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Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may lead to more proliferation resistant and physically secure design features for SMRs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

U.S. Domestic Pebble Bed Reactor: Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) that utilize pebble-based fuels and increase the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model HTGR that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic HTGR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic HTGRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can impact the design of and complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for SMRs. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

U.S. Domestic Microreactor Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of a microreactor and increase the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model microreactor that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic microreactor facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to-eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic microreactors. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can impact the design of and complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for microreactors. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all microreactor designs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

U.S. Domestic Small Modular Reactor Security by Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting evolving security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the past approach) can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. This effort will intend to integrate security into the design phase of a model SMR that meets current NRC physical protection requirements and provide advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D, PATHTRACE and Blender were used to model a hypothetical generic domestic SMR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. One outsider sabotage scenario was examined with 4-8 adversaries to determine security metrics. This work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic SMRs. The purpose of this project is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy Complex can impact the design of U.S. domestic SMRs and the complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for SMRs.

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Security System Design Concepts Instructor Guide

The goal of this session is to introduce five security system design concepts that will enable the development of an integrated security system and will increase the likelihood of effective security management. As a regulator, it’s important to be aware of these design concepts so that when you inspect or evaluate a facility’s security system, you can ensure that these concepts have been applied.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

U.S. Domestic Molten Salt Reactor: Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, economical, and effective physical protection systems (PPS). The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of a molten salt reactor (MSR) and show how to effectively design a PPS with a reduced staffing headcount. Specifically, this work focuses on integrating PPS design features into a developed facility layout by making minor modifications to building structures. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D©, PathTrace©, and Blender©, were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic MSR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and responders were added into the model based on defending the hypothetical MSR facility against a hypothetical design basis threat (DBT). Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined, with adversary team sizes ranging from 4–8 to determine security system effectiveness. The results of this work will influence PPS designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic MSRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) complex can impact the design and completion of security-by-design (SeBD) for small modular reactors (SMRs). The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Microreactor Security-by-Design Recommendations for Domestic and International Deployments

This report outlines methods vendors can use to incorporate security-by-design (SeBD) into their microreactor facility design to support and address security for both U.S. and international deployment. The team developed a hypothetical below-grade microreactor with a physical protection system (PPS) to protect the microreactor against acts of theft and sabotage and evaluated it against two adversary attack scenarios defined by a group of adversary subject matter experts (SMEs). The hypothetical microreactor facility consists of two distinct buildings. The first is the above-grade protected area (PA) entry control point (ECP) building, which houses security personnel responsible for conducting screenings and managing access to the PA. The second building is the reactor building, which features both an above-grade floor and a below-grade floor.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Small Modular Reactor and Microreactor Security-by-Design Lessons Learned: Integrated PPS Designs

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security into the design process can provide robust, cost-effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this report is to capture lessons learned by the Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program that may be beneficial for other advanced and small modular reactor (SMR) vendors to use when developing security systems and postures. This report will capture relevant information that can be used in the security-by-design (SeBD) process for SMR and microreactor vendors.

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Driving Economics and Reducing Risks: The Business Case for Security-by-Design in Nuclear Power

This report provides an analysis of the financial, operational, and strategic advantages of incorporating Security-by-Design (SeBD) early in the lifecycle of nuclear power plant projects. By framing security as a foundational design element rather than a late-stage add-on, owners, vendors, and operators can reduce budget overruns, strengthen regulatory compliance, and increase revenue opportunities. The report details key lifecycle phases, highlighting the strategic imperative for organizations (including project developers, investors, vendors, and regulators) to adopt SeBD. Drawing on industry estimates, real-world case studies, and comparative cost analyses, the findings underscore that even a modest upfront investment in SeBD can yield substantial long-term returns by preventing costly retrofit activities, minimizing regulatory delays, and positioning nuclear vendors for the ability to adapt in the evolving security market. By avoiding excessive retrofit expenses and positioning security as a built-in feature rather than an afterthought, nuclear projects can protect their financial performance, enhance public trust, and secure a competitive edge in an increasingly complex global energy market. The authors advocate for SeBD’s strategic implementation, supported by established quality management methodologies, thereby promoting continuous improvement and defect avoidance. Ultimately, early SeBD integration represents a strategic investment, yielding significant returns by preventing costly retrofits and positioning nuclear projects for enhanced competitiveness and public trust.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Internship Presentation: Integrating Safety and Cybersecurity: Security-by-Design with SOWT Analysis for Reactor Testing

This study covers leveraging reactor testing facilities that are primarily designed with a focus on safety to enhance cybersecurity testing. By incorporating reactor security-by-design with reactor safety-by-design principles and adopting defense-in-depth strategies that emphasize both safety and security, the research evaluates applicable cyber tools, models, and solutions. This includes simulating specific cyber-attack scenarios using reactor simulators and performing SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis to improve the cybersecurity of reactor systems.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

U.S. Domestic Security-by-Design: On Site Response Force Strategies

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost- effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) that utilize pebble-based fuels and microreactors. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model HTGR and microreactor that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic HTGR facility and microreactor facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and onsite response forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to-eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic HTGRs and microreactors. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can lead to efficient security systems that utilize an onsite response force. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC&A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC&A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Design of a physical security perimeter fencing system.

Design of a physical security perimeter fencing system requires that security designers provide effective detection, delay, and response functionalities with minimal nuisance alarms. In addition, the designers must take into considerations the security fence system life cycle cost (equipment and grounds maintenance), complexity of the terrain, safety, and environmental conditions (location of where the security fence will be installed). Often, these factors drive the security designers to design a perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system (PIDAS) that includes: (1) larger than desired footprint, (2) one or more animal control fences to minimize the nuisance alarm rate (NAR), and (3) clear zones and an isolation zone to facilitate intrusion detection and assessment by keeping the fence lines clear of vegetation, trash, and other objects that could impede the security system's performance. This paper presents a two-tier PIDAS design that focuses on effective performance specifically in high probability of detection and low NAR that minimizes cost and the footprint of the system.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Security by Design Economics Analysis for Advanced Reactors and Small Modular Reactors Project Interim Report for FY2021

Advanced Reactor and Small Modular Reactor (AR/SMR) designs have the potential to provide clean, reliable baseload energy. Ensuring the capability to deploy these reactors in an economically viable fashion is of interest to industry. A large portion of the expected operating costs of AR/SMRs involves the security of the plant. Security by Design (SeBD) is the practice of including features in the design and construction of the site, with the intent to decrease the operating costs related to security. Quantifying the increase or decrease in the overall lifetime cost to the plant as a result of SeBD is of paramount importance in understanding the disadvantages and benefits of such activities. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) is funding the development of a methodology whereby the capital expenses and operating expenses, as well as the physical security effectiveness, of SeBD can be quantified for AR/SMRs. This report is an interim report on the progress of the work performed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Idaho National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). It is the second annual report on this work.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A National Secure-by-Design Strategy

The US National Cybersecurity Strategy published March 2, 2023 uses plain language to communicate that the US is calling for a major change in how we prioritize the security of software systems used in critical infrastructure. It acknowledges that our current approach, which is essentially, “let the buyer beware,” leaves entities who are least able to assess or defend vulnerable software responsible for the impacts of designed-in weaknesses while the makers of the technology bear no liability. The strategy recommends a security-by-design approach, recommending that software vendors be held liable to uphold a “duty of care” to consumers and for systems to be designed to “fail safely and recover quickly” . For energy infrastructure, the strategy calls out the need to implement the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy to achieve higher confidence security for energy infrastructures. The Idaho National Laboratory, a pioneer in cyber-informed engineering concepts, is at the forefront of organizations educating others in industry, academia, and government on how to apply these concepts to real-world challenges. In this brief, we'll outline some of the basic principles of security-by-design and offer examples of how, in a water sector context, they're being put into successful practice.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Secure biosystems design in Saccharomyces cerevisiae establishes effective biocontainment strategies and mechanisms of escape

The widespread application of recombinant DNA and synthetic biology approaches for microbial metabolic engineering pursuits has motivated the development of biocontainment strategies, targeting safe and secure deployment of genetically modified microorganisms (GMMs). However, the design rules and mechanistic drivers governing biocontainment efficacy, as well as impacts of biocontainment upon microbial fitness, remain to be comprehensively evaluated, hindering predictive design and application of these strategies. We have developed a platform for high-resolution analysis of a transactivated kill switch in laboratory and industrial strains of Saccharomyces cerevisiae to assess modes of biocontainment escape and establish design rules for development of kill switch systems in diverse microbes. A camphor-regulated, RelE toxin system was systematically deployed to assess the impacts of differential kill switch copy number and ploidy in laboratory vs industrial strains. CRISPR-mediated integration of the biocontainment system at various loci revealed rapid escape events driven, in part, by mutations to both the Cam-transactivator (cam-TA) and RelE toxin. Genetic engineering enabled recapitulation of escape phenotypes, confirming mechanisms of escape and establishing structure-function relationships in the cam-TA system. Interestingly, genomic resequencing of escape mutants also revealed a series of off-target mutations, implicating additional modes of kill switch escape. Multi-copy integration of the kill switch system mitigated these effects by orders of magnitude, without compromising the biosynthetic capacity of the microbes, but proved insufficient to establish sustained biocontainment. The resultant data define a series of key design rules for next-generation biocontainment strategies and add to a growing foundational knowledge base targeting establishment of secure biosystems designs.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Persistence Control of Engineered Functions in Complex Soil Microbiomes (PerCon SFA), Secure Biosystems Design Project Data Catalog at PNNL DataHub

The Persistence Control of Engineered Functions in Complex Soil Microbiomes Project (PerCon SFA) at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is a Genomic Sciences Program Biosystems Design, Science Focus Area research project consortium. Collaborating across highly integrated institutions, PerCon SFA scientists are exploring how environmental niches can be sculpted using the mechanisms of genome reduction and metabolic addiction to drive secure rhizosphere community design for robust biomass cropping in challenging environments. The PerCon SFA DataHub project repository contains publication-relevant digital dataset and metadata DOI packages, enabling exploration and download of integrated experimental dataset catalogs publicly available to a global scientific community. and metadata repository allow for exploring and downloading integrated experimental biodesign omics dataset catalogs, including experimental protocols and/or workflows, raw and/or processed data, as required by the repository, and other relevant supporting materials and/or metadata required for research reproducibility and reporting.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Security-by-Design: Light Water Small Modular Reactor

The growing demand for nuclear power is increasing pressure to find solutions to cost prohibitive requirements of both construction and security. Offsite response has been proposed as an option to reduce costs associated with training and maintaining an onsite response force. A previous report explored this option and revealed that security could be provided at the required level, but cost savings was not a result of this methodology. An offsite response strategy required costly active and passive delay barriers to provide sufficient time for responders to muster and deploy to a site in time to interrupt a determined and well-equipped adversary. Also, contrary to the hypothesis, the number of responders required for this strategy exceeded that needed for an onsite response force, as the adversaries could avail themselves of advantageous positions within the facility to repel arriving responders. This report builds upon the previous evaluation by using the same hypothetical light water small modular reactor (LWSMR) facility model, but this time an onsite response strategy was assessed. The goal of this analysis was to show that an onsite response strategy could be implemented effectively at a cost point that removes barriers within the industry at this critical time of growth and development. The assessment of the facility design and response strategy was completed through modeling using Scribe3D© and subsequent scenario analysis over the course of a two-day tabletop exercise. Subject matter experts in nuclear security, nuclear facility design, and response strategy and tactics contributed to the effort to ensure accurate representation of hypothetical scenarios. Several adaptations were made to the layout of the LWSMR based on lessons learned during the first day of scenario analysis. The subsequent design evaluated on the second day proved to provide a robust response posture against a large and well-trained adversary force. This report details the process of the analysis and compares the cost of the final facility design with that of the LWSMR model used for evaluation of offsite response. Ultimately, the results of this effort indicate that, when implemented correctly, an onsite response strategy is the best option from a security and cost perspective.

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