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Sister Rod Destructive Examinations (FY2020) Appendix I: SNF Aerosols Released During Rod Fracture

As a part of the DOE NE High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is performing destructive examinations (DEs) of high burnup (HBU) (>45 GWd/MTU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) rods from the North Anna Nuclear Power Station operated by Dominion Energy. The SNF rods, called sister rods or sibling rods, are all HBU and include four different kinds of fuel rod cladding: standard Zircaloy-4 (Zirc-4), low-tin Zirc-4, ZIRLO, and M5. This report documents the status of the ORNL Phase 1 DE activities related to the collection of SNF aerosol particles released during fuel rod fracture in four-point bending in Phase 1 of the sister rod test program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Remaining Life Prediction of SNF Storage Canisters Exposed to CISCC Environments

• DOE Standardized SNF Storage Canisters o DOE designed standard spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage canisters for storage of DOE SNF. o DOE canisters are significantly different from commercial MultiPurpose Canisters (MPC) in size. o MPC canisters are large, a height = 15.8 ft, OD = 68”, WT = 0.5”. o DOE canisters are small with 18” / 24” diameter, 10’ / 15’ length. • Integrity Evaluation of DOE versus MPC Canisters o Many investigations have been performed for MPC canisters. o Limit investigations were performed for DOE standard canisters. Most were done at Idaho National Lab (INL). o DOE has sponsored integrity studies to evaluate weld integrity using drop tests and FEA simulations. o No evaluation on CISCC/service life of DOE canister in literature. o MPC canister: 4 axial welds, 1 center girth weld, 2 closing welds.

ZHU, Xiankui↗

Main Principles of the Perspective System of SNF Management in Russia - 13333

For the last several years the System of the Spent Nuclear Fuel management in Russia was seriously changed. The paper describes the main principles of the changes and the bases of the Perspective System of SNF Management in Russia. Among such the bases there are the theses with the interesting names like 'total knowledge', 'pollutant pays' and 'pay and forget'. There is also a brief description of the modern Russian SNF Management Infrastructure. And an outline of the whole System. The System which is - in case of Russia - is quite necessary to adjust SNF accumulation and to utilize the nuclear heritage. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Interrelation of technologies for RW preparation and sites for final isolation of the wastes from pyrochemical processing of SNF

For the justification of engineering solutions and practical testing of the radiochemical component of the perspective nuclear power complex with on-site variant of nuclear fuel cycle (NFC), it is planned to establish a multi-functional research-development complex (MFCRC) for radiochemical processing of spent nuclear fuels (SNF) from fast reactors. MFCRC is being established at the NIIAR site, it comprises technological process lines, where innovation pyro-electrochemical and hydrometallurgical technologies are realized, with an option for closing the inter-chain material flows for testing the combined radiochemically converted materials. The technological flowchart for processing at the MFCRC is subdivided into 3 segments: -) complex of the lead operations for dismantling the fuel elements (FE) and fuel assemblies (FA), -) pyrochemical extraction flowchart for processing SNF, and -) hydrometallurgical flowchart for processing SNF. The engineered solutions for the management and disposition of the radioactive wastes from MFCRC are reviewed.

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Potential Cost Implications of an Interim Storage Facility for Commercial SNF+ - 17132

The question of whether or not consolidated interim storage of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) should be part of the federal waste management system as an intermediate step before permanent disposal has been debated for more than four decades. This paper summarizes an evaluation of the cost implications of incorporating a consolidated interim storage facility (ISF) into the waste management system (WMS). In this study, the order-of-magnitude estimates of total system costs were calculated and tabulated. The analyzed scenarios involve shipment of SNF from reactors in dual-purpose storage and transportation canisters (DPCs) currently being used by utilities for dry storage at reactor sites. A number of pertinent conclusions can be drawn from this evaluation, including: - Delay in repository availability increases total system costs. Any delay in opening a repository increases total system costs, regardless of whether the system has an ISF or not. This is due to the increased cost associated with an extended duration for storage, whether at multiple independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) or at an ISF, until waste can be disposed of.- There is a potential total system lifecycle cost avoidance in realistic scenarios with an ISF when compared to scenarios with no ISF. However, most of the cost avoidance occurs several decades after the ISF is opened. The total WMS cost differential over the long term is mainly attributed to the reduced operational costs of storing the fuel in a consolidated facility rather than at individual reactor sites. - Earlier establishment of an ISF allows for more avoidance of post-shutdown at-reactor storage costs for any repository opening date. An ISF allows earlier acceptance of fuel from reactors, which reduces at-reactor costs from a total system perspective. - Transportation costs have little impact on a WMS with or without an ISF. These impacts range from 3-11% of the total cost in all scenarios. Therefore, transporting the fuel twice does not appear to be a significant cost concern driver relative to other system costs. In conclusion, designing, licensing, and constructing an ISF will require a large near-term financial investment. However, reduced annual operating and maintenance costs for an integrated waste management system with an ISF, compared to a system without an ISF, could eventually result in system-wide (integrated) cost avoidance due to reductions in at-reactor storage costs in the long term. The largest cost avoidances would not occur for several decades, so assumptions about inflation, escalation, and discount rates will have a significant effect on potential economic impacts of an ISF. It should be noted that other benefits associated with the investment of an ISF-such as earlier removal of SNF from shutdown reactor sites, earlier prospects for site re-utilization, and additional overall integrated waste management system flexibility-were not addressed in this study. (authors)

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Developments in the Regulatory Framework of Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) in Germany - 17374

According to article 6 of the German Atomic Energy Act, storage of nuclear fuel requires a license, granted by the competent authority in this field, which has been the Federal Office of Radiation Protection (BfS) until July 2016 and currently is the Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (BfE). A first license was granted in 1983 for storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and vitrified high level waste (HAW) at the interim storage facility in Gorleben. This license was reviewed in 1995. Dry Interim storage at the NPP sites in its current form started in 2002 in the interim storage facility next to the NPP Lingen. Since that time at each site of an operational NPP storage facilities were licensed and erected. Thus additionally to the three central storage facilities (Ahaus, Gorleben and Rubenow) there are now 12 storage facilities onsite the NPPs. All of these facilities use dry storage in metallic dual purpose casks (DPCs). The actual storage licenses for SNF and the HAW (which is stored in Gorleben and Rubenow) are limited to 40 years after closing the transport and storage cask. The first license to expire will be the storage license for the interim storage facility in Gorleben in the year 2034. The German 'Programme for the safe and responsible management of spent fuel and radioactive waste' expects to take the disposal facility into operation in the year 2050. Thus necessary preparations for interim storage till that time have to be taken on the side of the regulator. In the German Atomic Energy Act precautions have already been taken and a consulting of the German parliament (Bundestag) is mandatory if inevitable events would require an extension of currently licensed interim storage period. In the year 2016, the regulatory body in Germany was given a new structure. The BfS was formerly competent authority in the field of radiation protection since 1989. It had competencies for ionizing and non-ionizing radiation protection (e.g. mobile phone radiation, high voltage power lines and the effects of electric fields), licensing storage of spent nuclear fuel and as the operator of facilities for final disposal. Now there is a new structure with two Federal Offices (BfS and BfE) and a federal company for final disposal (BGE). The BfE is responsible for regulation in the field of nuclear disposal since 30.07.2016. So the package design approval for DPCs and the storage licenses for SNF are now granted by this office. The search for a repository site will be coordinated there as well. The site selection, construction and operation of the repository will be in the responsibility of BGE. The parts of the former BfS dealing with recovery of the waste from Asse (a former salt mine used for disposal research) and the construction of the repository Konrad (for low and medium level radioactive waste) will be transferred into that company. It is planned to incorporate the German company for construction and management of waste disposal facilities (DBE) which is owned by the German utilities as well. The BfS will focus on the scientific foundations and further advancement of radiation protection. (authors)

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Streamlining analysis capabilities for SNF management - 15490

A comprehensive, integrated data and analysis tool-the Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage, Transportation and Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST and DARDS) -is being developed for the US DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation Planning Project (NFST). The overarching goal of UNF-ST and DARDS is to provide a comprehensive controlled source of technical data integrated with key analysis capabilities to characterize inputs to the overall US waste management system from reactor power production through ultimate disposition. UNF-ST and DARDS seamlessly integrates a unified SNF system relational database and key analysis capabilities to simplify and automate the performance of accurate and efficient SNF related analyses to support numerous DOE waste management and fuel cycle activities. Hence, UNF-ST and DARDS enables decision making relative to design, safety, and licensing of SNF systems and facilities by providing the best information available. Automated analysis sequences have been deployed to characterize the discharge inventory and perform criticality, thermal, and dose analyses using time-dependent data. UNF-ST and DARDS provides cask-specific as-loaded safety analysis including criticality, thermal and dose evaluations, as well as results visualization. (authors)

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Twenty years of dry interim storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in Germany- History and developments - 15575

According to article 6 of the German Atomic Energy Act, storage of nuclear fuel requires a license granted by the competent authority in this field, which is the Federal Office of Radiation Protection. In 1983 a license to store spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and later expanded for vitrified high level waste (HAW) for the interim storage facility in Gorleben was granted. Dry Interim storage at the NPP sites in its actual form started in 2002 in the interim storage facility next to the NPP Lingen. Since this time each NPP erected its own storage facility and three central storage facilities have been built. All of these facilities use dry storage in metallic casks. The actual storage licenses for SNF and the HAW (which is stored in Gorleben and Rubenow) are limited to 40 years starting with the first cask emplacement. As no opening of the cask is intended during the storage period the condition of the inventory and the cask before loading has to be known in detail. This requires for instance detailed knowledge of the history of the SNF loaded as well as supervision of the manufacturing process of the cask. Within the last twenty years several mishaps influenced the regulatory point of view. During a loading campaign in a boiling water reactor traces of pool water remained in the gasket slot and during the drying procedure crystalline boron salts prevented the required tightness. After that event a long-term experiment was started and is still going on which studies the effects of water and minor damages to the gasket. As well changes in the loading procedure have been introduced. The pressure switch used to monitor the pressure in the space between primary and secondary lid has a self surveillance function. This indicated a malfunction 23 times in the last twenty years. Examinations of all events indicated no systematic failure, but a weak point seems to be the plug-in connection. The manufacturer introduced some modifications to improve the system. Introduction of FEM methods in safety analysis to amend the existing methods of testing allowed a new view on and in the cask safety analysis. Progress in this field is closely connected to the available computing capacity and stipulates experts to ongoing improvement. After expiring of the storage license which will be the case for the first cask loaded in 1992 and stored in Ahaus 2032 an extension or a new license can only be granted if the at this time relevant requirements are met. This will require detailed knowledge about the happenings and accidents during the previous storage period. All experience of the periodic safety assessment (PSA) which started in 2013 and accompanying experiments conducted till now and during the licensed storage time will be needed. (authors)

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Perspective of Dry Interim Storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in Germany - 16504

According to article 6 of the German Atomic Energy Act, storage of nuclear fuel requires a license granted by the competent authority in this field, which is the Federal Office of Radiation Protection (BfS). In 1995 a license to store spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and vitrified high level waste (HAW) for the interim storage facility in Gorleben was granted. Dry Interim storage at the NPP sites in its current form started in 2002 in the interim storage facility next to the NPP Lingen. Since this time each NPP erected its own storage facility and three central storage facilities have been built. All of these facilities use dry storage in metallic dual purpose casks (DPCs). The actual storage licenses for SNF and the HAW (which is stored in Gorleben and Rubenow) are limited to 40 years after closing the transport and storage cask. The first license to expire will be the storage license for the interim storage facility in Gorleben in the year 2035. During the last two years in Germany preparatory consultations to restart the process towards finding a repository took place, organised by a commission. This commission consists out of members of the scientific community, religious parties, social communities and environmental organizations as well as members of federal states governments and members of the German parliament (Bundestag). Recently the commission decided to extend its working period until summer 2016. Taking this background into account the BfS plans to intensify its research into extended interim storage with respect to potential material degradation leading to interference with safety functions (e.g. neutron shielding material). This includes topics like ageing of gasket materials which are already studied in ongoing experiments (e.g. at the Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing) as well as studies of long term relaxation processes. Because of the need for transportation towards a repository another important field is the behaviour of the inventory under mechanical loads. For SNF, first calculations showed that because of the lower decay heat load after 60 years due to hydride reorientation the cladding might become much less ductile. (authors)

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Preliminary Evaluation of Removing SNF from Nuclear Power Plant Sites - Pilgrim Site Visit - 20048

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Integrated Waste Management (DOE-IWM)a conducted an evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the Pilgrim site on November 4-8, 2019. The Pilgrim site is located on the western shore of Cape Cod Bay in the Town of Plymouth, Massachusetts, about 61 km southeast of Boston and 71 km east of Providence, Rhode Island. Participants in the site visit included the U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, the state of Massachusetts, the Federal Railroad Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, the Consolidated Group of Tribes and Organizations, the Council of State Governments-Eastern Regional Conference, the Pilgrim Nuclear Decommissioning Citizens Advisory Panel, and the Massachusetts Coastal Railroad. The Pilgrim site was found to have two transportation mode options for the removal of SNF, offsite rail access and onsite barge access. Two offsite heavy haul truck to rail transload locations were evaluated, one in Middleborough, Massachusetts, about 35-47 km from the Pilgrim site, and a second location in Middleborough about 36-43 km from the Pilgrim site. A passenger railroad terminates in Plymouth, Massachusetts, about 11 km from the Pilgrim site; however, this location is not suitable for freight rail involving large SNF transportation casks. There is also an onsite barge facility located on the Pilgrim site that was used during construction and would require refurbishment to be used. (authors)

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Progress in demonstrating the performance of Engineered Barriers for the disposal of HLW and SNF: lab studies and demonstration experiments - 20293

Disposal of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and spent nuclear fuels (SNF) in a geological disposal facility requires a fundamental understanding of the degradation processes of materials used in its engineered barrier system (EBS) over very long timescales. Beyond the wasteform itself (i.e. the borosilicate glass for HLW or the fuel matrix and cladding for SNF), materials often employed in a disposal concept include metallic containers (typically copper and/or carbon steel) and clay-based buffer materials (typically bentonite). In this paper we explore key developments on the long-term evolution of materials employed for the immobilisation, isolation and containment of HLW and SNF in a geological disposal facility, including nuclear glasses, candidate container materials and clay buffers. Our discussion is based on the latest findings from both experimental studies and in-situ demonstration experiments. We present relevant findings from the long-term evolution of HLW glasses (UK composition), metallic materials for the containment system (envisaged in Switzerland, Sweden, Canada and other countries), and bentonite clays (envisaged in many national disposal programmes). (authors)

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ADVANTG Results for a Proposed NDA System for Detecting Pin Diversion from SNF - Paper 120

This summary describes the results of applying the ADVANTG variance reduction parameter generator to accelerate continuous-energy Monte Carlo simulations of the {sup 252}Cf Interrogation with Prompt Neutron (CIPN) detection system proposed by Hu et al. for detecting the diversion of fuel elements from spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies. In previous work, ADVANTG was applied to a suite of nine radiation detection, special nuclear material (SNM) movement detection, and safeguards test cases. That effort demonstrated that ADVANTG was able to provide large increases in tally figures of merit (FOMs) in nearly all of the cases without introducing bias into the Monte Carlo results. The objective of the work described here is to further evaluate ADVANTG, and also to identify gaps in capability with regard to nuclear safeguards applications, by applying the code to a challenging problem that is of a different nature from the ones previously studied. The CIPN nondestructive assay (NDA) system consists of three fission chambers embedded in a C-shaped block of polyethylene and a polyethylene-moderated {sup 252}Cf source that are placed on opposite sides of a subject SNF assembly. The idea of the detection system is to measure the difference between the background neutron count rate, due to spontaneous fission in the fuel material, and the count rate observed once the source is introduced, which is dominated by multiplication within the assembly. Based on the difference between these count rates, the fissile content of the assembly can be inferred, and this information can be used to determine if some fraction of the original fuel pins have been replaced with depleted uranium substitutes. The authors report that the system can detect the replacement of at least eight pins (3% of total mass). The ADVANTG code generates space- and energy-dependent weight-window bounds and biased source distributions based on approximate transport solutions that are efficiently generated by the Denovo 3-D discrete ordinates package. ADVANTG implements the Consistent Adjoint Driven Importance Sampling (CADIS) method for accelerating individual tallies and the Forward-Weighted CADIS (FW-CADIS) method for obtaining relatively uniform uncertainties across tallies over multiple regions and/or energy bins. The variance reduction parameters are generated in a format directly usable by standard versions of MCNP5 and MCNPX. In this work, the ADVANTG variance reduction parameter generator was applied to accelerate continuous energy MCNPX simulations of the {sup 252}Cf Interrogation with Prompt Neutron detection system for detecting the diversion of fuel elements from SNF assemblies. Variance reduction parameters generated with the existing version of ADVANTG actually slowed down tally convergence in all cases. The cause of the poor performance was found to be the lack of an induced fission source treatment in the fixed-source discrete ordinates calculations employed by ADVANTG. Because fission was treated as capture and not as a source, the importance maps generated by ADVANTG significantly underestimated the importance of thermal neutrons in and around the fuel elements. In order to obtain improved results, we developed an experimental implementation of a fission source outer iteration for the adjoint calculations. We used this prototype capability to generate new variance reduction parameters and found that the mean fission rates agreed well with those predicted by the conventional MCNPX simulations, as was expected. With these new parameters, speedup factors of 59 to 80 were obtained for the case with the background source, and factors of 17 to 24 were obtained for the cases with the interrogating source. These results demonstrate that a fission source treatment is needed to improve the effectiveness of ADVANTG in problems where the effects of induced fission are important. This includes many types of NDA problems that are relevant to safeguards applications. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Preliminary Deposition Modeling: For Determining the Deposition of Corrosive Contaminants on SNF Canisters

This report fulfills the M3 milestone M3SF-20PN010207045. During fiscal year (FY) 2019, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) worked to develop initial deposition and particle tracking models which could be used to better understand how corrosive contaminants deposit on the surfaces of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters during dry storage. These models may be useful in understanding the likelihood of chloride induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC) on SNF canisters

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A probabilistic assessment of PWR SNF cladding pinching failure considering potential transportation accident conditions

This report presents a probabilistic assessment of pressurized water reactor (PWR) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) rod cladding pinching failure triggered by a transportation accident, after 300 years of dry storage. Three thousand pinching scenarios, which were previously evaluated assuming a baseline 9-m cask drop and a horizontal impact on an unyielding surface, are reassessed assuming more realistic train transportation accidents. Each scenario was defined using Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) of SNF rod conditions and loading parameters, and it is simulated with a nonlinear finite element (FE) model. Cladding failure is evaluated under consideration of hydride-related embrittlement effects. The reassessment indicates that cladding pinching failure is not significantly affected by the assumptions on transportation accidents, but is rather controlled by other parameters, mainly the pellet-cladding gap width. The reevaluated, conditional failure probability ranges from 1.62 E-7 to 6.47 E-7, for 5,000 km of transportation by train.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

One-dimensional SnF{sub 2} single crystals in the inner channels of single-wall carbon nanotubes: II. Structure and nanocomposite construction modeling

A structural model of the nanocomposite consisting of one-dimensional (1D) {alpha}-SnF{sub 2} single crystals and single-wall carbon nanotubes (SWCNTs) is proposed. The main cationic motif is revealed in the structure of monoclinic modification: two-layer packing of tin cations along the [283] direction. Four theoretical structural projections of a 1D crystal on the plane parallel to the [283] direction are determined and described. A fragment of the {alpha}-SnF{sub 2} structure in an SWCNT (with a channel diameter of 1.02 nm) is calculated. High-resolution electron microscopy (HREM) images are modeled. These images correspond to the actually observed HREM patterns.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

Study of the feasibility of distributed cathodic arc as a plasma source for development of the technology for plasma separation of SNF and radioactive wastes

One of the key problems in the development of plasma separation technology is designing a plasma source which uses condensed spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or nuclear wastes as a raw material. This paper covers the experimental study of the evaporation and ionization of model materials (gadolinium, niobium oxide, and titanium oxide). For these purposes, a vacuum arc with a heated cathode on the studied material was initiated and its parameters in different regimes were studied. During the experiment, the cathode temperature, arc current, arc voltage, and plasma radiation spectra were measured, and also probe measurements were carried out. It was found that the increase in the cathode heating power leads to the decrease in the arc voltage (to 3 V). This fact makes it possible to reduce the electron energy and achieve singly ionized plasma with a high degree of ionization to fulfill one of the requirements for plasma separation of SNF. This finding is supported by the analysis of the plasma radiation spectrum and the results of the probe diagnostics.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

AmeriFlux FLUXNET-1F US-Snf Sherman Barn

This is the AmeriFlux Management Project (AMP) created FLUXNET-1F version of the carbon flux data for the site US-Snf Sherman Barn. This is the FLUXNET version of the carbon flux data for the site US-Snf Sherman Barn produced by applying the standard ONEFlux (1F) software. Site Description - The Sherman Barn is pasture site on Sherman Island, that is managed by the California Department of Water Resources (DWR). A flux tower equipped to analyze energy, H2O, CO2, and CH4 fluxes was installed on June, 2018

Kusak, Kuno↗

Draft Experimental Plan for Commercial SNF Degradation in Repository Environments with a Focus on Fracture Matrix Degradation

This report documents work performed supporting US Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition, Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology, under work breakdown structure element 1.08.01.03.04, “Inventory and Waste Form Characteristics and Performance.” In particular, this report fulfills the M3 milestone, M3SF-21OR010309072 "Draft Experimental Plan for Commercial SNF Degradation in Repository Environments” as described in work package SF-21OR01030907 "SNF Degradation Testing-ORNL".This experimental plan is a collaboration between ORNL, SNL, ANL, and PNNL. It is intended to support source term model development and spent fuel degradation testing in a range of generic repository conditions. Potential testing and experiments to support validation of the Fuel Matrix Dissolution Model (FMDM) and the overall development/validation of repository source term modeling are discussed.

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