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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

Spent Fuel Ratio Estimates from Numerical Models in ALE3D

Potential threat of intentional sabotage of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities is of significant importance to national security. Paramount is the study of focused energy attacks on these materials and the potential release of aerosolized hazardous particulates into the environment. Depleted uranium oxide (DUO 2 ) is often chosen as a surrogate material for testing due to the unreasonable cost and safety demands for conducting full-scale tests with real spent nuclear fuel. To account for differences in mechanical response resulting in changes to particle distribution it is necessary to scale the DUO 2 results to get a proper measure for spent fuel. This is accomplished with the spent fuel ratio (SFR), the ratio of respirable aerosol mass released due to identical damage conditions between a spent fuel and a surrogate material like depleted uranium oxide (DUO 2 ). A very limited number of full-scale experiments have been carried out to capture this data, and the oft-questioned validity of the results typically leads to overly-conservative risk estimates. In the present work, the ALE3D hydrocode is used to simulate DUO 2 and spent nuclear fuel pellets impacted by metal jets. The results demonstrate an alternative approach to estimate the respirable release fraction of fragmented nuclear fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

CCE Case Study: Baltavia Substation Power Outage

In this case study, we will examine a fictional event broadly inspired by the real power outages in Ukraine that took place in December 2015 and December 2016 - both the result of cyber-enabled sabotage. The actual events of 2015 and 2016 were well-documented - the adversaries in these attacks gained access to a few power companies’ corporate networks, pivoted to industrial control system (ICS) networks, and created widespread physical effects in the form of power outages.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

CCE Case Study: Baltavia Substation Power Outage

In this case study, we will examine a fictional event broadly inspired by the real power outages in Ukraine that took place in December 2015 and December 2016—both the result of cyber-enabled sabotage. The actual events of 2015 and 2016 were well-documented—the adversaries in these attacks gained access to a few power companies’ corporate networks, pivoted to industrial control system (ICS) networks, and created widespread physical effects in the form of power outages.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

CCE Case Study: Stinky Cheese Company

This document explores how to apply Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) to identify and mitigate catastrophic effects resulting from cyber-enabled sabotage in a case study. For this case study, we will examine a fictional organization named the Stinky Cheese Company.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Stakeholder Transportation Scorecard: Reviewing Nevada's Recommendations for Enhancing the Safety and Security of Nuclear Waste Shipments - 13518

As a primary stakeholder in the Yucca Mountain program, the state of Nevada has spent three decades examining and considering national policy regarding spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste transportation. During this time, Nevada has identified 10 issues it believes are critical to ensuring the safety and security of any spent nuclear fuel transportation program, and achieving public acceptance. These recommendations are: 1) Ship the oldest fuel first; 2) Ship mostly by rail; 3) Use dual-purpose (transportable storage) casks; 4) Use dedicated trains for rail shipments; 5) Implement a full-scale cask testing program; 6) Utilize a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process for the selection of a new rail spur to the proposed repository site; 7) Implement the Western Interstate Energy Board (WIEB) 'straw man' process for route selection; 8) Implement Section 180C assistance to affected States, Tribes and localities through rulemaking; 9) Adopt safety and security regulatory enhancements proposed states; and 10) Address stakeholder concerns about terrorism and sabotage. This paper describes Nevada's proposals in detail and examines their current status. The paper describes the various forums and methods by which Nevada has presented its arguments and sought to influence national policy. As of 2012, most of Nevada's recommendations have been adopted in one form or another, although not yet implemented. If implemented in a future nuclear waste program, the State of Nevada believes these recommendations would form the basis for a successful national transportation plan for shipments to a geologic repository and/or centralized interim storage facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Game theoretic analysis of physical protection system design

The physical protection system (PPS) of a fictional small modular reactor (SMR) facility have been modeled as a platform for a game theoretic approach to security decision analysis. To demonstrate the game theoretic approach, a rational adversary with complete knowledge of the facility has been modeled attempting a sabotage attack. The adversary adjusts his decisions in response to investments made by the defender to enhance the security measures. This can lead to a conservative physical protection system design. Since defender upgrades were limited by a budget, cost benefit analysis may be conducted upon security upgrades. One approach to cost benefit analysis is the efficient frontier, which depicts the reduction in expected consequence per incremental increase in the security budget.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Safety and security of radioactive sources in industrial radiography in Bangladesh

Malicious use of radioactive sources can involve dispersal of that material through an explosive device. There has been recognition of the threat posed by the potential malicious misuse of NDT radioactive source by terrorists. The dispersal of radioactive material using conventional explosives, referred to as a 'dirty bomb', could create considerable panic, disruption and area access denial in an urban environment. However, as it is still a relatively new topic among regulators, users, and transport and storage operators worldwide, international assistance and cooperation in developing the necessary regulatory and security infrastructure is required. The most important action in reducing the risk of radiological terrorism is to increase the security of radioactive sources. This paper presents safety and security considerations for the transport and site storage of the industrial radiography sources as per national regulations entitled 'Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control Rules-1997'.The main emphasis was put on the stages of some safety and security actions in order to prevent theft, sabotage or other malicious acts during the transport of the packages. As a conclusion it must be mentioned that both safety and security considerations are very important aspects that must be taking in account for the transport and site storage of radioactive sources used in the practice of industrial radiography. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2017

Computational Safeguards Analysis of PWR Spent Nuclear Fuel in Dry Storage - 17435

The master plan for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management in Korea recently adopted by Korean atomic energy promotion council. According to the master plan, the detailed practical and R and D strategies for SNF transferring, storage and disposal should be determined in the near future. Besides, it is also necessary to make plan how to secure SNF at each step in terms of nuclear safeguards, safety, security and nonproliferation. Several nondestructive analysis (NDA) techniques have been studied for assuring the safety of SNF in PWR methods. Obviously, gamma-ray is most dominant radiation emitted by SNF so several gamma-ray measurement methods have been developed and applied for the purpose of SNF monitoring. Those methods, however, suffer from a lack of nuclear data and interfering background radiation. To date, several neutron measurement methods have been developed as a solution to the problem of gamma-ray methods. Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) currently develops a new novel technique of fast neutron detection for spent fuel monitoring at dry spent fuel storage facilities. As the first step, a computational program has been developed in order to evaluate neutron flux on the surface of PWR dry storage cask and study for some potential sabotage events. Typically, neutron flux on the surface of dry storage cask can be evaluated via two steps. The source term, based on burn-up rate of SNF, its cooling time and others related to operation condition at nuclear power plants, can be firstly defined by ORIGEN code. The surface flux can be then evaluated via MCNP code. These two separated steps are complicated and time consuming so KINAC developed a new algorithm and user-interface, coupled ORIGEN and MCNP. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

System impacts of accelerated transfer of used nuclear fuel to dry storage - 15220

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, and again after the March 11, 2011, accident at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi station from the Great East Japan Earthquake/tsunami, concern was expressed regarding security of current spent fuel storage practices in the United States. An approach recurrently proposed to reduce the potential for fire and the release of radionuclides in an accident or sabotage scenario is to reduce the loading of the reactor fuel pools, which are frequently maintained near their full capacity at many reactor sites in the U.S. We assess the impact on the waste management system of different scenarios for accelerating the schedule of used nuclear fuel (UNF) transfer from reactor pools to dry storage casks. We consider scenarios where the spent fuel pools are drawn down to 50% or 25% of full capacity over 5- or 10-year schedules. The scenarios include status quo, where UNF continues to remain in dry storage at the reactor sites, as well as scenarios with UNF transfer to interim storage and eventually to a mined geologic repository. The primary purpose is to evaluate how the different scenarios for accelerating the transfer of UNF to at-reactor dry storage would affect the performance of the entire UNF management system. Areas that were considered include an estimate of the additional system costs that could be incurred and where the existing infrastructure at the reactor sites would come under stress from the transfer demands. This study considered only the fuel-handling logistics and rough-order-of-magnitude cost at reactor sites, interim storage facility, and operations to package UNF into disposal canisters. The effects of minimum fuel age that could be transferred and the accelerated transfer starting date are also examined, but found to have relatively little effect. Impacts on safety and worker dose are not evaluated quantitatively, although effects can be inferred from increases in handling operations, etc. from the scenarios considered. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2026

Digital-Threat Bias and Psychological Distance: Barriers to Foundational Digital-Security Improvement

Modern life is held together by a web of digital dependencies that enable and provide delivery of critical services and functions—think the provision of utilities such as electricity and water, as well as our dependency on digital services for social and economic services (internet, communication, etc.). As this dependency grows, the complexity related to the delivery of these critical services increases as well. As complexity increases, the understanding of the risk and impact associated with potential disruption, degradation, or destruction—due to either malicious or non-malicious events of those digitally enabled functions—decreases. One potential explanation for the difficulty to 1) understand the risks faced and 2) address them appropriately and effectively is the abstractness and psychological distance assigned to “digital threat.” The complexity of these digitally enabled services creates a perceived complicatedness; as a result, digital threats are treated differently than similarly devasting (but more easily understood) kinetic or physical threats. How we categorize these threats also matters. Acts of cyber-enabled sabotage to critical infrastructure need to be defined as irregular warfare. By inadequately defining the threat, we compound the problem. Acknowledging this digital-threat bias is foundational to improving the ability to protect critical infrastructure. Using construal-level theory and psychological-distance concepts provides an intriguing starting point to address these issues, to reframe the challenges faced, and pursue more effective critical infrastructure security and defense policy.

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Security Assessment of an LBP16-Protocol-Based Computer Numerical Control Machine

Subtractive manufacturing systems, specifically, computer numerical control machines, have revolutionized the manufacturing industry. Computer numerical control machining is the preferred method for producing finished parts due to its efficiency, speed and suitability for high-volume production. Securing computer numerical control machines is a priority. Compromises or disruptions of these machines can result in significant downtime, loss of productivity and financial loss. This study examines the vulnerabilities and risks associated with computer numerical control machines, in particular, systems utilizing the LBP16 protocol for controller-machine communications. The study reveals that an adversary can execute cyber-physical attacks such as sabotage and denial of service. The potential security threats emphasize the importance of implementing robust security measures to mitigate the cyber risks to computer numerical control machines.

Forihat, Yahya [Virginia Commonwealth University, ↗
DOE OSTI2017

Implementing an Information Security Program

The threats to information security have dramatically increased with the proliferation of information systems and the internet. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNe) facilities need to address these threats in order to protect themselves from the loss of intellectual property, theft of valuable or hazardous materials, and sabotage. Project 19 of the European Union CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative is designed to help CBRN security managers, information technology/cybersecurity managers, and other decision-makers deal with these threats through the application of cost-effective information security programs. Project 19 has developed three guidance documents that are publically available to cover information security best practices, planning for an information security management system, and implementing security controls for information security.

blended attack↗
DOE OSTI2018

Foot-and-mouth disease virus non-structural protein 2B negatively regulates the RLR-mediated IFN-β induction

Highlights: • FMDV 2B is a negatively regulator of type I interferon induction. • FMDV 2B can inhibit the phosphorylation of TBK1 and IRF3. • FMDV 2B inhibited the expression of the RIG-I and MDA5. Foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) is the causative agent of Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), which is an acute and highly contagious disease affecting pigs, cattle and other cloven-hoofed animals. Several studies have shown that FMDV has evolved multiple strategies to evade the host innate immune response, but the underlying mechanisms for immune evasion are still not fully understood. In the current research, we have demonstrated that FMDV utilizes its non-structural protein 2B to sabotage the host immune response. Over-expression of the FMDV 2B inhibited Poly(I:C)-induced or SeV-triggered up-regulation of IFN-β, IL-6 as well as ISG15. When HEK293T cells were transfected with FMDV 2B, the phosphorylation of TBK1 and IRF3 was inhibited. Co-immunoprecipitation and pull-down experiments indicated that FMDV 2B protein could interact with host RIG-I and MDA5. Moreover, FMDV 2B also inhibited the expression of the RIG-I and MDA5. Thus, FMDV 2B negatively regulates the RLR-mediated IFN-β induction by targeting RIG-I and MDA5.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

JTAG-based PLC memory acquisition framework for industrial control systems

In industrial control systems (ICS), programmable logic controllers (PLC) are the embedded devices that directly control and monitor critical industrial infrastructure processes such as nuclear plants and power grid stations. Cyberattacks often target PLCs to sabotage a physical process. A memory forensic analysis of a suspect PLC can answer questions about an attack, including compromised firmware and manipulation of PLC control logic code and I/O devices. Given physical access to a PLC, collecting forensic information from the PLC memory at the hardware-level is risky and challenging. It may cause the PLC to crash or hang since PLCs have proprietary, legacy hardware with heterogeneous architecture. This paper addresses this research problem and proposes a novel JTAG (Joint Test Action Group)-based framework, Kyros, for reliable PLC memory acquisition. Kyros systematically creates a JTAG profile of a PLC through hardware assessment, JTAG pins identification, memory map creation, and optimizing acquisition parameters. It also facilitates the community of interest (such as ICS owners, operators, and vendors) to develop the JTAG profiles of PLCs. Further, we present a case study of Kyros implementation over Allen-Bradley 1756-A10/B to help understand the framework's application on a real-world PLC used in industry settings. The sample PLC memory dumps are shared with the research community to facilitate further research.

Rais, Muhammad Haris↗
DOE OSTI2021

Polymorphonuclear-MDSCs Facilitate Tumor Regrowth After Radiation by Suppressing CD8+ T Cells

Radiation therapy (RT) is widely used in the treatment of cancer. Unfortunately, RT alone is insufficient to control the disease in most cases, as regrowth after irradiation still occur. Thus, it would be meaningful to explore the underlying mechanism of tumor regrowth after irradiation. Myeloid-derived suppressor cells (MDSCs) contribute to the immunosuppressive tumor microenvironment and hinder the therapeutic efficacy of RT. However, it is unclear whether MDSCs-mediated immune suppression contributes to local relapse after irradiation. In this article, we tried to figure out how MDSCs sabotage the therapeutic effect of RT, and tried to determine the potential synergistic effect of combination between targeting MDSCs and RT.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Radiation Accidents and Malicious Events – Scenarios and Scope of the Work of ICRP Task Group 120

The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Task Group 120 (TG120) is developing ICRP recommendations for radiological protection for a wide range of radiation accidents and malicious events, complementing those given in ICRP Publication 146 (2020) for large nuclear accidents. The scope includes accidents involving criticalities, operating faults, and fires and explosions in nuclear facilities, inadvertent damage to sealed radiation sources, as well as malicious events, such as sabotage of nuclear facilities or materials, use of radiological dispersal devices, the contamination of food and drinking water supplies, and the deployment of nuclear weapons. A template has been designed to collate relevant information on a wide range of case studies and hypothetical malicious scenarios to ensure that the recommendations developed are broadly applicable and comprehensive. For all scenarios, a graded approach to protection is being taken, accepting that specific guidance may be required for some distinctive aspects, for example, protection during times of armed conflict. This paper provides an overview of the scenarios and scope of the work of TG120, including some of the radiological and non-radiological impacts of radiation emergencies, along the response and recovery timeline.

ICRP↗
DOE OSTI2019

Crystal structure of an adenovirus virus-associated RNA

Adenovirus Virus-Associated (VA) RNAs are the first discovered viral noncoding RNAs. By mimicking double-stranded RNAs (dsRNAs), the exceptionally abundant, multifunctional VA RNAs sabotage host machineries that sense, transport, process, or edit dsRNAs. How VA-I suppresses PKR activation despite its strong dsRNA character, and inhibits the crucial antiviral kinase to promote viral translation, remains largely unknown. Here, we report a 2.7 Å crystal structure of VA-I RNA. The acutely bent VA-I features an unusually structured apical loop, a wobble-enriched, coaxially stacked apical and tetra-stems necessary and sufficient for PKR inhibition, and a central domain pseudoknot that resembles codon-anticodon interactions and prevents PKR activation by VA-I. These global and local structural features collectively define VA-I as an archetypal PKR inhibitor made of RNA. The study provides molecular insights into how viruses circumnavigate cellular rules of self vs non-self RNAs to not only escape, but further compromise host innate immunity.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

Cyber Norms for Civilian Nuclear Power Plants

The international community agrees that the safe operation of civilian nuclear infrastructure is in every population’s best interest. One challenge each government must address is defining and agreeing to a set of acceptable norms of behavior in cyberspace as they relate to these facilities. The introduction of digital systems and networking technologies into these environments has led to the possibility that control and supporting computer systems are now accessible and exploitable, especially where interconnections to global information and communications technology (ICT) networks exist. The need for norms of behavior in cyberspace includes what is expected of system architects and cyber defenders as well as adversaries who should abide by rules of engagement even while conducting acts that violate national and international laws. The goal of this paper is to offer three behavioral cyber norms to improve the overall security of the ICT and Operational Technology (OT) networks and systems that underlie the operations of nuclear facilities. These norms of behavior will be specifically defined with the goals of reducing the threats associated to the theft of nuclear materials, accidental release of radiation and sabotage of nuclear processes. These norms would also include instances where an unwitting attacker or intelligence collection entity inadvertently makes their way into a nuclear facility network or system and can recognize they are in a protected zone and an approach to ensuring that these zones are not exploitable by bad actors to place their sensitive cyber effect delivery systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗