Safety analysis report for self-luminous sources used on Apollo spacecraft
Safety analysis of promethium 147 microspheres in self-luminous disks aboard Apollo spacecraft
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Safety analysis of promethium 147 microspheres in self-luminous disks aboard Apollo spacecraft
Reliability and safety analysis of reusable nuclear stage space shuttle system
This paper describes the MLS software safety analysis activities and documents the SSA results. The scope of this software safety effort is consistent with the MLS system safety definition and is concentrated on the software faults and hazards that may have impact on the personnel safety and the environment safety.
Safety analysis of parallel versus series propellant loading of space shuttle
For many years it has been suggested that lava tubes on the Moon could provide an ideal location for a manned lunar base, by providing shelter from various natural hazards, such as cosmic radiation, meteorites, micrometeoroids, and impact crater ejecta, and also providing a natural environmental control, with a nearly constant temperature, unlike that of the lunar surface showing extreme variation in its diurnal cycle. An analysis of radiation safety issues on lunar lava tubes has been performed by considering radiation from galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and Solar Particle Events (SPE) interacting with the lunar surface, modeled as a regolith layer and rock. The chemical composition has been chosen as typical of the lunar regions where the largest number of lava tube candidates are found. Particles have been transported all through the regolith and the rock, and received particles flux and doses have been calculated. The radiation safety of lunar lava tubes environments has been demonstrated.
The purpose of this document is to define the data inputs required for a full safety analysis to support launch approval.
The Accident Model Document is one of three documents of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System as applied to a Space Base Program. Potential terrestrial nuclear hazards involving the zirconium hydride reactor-Brayton power module are identified for all phases of the Space Base program. The accidents/events that give rise to the hazards are defined and abort sequence trees are developed to determine the sequence of events leading to the hazard and the associated probabilities of occurence. Source terms are calculated to determine the magnitude of the hazards. The above data is used in the mission accident analysis to determine the most probable and significant accidents/events in each mission phase. The only significant hazards during the prelaunch and launch ascent phases of the mission are those which arise form criticality accidents. Fission product inventories during this time period were found to be very low due to very limited low power acceptance testing.
The licensing process for any nuclear installation generally requires the review and approval of numerous documents by a regulatory body. Alternate approaches are needed where similar nuclear installations are planned to be built and operated at multiple sites around the world. Such is the case for the deployment of small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) under development by multiple enterprises in multiple countries. As a use case for this paper, the authors propose an alternative to the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) required by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) for the licensing of its nuclear installations. The DSA is a DOE construct that requires the review and approval of numerous documents. It includes an in-depth description of hazards, safe boundaries, and hazard controls.
The operational safety of six axle locomotives is analyzed. A locomotive model with corresponding data on suspension characteristics, a method of track defect characterization, and a method of characterizing operational safety are used. A user oriented software package was developed as part of the methodology and was used to study the effect (on operational safety) of various locomotive parameters and operational conditions such as speed, tractive effort, and track curvature. The operational safety of three different locomotive designs was investigated.
This grant funded research on human-computer interaction design and analysis techniques, using future ATC environments as a testbed. The basic approach was to model the nominal behavior of both the automated and human procedures and then to apply safety analysis techniques to these models. Our previous modeling language, RSML, had been used to specify the system requirements for TCAS II for the FAA. Using the lessons learned from this experience, we designed a new modeling language that (among other things) incorporates features to assist in designing less error-prone human-computer interactions and interfaces and in detecting potential HCI problems, such as mode confusion. The new language, SpecTRM-RL, uses "intent" abstractions, based on Rasmussen's abstraction hierarchy, and includes both informal (English and graphical) specifications and formal, executable models for specifying various aspects of the system. One of the goals for our language was to highlight the system modes and mode changes to assist in identifying the potential for mode confusion. Three published papers resulted from this research. The first builds on the work of Degani on mode confusion to identify aspects of the system design that could lead to potential hazards. We defined and modeled modes differently than Degani and also defined design criteria for SpecTRM-RL models. Our design criteria include the Degani criteria but extend them to include more potential problems. In a second paper, Leveson and Palmer showed how the criteria for indirect mode transitions could be applied to a mode confusion problem found in several ASRS reports for the MD-88. In addition, we defined a visual task modeling language that can be used by system designers to model human-computer interaction. The visual models can be translated into SpecTRM-RL models, and then the SpecTRM-RL suite of analysis tools can be used to perform formal and informal safety analyses on the task model in isolation or integrated with the rest of the modeled system. We had hoped to be able to apply these modeling languages and analysis tools to a TAP air/ground trajectory negotiation scenario, but the development of the tools took more time than we anticipated.
This is my Intern poster and deliverable. It is about using knowledge graphs and large language models for safety analysis in nuclear reactors.
Air-ingress following a depressurized loss-of-forced-cooling (DLOFC) event is a challenging, multiphysics safety scenario for High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors (HTGRs), involving coupled gas composition transport, buoyancy-driven flow redistribution, graphite oxidation, and structural heat-up. Despite its importance — air ingress is a key scenario identified in the PIRT process for the HTGRs — existing system-level safety codes have lacked the integrated capability to simulate the complete event sequence with high confidence. This report documents the development, validation, and demonstration of three new capabilities in the SAM code to address this gap: (1) a multi-component gas mixture flow model with binary diffusion to track the helium-air composition and its effect on system density and flow; (2) a 0-D graphite oxidation model based on the Roes correlation, including oxygen consumption and exothermic heat release; and (3) an isentropic critical flow model for accurate representation of primary system depressurization through a break. These capabilities are validated against two benchmark experiments. The NSTF heavy-gas ingress experiment validates the multi-component flow model: SAM correctly reproduces the rapid buoyancydriven flow stagnation and subsequent natural circulation recovery driven by composition-dependent density changes. The NACOK graphite oxidation experiment validates the oxidation model: SAM predicts a bottom-level graphite weight loss of 25%, in close agreement with the measured 24%, and reproduces the strong axial nonuniformity and block-geometry dependence of oxidation, at a level comparable to the SPECTRA and TINTE codes. The validated capabilities are then exercised together in an integrated, reactor-scale simulation of a DLOFC air-ingress transient in a simplified HTR-PM pebble-bed reactor. In a single calculation spanning approximately 8 days, SAM reproduces the complete accident sequence: rapid depressurization, densityand diffusion-driven air ingress over ˜15 hours, onset of buoyancy-driven natural circulation, exothermic graphite oxidation with a peak fuel temperature at ˜62 hours, and eventual passive cooldown. These results demonstrate that SAM now provides the nuclear community with a preliminarily validated, modern systemlevel tool for HTGR air-ingress safety analysis, filling a recognized capability gap. Future extensions to broaden species tracking, improve oxidation chemistry, and refine the reactor model are discussed.
This is a tutorial on how to use the SYSAI (System Analysis using Statistical AI), a flexible statistical learning framework for the V&V and analysis of complex and high-dimensional Aerospace systems with DNN and AI components. SYSAI provides functionality for a variety of analyses and V&V tasks, including statistical data analysis, high dimensional safety-envelope and time-series analysis, property checking, as well as intelligent test-case generation. The tutorial will demonstrate SYSAI with our industrial partner’s Autonomous Centerline Tracking system, which uses a DNN to enable autonomous aircraft taxiing as an example. Video & Tutorial
The objective of this document is to provide relevant information about the verification and validation (V&V) status of RELAP5-3D for the MARVEL microreactor design and safety analysis and to provide indications about needed V&V activities before MARVEL microreactor operation.
NASA is currently developing the Ares I launch vehicle as a key component of the Constellation program which will provide safe and reliable transportation to the International Space Station, back to the moon, and later to Mars. The risks and costs of the Ares I must be significantly lowered, as compared to other manned launch vehicles, to enable the continuation of space exploration. It is essential that safety be significantly improved, and cost-effectively incorporated into the design process. This paper justifies early and effective safety analysis of complex space systems. Interactions and dependences between design, logistics, modeling, reliability, and safety engineers will be discussed to illustrate methods to lower cost, reduce design cycles and lessen the likelihood of catastrophic events.
For the past 17 years, Professor Leveson and her graduate students have been developing a theoretical foundation for safety in complex systems and building a methodology upon that foundation. The methodology includes special management structures and procedures, system hazard analyses, software hazard analysis, requirements modeling and analysis for completeness and safety, special software design techniques including the design of human-machine interaction, verification, operational feedback, and change analysis. The Safeware methodology is based on system safety techniques that are extended to deal with software and human error. Automation is used to enhance our ability to cope with complex systems. Identification, classification, and evaluation of hazards is done using modeling and analysis. To be effective, the models and analysis tools must consider the hardware, software, and human components in these systems. They also need to include a variety of analysis techniques and orthogonal approaches: There exists no single safety analysis or evaluation technique that can handle all aspects of complex systems. Applying only one or two may make us feel satisfied, but will produce limited results. We report here on a demonstration, performed as part of a contract with NASA Langley Research Center, of the Safeware methodology on the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS) portion of the air traffic control (ATC) system and procedures currently employed at the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach CONtrol). CTAS is an automated system to assist controllers in handling arrival traffic in the DFW area. Safety is a system property, not a component property, so our safety analysis considers the entire system and not simply the automated components. Because safety analysis of a complex system is an interdisciplinary effort, our team included system engineers, software engineers, human factors experts, and cognitive psychologists.
Presentation for INL's AI/ML Symposium. Topic: Evaluation of AI-generated documents for nuclear permitting/licensing.
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