Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Safety Analysis Report”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 55 records · Page 3

COMPACTION OF FIBERBOARD OVERPACK MATERIALS IN A 9975 SHIPPING PACKAGE

Compaction of lower layers in the 9975 fiberboard overpack has been observed in packages that contain excess moisture. Dynamic loading of the package during transportation may also contribute to compaction of the fiberboard. This condition is being tested and analyzed to better understand these compaction mechanisms and provide a basis from which to evaluate their impact to the safety basis for transportation (Safety Analysis Report for Packaging) and storage (facility Design Safety Analysis) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). A test program has been developed and is being implemented to identify the extent of the compaction as a function of fiberboard moisture and typical transport dynamic loadings. Test conditions will be compared to regulatory requirements for dynamic loading. Characterization of the recovery of short-term compaction following the application of dynamic loading is also being evaluated. Interim results from this test program will be summarized.

42 ENGINEERING↗

COMPACTION OF FIBERBOARD IN A 9975 SHIPPING PACKAGE

Compaction of lower layers in the fiberboard overpack has been observed in 9975 packages that contain elevated moisture. Lab testing has resulted in a better understanding of (1) the relationship between the fiberboard moisture level and compaction of the lower fiberboard assembly, and (2) the behavior of the fiberboard during transport. In laboratory tests, higher moisture content has been shown to correspond to higher total compaction of fiberboard material, greater rate of compaction, and continued compaction over a longer period of time. In addition, laboratory tests have shown that the application of a dynamic load results in higher fiberboard compaction. The test conditions and sample geometric/loading configurations were chosen to simulate the regulatory requirements for 9975 package input dynamic loading. Dynamic testing was conducted over a period of several months to acquire immediate and cumulative changes in geometric data for various moisture levels. Currently, one sample set has undergone a complete dynamic test regimen, while testing of another set is still in-progress. The dynamic input, data acquisition, test effects on sample dynamic parameters, and interim results from this test program will be summarized and compared to regulatory specifications for dynamic loading. This will provide a basis from which to evaluate the impact of moisture and fiberboard compaction on the safety basis for transportation (Safety Analysis Report for Packaging) and storage (facility Documented Safety Analysis) at the Savannah River Site (SRS).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Analysis of Loss-of-Coolant Accidents in the NIST Research Reactor (Early Phase)

A study of the fuel temperature during the early phase of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) in the NIST research reactor (NBSR) was completed. Previous studies had been reported in the preliminary safety analysis report for the conversion of the NBSR from high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched (LEU) fuel. Those studies had focused on the most vulnerable LOCA situation, namely, a double-ended guillotine break in the time period after reactor trip when water is drained from either the coolant channels inside the fuel elements or the region outside the fuel elements. The current study fills in a gap in the analysis which is the early phase of the event when there may still be water present but the reactor is at power or immediately after reactor trip and pumps have tripped. The calculations were done, for both the current HEU-fueled core and the proposed LEU core, with the TRACE thermal-hydraulic systems code. Several break locations and different break sizes were considered. In all cases the increase in the clad (or fuel meat) temperature was relatively small so that a large margin to the temperature threshold for blistering (the Safety Limit for the NBSR) remained.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Definition of Small Gram Quantity Contents for Type B Radioactive Material Transportation Packages: Activity-Based Content Limitations

Since the 1960's, the Department of Transportation Specification (DOT Spec) 6M packages have been used extensively for transportation of Type B quantities of radioactive materials between Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, laboratories, and productions sites. However, due to the advancement of packaging technology, the aging of the 6M packages, and variability in the quality of the packages, the DOT implemented a phased elimination of the 6M specification packages (and other DOT Spec packages) in favor of packages certified to meet federal performance requirements. DOT issued the final rule in the Federal Register on October 1, 2004 requiring that use of the DOT Specification 6M be discontinued as of October 1, 2008. A main driver for the change was the fact that the 6M specification packagings were not supported by a Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) that was compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations part 71 (10 CFR 71). Therefore, materials that would have historically been shipped in 6M packages are being identified as contents in Type B (and sometimes Type A fissile) package applications and addenda that are to be certified under the requirements of 10 CFR 71. The requirements in 10 CFR 71 include that the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) must identify the maximum radioactivity of radioactive constituents and maximum quantities of fissile constituents (10 CFR 71.33(b)(1) and 10 CFR 71.33(b)(2)), and that the application (i.e., SARP submittal or SARP addendum) demonstrates that the external dose rate (due to the maximum radioactivity of radioactive constituents and maximum quantities of fissile constituents) on the surface of the packaging (i.e., package and contents) not exceed 200 mrem/hr (10 CFR 71.35(a), 10 CFR 71.47(a)). It has been proposed that a 'Small Gram Quantity' of radioactive material be defined, such that, when loaded in a transportation package, the dose rates at external points of an unshielded packaging not exceed the regulatory limits prescribed by 10 CFR 71 for non-exclusive shipments. The mass of each radioisotope presented in this paper is limited by the radiation dose rate on the external surface of the package, which per the regulatory limit should not exceed 200 mrem/hr. The results presented are a compendium of allowable masses of a variety of different isotopes (with varying impurity levels of beryllium in some of the actinide isotopes) that, when loaded in an unshielded packaging, do not result in an external dose rate on the surface of the package that exceeds 190 mrem/hr (190 mrem/hr was chosen to provide 5% conservatism relative to the regulatory limit). These mass limits define the term 'Small Gram Quantity' (SGQ) contents in the context of radioactive material transportation packages. The term SGQ is isotope-specific and pertains to contents in radioactive material transportation packages that do not require shielding and still satisfy the external dose rate requirements. Since these calculated mass limits are for contents without shielding, they are conservative for packaging materials that provide some limited shielding or if the contents are placed into a shielded package. The isotopes presented in this paper were chosen as the isotopes that Department of Energy (DOE) sites most likely need to ship. Other more rarely shipped isotopes, along with industrial and medical isotopes, are planned to be included in subsequent extensions of this work.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Proposed guidance for preparing and reviewing a molten salt non-power production or utilization facility application

Development of non-power molten salt reactors (MSRs) are under consideration to further establish an MSR experience base, support the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.43(e), and provide any additional analyses needed for development of a full-scale MSR. Guidance provided in this report is based on MSRs operating with liquid fuel (i.e., fuel dissolved within a molten salt). These reactors, unless owned by the DOE or DOD, will require licensing by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. Standard review plan (SRP) guidance for large light water reactors (LWRs) is available in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants; Light Water Reactor (LWR) Edition. However, NRC staff observed that NUREG-0800 is very cumbersome to apply to non-power reactors “because of the great differences in complexity and hazards between non-power reactors and nuclear power plants.” Therefore, a program to develop performance-based guidance applicable to non-power reactors was initiated. In 1996, NUREG-1537, Parts 1 and 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, was published. Part 1, the format and content guide, suggests a uniform format for presenting information in non-power reactor applications that is acceptable to the NRC staff, but conformance with the format and content is not required. Part 2, the SRP, ensures the quality and uniformity of the staff review of an application. Unfortunately, the application guidelines and SRP do not provide adequate guidance for all advanced non-LWR technologies and applications. This discrepancy eventually led to the 2012 development of interim staff guidance (ISG) for NUREG-1537, which includes criteria for describing and reviewing aqueous homogeneous reactors (AHRs). Specifically, NUREG-1537 ISG, 2012 expanded the original document to address three areas: 1. updated criteria for heterogeneous non-power reactors, 2. criteria for licensing AHRs, and 3. criteria for licensing a Part 50-licensed isotope production facility. In 2015, the US Department of Energy (DOE) opted to build on the AHR NUREG-1537 ISG experience by performing a gap analysis of the guidance that would be used to license a non-power MSR. MSRs represent one of the advanced non-LWR technologies selected by DOE for development through a multiyear cost share award with Southern Company Services. Under this Advanced Reactor Concepts 2015 (DOE Advanced Reactor Concepts [ARC] 15) award program, the DOE tasked Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the guidance changes that the NRC may need to consider when licensing an MSR non-power reactor. ORNL staff, with support from Boston Government Services, LLC, focused on five system-related chapters in NUREG-1537 that were considered most relevant to inform the effort that would be required for a non-power MSR applicant. ORNL documented this review in a technical report, ORNL/TM-2018/834, Proposed Guidance for Preparing and Reviewing Molten Salt Non-Power Reactor License Applications (NUREG-1537). The report was subsequently shared with industry and the NRC. The 2018 review was limited in scope, focusing on key system chapters based on the expected significance of each chapter relative to expected differences in addressing advanced non-LWR technologies, specifically non-power MSRs, compared with heterogeneously fueled non-power reactors. In the ORNL report, proposed generic adaptations were suggested for the following NUREG-1537 chapters: Chapter 4, “Reactor Description”; Chapter 5, “Reactor Coolant Systems”; Chapter 6, “Engineered Safety Features”; Chapter 9, “Auxiliary Systems”; Chapter 11, “Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management” The inclusion of Chapter 11 in the previous review effort was intended to provide guidance for categorizing the waste-handling process for an MSR operating with homogenous fuel. The introductions from Parts 1 and 2 of the 2012 NUREG-1537 ISG provide guidance for the application and review of production facilities. After a period of operation, non-power MSRs with homogenous fuel will include gaseous and soluble fission products. The gaseous fission products will be collected and held for decay in an off-gas system. There might also be an initiative to polish or filter the soluble fission products in the fuel salt by some mechanical or chemical means. The treatment and handling of fission products in the non-power MSR fuel salt and the description of this process in the safety analysis report (SAR) must be very precise to avoid the waste treatment facility being construed as a co-located special nuclear material (SNM) fuel cycle facility (see Section 2.3 of this report). Subsequent to the release of ORNL/TM-2018/834, NRC staff expressed a desire to continue the regulatory gap analysis that was begun in that report. This would provide additional clarity and information addressed in certain sections of the original report, while also providing new guidance on certain topics not addressed in the original report. This revision would benefit the NRC staff reviewing applications involving non-power MSR designs and would help developers understand how the NRC staff might approach the review of such applications. The focus of this report is to provide infrastructure support to the NRC staff for the regulatory review of non-power MSRs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Licensing of the national repository for LILW waste in Bulgaria - 15609

Radioactive waste arises from the operation and decommissioning of the Bulgarian nuclear power plants and from other sources in research, medical applications and industry. The need for building the National Disposal Facility (NDF) is recognized by the Bulgarian government, and described and justified in the Environment Impact Assessment Decision. The Bulgarian State Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management (SERAW) is endeavoring to build a near-surface repository for short-lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste (SL-LILW). The European Union finances the establishment of the NDF through the Kozloduy International Decommissioning Support Fund. The Bulgarian government has defined the NDF as a Project of National Importance. At the conclusion of an international tendering process, SERAW awarded the contract for development of the NDF design, including Intermediate Safety Analysis Report (ISAR), to the Consortium of Westinghouse Electric Spain S.A.U, DBE Technology GmbH of Germany, and ENRESA, the Spanish National Waste Management Agency. Two Bulgarian companies also participate in the project as subcontractors;KK-Project and EQE-Bulgaria. The project 'Technical Design and ISAR Preparation for the National Disposal Facility at Bulgaria' is identified within SERAW as 'R-Project 5'. Since obtaining SERAW's approval for the preferred repository design variant, R Project 5 has focused on the development of the Technical Design and on preparation of the ISAR, which demonstrates the safety and suitability of the proposed NDF design. The Consortium submitted to SERAW the Technical Design for revision on March 2013. SERAW's experts immediately started the review of the design. In addition, SERAW invited independent, highly qualified Bulgarian experts and scientists to participate in the review. In November 2013, SERAW approved the Technical Design. The Consortium submitted the Intermediate Safety Analysis Report to SERAW for review following a similar process in July 2014. Both documents were meanwhile handed over to the appropriate Bulgarian licensing authorities. SERAW's goal is to receive a license for construction of the NDF in early 2015. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

MN471017, Safety Basis Manual Appendix NF-01. Nuclear Facility Hazard Categorization

The purpose of this appendix is to provide a consistent approach for establishing the hazard category for a nuclear facility as required in 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management, Subpart B, "Safety Basis Requirements," Section 202 (b)(3). As defined, this approach is consistent with DOE-STD-1027-92 Change Notice No. 1, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports (hereafter DOE-STD-1027-92), and facilitates the use of updated dosimetry and release fractions as provided in NNSA SD G 1027 Admin Change 1, Guidance on Using Release Fraction and Modern Dosimetric Information Consistently with DOE STD 1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, Change Notice No. 1 (hereafter NNSA SD G 1027).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

NEW APPROACH TO ADDRESSING GAS GENERATION IN RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGING

Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging (SARP) document why the transportation of radioactive material is safe in Type A(F) and Type B shipping containers. The content evaluation of certain actinide materials require that the gas generation characteristics be addressed. Most packages used to transport actinides impose extremely restrictive limits on moisture content and oxide stabilization to control or prevent flammable gas generation. These requirements prevent some users from using a shipping container even though the material to be shipped is fully compliant with the remaining content envelope including isotopic distribution. To avoid these restrictions, gas generation issues have to be addressed on a case by case basis rather than a one size fits all approach. In addition, SARP applicants and review groups may not have the knowledge and experience with actinide chemistry and other factors affecting gas generation, which facility experts in actinide material processing have obtained in the last sixty years. This paper will address a proposal to create a Gas Generation Evaluation Committee to evaluate gas generation issues associated with Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging material contents. The committee charter could include reviews of both SARP approved contents and new contents not previously evaluated in a SARP.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Realization of the National Disposal Facility for Radioactive Waste in Bulgaria - 16611

Radioactive waste is generated in the Republic of Bulgaria from the operation and decommissioning of the country's nuclear power plants and from other sources in research, medical applications, and the industry. The need for building a National Disposal Facility (NDF) is recognized by the Bulgarian government and described and justified in its Environment Impact Assessment Decision. The Bulgarian State Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management (SERAW) is endeavoring to build a near-surface repository for short-lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (SL-LILW) to discharge its statutory responsibilities in waste management is. The European Union (EU) finances the establishment of the NDF through the Kozloduy International Decommissioning Support Fund (KIDSF). After an international tendering procedure, SERAW placed a contract for the development of the design of the NDF to the Consortium of Westinghouse Electric Spain S.A.R and DBE Technology GmbH of Germany, with ENRESA, the Spanish National Waste Management Agency providing technical review and support. Two Bulgarian companies participate also in the project as subcontractors - EQE Bulgaria and to a lesser extent KK-Project. The repository project official name is 'Technical Design and ISAR Preparation for the National Disposal Facility at Bulgaria', usually abbreviated as 'R-Project 5'. After obtaining SERAW's approval for the preferred repository conceptual design variant, the R Project 5 focused on developing the Technical Design on the one hand, and on preparing the Intermediate Safety Analysis Report (ISAR) to demonstrate the safety and suitability of the proposed NDF design on the other. These documents were handed over to the Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (BNRA) as well as to the different authorities involved in the comprehensive licensing process required for nuclear facilities in the country. The corresponding permits have mostly been received or are expected for early 2016. In the last quarter of 2015 the procurement procedure for repository construction as turn-key project was started with the pre-qualification of possible constructors for the Phase I repository realization on a lump sum contract basis. Repository construction is now expected to start in 2016, with the start of waste disposal now scheduled for around 2020. With the realization of the Bulgarian National Disposal Facility an important milestone for waste disposal in the European Union is about to be achieved. This paper is a sequel of previously presented papers on the NDF construction, now including details of the complex licensing process that this disposal facility underwent, now in its final stages. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Synthetic Vision Preliminary Integrated Safety Analysis

This report documents efforts to analyze a sample of aviation safety programs, using the LMI-developed integrated safety analysis tool to determine the change in system risk resulting from Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) technology implementation. Specifically, we have worked to modify existing system safety tools to address the safety impact of synthetic vision (SV) technology. Safety metrics include reliability, availability, and resultant hazard. This analysis of SV technology is intended to be part of a larger effort to develop a model that is capable of "providing further support to the product design and development team as additional information becomes available". The reliability analysis portion of the effort is complete and is fully documented in this report. The simulation analysis is still underway; it will be documented in a subsequent report. The specific goal of this effort is to apply the integrated safety analysis to SV technology. This report also contains a brief discussion of data necessary to expand the human performance capability of the model, as well as a discussion of human behavior and its implications for system risk assessment in this modeling environment.

Hemm, Robert↗

JM-1 SLOWPOKE-II Research Reactor Supporting Analysis Report for the Conversion from HEU to LEU

The JM-1 research reactor (SLOWPOKE-2 type) at the International Centre for Nuclear and Environmental Sciences (ICENS) of the University of West Indies, in Kingston (Jamaica), was successfully converted from HEU to LEU fuel on September 2015. As part of the work to produce the corresponding Safety Analysis Report (SAR), which was to be reviewed and approved by the Jamaican regulator in order to provide authorization for the reactor commissioning, a detailed safety analysis was carried out. This analysis, involving a variety of calculations, is summarized in the present report; describing the basic methodology and the obtained results. The report covers both the neutronic and thermal hydraulic aspects of the analysis, for which MCNP and PLTEMP/ANL codes, respectively, were used. On one hand, the HEU core was modeled and analyzed, subsequently comparing the obtained results with the available experimental data. On the other hand, the modifications involved with the change to an LEU core were introduced into the models and the results examined to ensure that the differences in the expected behavior did not negatively affect the reactor safety or performance. In fact, the LEU core was found to present significant advantages in different areas. Consequently, the present report provided a solid basis for the SAR.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

RH Packaging Program Guidance (Rev. 3)

The purpose of this program guidance document is to provide the technical requirements for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the Remote Handled-Transuranic (RH-TRU) 72-B Waste Shipping Package (also known as the "RH-TRU 72-B") and directly related components. This document complies with the requirements as specified in the RH-TRU 72-B Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9212. If there is a conflict between this document and the SARP and/or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of C states: "...each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application." It further states: "...each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application." Chapter 9.0 of the SARP tasks the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Management and Operating (M&O) Contractor with assuring the packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC-approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §71.8, "Deliberate Misconduct." Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, "Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material," certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance," regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations are conducted. This document details the instructions to be followed to operate, maintain, and test the RH-TRU 72-B packaging. This Program Guidance standardizes instructions for all users. Users shall follow these instructions or equivalent approved instructions. Following these instructions assures that operations meet the requirements of the SARP.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

RH Packaging Program Guidance (Rev. 3.1)

The purpose of this program guidance document is to provide the technical requirements for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) 72-B Waste Shipping Package (also known as the "RH-TRU 72-B") and directly related components. This document complies with the requirements as specified in the RH-TRU 72-B Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9212. If there is a conflict between this document and the SARP and/or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of C states, "each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application." It further states: "…each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application." Chapter 9.0 of the SARP tasks the Department of Energy Carlsbad Field Office or the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Management and Operating (M&O) Contractor with assuring the packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §71.8, "Deliberate Misconduct." Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, "Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material," certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances," regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations are conducted. This document details the instructions to be followed to operate, maintain, and test the RH-TRU 72-B packaging. This Program Guidance standardizes instructions for all users. Users shall follow these instructions or equivalent approved instructions. Following these instructions assures that operations meet the requirements of the SARP.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fiberboard Properties and Degradation Rates for Storage of 9975 Shipping Package in KAC (2020 Status Report)

Savannah River Site (SRS) stores plutonium materials within model 9975 shipping packages in the K-Area Complex (KAC). The 9975 shipping package consists of a 35 gallon stainless steel drum, Celotex fiberboard insulation, lead shield, and primary and secondary containment vessels. The 9975 shipping package design, performance, and analysis for safe transport of radioactive material are described in the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). Celotex fiberboard provides three safety functions: thermal insulation to limit internal temperature during a fire, criticality control, and resistance to package crushing. The fiberboard material must retain its dimensions and density within certain ranges to provide the required impact resistance, criticality control, and fire resistance. The SRS Surveillance Program monitors material performance to establish a basis for service life and ensures the continued integrity of 9975 packages. Fiberboard samples, taken from multiple fiberboard assemblies fabricated from cane and softwood fiberboard, have been conditioning in elevated temperature environments since 2005. The samples are periodically examined to monitor thermal, mechanical, and physical properties, and assess degradation trends. Fiberboard properties of interest that are evaluated to demonstrate acceptable long-term performance include dimensional stability, density, compressive strength, thermal conductivity, and specific heat capacity. Duplicate samples from multiple package sources have been tested to identify the range of variability in fiberboard properties and degradation rates. Baseline and long-term testing of fiberboard material properties have been reported previously; reference 6 summarized experimental results of cane and softwood fiberboard through May 2019 and presented degradation models for the measured properties. This report presents the cumulative data collected through June 2020 and the corresponding updated aging models.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 1: Reference Design Document (RDD)

The Reference Design Document, of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System provides the basic design and operations data used in the nuclear safety analysis of the Rector Power Module as applied to a Space Base program. A description of the power module systems, facilities, launch vehicle and mission operations, as defined in NASA Phase A Space Base studies is included. Each of two Zirconium Hydride Reactor Brayton power modules provides 50 kWe for the nominal 50 man Space Base. The INT-21 is the prime launch vehicle. Resupply to the 500 km orbit over the ten year mission is provided by the Space Shuttle. At the end of the power module lifetime (nominally five years), a reactor disposal system is deployed for boost into a 990 km high altitude (long decay time) earth orbit.

Source record↗

Impacts of Irradiation Structural Behavior on Thermal Hydraulics Safety Analysis to Support MURR LEU Conversion

The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) located in Columbia, Missouri is one of six U.S. High Performance Research Reactors (USHPRR), including one critical facility, that is actively collaborating with U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Material Management and Minimization (M3) Office of Reactor Conversion and Uranium Supply to convert from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU; ≥20 wt% U-235) to low-enriched uranium (LEU; <20 wt% U-235) fuel. A new type of very high-density LEU fuel based on an alloy of uranium and 10 wt% molybdenum (U-10Mo) is expected to allow the conversion to LEU of MURR, as well as four other USHPRR. MURR has been working with the Reactor Conversion Pillar at Argonne to perform fuel element design and fuel cycle performance analyses, steady-state thermal hydraulics safety analysis, and accident safety analyses in preparation for the conversion of MURR and to support a preliminary safety analysis report for conversion to LEU fuels. Subsequent analyses have also been performed, including transition cycles where all-fresh LEU fuel elements are introduced upon conversion and progressing through reactor operations the core is brought to equilibrium. Thermal hydraulics safety analyses performed as part of the above have employed an assumption on channel gap reduction due to burnup-related phenomena including fuel swelling, irradiation creep, and oxide layer buildup. Recently, a series of structural analyses have been performed on the MURR LEU fuel plates and an element due to significant differences between the plate and element designs of the MURR HEU and LEU fuels. In addition, NUREG-1537 indicates that structural phenomena are to be evaluated. Two separate types of structural analyses were performed for the MURR LEU fuel element: fluid-structure interaction (FSI) and irradiation thermo-mechanical. The FSI analysis evaluated the effects of hydraulic forces on the MURR LEU fuel element to quantify the flow-induced plate deflection, and a minimal impact to the channel gap thickness was predicted under prototypic and bounding conditions. The irradiation thermo-mechanical analysis evaluated the effects of fuel swelling, irradiation creep, and thermal expansion for the MURR LEU plates and the element for prototypic thermal and irradiation conditions based on a high-fidelity approach multiphysics approach. Overall, this thermo-mechanical analysis predicts smaller gap thickness changes in previously limiting regions. Larger changes are predicted in the middle of channels, and for end channels where power density is not typically a maximum. An additional thermo-mechanical analysis was performed for the outermost HEU fuel plate, which showed a similar magnitude of deflection as the outermost LEU plate. Due to substantial differences between the channel gap reductions assumed for the previous safety analyses and those predicted by the irradiation thermo-mechanical analysis, a need to evaluate their impact on the thermal hydraulics safety analyses arose. This report presents the results from the steady-state safety analyses for normal operation as well as the accident analyses for the two most limiting accident scenarios.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safety Analysis for the Versatile Test Reactor Conceptual Design

Safety analysis simulations have been carried out using the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 safety analysis code system to update the baseline set of results for the Versatile Test Reactor conceptual design. Results from a previous revision of this work provided input for the Conceptual Safety Design Report summarizing the overall safety basis for the VTR. This work will also support future analyses that will be required for Chapter 13, “Accident Analysis,” of a preliminary safety analysis report. A number of transients have been evaluated based on categories of postulated accident sequences suggested for consideration in NUREG-1537. Ultimately, the full spectrum of event initiators and subsequent accident sequences will be defined through a probabilistic risk assessment of the plant design following the implementation of the Licensing Modernization Project guidelines as described in the VTR Safety Design Strategy. Since that process is ongoing, the present analysis addresses several transients that are expected to be bounding accident scenarios that represent the three key ways to perturb a reactor: through changes to the core inlet temperature, mass flow rate, or reactivity. These correspond to a loss of heat sink (LOHS), loss of flow (LOF) or station blackout (SBO), and transient overpower (TOP), respectively. Both Protected and Unprotected versions of these transients have been evaluated, along with additional transients that include transient overpower with one stuck rod, pump coast-down failures, seismic events, and overcooling events. At the current stage of design, transient simulation results for the Versatile Test Reactor indicate that large safety margins exist for many event initiators. However, several “enabling” assumptions have been made, in terms of both design features and design limits, in order to perform the analyses; and these assumptions will need to be revised as the design matures. In addition, a larger spectrum of events needs to be evaluated as part of the on-going probabilistic risk assessment process.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Preliminary Results of Ancillary Safety Analyses Supporting TREAT LEU Conversion Activities

The Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT), located at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), is a test facility designed to evaluate the performance of reactor fuels and materials under transient accident conditions. The facility, an air-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor designed to utilize fuel containing high-enriched uranium (HEU), has been in non-operational standby status since 1994. Currently, in support of the missions of the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Material Management and Minimization (M3) Reactor Conversion Program, a new core design is being developed for TREAT that will utilize low-enriched uranium (LEU). The primary objective of this conversion effort is to design an LEU core that is capable of meeting the performance characteristics of the existing HEU core. Minimal, if any, changes are anticipated for the supporting systems (e.g. reactor trip system, filtration/cooling system, etc.); therefore, the LEU core must also be able to function with the existing supporting systems, and must also satisfy acceptable safety limits. In support of the LEU conversion effort, a range of ancillary safety analyses are required to evaluate the LEU core operation relative to that of the existing facility. These analyses cover neutronics, shielding, and thermal hydraulic topics that have been identified as having the potential to have reduced safety margins due to conversion to LEU fuel, or are required to support the required safety analyses documentation. The majority of these ancillary tasks have been identified in [1] and [2]. The purpose of this report is to document the ancillary safety analyses that have been performed at Argonne National Laboratory during the early stages of the LEU design effort, and to describe ongoing and anticipated analyses. For all analyses presented in this report, methodologies are utilized that are consistent with, or improved from, those used in analyses for the HEU Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [3]. Depending on the availability of historical data derived from HEU TREAT operation, results calculated for the LEU core are compared to measurements obtained from HEU TREAT operation. While all analyses in this report are largely considered complete and have been reviewed for technical content, it is important to note that all topics will be revisited once the LEU design approaches its final stages of maturity. For most safety significant issues, it is expected that the analyses presented here will be bounding, but additional calculations will be performed as necessary to support safety analyses and safety documentation. It should also be noted that these analyses were completed as the LEU design evolved, and therefore utilized different LEU reference designs. Preliminary shielding, neutronic, and thermal hydraulic analyses have been completed and have generally demonstrated that the various LEU core designs will satisfy existing safety limits and standards also satisfied by the existing HEU core. These analyses include the assessment of the dose rate in the hodoscope room, near a loaded fuel transfer cask, above the fuel storage area, and near the HEPA filters. The potential change in the concentration of tramp uranium and change in neutron flux reaching instrumentation has also been assessed. Safety-significant thermal hydraulic items addressed in this report include thermally-induced mechanical distortion of the grid plate, and heating in the radial reflector.

Brunett, A. J.↗