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Optimising National WM Strategies through early consideration of Nuclear Safeguards - 18607

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards stand alongside safety and security as one of the three pillars for prudent management of all nuclear material, including nuclear waste. Although safety considerations, including public and environmental radiation protection, are the traditional drivers of waste management strategies, there is a requirement for nuclear safeguards in shaping and quantifying long-term solutions for special classes of radioactive waste. This is especially important when considering the disposal of nuclear material in a repository that could be released from regulatory oversight for radiation protection after a period of institutional control, as some safeguards oversight would still be required. Failure to consider nuclear safeguards at the early stages of planning may alternatively lead to excessive volumes for disposal or the need to recondition already treated wastes. At the very least, safeguards measures should be considered before countries seek to dispose of legacy nuclear materials, decommissioning wastes and other materials containing uranium, thorium or plutonium in an operating repository. Nuclear safeguards are the set of tools and techniques used by the IAEA to verify that countries comply with their international obligations not to divert nuclear materials to nuclear explosive devices. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear safeguards apply to all uranium, thorium and plutonium held in non-weapons NPT states, with limited exceptions. In nuclear-weapon states, much of their material is likewise subject to IAEA safeguards through conditions in agreements with respective suppliers of the uranium. Under IAEA safeguards, such nuclear material must remain accounted for and accessible for periodic verification-analogous to the safety concepts of reversibility and retrievability. Nevertheless, safeguards requirements can be terminated - provided that the State and the [IAEA] agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable - through dilution or immobilisation in solid form (such as cement, glass or ceramic). This means candidate material can be disposed of as non- nuclear material, with no further safeguards requirements, provided this criterion is met. Unlike radiological wastes where repository design strongly influences pathways for radionuclide migration and overall safety performance, repository design is not a factor in considering the termination of safeguards on nuclear material. This paper looks at similarities and differences in the safety, security and safeguards regulatory requirements for the management of radioactive waste and nuclear material in Australia. In particular, it outlines recent experience gained from participation in Australia's waste acceptance criteria working group for a national low-level waste repository and intermediate-level waste store, as well as from Australia's overall waste management strategy. These items of work have coincided with the IAEA update of its internal policy on termination of safeguards on nuclear material. Australia's experience shows how inclusion of safeguards criteria in the planning process is leading to optimisations in choice of facility concepts, project sequencing and equitable distribution of economic risk. By considering the three pillars-safety, security and safeguards-early on in the planning process, Australia's waste management strategy will provide a benchmark for other states in establishing and updating their own waste acceptance criteria for the disposal of nuclear material. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Challenges and Technology-Driven Opportunities for Safeguarding Microreactors

Nuclear microreactors (MRs) represent a new class of reactors characterized by their compactness, portability, and low power output. These features enable MRs to supply electricity and process heat to remote areas like military bases; inaccessible locations; small grids, such as on islands; or disaster impacted areas. Compared to traditional light water reactors, MRs have a unique set of attributes that need to be considered for the implementation of safeguard strategies. Current safeguard methodologies are reactor technology specific and are employed on large, stationary reactors where there is easy access by safeguards inspectors and where safeguard equipment can be easily installed and retrofitted. While there are numerous benefits to MRs, their compact size, portability, scalability, and operational lifetime create challenges to the traditional safeguard approaches, thus needing novel safeguard strategies. Here, this paper addresses the unique challenges posed by MRs to the international nuclear safeguards regime, including limited human resources, and explores how technology advancements can help mitigate these challenges. Specifically, it examines novel technologies that could contribute to establishing a comprehensive safeguards framework for MRs. These safeguards-enabling technologies encompass safeguards by design, remote sensing and monitoring technologies, applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms, utilization of digital twins, and system of systems assessments. While each of these safeguards-enabling technologies offers partial solutions to the challenges posed by MRs for the international safeguards regime, none of them alone can entirely address these challenges. Consequently, a combination of the safeguards-enabling technologies outlined in this paper is recommended to establish a robust safeguards regime for MRs.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗