological innovation, and I look forward to discussing these issues further when President Medvedev visits the United States later this year, because there is much we can do on behalf of our security and prosperity if we continue to work together. When one surveys the many challenges that we face around the world, it’s easy to grow complacent, or to abandon the notion that progress can be shared. But I want to repeat what I said last year in Prague: When nations and peoples allow themselves to be defined by their differences, the gulf between them widens. When we fail to pursue peace, then it stays forever beyond our grasp. This majestic city of Prague is in many ways a monument to human progress. And this ceremony is a testament to the truth that old adversaries can forge new partnerships. I could not help but be struck the other day by the words of Arkady Brish, who helped build the Soviet Union’s first atom bomb. At the age of 92, having lived to see the horrors of a World War and the divisions of a Cold War, he said, We hope humanity will reach the moment when there is no need for nuclear weapons, when there is peace and calm in the world. It’s easy to dismiss those voices. But doing so risks repeating the horrors of the past, while ignoring the history of human progress. The pursuit of peace and calm and cooperation among nations is the work of both leaders and peoples in the 21st century. For we must be as persistent and passionate in our pursuit of progress as any who would stand in our way. Once again, President Medvedev, thank you for your extraordinary leadership.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Response of the REWARD detection system to the presence of a Radiological Dispersal Device

In recent years an increased international concern has emerged about the radiological and nuclear (RN) threats associated with the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials that could be potentially used for terrorist attacks. The objective of the REWARD (Real Time Wide Area Radiation Surveillance System) project, co-funded by the European Union 7. Framework Programme Security, consisted in building a mobile system for real time, wide area radiation surveillance, using a CdZnTe detector for gamma radiation and a neutron detector based on novel silicon technologies. The sensing unit includes a GPS system and a wireless communication interface to send the data remotely to a monitoring base station, where it will be analyzed in real time and correlated with historical data from the tag location, in order to generate an alarm when an abnormal situation is detected. Due to its portability and accuracy, the system will be extremely useful in many different scenarios such as nuclear terrorism, lost radioactive sources, radioactive contamination or nuclear accidents. This paper shortly introduces the REWARD detection system, depicts some terrorist threat scenarios involving radioactive sources and special nuclear materials and summarizes the simulation work undertaken during the past three years in the framework of the REWARD project. The main objective consisted in making predictions regarding the behavior of the REWARD system in the presence of a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD), one of the reference scenarios foreseen for REWARD, using the Monte Carlo simulation program MCNP6. The reference scenario is characterized in detail, from the i) radiological protection, ii) radiation detection requirements and iii) communications points of view. Experimental tests were performed at the Fire Brigades Facilities in Rome and at the Naples Fire Brigades, and the results, which validate the simulation work, are presented and analyzed. The response of the REWARD detection system to the presence of an RDD is predicted and discussed. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Small CaH{sub 2} Moderated Thermal Reactor for Surface Power Generation I: Conceptual Design

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) published 'Journey to Mars' on October 8, 2015, stating their plan to send human to Mars for exploration, scientific research and colonization of Mars. Mission time on Martian surface is supposed to be ∼1 year, therefore, a surface power generation system is required for human habitation on Mars. Even though solar power and chemical battery have been used for the past missions, the former cannot generate power during month-scale dust storm on Mars, and the latter is not reliable for long-term use under a cold environment. On the other hand, nuclear power provides stable power even on Mars surface and, since kilowatt class power system is required in the planned mission, a fission power system is better than a radioisotope battery. An 8-year operation is required for the Mars surface power generation system with electrical power of 10 to 100 kWe and specific power of >5 We/kg, which means the system weight needs to be below 2000 kg in the case of 10 to 100 kWe system. In the current study, stretch goals for surface fission power system were set as follows: electric power of 20 kWe and total system weight below 1000 kg. In addition, nuclear security and critical safety are essential features for the surface fission power system considering launch accidents. A sufficient level of nuclear security is needed to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear materials even the reactor falls in a geographic area dominated by terrorists. From this view point, it is preferable not to use highly enriched uranium with a space reactor that can be diverted to nuclear weapons. Also, a nuclear reactor core should not reach criticality during a launch accident where the reactor core can be compressed by collision with sea or land. A novel concept of surface power reactor system that satisfies the above requirements is proposed in the current study. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Exposure Levels for Chemical Threat Compounds; Information to Facilitate Chemical Incident Response

Exposure Standards, Limits and Guidelines for Chemical Threat Compunds ABSTRACT Exposure criteria for chemical warfare (CW) agents and certain toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) used as CW agents (such as chlorine fill in an improvised explosive device) have been developed for protection of the civilian general public, civilian employees in chemical agent processing facilities and deployed military populations. In addition, compound-specific concentrations have been developed to serve as how clean is clean enough clearance criteria guiding facility recovery following chemical terrorist or other hazardous release events. Such criteria are also useful to verify compound absence, identify containment boundaries and expedite facility recovery following chemical threat release. There is no single right value or concentration appropriate for all chemical hazard control applications. It is acknowledged that locating and comparing the many sources of CW agent and TIC exposure criteria has not been previously well-defined. This paper summarizes many of these estimates and assembles critical documentation regarding their derivation and use.

chemical terrorist↗