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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Evaluation of an Accident Tolerant Fuel Leak in the Advanced Test Reactor

Accident Tolerant Fuels (ATF), which are nuclear fuel sources designed to withstand operational irregularities and incidents, have been a topic of interest in the nuclear industry for several decades. Interest in ATF technology surged following the 2011 accident at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan. At the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), one of Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) four operating nuclear reactors, the ATF program is a collaborative effort between the national laboratory and various stakeholders within the nuclear industry. This program focuses on the research and development of novel fuel compositions, cladding, and component materials with enhanced accident-resistant properties. During one of ATR’s 60-day operating cycles in 2024, the reactor experienced five unplanned shutdowns. Following the fifth shutdown, radiation monitors detected an increase in radiation levels coming from the loop piping. Subsequent water samples confirmed the cause was a leak of fission products from the ATF experiment, designated as ATF-2C. The source of the leak was identified as the instrumented section of the test train. The primary discussions in this paper are 1) the design of the ATF test train, 2) the operating parameters leading up to and following the detection of the leak, and 3) the quantification and characterization of the released fission products.

Accident Tolerant Fuels↗
DOE OSTI2025

Evaluation of an Accident Tolerant Fuel Leak in the Advanced Test Reactor

Accident Tolerant Fuels (ATF), which are nuclear fuel sources designed to withstand operational irregularities and incidents, have been a topic of interest in the nuclear industry for several decades. Interest in ATF technology surged following the 2011 accident at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan. At the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), one of Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) four operating nuclear reactors, the ATF program is a collaborative effort between the national laboratory and various stakeholders within the nuclear industry. This program focuses on the research and development of novel fuel compositions, cladding, and component materials with enhanced accident-resistant properties. During one of ATR’s 60-day operating cycles in 2024, the reactor experienced five unplanned shutdowns. Following the fifth shutdown, radiation monitors detected an increase in radiation levels coming from the loop piping. Subsequent water samples confirmed the cause was a leak of fission products from the ATF experiment, designated as ATF-2C. The source of the leak was identified as the instrumented section of the test train. The primary discussions in this presentation are 1) the design of the ATF test train, 2) the operating parameters leading up to and following the detection of the leak, and 3) the quantification and characterization of the released fission products.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Data Processing Workflow for Fixed-wing Drone Based Radiation Mapping in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone (CEZ) - 20119

April 2020 marks the 34. anniversary of the high-profile radiological release from the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP). The release of radioactive material from reactor number four began on the 26 April 1986 and continued over a period of about 10 days, releasing approximately 1700 PBq of radioactive material (including 85 PBq of 137-Cs) into the environment. To this day, the accident remains the most significant release of radioactive material since civil nuclear power generation began. In the years since the accident, automated and remote radiation monitoring technologies have advanced significantly in their capabilities. One such example of this is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in radiation mapping investigations. In April 2019, a team of scientists from the University of Bristol showcased a novel radiation mapping system within the CEZ, specifically aiming to map radiation over a large portion of the area immediately surrounding the ChNPP. Over six days of data collection, the system flew a total distance of 583.8 km, covering an area of 14.6 sq.km with an exceptional spatial resolution (sub 20 m/pixel). The work presented herein outlines and explains the data processing procedure to convert the raw data into 137-Cs activity (kBq/sq.m) and cesium-equivalent dose-rate (CED) at 1 m above ground level (μSv/hr). A demonstration of the validity of the method is demonstrated through the successful reduction of the raw data into a single linear relationship between the measured {sup 137}Cs net peak intensity and the {sup 137}Cs activity. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Solar Reference Cells on a Two-Axis Tracker Using Spectral Measurements

A simple model calculating the performance of an IMT solar reference cell is proposed and tested under clear sky periods. One-minute data from EKO spectroradiometers collocated with an IMT reference cell are used for the analysis. Data are obtained at the NREL Solar Radiation Research Laboratory in Golden, Colorado and the UO Solar Radiation Monitoring Laboratory in Eugene, Oregon. The model is also applied and evaluated under cloudy conditions. A match of better than 1% is found between calculated clear sky values and IMT measurements for July, 2020. One- minute cloudy sky comparisons show a much larger variation, but when averaged over one hour, a standard deviation of 4% between the calculated and measured values is found.

atmospheric radiation↗
DOE OSTI2023

Operational Focused Data Analytics for Optimizing Radiation Portal Monitor-Based Nuclear Smuggling Detection Systems at Global Ports of Entry

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence has deployed a fleet of radiation portal monitors (RPMs) across the world at global ports of entry including seaports, airports, and land border crossings. These RPMs are integrated into radiation detection systems (RDS) that also include fixed cameras, optical character recognition (OCR) systems, primary scanning systems (e.g., X-ray or gamma-ray), and secondary scanning systems (e.g., spectroscopic radiation portal monitors, portable radiation detection systems). The data from these sensing technologies is collected at the Central Alarm Station (CAS) where servers and computers reside to control and operate the system. Operators utilize the data collected by the CAS and declared cargo information to make decisions on how to respond to an alarm.This work explores the use of CAS-located data, looking at both the sensor data streams and operator inputs, to perform analysis which supports customs and border protection agencies to improve training capability and operational effectiveness. We focus on analyzing site level effectiveness and behavior by rolling up CAS-located data collected from individual occurrences. To-date, more than 15 sites (e.g., seaports, airports, border crossings) have been analyzed in this manner with the goal of understanding system operations to verify effectiveness and recommend potential improvements. This work first aims to provide background information on relevant CAS-located data sources and our current operational system analytics process including example results. After summarizing our current analytic techniques, we discuss how the future data analytics systems can provide key benefits to improving operational performance while minimizing the burden these detection systems place on operators.

Kuhn, Michael↗
DOE OSTI2020

Utilizing Commercial Submersible Mixer Pumps for Sludge Removal in Savannah River Site's Tank 26 - 20289

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Liquid Waste System (LWS) safely manages, stores, treats, and dispositions liquid radioactive waste. The LWS consists of 51 underground waste storage tanks (eight of which are operationally closed and filled with grout), waste evaporators, treatment facilities, and solidification facilities, known as the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) and Saltstone Production Facility (SPF). One of the waste storage tanks, Tank 26, was placed into service in 1980 as an F Tank Farm (FTF) Evaporator Feed Tank. From 1980 to 2013, Tank 26 received F Canyon receipts and dilute supernate that was then transferred to the 242-16F FTF Evaporator for volume reduction. In 2013, the steam tube bundle failed in the FTF Evaporator, and the decision was made not to repair/resume evaporator operation. During operation of Tank 26, solids built up to a level of 2.03 m in the tank with a volume of 1062.9 kL. Due to the evaporator failure and subsequent shutdown, the solids in Tank 26 were selected to feed Sludge Batch 10, which is collected and prepped prior to being sent to DWPF for final disposition. To accomplish solids removal, Commercial Submersible Mixer Pumps (CSMPs) were selected to slurry the solids in preparation to be sent to Tank 51. Four CSMPs were installed in Tank 26 with each one installed in a separate quadrant of Tank 26. This work would mark the first deployment of CSMPs in an SRS waste tank. The CSMPs were developed in response to operational issues from previous mixing pumps and budgetary constraints. The CSMPs use the concept of modifying commercially available equipment for nuclear waste applications. The CSMPs consist of a 230-horsepower submersible mixing pump (manufactured by GPM, Inc.) joined to a mast fabricated at SRS. For this application, Savannah River Remediation (SRR) design services was challenged to provide a mast design that required no steel superstructure support system on top of Tank 26. Also, SRR design services provided a simplified Tank 26 riser interface that did not require extensive machine parts to adjust height of the suction screen of the CSMP within the tank. Other design improvements include no requirements for tank top radiation monitors and no requirements for flushing of the CSMPs during startup/shutdown operations. The CSMPs were operated at an initial height of 2.29 m above the Tank 26 bottom for 10 days. After sludge sounding, the CSMPs were lowered to a height of 1.52 m with no issues due to proper work planning and the simplified riser interface. With the CSMPs lowered to a level of 1.52 meters above the tank bottom, the CSMPs were operated for 12 days and another sounding was performed. The sounding level came back matching the disturbance depth results of the first pump run. Chemistry samples were analyzed while the tank was left to settle. The analysis revealed enough weight percent solids to provide good feed to Sludge Batch 10. Also, the results revealed the supernate within the mixture would provide good salt solution feed to Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) Salt Batch 3. So, the plan was modified to let the disturbed solids settle and decant the salt solution for addition to SWPF Salt Batch 3. Then water will be added back to Tank 26, and the CSMPs run in order to wash the solids to decrease settling time prior to being sent to Tank 51 for Sludge Batch 10. Utilizing CSMPs for waste removal in an SRS Tank has provided a cost-effective means for further waste removal efforts. In addition, the CSMPs are easier to operate by utilizing a robust and simplified design. The CSMPs performed quite well with no process shutdown or delays during operation. As a result, CSMPs are integral to the future of removing radioactive waste from storage tanks at SRS. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2020

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. Radionuclides in air from NNSS activities have been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this sources dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of manmade radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), specifically the National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (40 CFR 61, Subpart H, 2020) limits the release of radioactivity from a DOE facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent (EDE) to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS. This alternative was proposed and formerly submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are closer to radionuclide releases than where the public resides so they act as protective substitutes for public receptor locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in Table 2 of 40 CFR 61, Appendix E. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. The EPAapproved air transport model, called the Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) is also used to calculate the effective dose equivalent to the maximally exposed individual from NNSS air emissions. CAP88-PC was also used to calculate the population dose, or the collective EDE (expressed as person-rem [roentgen equivalent man] per year [person-rem/y]) for all individuals combined who reside within 80 kilometers (km) of NNSS emission sources. In 2020, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by both the air sampling data collected at critical receptor air monitoring stations and CAP88-PC modeling. The average concentrations of radioactivity at air critical receptor stations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 4.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. CAP88-PC modeling of all 2020 NNSS radionuclide emissions showed the maximally exposed individual to be in Amargosa Valley and this individual received a potential dose of 0.063 mrem/y. The collective dose was calculated to be 0.29 person-rem/year for the 521,300 people who lived within 80 km of NNSS emission sources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions (CY 2019)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this source dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

RCT Continuing Training: Radiological Emergency Response

Objectives: 1) List the revised initial response and supplemental actions while responding to a major injury inside of a radiological area; 2) List the initial response and supplemental actions while responding to a minor injury inside of a radiological area; 3) List the initial response and supplemental actions for responding to a Continuous Air Monitoring (CAM) alarm; 4) List the initial response and supplemental actions for responding to a radioactive spill; 5) List the initial response and supplemental actions of responding to an Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) alarm; 6) List the initial response and supplemental actions of an Electronic Personal Dosimeter (EPD) dose and dose rate alarm; 7) List the initial response and supplemental actions of responding to a Stationary Contamination Monitor (SCM) alarm; 8) Identify the methods to perform personnel decontamination.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2020 (Rev. 2)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Number NEV HW0101 associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): 1) CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; 2) CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; 3) CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; 4) CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; 5) CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; 6) CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches The locations of the sites are shown in Figure ES-1. This report covers calendar year 2020. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAUs 92 and 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAUs 110 and 111, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 110, the site fence, gate, lock, and use restriction signs are evaluated. At CAU 111, an ecological survey, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are also conducted. This report will address all monitoring item notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 6 of RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remained in effect until December 10, 2020. At the time of this report submittal, the new RCRA permit application was in review.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Long-length Scintillating Fibers for Nuclear Waste Repositories (Conference Record)

This paper describes the fabrication, testing, and characterization of long-length, up to 50 m, scintillating fibers for the purpose of radiation monitoring in inaccessible radiological and nuclear waste repositories. The fabrication aspect was focused on ruggedizing the 1-mm diameter fiber and limiting external light interference for fibers. Testing and characterization were performed in a laboratory setting with radiation sources, a photosensor module and a multi-channel analyzer. Light attenuation was studied as a function of distance by analyzing both the spectrum and count rate. Additionally, the scintillating fibers were coupled to optical communication fibers (100 m) to extend the reach of the system. This paper also includes the optical spectrometry results from the sensitivity and response of the signal attenuation. Lastly, the paper covers the field testing of the scintillating fibers in a relevant environment.

47 - OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2022

An LSTM Deep Learning Network for ¿Background Radiation Prediction

Determination of appropriate background radiation is important in any measurement application. Environmental radiation monitors and monitors used to assess dose to individuals outside of controlled areas are particularly susceptible to changes in readings due to fluctuations in the environmental conditions. These fluctuations (e.g. radon progeny concentrations) lead to changes in the detector response in the actual radiation environment, and they need to be taken into account when extracting the net operational doses. Work has been ongoing to apply advances in Deep Learning and Artificial Intelligence to account for changes in detector responses based on environmental parameters; in particular, a Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) Deep Learning architecture has been utilized to incorporate time-series data into a prediction model. In this work, we present the current status of the project to predict radiation measurements based on meteorological conditions and air packet trajectories extracted using the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Hybrid Single-Particle Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory (HYSPLIT4) model.

Degtiarenko, Pavel↗
DOE OSTI2021

RCT Continuing Training (Q2 2021) [Slides]

This quarter’s training assignment is split into two sections. Section one will review the fundamental elements of removing items from controlled areas. This section discusses each decision point and the required actions to determine if an item is suitable for release. Section two briefly reviews Area Radiation Monitors, commonly referred to as ‘ARMs’, and discusses the required actions to take in the event of an ARM alarm.” Report includes slides and transcript.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗