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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2013

What Reliability Engineers Should Know about Space Radiation Effects

Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.

DiBari, Rebecca↗
NASA NTRS2014

Single-Event Effect Report for EPC Series eGaN FETs: Comparison of EPC1000 and EPC2000 Series Devices for Destructive SEE

Recent testing of the EPC1000 series eGaN FETs has shown sensitivity to Single Event Effects (SEE) that are destructive. These effects are most likely the failure of the very thin gate structure in HEMT architecture. EPC has recently changed the doping of the substrate to improve the performance and the SEE response. This testing compares the SEE response of both devices.

Scheick, Leif↗
NASA NTRS2015

Single-Event Effect Performance of a Conductive-Bridge Memory EEPROM

We investigated the heavy ion SEE characteristics of an EEPROM based on CBRAM technology. SEFI is the dominant type of SEE for each operating mode (standby, read-only, write/read). We also observed single bit upsets in the CBRAM cell, during write/read tests. the SEULET threshold is between 10 and 20 MeV * sq cm/mg, with an upper fluence limit of 3 × 10(exp 6) cm(exp -2) at 10 MeV * sq cm/mg. In the stand by mode, the CBRAM array appears immune to bit upsets.

single event effects↗
NASA NTRS2015

Compendium of Current Single Event Effects for Candidate Spacecraft Electronics for NASA

NASA spacecraft are subjected to a harsh space environment that includes exposure to various types of ionizing radiation. The performance of electronic devices in a space radiation environment are often limited by their susceptibility to single event effects (SEE). Ground-based testing is used to evaluate candidate spacecraft electronics to determine risk to spaceflight applications. Interpreting the results of radiation testing of complex devices is and adequate understanding of the test condition is critical. Studies discussed herein were undertaken to establish the application-specific sensitivities of candidate spacecraft and emerging electronic devices to single-event upset (SEU), single-event latchup (SEL), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), single-event burnout (SEB), and single-event transient (SET). For total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage dose (DDD) results, see a companion paper submitted to the 2015 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference (NSREC) Radiation Effects Data Workshop (REDW) entitled "compendium of Current Total Ionizing Dose and Displacement Damage for Candidate Spacecraft Electronics for NASA by M. Campola, et al.

spacecraft electronics↗
NASA NTRS2014

Compendium of Single Event Effects, Total Ionizing Dose, and Displacement Damage for Candidate Spacecraft Electronics for NASA

We present results and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on a variety of candidate spacecraft electronics to proton and heavy ion induced single event effects (SEE), proton-induced displacement damage (DD), and total ionizing dose (TID). Introduction: This paper is a summary of test results.NASA spacecraft are subjected to a harsh space environment that includes exposure to various types of ionizing radiation. The performance of electronic devices in a space radiation environment is often limited by its susceptibility to single event effects (SEE), total ionizing dose (TID), and displacement damage (DD). Ground-based testing is used to evaluate candidate spacecraft electronics to determine risk to spaceflight applications. Interpreting the results of radiation testing of complex devices is quite difficult. Given the rapidly changing nature of technology, radiation test data are most often application-specific and adequate understanding of the test conditions is critical. Studies discussed herein were undertaken to establish the application-specific sensitivities of candidate spacecraft and emerging electronic devices to single-event upset (SEU), single-event latchup (SEL), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), single-event burnout (SEB), single-event transient (SET), TID, enhanced low dose rate sensitivity (ELDRS), and DD effects.

Single Event Effects↗
NASA NTRS2002

SEE and TID of emerging non-volatile memories

We report on the SEE and TID tests of higher density flash memories. Stand-by currents and full functional tests were used to characterize the response of radiation effects.

single-event upset non-volatile memories↗
NASA NTRS2014

Investigation of the Semicoa 2N7616 and 2N7425 and the Microsemi 2N7480 for Single-Event Gate Rupture and Single-Event Burnout

Single-event-effect test results for hi-rel total-dose-hardened power MOSFETs are presented in this report. The 2N7616 and the 2N7425 from Semicoa and the 2N7480 from International Rectifier were tested to NASA test condition standards and requirements. The 2N7480 performed well and the data agree with the manufacture's data. The 2N7616 and 2N7425 were entry parts from Semicoa using a new device architecture. Unfortunately, the device performed poorly and Semicoa is withdrawing power MOSFETs from it line due to these data. Vertical metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect transistors (MOSFETs) are the most commonly used power transistor. MOSFETs are typically employed in power supplies and high current switching applications. Due to the inherent high electric fields in the device, power MOSFETs are sensitive to heavy ion irradiation and can fail catastrophically as a result of single-event gate rupture (SEGR) or single-event burnout (SEB). Manufacturers have designed radiation-hardened power MOSFETs for space applications. See [1] through [5] for more information. The objective of this effort was to investigate the SEGR and SEB responses of two power MOSFETs recently produced. These tests will serve as a limited verification of these parts. It is acknowledged that further testing on the respective parts may be needed for some mission profiles.

Scheick, Leif↗
NASA NTRS2004

Tradeoffs in Flight Design Upset Mitigation in State of the Art FPGAs: Hardened by Design vs. Design Level Hardening

This presentation compares and contrasts the effectiveness and the system/designer impacts of the two main approaches to upset hardening: the Actel approach (RTSX-S and RTAX-S) of low-level (inside each flip-flop) triplication and the Xilinx approach (Virtex and Virtex2) of design-level triplication of both functional blocks and voters. The effectiveness of these approaches is compared using measurements made in conjunction with each of the FPGAs' manufacturer: for Actel, published data [1] and for Xilinx, recent results from the Xilinx SEE Test Consortium (note that the author is an active and founding member). The impacts involve Actel advantages in the areas of transistor-utilization efficiency and minimizing designer involvement in the triplication while the Xilinx advantages relate to the ability to custom tailor upset hardness and the flexibility of re-configurability. Additionally, there are currently clear Xilinx advantages in available features such as the number of I/O's, logic cells, and RAM blocks as well as speed. However, the advantage of the Actel anti-fuses for configuration over the Xilinx SRAM cells is that the latter need additional functionality and external circuitry (PROMs and, at least a watchdog timer) for configuration and configuration scrubbing. Further, although effectively mitigated if done correctly, the proton upset-ability of the Xilinx FPGAs is a concern in severe proton-rich environments. Ultimately, both manufacturers' upset hardening is limited by SEFI (single-event functional interrupt) rates where it appears the Actel results are better although the Xilinx Virtex2-family result of about one SEFI in 65 device-years in solar-min GCR (the more intense part of the galactic cosmic-ray background) should be acceptable to most missions

radiation effects↗
NASA NTRS2003

Single-Event Effects Ground Testing and On-Orbit Rate Prediction Methods: The Past, Present and Future

Over the past 27 years, or so, increased concern over single event effects in spacecraft systems has resulted in research, development and engineering activities centered around a better understanding of the space radiation environment, single event effects predictive methods, ground test protocols, and test facility developments. This research has led to fairly well developed methods for assessing the impact of the space radiation environment on systems that contain SEE sensitive devices and the development of mitigation strategies either at the system or device level.

Reed, Robert A.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Spacecraft Solar Particle Event (SPE) Shielding: Shielding Effectiveness as a Function of SPE model as Determined with the FLUKA Radiation Transport Code

Analysis of both satellite and surface neutron monitor data demonstrate that the widely utilized Exponential model of solar particle event (SPE) proton kinetic energy spectra can seriously underestimate SPE proton flux, especially at the highest kinetic energies. The more recently developed Band model produces better agreement with neutron monitor data ground level events (GLEs) and is believed to be considerably more accurate at high kinetic energies. Here, we report the results of modeling and simulation studies in which the radiation transport code FLUKA (FLUktuierende KAskade) is used to determine the changes in total ionizing dose (TID) and single-event environments (SEE) behind aluminum, polyethylene, carbon, and titanium shielding masses when the assumed form (i. e., Band or Exponential) of the solar particle event (SPE) kinetic energy spectra is changed. FLUKA simulations have fully three dimensions with an isotropic particle flux incident on a concentric spherical shell shielding mass and detector structure. The effects are reported for both energetic primary protons penetrating the shield mass and secondary particle showers caused by energetic primary protons colliding with shielding mass nuclei. Our results, in agreement with previous studies, show that use of the Exponential form of the event

Koontz, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2004

FPGA-Based, Self-Checking, Fault-Tolerant Computers

A proposed computer architecture would exploit the capabilities of commercially available field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) to enable computers to detect and recover from bit errors. The main purpose of the proposed architecture is to enable fault-tolerant computing in the presence of single-event upsets (SEUs). [An SEU is a spurious bit flip (also called a soft error) caused by a single impact of ionizing radiation.] The architecture would also enable recovery from some soft errors caused by electrical transients and, to some extent, from intermittent and permanent (hard) errors caused by aging of electronic components. A typical FPGA of the current generation contains one or more complete processor cores, memories, and highspeed serial input/output (I/O) channels, making it possible to shrink a board-level processor node to a single integrated-circuit chip. Custom, highly efficient microcontrollers, general-purpose computers, custom I/O processors, and signal processors can be rapidly and efficiently implemented by use of FPGAs. Unfortunately, FPGAs are susceptible to SEUs. Prior efforts to mitigate the effects of SEUs have yielded solutions that degrade performance of the system and require support from external hardware and software. In comparison with other fault-tolerant- computing architectures (e.g., triple modular redundancy), the proposed architecture could be implemented with less circuitry and lower power demand. Moreover, the fault-tolerant computing functions would require only minimal support from circuitry outside the central processing units (CPUs) of computers, would not require any software support, and would be largely transparent to software and to other computer hardware. There would be two types of modules: a self-checking processor module and a memory system (see figure). The self-checking processor module would be implemented on a single FPGA and would be capable of detecting its own internal errors. It would contain two CPUs executing identical programs in lock step, with comparison of their outputs to detect errors. It would also contain various cache local memory circuits, communication circuits, and configurable special-purpose processors that would use self-checking checkers. (The basic principle of the self-checking checker method is to utilize logic circuitry that generates error signals whenever there is an error in either the checker or the circuit being checked.) The memory system would comprise a main memory and a hardware-controlled check-pointing system (CPS) based on a buffer memory denoted the recovery cache. The main memory would contain random-access memory (RAM) chips and FPGAs that would, in addition to everything else, implement double-error-detecting and single-error-correcting memory functions to enable recovery from single-bit errors.

Some, Raphael↗
NASA NTRS2013

Destructive Single-Event Failures in Diodes

In this summary, we have shown that diodes are susceptible to destructive single-event effects, and that these failures occur along the guard ring. By determining the last passing voltages, a safe operating area can be derived. By derating off of those values, rather than by the rated voltage, like what is currently done with power MOSFETs, we can work to ensure the safety of future missions. However, there are still open questions about these failures. Are they limited to a single manufacturer, a small number, or all of them? Is there a threshold rated voltage that must be exceeded to see these failures? With future work, we hope to answer these questions. In the full paper, laser results will also be presented to verify that failures only occur along the guard ring.

Casey, Megan C.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Comparison of TID Response and SEE Characterization of Single and Multi Level High Density NAND Flash Memories

Heavy ion single-event measurements and TID response for 8Gb commercial NAND flash memories are reported. Radiation results of multi-level flash technology are compared with results from single-level flash technology. In general, these commercial high density memories appear to be much less susceptible to SEE and have better TID response compared to older generations of flash memories. The charge pump survived up to 600 krads.

nonvolatile memory↗
NASA NTRS2014

Single-Event Effect Testing of the Cree C4D40120D Commercial 1200V Silicon Carbide Schottky Diode

This study was undertaken to determine the single event effect (SEE) susceptibility of the commercial silicon carbide 1200V Schottky diode manufactured by Cree, Inc. Heavy-ion testing was conducted at the Texas A&M University Cyclotron Single Event Effects Test Facility (TAMU). Its purpose was to evaluate this device as a candidate for use in the Solar-Electric Propulsion flight project.

silicon carbide (SiC)↗