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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
NASA NTRS2000

End-To-End Risk Assesment: From Genes and Protein to Acceptable Radiation Risks for Mars Exploration

The human exploration of Mars will impose unavoidable health risks from galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and possibly solar particle events (SPE). It is the goal of NASA's Space Radiation Health Program to develop the capability to predict health risks with significant accuracy to ensure that risks are well below acceptable levels and to allow for mitigation approaches to be effective at reasonable costs. End-to-End risk assessment is the approach being followed to understand proton and heavy ion damage at the molecular, cellular, and tissue levels in order to predict the probability of the major health risk including cancer, neurological disorders, hereditary effects, cataracts, and acute radiation sickness and to develop countermeasures for mitigating risks.

Cucinotta, Francis A.↗
NASA NTRS2018

NASA’s Mid-Atlantic Communities and Areas at Intensive Risk Demonstration: Translating Compounding Hazards to Societal Risk

Remote sensing provides a unique perspective on our dynamic planet, tracking changes and revealing the course of complex interactions. Long term monitoring and targeted observation combine with modeling and mapping to provide increased awareness of hydro-meteorological and geological hazards. Disasters often follow hazards and the goal of NASA’s Disasters Program is to look at the earth as a highly coupled system to reduce risk and enable resilience. Remote sensing and geospatial science are used as tools to help answer critical questions that inform decisions. Data is not the same as information, nor does understanding of processes necessarily translate into decision support for disaster preparedness, response and recovery. Accordingly, NASA is engaging the scientific and decision-support communities to apply remote sensing, modeling, and related applications in Communities and Areas at Intensive Risk (CAIR). In 2017, NASA’s Applied Sciences Disasters Program hosted a regional workshop to explore these issues with particular focus on coastal Virginia and North Carolina. The workshop brought together partners in academia, emergency management, and scientists from NASA and partnering federal agencies to explore capabilities among the team that could improve understanding of the physical processes related to these hazards, their potential impact to changing communities, and to identify methodologies for supporting emergency response and risk mitigation. The resulting initiative, the mid-Atlantic CAIR project, demonstrates the ability to integrate satellite derived earth observations and physical models into actionable, trusted knowledge. Severe storms and associated storm surge, sea level rise, and land subsidence coupled with increasing populations and densely populated, aging critical infrastructure often leave coastal regions and their communities extremely vulnerable. The integration of observations and models allow for a comprehensive understanding of the compounding risk experienced in coastal regions and enables individuals in all positions make risk-informed decisions. This initiative uses a representative storm surge case as a baseline to produce flood inundation maps. These maps predict building level impacts at current day and for sea level rise (SLR) and subsidence scenarios of the future in order to inform critical decisions at both the tactical and strategic levels. To accomplish this analysis, the mid-Atlantic CAIR project brings together Federal research activities with academia to examine coastal hazards in multiple ways: 1) reanalysis of impacts from 2011 Hurricane Irene, using numerical weather modeling in combination with coastal surge and hydrodynamic, urban inundation modeling to evaluate combined impact scenarios considering SLR and subsidence, 2) remote sensing of flood extent from available optical imagery, 3) adding value to remotely sensed flood maps through depth predictions, and 4) examining coastal subsidence as measured through time-series analysis of synthetic aperture radar observations. Efforts and results are published via ArcGIS story maps to communicate neighborhoods and infrastructure most vulnerable to changing conditions. Story map features enable time-aware flood mapping using hydrodynamic models, photographic comparison of flooding following Hurricane Irene, as well as visualization of heightened risk in the future due to SLR and land subsidence.

Rogers, Laura↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Miserable Risk Estimation: “Managing” Low-Probability, High-Consequence Risks

As with all bold endeavors, NASA missions must identify and manage their risks. While estimating the consequences of these risks is typically straightforward, it can be challenging to estimate their likelihood. This is especially true for low-probability risks, due both to the lack of operational data and the cognitive biases humans bring to risk estimation. In this talk, I will present both a tongue-in-cheek and “Management Science” approach to estimating low-probability, high-consequence risks. I then summon my Human Factors colleagues to provide NASA mission managers with the gentle guidance needed to avoid common errors in risk assessment

Mary K Kaiser↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Risk-Based SMA and Modernizing Risk Classification at GSFC

In 2014, in response to a large volume of feedback from industry, the science community, and internal to Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), GSFC’s Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate began a transition to a risk-based implementation of SMA, departing from its longstanding practice of being primarily driven by a mostly static set of Mission Assurance Requirements. The transition started out with a pilot project involving risk-based acceptance of bare-printed circuit boards that was enormously successful, continued through a complete organizational transformation in 2015, and culminated with the baselining of formal Risk-Based SMA policy in 2016. In this presentation we will describe the risk-based SMA concept, segue into how it shapes a modernization of risk classification that GSFC has rolled out, and provide results from the original pilot project for risk-based SMA, involving the printed circuit board assurance process.

Jesse Leitner↗
DOE OSTI2025

2032 and 2036 risk enhancement from NEOs in the Taurid stream: Is there a significant coherent component to impact risk?

Impact risk is normally quantified by summing the product of the probability of an event and some measure of its consequences over the set of all possible events. The probability factor is considered to be more objective and is based on the size frequency distribution of Near Earth objects (NEOs) and an implicit assumption of randomness, which can be described as “stochastic risk”. Impact frequency does change with time, however, and there have been episodes in the deep geological past when the flux has been much higher. The hypothesis of “coherent catastrophism” suggests large variations on shorter timescales. It postulates the existence of a “Taurid resonant swarm” (TRS) of debris associated with Comet Encke that is stabilized by Jupiter and in a 7:2 resonance with it. The hypothetical cluster orbits in the broad Taurid stream, which crosses Earth's orbit twice a year at its nodes. Whereas the most extreme and fanciful versions of coherent catastrophism in recent geologic history have been comprehensively refuted, the possibility of a significant component of coherent (time-dependent) risk, associated with non-random correlated events, remains. This paper incorporates recently published data from observational campaigns associated with the Taurid stream. There is no evidence for objects in the Taurid stream that are above the global catastrophe threshold, but the possibility of a few large objects and a significant population of objects the size of the Chelyabinsk or Tunguska bodies has not been eliminated. Eyewitness accounts and comparison of airburst models to ground truth suggest that the Tunguska object was a Beta Taurid. The Tunguska event is probably an outlier when compared to the size frequency distributions under stochastic assumptions, but if there is a significant coherent component it may be representative of events that take place far more frequently, and risk assessments may have underestimated the contribution from airbursts. If so, the Earth will experience increased risk from objects this size, peaking in November 2032 and June 2036. We recommend targeted survey campaigns during these hypothetical TRS node crossings to quantify the population, search for potentially hazardous objects, and identify imminent impactors.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗
NASA NTRS2014

Risk Classification and Risk-based Safety and Mission Assurance

Recent activities to revamp and emphasize the need to streamline processes and activities for Class D missions across the agency have led to various interpretations of Class D, including the lumping of a variety of low-cost projects into Class D. Sometimes terms such as Class D minus are used. In this presentation, mission risk classifications will be traced to official requirements and definitions as a measure to ensure that projects and programs align with the guidance and requirements that are commensurate for their defined risk posture. As part of this, the full suite of risk classifications, formal and informal will be defined, followed by an introduction to the new GPR 8705.4 that is currently under review.GPR 8705.4 lays out guidance for the mission success activities performed at the Classes A-D for NPR 7120.5 projects as well as for projects not under NPR 7120.5. Furthermore, the trends in stepping from Class A into higher risk posture classifications will be discussed. The talk will conclude with a discussion about risk-based safety and mission assuranceat GSFC.

Risk Management↗
NASA NTRS2018

Risk Tolerance and Safety Culture: Minimizing the Risk of Catastrophe by Bringing the Lessons of Space Home

The Johnson Space Center has pursued integrating safety culture and risk management practices and techniques throughout a large organization with an extraordinarily diverse mission. Past mission and institutional failures have been used to inform NASA's safety culture and a implement a uniform risk management environment. Basics from the loss prevention industry have influenced NASA's approach to sustaining its unique, yet aging, infrastructure. Lessons learned at NASA can augment and enhance occupational safety, health and risk management capabilities within hazardous industries. By focusing on risk informed decision-making, building a pervasive safety culture, and accommodating human factors, NASA's safety capabilities have been specifically developed to minimize the risk of loss of life and loss of mission.

Mishap↗
NASA NTRS2018

Risk Tolerance and Safety Culture: Minimizing the Risk of Catastrophe by Bringing the Lessons of Space Home

The Johnson Space Center has pursued integrating risk management practices and techniques throughout a large organization with an extraordinarily diverse mission. Past mission and institutional failures have been used to inform NASA's safety culture and a implement a uniform risk management environment. Basics from the loss prevention industry have influenced NASA's approach to sustaining its unique, yet aging, infrastructure. Lessons learned at NASA can augment and enhance occupational safety, health and risk management capabilities within hazardous industries. By focusing on risk informed decision-making, building a pervasive safety culture, and accommodating human factors, NASA's safety capabilities have been specifically developed to minimize the risk of loss of life and loss of mission.

Loyd, David↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Risk Analysis Tool for Estimating the Risk of Electrical Failures Due to Human Induced Defects

Aerospace electrical systems are required to withstand and adequately operate in extremely harsh environments that include, for example, high radiation exposure, temperature extremes, intense vibrational stress and drastic temperature cycling. The nature of aerospace electronics also demands high reliability since, with very few exceptions, there is no chance for hardware servicing or repairs. Common risk mitigation techniques for this type of situation are to perform a Reliability Analysis of the system throughout the development cycle, and to use electrical components that are regarded as “high reliability” because of additional controls and requirements applied in their design, manufacturing and testing. Unfortunately, studies have shown that even though these techniques are used, many systems fail to meet mission requirements well before the predicted lifetimes. This paper presents the analysis of failures of electrical parts, experienced during various stages of system development, at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt MD, between the years 2001 and 2013. These components were subjected to qualification, screening and testing in which the goal was to ensure that the components would survive the stresses of the mission. The analysis categorizes failures by part type and failure mechanisms. One of the results of the analysis was the realization that a surprising proportion of failures experienced during system integration and testing were caused by human error (i.e. human induced defect). Further analysis included the determination of root failure mechanisms and any influencing factors contributing to these failures. The major causes of these defects were attributed to electrostatic damage (ESD), electrical overstress (EOS), mechanical overstress (MOS), and thermal overstress (TOS). Finally, the study proposes a risk analysis tool which incorporates these major causes for the failures, termed error-producing conditions (EPCs), and a proportionality factor representing the number of each type of failure that has occurred at the facility under study. These factors are quantified and used to communicate the risk of human induced defects for the assembly, integration and testing of space hardware based on the system’s electrical parts list. The new risk identification can trigger risk-mitigating actions more effectively, based on the presence of component categories or other hazardous conditions that have a history of failure due to human error.

Majewicz, Peter J.↗
NASA NTRS2020

NASA Risk Management: Speaking the Format of Risk

NASA's Risk Management Program is designed to communicate risk at all levels of the Agency. This presentation serves as an introduction to NASA Risk Management principles and risk-informed decision making. The contents of this presentation are intended to familiarize attendees of NASA's Quality Leadership Forum with how to incorporate risk communication into their practices.

Dacko, Taylor↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluation of the Spaceflight Cardiovascular Disease Risk using the Clinical Prediction Model Astro-Charm and the NASA Radiation Risk Model

Exposure to space radiation and other spaceflight hazards may pose an increased risk for cardiovascular diseases (CVD) during and after spaceflight [1], that should be quantified to plan future long-duration space missions such as the flight to Mars. The first CVD clinical prediction models (CPMs) for individuals were developed by the Framingham Heart Study investigators in the 1960’s. Since then, many CPMs have been developed and refined. The CPMs consider cardiovascular risk factors such as blood pressure, diabetes, cholesterol, and smoking. As there is a relationship between radiation-induced CVD risk and the background (non-exposed) CVD risk, it is possible to use CPMs to calculate a personalized risk for astronauts.

I. Plante↗
NASA NTRS2004

Got risk? risk-centric perspective for spacecraft technology decision-making

A risk-based decision-making methodology conceived and developed at JPL and NASA has been used to aid in decision making for spacecraft technology assessment, adoption, development and operation. It takes a risk-centric perspective, through which risks are used as a reasoning step to interpose between mission objectives and risk mitigation measures.

risk↗
NASA NTRS1980

Carbon/graphite fiber risk analysis and assessment study: Assessment of risk to the Lockheed Model L-1011 commercial transport aircraft

The risk associated with the accidental release of carbon/graphite fibers (CF) from fires on commercial transport aircraft incorporating composite materials was assessed. Data are developed to evaluate the potential for CF damage to electrical and electronic equipment, assess the cost risk, and evaluate the hazard to continued operation. The subjects covered include identification of susceptible equipments, determination of infiltration transfer functions, analysis of airport operations, calculation of probabilities of equipment failures, assessment of the cost risk, and evaluation of the hazard to continued operation. The results show the risks associated with CF contamination are negligible through 1993.

Daniledes, J.↗
NASA NTRS1999

The Use of the Satellite Breakup Risk Assessment Model (SBRAM) to Characterize Collision Risk to Manned Spacecraft

NASA uses environment models such as ORDEM96 to characterize the long-term orbital debris collision hazard for spacecraft in LEO. Occasionally, however, there are breakups of satellites or rocket bodies that create enhanced collision hazard for a period of time. This enhanced collision hazard can pose increased risks to space operations - especially those involving manned missions where the tolerance for risk is very low. NASA has developed SBRAM to simulate the enhanced debris environment in the days and weeks that follow such a breakup. This simulation provides the kind of risk probabilities that can be used by mission planners to consider if changes are warranted for the mission. Announcements of breakups come to NASA from US Space Command as soon as they are identified. The pre-breakup orbit and time of breakup are used to determine the initial conditions of the explosion. SBRAM uses the latest explosion models developed at NASA to simulate a debris cloud for the breakup. The model uses a Monte Carlo technique to create a random debris cloud from the probability distributions in the breakup model. Each piece of debris randomly created in the cloud is propagated in a deterministic manner to include the effects of drag and other orbital perturbations. The detailed geometry of each simulated close approach to the target spacecraft is noted and logged and the collision probability is computed using an estimated probability density in down-range and cross-range positions of both the target spacecraft and debris object. The collision probability is computed from the overlap of these probability densities for each close-approach geometry and summed over all computed conjunctions. Cloud propagation runs over the desired time interval are then repeated until the scale of the collision risk can be estimated to a desired precision. This paper presents an overview of the SBRAM model and a number of examples, both real and hypothetical, to demonstrate its use. In addition, a number of different examples are shown how the data can be used by decision makers on issues such as spacecraft orientation and timing of EVAs.

Matney, Mark J.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Independent Review of U.S. and Russian Probabilistic Risk Assessments for the International Space Station Mini Research Module #2 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

The Mini-Research Module-2 (MRM-2), a Russian module on the International Space Station, does not meet its requirements for micrometeoroid and orbital debris probability of no penetration (PNP). To document this condition, the primary Russian Federal Space Agency ISS contractor, S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation-Energia (RSC-E), submitted an ISS non-compliance report (NCR) which was presented at the 5R Stage Operations Readiness Review (SORR) in October 2009. In the NCR, RSC-E argued for waiving the PNP requirement based on several factors, one of which was the risk of catastrophic failure was acceptably low at 1 in 11,100. However, NASA independently performed an assessment of the catastrophic risk resulting in a value of 1 in 1380 and believed that the risk at that level was unacceptable. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center was requested to evaluate the two competing catastrophic risk values and determine which was more accurate. This document contains the outcome of the assessment.

Squire, Michael D.↗
NASA NTRS2015

2015 Sensorimotor Risk Standing Review Panel Evidence and Status Review For: the Risk of Impaired Control of Spacecraft/Associated Systems and Decreased Mobility Due to Vestibular/Sensorimotor Alterations Associated with Spaceflight

The 2015 Sensorimotor Risk Standing Review Panel (from here on referred to as the SRP) participated in a WebEx/teleconference with members of the Human Health Countermeasures (HHC) Element, representatives from the Human Research Program (HRP), NASA Headquarters, and NASA Research and Education Support Services (NRESS) on December 17, 2015 (list of participants is in Section VI of this report). The SRP reviewed the new Evidence Report for the Risk of Impaired Control of Spacecraft/Associated Systems and Decreased Mobility Due to Vestibular/Sensorimotor Alterations Associated with Spaceflight (from here on referred to as the 2015 Sensorimotor Evidence Report), and also received a status review of the Risk. The opening section of the 2015 Sensorimotor Evidence Report provides written descriptions of various incidents that have occurred during space missions. In most of these incidents, the main underlying contributing factors are not easy to identify unambiguously. For example, in section 1.9, a number of falls occurred while astronauts were walking on the moon. It is not clear to the SRP, however, why they fell. It is only possible to extrapolate from likely specific psychophysical or physiological abnormalities, but how these abnormalities were determined, and how they were directly responsible for the falls is unclear to the SRP. Section 2.1.2 on proprioception is very interesting, but the functional significance of the abnormalities detected is not clear. The SRP sees this as a problem throughout the report: a mapping between the component abnormalities identified and the holistic behaviors that are most relevant, for example, controlling the vehicle, and locomotion during egress, is generally lacking. The SRP thinks the cognitive section is too strongly focused on vestibular functioning. The SRP questions the notion that the main cognitive effects are mainly attributable to reversible vestibular changes induced by spaceflight. The SRP thinks that there can also be independent cognitive effects. The Functional Task Test (FTT) protocols and the Field Test are particularly valuable. The conclusion is that the unloading of major postural muscles experienced during spaceflight plays a central role in the alteration of functional task performance and balance control. This conclusion stands in contrast with the statements in other parts of the document that emphasize the role of vestibular changes on these functions. It would help to more fully integrate these two views on the predominant effects of spaceflight. Although the SRP thinks the countermeasures section is interesting, the proposed countermeasures are not well integrated with the abnormalities described in previous sections. The SRP thinks it would help enormously to have explicit links among each abnormality, its 2015 Sensorimotor Risk SRP Evidence Review Final Report 2 overall importance/impact on function, and the appropriate countermeasure that can be implemented to maintain adequate functioning.

Steinberg, Susan↗