Engineering PapersSearch

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Risk Management”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 55 records · Page 3

NASA Risk Management Handbook: Version 2.0, Part 2

The purpose of this handbook is to provide an in-depth reference for the practice of risk management in NASA, updating the guidance offered in its original version, NASA/SP-2011-3422 (November 2011), and closely aligning the updated guidance with the current NASA Procedural Requirements for Agency Risk Management, NPR 8000.4, and the parent NASA Policy Directive for NASA Governance and Strategic Management, NPD 1000.0 (January 2020). NPD 1000.0 introduces with emphasis the concept of “Risk Leadership,” making it a fundamental tenet and pillar of the risk management culture that it advocates for the Agency. NPR 8000.4 applies this concept and establishes Risk Management (RM) requirements for the Agency as an integrated enterprise, as well as the RM requirements for portfolio elements within the enterprise. Such elements include the various programs and projects that contribute to the Agency’s objectives and the various institutional activities carried out by entities that contribute to mission support. The present version of the handbook also emphasizes the integration of risk management processes across activity and project life cycles and their coordination and interaction with day-to-day programmatic and organizational functions. Areas of application of risk assessment and management that were not covered with specific guidance in the preceding version are addressed in this version with in-depth examples. The handbook is structured into two parts, whose chapters are in turn organized in a sequential order intended to facilitate a gradual and progressive introduction of the reader to risk management principles and practices. Part 1 of the handbook is dedicated to the introduction of the basic foundations of the NASA integrated risk management framework, the related fundamental risk concepts, the description of the risk management and decision processes that are to be implemented within the framework, the discussion of the risk assessment techniques that should be utilized in support of such processes, and the management and organizational interactions and interfaces that should be enabled to implement an effective integration of risk management activities within the Agency. Part 2 provides self-contained, end-to-end examples of application of the processes and techniques introduced in Part 1, in the context of both programmatic (i.e., project and/or mission related) and institutional activities.

Risk Leadership

Risk Management: A Practical Design Tool For Space Systems and Technology Development

Over the past two decades, risk management and risk analysis have emerged throughout the business community in the United States (US) as prominent planning and development strategies used to mitigate risk of failure and ensure a high return on investment (ROI) for business endeavors (financial and otherwise). They are generic tools that can be applied to any business regardless of the sector (i.e., government, university, private) and have been used by the Federal government in the form of institutional practices aimed at maximizing the probability of success in business activities. One US Federal agency that incorporates risk management and analysis techniques into business and/or engineering activities is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The present work is a discussion on mission, spacecraft and instrument design (as well as technology development) and the role of risk management, analysis and mitigation as a fundamental tool in the design process.

Silk, Eric A.

Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Approach to Enterprise Risk Management

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Division has implemented an innovative approach to Enterprise Risk Management under a unique governance structure and streamlined integration model. ESD's mission is to design and build the capability to extend human existence to deep space. The Enterprise consists of three Programs: Space Launch System (SLS), Orion, and Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO). The SLS is a rocket and launch system that will be capable of powering humans, habitats, and support systems to deep space. Orion will be the first spacecraft in history capable of taking humans to multiple destinations within deep space. GSDO is modernizing Kennedy's spaceport to launch spacecraft built and designed by both NASA and private industry. ESD's approach to Enterprise Risk Management is commensurate with affordability and a streamlined management philosophy. ESD Enterprise Risk Management leverages off of the primary mechanisms for integration within the Enterprise. The Enterprise integration approach emphasizes delegation of authority to manage and execute the majority of cross-program activities and products to the individual Programs, while maintaining the overall responsibility for all cross-program activities at the Division. The intent of the ESD Enterprise Risk Management approach is to improve risk communication, to avoid replication and/or contradictory strategies, and to minimize overhead process burden. This is accomplished by the facilitation and integration of risk information within ESD. The ESD Division risks, Orion risks, SLS risks, and GSDO risks are owned and managed by the applicable Program. When the Programs have shared risks with multiple consequences, they are jointly owned and managed. When a risk is associated with the integrated system that involves more than one Program in condition, consequence, or mitigation plan, it is considered an Exploration Systems Integration (ESI) Risk. An ESI risk may require visibility and risk handling by multiple organizations. The Integrated Risk Working Group (IRWG) is a small team of Risk experts that are responsible for collaborating and communicating best practices. In addition, the forum facilitates proper integration of risks across the Enterprise. The IRWG uses a Continuous Risk Management approach for facilitating the identification, analysis, planning, tracking, and controlling of ESI Risks. The ESD Division, Programs, and Integrated Task Teams identify ESI Risks. The IRWG maintains a set of metrics for understanding Enterprise Risk process and the overall Risk Posture. The team is also actively involved in the modeling of risk for Enterprise Performance Management. With the Enterprise being constrained in Schedule and Budget, and with significant technical complexity, the appropriate use of Risk Management techniques is crucial to the success of the Enterprise. The IRWG achieves this through the modified approach, providing a forum for collaboration on risks that cross boundaries between the separate entities.

Bauder, Stephen P.

Risk Management from GSFC Perspective

Risk Management is an organized, systematic decision making process that efficiently identifies, analyzes, plans, tracks, controls, communicates and documents risk

Jambulingam, Natesan

Marine Energy Technology Development Risk Management Framework

Over the past decades, the global marine energy industry has suffered a number of serious technological and commercial setbacks. To help reduce the risks of industry failures and advance the development of new technologies, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) developed a Marine Energy Risk Management Framework in 2015, with this revision published in 2024. This risk management framework shall be utilized on all DOE Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO) projects that require system testing in the open water. By addressing uncertainties, the Marine Energy Risk Management Framework increases the likelihood of successful development of marine energy converter technology. It covers projects of any technology readiness level technology performance level (TPL) and all risk types (e.g. technological risk, regulatory risk, commercial risk) over the development cycle. This risk framework is not a substitute for other risk management procedures that may be required for marine operations, such as installations at sea, hoisting and rigging, safe diver operations, and other safety requirements. This risk framework is intended to meet DOE's risk management expectations for marine energy technology research and development efforts from WPTO. It also provides an overview of other relevant risk management tools and documentation.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER

Valuing Rigor in the Risk Management Process

NASA, as an organization, takes risk management (RM) seriously, and for most projects, the risk management process is exemplar. There can be challenges, though, with defining RM processes. For example, many different risk analysis methodologies are available, they can be applied with varying degrees of rigor, and they can have different value depending on how projects use them. In particular, risk analysis methodologies vary considerably in the level of quantitative detail, with more probabilistic techniques encouraged in some situations. We discussed these processes and methodologies with ten project managers (PM) at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). Our intent was not to prove with some level of statistical significance that some are more helpful than others, but rather to obtain a general understanding of how projects are identifying, and thinking, about risks. This paper describes some of the available risk processes and methodologies, and provides some insights about the benefits that can gained from their use. We provide an in-depth discussion of one quantitative methodology, Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs), and conclude with a few insights from observed best practices.

Dillon, Robin L.

Application of Risk Assessment Tools in the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Process

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is currently implementing the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Program developed by the Carnegie Mellon University and recommended by NASA as the Risk Management (RM) implementation approach. The four most frequently used risk assessment tools in the center are: (a) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis (HA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA). There are some guidelines for selecting the type of risk assessment tools during the project formulation phase of a project, but there is not enough guidance as to how to apply these tools in the Continuous Risk Management process (CRM). But the ways the safety and risk assessment tools are used make a significant difference in the effectiveness in the risk management function. Decisions regarding, what events are to be included in the analysis, to what level of details should the analysis be continued, make significant difference in the effectiveness of risk management program. Tools of risk analysis also depends on the phase of a project e.g. at the initial phase of a project, when not much data are available on hardware, standard FMEA cannot be applied; instead a functional FMEA may be appropriate. This study attempted to provide some directives to alleviate the difficulty in applying FTA, PRA, and FMEA in the CRM process. Hazard Analysis was not included in the scope of the study due to the short duration of the summer research project.

Paul S. Ray

Navigator program risk management

In this paper, program risk management as applied to the Navigator Program: In Search of New Worlds will be discussed. The Navigator Program's goals are to learn how planetary systems form and to search for those worlds that could or do harbor life.

risk management

Continuous Risk Management Course

This document includes a course plan for Continuous Risk Management taught by the Software Assurance Technology Center along with the Continuous Risk Management Guidebook of the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon University and a description of Continuous Risk Management at NASA.

Hammer, Theodore F.

The NASA Risk Management Program

This paper describes the NASA Risk Management Program established by the Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Quality (MSQ). Current agency policy is outlined, risk management assistance to the field is described, and examples are given of independent risk assessments conducted by SMQ. The motivation for and the structure of the program is placed in the historical context of pre- and post-Challenger environments.

Buchbinder, Benjamin

NASA Risk Management Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide guidance for implementing the Risk Management (RM) requirements of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) document NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements [1], with a specific focus on programs and projects, and applying to each level of the NASA organizational hierarchy as requirements flow down. This handbook supports RM application within the NASA systems engineering process, and is a complement to the guidance contained in NASA/SP-2007-6105, NASA Systems Engineering Handbook [2]. Specifically, this handbook provides guidance that is applicable to the common technical processes of Technical Risk Management and Decision Analysis established by NPR 7123.1A, NASA Systems Engineering Process and Requirements [3]. These processes are part of the \Systems Engineering Engine. (Figure 1) that is used to drive the development of the system and associated work products to satisfy stakeholder expectations in all mission execution domains, including safety, technical, cost, and schedule. Like NPR 7123.1A, NPR 8000.4A is a discipline-oriented NPR that intersects with product-oriented NPRs such as NPR 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements [4]; NPR 7120.7, NASA Information Technology and Institutional Infrastructure Program and Project Management Requirements [5]; and NPR 7120.8, NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements [6]. In much the same way that the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook is intended to provide guidance on the implementation of NPR 7123.1A, this handbook is intended to provide guidance on the implementation of NPR 8000.4A. 1.2 Scope and Depth This handbook provides guidance for conducting RM in the context of NASA program and project life cycles, which produce derived requirements in accordance with existing systems engineering practices that flow down through the NASA organizational hierarchy. The guidance in this handbook is not meant to be prescriptive. Instead, it is meant to be general enough, and contain a sufficient diversity of examples, to enable the reader to adapt the methods as needed to the particular risk management issues that he or she faces. The handbook highlights major issues to consider when managing programs and projects in the presence of potentially significant uncertainty, so that the user is better able to recognize and avoid pitfalls that might otherwise be experienced.

Dezfuli, Homayoon

Imaging X-Ray Polarimetry Explorer (IXPE) Risk Management

The Imaging X-ray Polarimetry Explorer (IXPE) project is an international collaboration to build and fly a polarization sensitive X-ray observatory. The IXPE Observatory consists of the spacecraft and payload. The payload is composed of three X-ray telescopes, each consisting of a mirror module optical assembly and a polarization-sensitive X-ray detector assembly; a deployable boom maintains the focal length between the optical assemblies and the detectors. The goal of the IXPE Mission is to provide new information about the origins of cosmic X-rays and their interactions with matter and gravity as they travel through space. IXPE will do this by exploiting its unique capability to measure the polarization of X-rays emitted by cosmic sources. The collaboration for IXPE involves national and international partners during design, fabrication, assembly, integration, test, and operations. The full collaboration includes NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Ball Aerospace, the Italian Space Agency (ASI), the Italian Institute of Astrophysics and Space Planetology (IAPS)/Italian National Institute of Astrophysics (INAF), the Italian National Institute for Nuclear Physics (INFN), the University of Colorado (CU) Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP), Stanford University, McGill University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The goal of this paper is to discuss risk management as it applies to the IXPE project. The full IXPE Team participates in risk management providing both unique challenges and advantages for project risk management. Risk management is being employed in all phases of the IXPE Project, but is particularly important during planning and initial execution-the current phase of the IXPE Project. The discussion will address IXPE risk strategies and responsibilities, along with the IXPE management process which includes risk identification, risk assessment, risk response, and risk monitoring, control, and reporting.

IXPE

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey

Managing Risk for the James Webb Space Telescope Deployment Mechanisms: Enabling First Light

The $10 billion James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is perhaps the most ambitious astronomy mission in NASA history and is the largest and most powerful space science telescope optimized for infrared detection. It is operating in an L2 Orbit about a million miles away from the earth. This will complement and extend the discoveries of the Hubble Space Telescope. It was so big that it had to fold origami – style to fit in the rocket and open in space.Webb’s 5-layer tennis court sized sunshield assembly(SSA) protects the telescope from the Sun’s thermal radiation enabling instruments to operate about 230degree C below 0. It relayed the first amazing picture of galaxies to the world on 12 July 2022. Webb’s unprecedented infrared sensitivity will peer back in time over 13.5 billion years to see the first galaxies born after the Big Bang.

JWST

A Proactive and Top-Down Approach to Managing Risk at NASA

Our ultimate goal is to manage risk in a holistic and coherent fashion across the Agency: a) The RIDM process is intended to risk-inform direction-setting decisions. c) The CRM process is intended to manage risk associated with the implementation of baseline performance requirements. Currently we are working on: a) Enhancements to the CRM process. b) Better integration of the RIDM and CRM processes. c) Better integration of institutional risk considerations into RM framework.

Dezfuli, Homayoon