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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Promoting the regulatory acceptance of combined ion and neutron irradiation for material degradation in nuclear reactors

The Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies (AMMT) program within the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy has developed its current recommendation for promoting the use of combined ion irradiation and neutron irradiation for the accelerated qualification of materials to be deployed in nuclear reactors. This plan is intended to provide a collaborative path forward that can be adopted by academia, national laboratories, and industry, and has been developed with input from the regulatory research arm of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). To deploy new materials or materials manufactured with new technologies, such as additive manufacturing, materials must be evaluated for reactor-induced degradation from the combination of harsh temperatures, corrosive environments, and radiation fields. However, rapid deployment of materials necessitates accelerated testing methods rather than relying on years of neutron irradiation in a material test reactor. Ion irradiation has demonstrated success in reproducing material microstructure and select property evolution resulting from neutron irradiation with three to four orders of magnitude reduction in time and cost, making it an ideal candidate for accelerated irradiation testing. This presentation provides context governing both the scientific and regulatory aspects of the proposed goal. The discussion is aimed at a broad audience including researchers from industry, national laboratories, and academia. The recommended path forward is presented as a conceptual framework of specific steps. In brief, the strategy entails developing an integrated ion and neutron irradiation test plan for the material property of interest based on the fundamental tenet of the linkage of microstructure and properties in materials. Physics-based modeling interprets ion irradiation data and predicts neutron irradiation microstructure and properties with uncertainty bounds. The first round of testing is sufficient for an initial licensing application using a risk-informed approach, while a minimum required neutron irradiation test plan reduces cost and time requirements. A surveillance program with witness specimens in-reactor provides additional data over time to improve model predictions to higher damage levels and further reduce uncertainty bounds, which can be used for license extensions or longer lifetimes in new license applications.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗
DOE OSTI2022

Ecological information and approaches needed for risk communication dialogs for acute or chronic environmental crises

Scientists, social scientists, risk communicators, and many others are often thrust into a crisis situation where they need to interact with a range of stakeholders, including governmental personnel (tribal, U.S. federal, state, local), local residents, and other publics, as well as other scientists and other risk communicators in situations where information is incomplete and evolving. This paper provides: (1) an overall framework for thinking about communication during crises, from acute to chronic, and local to widespread, (2) a template for the types of ecological information needed to address public and environmental concerns, and (3) examples to illustrate how this information will aid risk communicators. The main goal is providing an approach to the knowledge needed by communicators to address the challenges of protecting ecological resources during an environmental crisis, or for an on-going, chronic environmental issue. To understand the risk to these ecological resources, it is important to identify the type of event, whether it is acute or chronic (or some combination of these), what receptors are at risk, and what stressors are involved (natural, biological, chemical, radiological). For ecological resources, the key information a communicator needs for a crisis is whether any of the following are present: threatened or endangered species, species of special concern, species groups of concern (e.g., neotropical bird migrants, breeding frogs in vernal ponds, rare plant assemblages), unique or rare habitats, species of commercial and recreational interest, and species/habitats of especial interest for medicinal, cultural, or religious activities. Communication among stakeholders is complicated with respect to risk to ecological receptors because of differences in trust, credibility, empathy, perceptions, world view valuation of the resources, and in many cases, a history of misinformation, disinformation, or no information. Exposure of salmon spawning in the Columbia River to hexavalent chromium from the Hanford Site is used as an example of communication challenges with different stakeholders, including Native Americans with Tribal Treaty rights to the land.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

The Regulatory Treatment of Low Frequency External Events as Part of a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Approach

To assist the developing advanced reactor industry in future licensing efforts, the U.S. Department of Energy Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program Regulatory Development area initiated a project at Argonne National Laboratory to examine the regulatory treatment of external hazards as part of a risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) licensing framework. A RIPB licensing framework for advanced reactors built on establishing an affirmative safety case offers the benefits of increased flexibility regarding key design and licensing decisions based on a detailed assessment and understanding of plant risk. Historically, reactor licensing addressed events of very low frequency primarily through the application of design margin and defense-in-depth philosophy. In contrast, RIPB approaches attempt to evaluate these scenarios at a level of detail commensurate with their risk, which often necessitates an explicit treatment of their frequency and associated consequence. While the detailed analysis of low frequency events provides insights that can help justify alternative treatments to past conservatism, the findings are dependent on the quality and confidence associated with the analyses. The assessment of external hazards presents a unique challenge, as their potential frequency of occurrence, especially of large magnitude events, is inherently uncertain given the long return periods in question. This project aims to identify the benefits and challenges of such approaches for advanced reactor vendors and aid in the development of consistent and appropriate analysis methodologies. The paper summarizes project findings and explores the application of various approaches for different external hazards. In addition, the current work also evaluates the application of the quantitative health objectives as a limit on external event risk, as they are a potential regulatory requirement under the current draft 10 CFR Part 53, which is a new technology-neutral reactor licensing pathway in the U.S.

Grabaskas, David↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗
DOE OSTI2024

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor: Licensing Part I

NRC PRA Policy Statement motivates risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) approach to modular High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) licensing Complements traditional deterministic design approach to increase use of risk insights in design and licensing decisions Risk-informed approach: Explicit consideration to a broader set of challenges Logical prioritization of challenges Consideration of broader set of resources to defend against challenges Explicitly identifying and quantifying sources of uncertainty Better decision making by testing for sensitivity to key assumptions Performance-Based Approach: Measurable (or calculable) parameters for monitoring Objective criteria to assess performance

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Information needs, approaches, and case studies in human health risk communication

This article uses ten case studies to illustrate the information needs, various communication approaches, and the communicator's role in explaining environmental health risks from a variety of hazards, to a variety of audiences, over time frames from days to years, using in person consultation, lectures, zooms, and email formats. Events often had a long history before the communication began and may have had a long tail afterward. Audiences may be public officials, companies, workers, communities, or individuals. Each individual may have their own understanding or mental model regarding the hazard, exposure, and risk. The communicator's role or intention may be to reassure an audience that has unrealistic exaggerated concerns or fears or to protect a client if the fears are realistic. Or it may be altruistic to inform a complacent audience to take the risks it faces more seriously. Although risk assessment research has advanced the techniques for communicating abstruse probabilities to audiences with low numeracy, in my experience, audiences are unimpressed by precise–sounding probability numbers, and are more interested in whether exposure is occurring or may occur and how to stop it. Often audiences have reason to be outraged and may be more concerned about punishing wrong doers than about the hazard itself, particularly when the exposure is past and cannot be undone. Thus, there is a difference between discussing the riskiness of a situation (risk communication) and what you are going to do about the situation (risk management). Risk communication is successful when the audience responds as intended, calming down or taking action. These case studies are drawn from a large number of risk communication experiences that I and my Rutgers colleagues have engaged in over the past four decades. Through the 20th century, New Jersey was the most densely industrialized State in United States. New Jersey experienced growth of the chemical and petrochemical industries and the unfortunately profligate disposal of toxic wastes. Having the most Superfund sites of any state is a dubious distinction, but New Jersey also has the most experience in evaluating and responding to these hazards.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Scalable Technologies Achieving Risk-Informed Condition-Based Predictive Maintenance Enhancing the Economic Performance of Operating Nuclear Power Plants

The primary objective of the research presented in this report is to develop scalable technologies that are deployable across plant assets and across the nuclear fleet to achieve risk-informed predictive maintenance (PdM) strategies at commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs). Over the years, the nuclear fleet has relied on labor-intensive and time-consuming preventive maintenance (PM) programs, driving up operation and maintenance (O&M) costs to achieve high capacity factors. A well-constructed risk-informed PdM approach for an identified plant asset has been developed in this research, taking advantage of advancements in data analytics, machine learning (ML), artificial intelligence (AI), physics-informed modeling, and visualization. These technologies would allow commercial NPPs to reliably transition from current labor-intensive PM programs to a technology driven PdM program, eliminating unnecessary O&M costs. The work presented in the report is being developed as part of a collaborative research effort between Idaho National Laboratory and Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear, LLC. This report (1) reflects the results of work by LWRS Program researchers with PSEG, Nuclear LLC-owned Salem and Hope Creek Nuclear Power Plants; (2) presents utilization of circulating water system (CWS) heterogeneous data and fault modes from both the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear power plant sites to develop salient fault signatures associated with each fault mode; (3) describes the integration of component-level predictive models into a robust system-level model enabled by the federated-transfer learning; (4) describes the development of physics-informed model of circulating water pump and motor; (5) develops a scalable risk and economic model; and (6) outlines the development of a user-centric visualization application. The outcomes presented in this report lays the foundation and provides a much-needed technical basis to focus on explainability and trustworthiness of ML and AI-based technologies, as part of future research.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Toward More Actionable Flood‐Risk Information

Abstract The increasingly urgent need to develop knowledge and practices to manage flood risks drives innovative information design. However, experts often disagree about design practices. As a result, flood‐risk estimates can diverge, leading to different conclusions for decision‐making. Using examples of household‐scale fluvial (riverine) flood‐risk information in the United States, we assess design features and risk communication approaches that may lead to more actionable information for decision‐making. We argue that increased attention to uncertainty characterization and model diagnostics is a critical intermediate step for developing simpler approaches for designing flood‐risk information. Simpler frameworks are desirable because flood risks change over time, and simpler frameworks are less costly to update. Developing frameworks for large spatial domains require collaboration grounded in principles of open science. Finally, systematically evaluating how decision‐makers access and use information can provide new insights to guide risk communication and information design.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Integrated Risk-Informed Condition Based Maintenance Capability and Automated Platform: Technical Report 1

Due to continuing global energy market trends, driven heavily by the abundant preserves of natural gas, there is an immediate need to reduce costs associated with operation and maintenance (O&M) for the current domestic nuclear power industry and for future reactor developments. This is to ensure that nuclear power generation remains an economically competitive and viable option in the energy market. O&M costs include labor-intensive preventive maintenance (PM) programs, which involve manually-performed inspection, calibration, testing, and maintenance of plant assets at periodic frequency and time-based replacement of assets, irrespective of their condition. This has resulted in an expensive, labor-centric business model to achieve high capacity factors. Fortunately, there are technologies (advanced sensors, data analytics, and risk assessment methodologies) that can enable the transition from a labor-centric business model to a technology-centric business model. The technology-centric business model will result in a significant reduction of PM activities, laying the foundation for real-time condition assessment of plant assets, reducing overall labor and part costs. To enable this transition, PKMJ Technical Services LLC is partnering with the U.S. Department of Energy’s Idaho National Laboratory (operated by the Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC) and the Public Services Enterprise Group (PSEG) Nuclear, LLC in the Integrated Risk-Informed Condition-Based Maintenance Capability and Automated Platform Project. In this report, the configuration of a digital cloud platform using Microsoft Azure is discussed, data from the PSEG Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 & 2 are imported into a digital cloud platform, and the data is used for an evaluation of several key areas: cost impact analysis, risk-informed model development, and preventive maintenance strategy optimization. First, the cost impact analysis reviews which plant assets are potential good candidates for condition-based monitoring. Next, INL utilized the data in their local environment to develop the risk-informed model; which provides estimates of failure rates and probability of failures of assets based upon their past performance. The developed model is performed on assets selected from the cost impact analysis. Lastly, engineers assess the preventive maintenance strategy for the selected assets at PSEG against maintenance strategies in the nuclear industry for similar assets to potentially identify acceptable justification for the extension of current maintenance frequencies.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2025

Hungary 908 Event - Risk Based Graded Approach to ITM

This presentation, Risk-Based, Graded Approach to Insider Threat Mitigation: Human Measures, introduces a structured framework for managing insider threat risk using internationally recognized guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series No. 8-G (Rev. 1) and the Joint Statement on Mitigating Insider Threats (INFCIRC/908). The presentation emphasizes that effective insider threat mitigation (ITM) depends on both positional controls, which manage inherent risk based on access, authority, and knowledge, and human measures, which address residual risk reflected in behavior, motivation, and reliability. Using a risk-informed and graded approach, the presentation outlines methods for identifying and prioritizing high-risk positions, applying layered organizational controls, and integrating human reliability mechanisms such as the Behavior Observation Program (BOP), Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) evaluations, Employee Assistance Programs (EAP), and Nuclear Security Culture (NSC). The human-focused portion examines behavioral and organizational indicators of opportunity, vulnerability, motivation, and crisis, demonstrating how early detection, deterrence, and response can prevent insider events. The session concludes with a case review of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station incident involving engineer George Galatis. The case illustrates how weak leadership and a poor safety culture can create conditions for failure and how a comprehensive ITM framework could have altered the outcome. The objective of this presentation is to help practitioners apply a risk-based, graded philosophy to human factors and promote a culture of accountability, communication, and resilience within nuclear organizations.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Utilization of the LMP Methodology in Support of the VTR Conceptual Safety Design Report

The Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) is a fast spectrum test reactor currently being developed in the United States under the direction of the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy. The VTR is utilizing a risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) approach for design support and authorization by the DOE, derived from recent efforts by the US industry led Licensing Modernization Project (LMP). This document contains an overview of the implementation of the LMP approach in support of the VTR Conceptual Safety Design Report (CSDR). The work reported here is the result of studies supporting a VTR conceptual design, cost, and schedule estimate for DOE-NE to make a decision on procurement. As such, it is preliminary. The VTR RIPB authorization approach utilizes information from the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), coupled with deterministic analyses, to aid in decision-making regarding the identification and categorization of safety basis events (SBEs), the classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and the evaluation of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy. As part of initial reactor design efforts, a VTR conceptual design PRA was developed to support the RIPB process, which focused on at-power internal events, with scoping analyses for seismic and sodium fire hazards. In addition to supporting numerous design studies, preliminary results from the RIPB approach and the VTR conceptual design PRA were utilized as the basis of the VTR CSDR. The initial identification and categorization of SBEs, SSC classification, and DID evaluation were contained within the CSDR, which was submitted to DOE in 2019 as part of the CD-1 submittal package. Following review, DOE approved the CSDR in April 2020 and the CD-1 package in late 2020. Valuable experience was gained through the implementation of the RIPB approach for design and authorization during the VTR conceptual design phase, which is summarized in this document. To the extent possible, this experience has been shared with the advanced reactor industry, through publications and participation in licensing tabletops, in addition to informing DOE:NE advanced reactor regulatory development efforts. Furthermore, the approval of the CSDR by the DOE as part of CD-1 represents a significant milestone in the use of RIPB approaches for advanced reactor licensing.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗