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DOE OSTI2019

DATA-DRIVEN ALGORITHMS FOR DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM OPERATION AND CONTROL

Transactive energy systems are an alternative solution for the problems that distribution system operators face due to an increase in the use of distributed energy resources(DERs) and resulting much required scalability in managing active distribution system. To meet the reliability, sustainability and security requirement, ecient management and control of DERs including distributed generators, energy storage systems, and demand response is necessary. DERs can provide services such as reactive power compensation, voltage control, energy balancing, peak load reduction. These edge resources can also be used for system restoration after the extreme events within regulatory bound and enabling resiliency of the electric grid. While there are numbers of related work focused on solving these problems, availability of additional data resources has not been utilized to its potential to enable the reliable, sustainable and resilient electric grid. In order to address these challenges, data-driven algorithms have been proposed in this dissertation, including a) Volt/Var control, b) activity aware demand response and c) estimation of behind the meter distributed energy resources. Results indicate satisfactory performance of the developed algorithms.

ZHANG, YUE↗

DOE OSTI2020

U.S. Domestic Small Modular Reactor Security by Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting evolving security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the past approach) can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. This effort will intend to integrate security into the design phase of a model SMR that meets current NRC physical protection requirements and provide advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D, PATHTRACE and Blender were used to model a hypothetical generic domestic SMR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. One outsider sabotage scenario was examined with 4-8 adversaries to determine security metrics. This work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic SMRs. The purpose of this project is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy Complex can impact the design of U.S. domestic SMRs and the complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for SMRs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2017

A Methodology for Dynamic Security Risk Quantification and Optimal Resource Allocation of Security Assets

In this presentation we overview a methodology for dynamic security risk quantification and optimal resource allocation of security assets for high profile venues. This methodology is especially applicable to venues that require security screening operations such as mass transit (e.g., train or airport terminals), critical infrastructure protection (e.g., government buildings), and largescale public events (e.g., concerts or professional sports). The method starts by decomposing the three core components of risk -- threat, vulnerability, and consequence -- into their various subcomponents. For instance, vulnerability can be decomposed into availability, accessibility, organic security, and target hardness and each of these can be evaluated against the potential threats of interest for the given venue. Once evaluated, these subcomponents are rolled back up to compute the specific value for the vulnerability core risk component. Likewise, the same is done for consequence and threat, and then risk is computed as the product of these three components. A key aspect of our methodology is dynamically quantifying risk. That is, we incorporate the ability to uniquely allow the subcomponents and core components, and in turn, risk, to be quantified as a continuous function of time throughout the day, week, month, or year as appropriate.

Brigantic, Robert T.↗

DOE OSTI2012

Fiscal Year 2012 Institutional Commitments [Slides]

Assess the safety, reliability, and performance of LANL weapons systems. Achieve NNSA's Weapon Complex Transformation for the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and meet national security requirements. Provide early identification, creative maturation, and timely delivery of scientific solutions to technically challenging security issues. Become the premier capabilities-based national security science Laboratory . Develop sustainable solutions that allow resilient adaptation to growing global energy demand. Make safety and security integral to every activity we do. Reduce risks while providing seamless information services. Establish excellence in environmental stewardship. Provide efficient, compliant, and secure infrastructure supported with disciplined operations. Enable mission and operational excellence. Deliver cost effective business systems that meet LANL's business needs. Demonstrate our value as a national security science Laboratory, as an employer, and as a good corporate citizen by communicating effectively with our employees, customers, community, and stakeholders while successfully executing our community commitments. Cultivate a work environment where employees are empowered to achieve success.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Achieving Cyber-Resilience for Power Systems using a Learning, Model-Assisted Blockchain Framework

The secure integration and management of distributed energy resources (DER) and power aggregators in the electric grid requires secure communications and a physics-aware Command and Control (C2) strategy. A Blockchain (BC)-based overlay network was developed to provide a security layer for the existing power grid network that mitigates risks in current and legacy network and C2 protocols. By integrating a Model-Assisted Machine Learning (MAML) framework with a Secure Blockchain Overlay Network (SBON) a defense-in-depth strategy was achieved. In our approach, the MAML framework leveraged a smart contract framework to gather network data and learn the dynamics of DER to develop detection strategies for attacks targeting sensors and actuators used by DER. The MAML framework learned dynamical systems models for individual DERs to detect sensor attacks. For DER we utilized a Digital Twin (DT) to accelerate the learning process for a model resistant to stealthy attacks. The project created DT for PV inverters and BESS. The DTs were coupled with a model-assisted, data-driven learning of DER behavior. Specifically, we evaluated architectures for model-based learning with model-free fine-tuning. Additionally, differential privacy techniques were used to obfuscate data, while still allowing the computation of attack detection results based on obfuscated data. The SBON developed leverages a private permissioned blockchain network orchestrated with the Hyperledger Fabric framework. To connect the cyber world, which orchestrates the blockchain fabric, and the physical world where the power network resides, we developed a system implementation to enable the secure interaction of the physical world and the abstracted blockchain.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2021

U.S. Domestic Pebble Bed Reactor: Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) that utilize pebble-based fuels and increase the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model HTGR that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic HTGR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic HTGRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can impact the design of and complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for SMRs. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2021

U.S. Domestic Microreactor Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of a microreactor and increase the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model microreactor that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic microreactor facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to-eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic microreactors. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can impact the design of and complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for microreactors. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all microreactor designs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2023

U.S. Domestic Security-by-Design: On Site Response Force Strategies

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost- effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) that utilize pebble-based fuels and microreactors. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model HTGR and microreactor that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic HTGR facility and microreactor facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and onsite response forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to-eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic HTGRs and microreactors. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can lead to efficient security systems that utilize an onsite response force. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2015

Beyond a series of security nets: Applying STAMP & STPA to port security

Port security is an increasing concern considering the significant role of ports in global commerce and today’s increasingly complex threat environment. Current approaches to port security mirror traditional models of accident causality -- ‘a series of security nets’ based on component reliability and probabilistic assumptions. Traditional port security frameworks result in isolated and inconsistent improvement strategies. Recent work in engineered safety combines the ideas of hierarchy, emergence, control and communication into a new paradigm for understanding port security as an emergent complex system property. The ‘System-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP)’ is a new model of causality based on systems and control theory. The associated analysis process -- System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) -- identifies specific technical or procedural security requirements designed to work in coordination with (and be traceable to) overall port objectives. This process yields port security design specifications that can mitigate (if not eliminate) port security vulnerabilities related to an emphasis on component reliability, lack of coordination between port security stakeholders or economic pressures endemic in the maritime industry. As a result, this article aims to demonstrate how STAMP’s broader view of causality and complexity can better address the dynamic and interactive behaviors of social, organizational and technical components of port security.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA NTRS2013

Autonomous Byte Stream Randomizer

Net-centric networking environments are often faced with limited resources and must utilize bandwidth as efficiently as possible. In networking environments that span wide areas, the data transmission has to be efficient without any redundant or exuberant metadata. The Autonomous Byte Stream Randomizer software provides an extra level of security on top of existing data encryption methods. Randomizing the data s byte stream adds an extra layer to existing data protection methods, thus making it harder for an attacker to decrypt protected data. Based on a generated crypto-graphically secure random seed, a random sequence of numbers is used to intelligently and efficiently swap the organization of bytes in data using the unbiased and memory-efficient in-place Fisher-Yates shuffle method. Swapping bytes and reorganizing the crucial structure of the byte data renders the data file unreadable and leaves the data in a deconstructed state. This deconstruction adds an extra level of security requiring the byte stream to be reconstructed with the random seed in order to be readable. Once the data byte stream has been randomized, the software enables the data to be distributed to N nodes in an environment. Each piece of the data in randomized and distributed form is a separate entity unreadable on its own right, but when combined with all N pieces, is able to be reconstructed back to one. Reconstruction requires possession of the key used for randomizing the bytes, leading to the generation of the same cryptographically secure random sequence of numbers used to randomize the data. This software is a cornerstone capability possessing the ability to generate the same cryptographically secure sequence on different machines and time intervals, thus allowing this software to be used more heavily in net-centric environments where data transfer bandwidth is limited.

Paloulian, George K.↗

DOE OSTI2020

Regulatory Development Challenges and Opportunities for the Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Materials

Drafting regulations for transport safety and transport security achieve two separate objectives, which can lead to divergent outcomes. With transport safety, the principle goal is to protect the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, while in contrast, the principle goal of transport security is to protect the material from malicious actors. While many Member States may have transport safety regulations for radioactive materials, transport security regulatory development is still in its nascent stages globally. Trying to develop harmonized transport safety and transport security regulations could lead to challenges ranging from differences in terminology used in transport safety versus terminology uses in transport security, roles and responsibilities for the variety of stakeholders involved in transport, and finally, the possible role of multiple competent authorities in governing the transport of dangerous goods, which includes radioactive material. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently developing a process of a methodology for drafting transport security regulations, any process must address both safety considerations and security requirements. (As the most vulnerable part of the life cycle of radioactive materials, the need for harmonized transport safety/transport security regulations is essential.) This paper investigates the regulatory elements of the safety-security interface for nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Examining challenges including use of terms, the role of multiple competent authorities, and practical challenges involved in the safe and secure transport of radioactive material, the paper analyzes the need for integrated regulatory development for the safe and secure transport of these materials.

Anderson, Kimberly↗

DOE OSTI2013

U.S. Patent Pending, Cyberspace Security System for Complex Systems, U.S. Patent Application No.: 14/134,949

A computer implemented method monetizes the security of a cyber-system in terms of losses each stakeholder may expect to lose if a security break down occurs. A non-transitory media stores instructions for generating a stake structure that includes costs that each stakeholder of a system would lose if the system failed to meet security requirements and generating a requirement structure that includes probabilities of failing requirements when computer components fails. The system generates a vulnerability model that includes probabilities of a component failing given threats materializing and generates a perpetrator model that includes probabilities of threats materializing. The system generates a dot product of the stakes structure, the requirement structure, the vulnerability model and the perpetrator model. The system can further be used to compare, contrast and evaluate alternative courses of actions best suited for the stakeholders and their requirements.

Availablity↗

NASA NTRS2010

NASA's Earth Observing System (EOS): Delivering on the Dream, Today and Tomorrow

This paper describes the successful operations of NASA's Earth Observing System (EOS) satellites over the past 10 years and the plans for the future. Excellent operations performance has been a key factor in the overall success of EOS. The EOS Program was conceived in the 1980s and began to take shape in the early 1990s. EOS consists of a series of satellites that study the Earth as an interrelated system. It began with the launch of Terra in December 1999, followed by Aqua in May 2002, and Aura in July 2004. A key EOS goal is to provide a long-term continuous data set to enable the science community to develop a better understanding of land, ocean, and atmospheric processes and their interactions. EOS has produced unprecedented amounts of data which are used all over the world free of charge. Mission operations have resulted in data recovery for Terra, Aqua, and Aura that have consistently exceeded mission requirements. The paper describes the ground systems and organizations that control the EOS satellites, capture the raw data, and distribute the processed science data sets. The paper further describes how operations have evolved since 1999. Examples of this evolution include (a) the implementation of new mission safety requirements for orbital debris monitoring; (b) technology upgrades to keep facilities at the state of the art; (c) enhancements to meet changing security requirements; and (d) operations management of the 2 international Earth Observing Constellations of 11 satellites known as the "Morning Constellation" and the "A-Train". The paper concludes with a view into the future based on the latest spacecraft status, lifetime projections, and mission plans.

Kelly, Angelita C.↗

DOE OSTI2024

Small Modular Reactor and Microreactor Security-by-Design Lessons Learned: Integrated PPS Designs

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

U.S. Domestic Molten Salt Reactor: Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, economical, and effective physical protection systems (PPS). The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of a molten salt reactor (MSR) and show how to effectively design a PPS with a reduced staffing headcount. Specifically, this work focuses on integrating PPS design features into a developed facility layout by making minor modifications to building structures. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D©, PathTrace©, and Blender©, were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic MSR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and responders were added into the model based on defending the hypothetical MSR facility against a hypothetical design basis threat (DBT). Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined, with adversary team sizes ranging from 4–8 to determine security system effectiveness. The results of this work will influence PPS designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic MSRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) complex can impact the design and completion of security-by-design (SeBD) for small modular reactors (SMRs). The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2016

NUSAM Methodology for Assessment.

This document provides a methodology for the performance-based assessment of security systems designed for the protection of nuclear and radiological materials and the processes that produce and/or involve them. It is intended for use with both relatively simple installations and with highly regulated complex sites with demanding security requirements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NASA NTRS2022

The Mars 2020 Ground Data System Architecture

The Mars 2020 Mission’s primary objective is to collect 20 geographically unique samples during its prime mission of one and a quarter Martian years, or just over 2 Earth years. Mission planners determined the project needed to develop a system that would enable the operations team to analyze engineering and science data, make science decisions, select viable rover targets at a millimeter resolution and validate an uplink bundle for a car sized rover with more complex science instruments than any previous Mars surface mission. All this had to be done within a five hour time frame. Doing this with a small team would be a challenge, but this had to be accomplished by a large team of engineers and scientists located across North America and Europe. Achieving this level of operational efficiency was unheard of in the prime mission. In addition, the mission had another set of requirements that had nothing to do with surface operations; the Mars 2020 Ground Data System (GDS) was also expected to comply with a new set of security requirements to keep up with the ever changing cybersecurity landscape. The Mars 2020 Ground Data System (GDS) is a re-architected version of the Mars Science Laboratory GDS. The primary goal was to integrate the lessons learned from previous Mars surface missions, accommodate a set of new requirements and capabilities required to ensure mission success, and comply with a new set of cybersecurity controls. The new architecture includes several unique qualities including a data lake, language-agnostic system-wide event-based operations, containerization, automated deployment, network segmentation, infrastructure-as-code, API-driven interfaces, and the first Mars surface GDS to operate primarily in the cloud. The new architecture enabled greater access to the system’s data, tighter integration with the operations team, and a higher level of traceability. The availability of the data also enabled a new set of capabilities previously not possible on surface missions. These new capabilities include an autonomous data to information, pipeline for downlink analysis, horizontal scaling of science data processing capabilities, autonomous round trip data tracking of science and engineering data, integration of flight system state into the tactical planning cycle, high fidelity targeting utilizing kinematic data, and hierarchical image and 3d meshes data representations. This paper will introduce the requirements for the Mars 2020 Mission, the heritage architecture, and the rationale for the changes to achieve the new architecture. The paper will continue to describe the fundamental changes made to the GDS architecture, how these changes enabled a more tightly integrated GDS, and the new capabilities that were enabled by the new architecture. The paper will conclude with the lessons learned from the process of rearchitecting a heritage GDS system and from the first 200 days of operations supporting over 800 users from around the world.

Lopez-Roig, Reynaldo↗

DOE OSTI2013

The Application of materials attractiveness in a graded approach to nuclear materials security

The threat from terrorist groups has recently received greater attention. In this paper, material quantity and material attractiveness are addressed through the lens of a minimum security strategy needed to prevent the construction of a nuclear explosive device (NED) by an adversary. Nuclear materials are placed into specific security categories (3 or 4 categories) , which define a number of security requirements to protect the material. Materials attractiveness can be divided into four attractiveness levels, High, Medium, Low, and Very Low that correspond to the utility of the material to the adversary and to a minimum security strategy that is necessary to adequately protect the nuclear material. We propose a graded approach to materials attractiveness that recognizes for instance substantial differences in attractiveness between pure reactor-grade Pu oxide (High attractiveness) and fresh MOX fuel (Low attractiveness). In either case, an adversary's acquisition of a Category I quantity of plutonium would be a major incident, but the acquisition of Pu oxide by the adversary would be substantially worse than the acquisition of fresh MOX fuel because of the substantial differences in the time and complexity required of the adversary to process the material and fashion it into a NED.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗