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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI1995

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 1, January-June 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part II: The State of the Nuclear Fuel Located Within the Chornobyl Sarcophagus, A A. Borovoi and A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 33 Nuclear Power Safety in Central and Eastern Europe, R. Wilson; 46 Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors in the Former Eastern European Countries, S. Chakraborty; 53 Technical Note: On the Definition of Common-Cause Failures, H. Paula; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 58 Modeling and Analysis of Core-Debris Recriticality During Hypothetical Severe Accidents in the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor, S.-H. Kim, V. Georgevich, D. B. Simpson, C. O. Slater, and R. P. Taleyarkhan; 68 Ignitability of Hydrogen/Oxygen/Diluent Mixtures in the Presence of Hot Surfaces, R. K. Kumar and G. W. Koroll; 94 Coupled RELAP5 and CONTAIN Accident Analysis Using PVM, K. A. Smith, A. J. Baratta, and G. E. Robinson; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 109 Application of Fuzzy Logic in Nuclear Reactor Control Part I: An Assessment of State-of-the-Art, A. S. Heger, N. K. Alang-Rashid, and M. Jamshidi; DESIGN FEATURES: 122 Twenty-Third DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning and Treatment Conference, R. R. Bellamy, J. J. Hayes, and M. W. First; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 135 Atmospheric Dispersion and the Radiological Consequences of Normal Airborne Effluents from a Nuclear Power Plant, D. Fang, C. Z. Sun, and L. Yang; 142 Calculation of Distribution Coefficients for Radionuclides in Soils and Sediments, I. Puigdomenech and U. Bergstrom: OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 155 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 158 Operating Experience Feedback Report—Reliability of Safety-Related Steam Turbine-Driven Standby Pumps Used in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, J. R. Boardman; 166 Turbine Building Hazards, H. L Ornstein; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 169 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 175 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1994; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 32 Harvard School of Public Health In-Place Filter Testing Workshop; 134 International Conference on Advances in the Operational Safety of Nuclear Power Plants; 193 30th Tennessee Industries Week; 193 DOE Technical Standards Program 1995 Workshop; 194 Multiphase Flow Experiments and Instrumentation; 180 The Authors; 185 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volumes 34 and 35.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI1994

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 35, No. 2, July-December 1994]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 179 Consideration of Postaccident Consequences in the Determination of Safety Objectives for Future Nuclear Power Plants in France, D. Queniart, A. Sugier, and J. Lochard; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 187 Nuclear Safety Research: The Phebus FP Severe Accident Experimental Program, P. von der Hardt, A. V. Jones, C. Lecomte, and A. Tattegrain; 205 Containment Performance Analysis of the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, S. H. Kim, R. P. Taleyarkhan, and V. Georgevich; 213 Assessment of Fission Product Deposits in the Reactor Coolant System: The DEVAP Program, G. Le Marois and M. Megnin; 222 Erratum to “A Review of the Available Information on the Triggering Stage of a Steam Explosion," Vol. 35, No. 1, CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 223 Effects of Normal Aging on Calibration and Response Time of Nuclear Plant Resistance Temperature Detectors and Pressure Sensors, H. M. Hashemian; DESIGN FEATURES: 235 Defense in Depth Against the Hydrogen Risk—A European Research Program, F. Fineschi; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 246 Technical Note: A Preliminary Analysis of the Risks to Hong Kong Resulting from Potential Accidents of Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant, Z. Shi and X. Wei; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 253 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; SPECIAL SECTION ON TMI-2 VESSEL INVESTIGATION PROJECT: 256 Three Mile Island—New Findings 15 Years After the Accident A. M. Rubin and E. Beckjord; 269 Relocation of Molten Material to the TMI-2 Lower Head, J. R. Wolf, D. W. Akers, and L. A. Neimark; 280 Insight Into the TMI-2 Core Material Relocation Through Examination of Instrument Tube Nozzles, L. A. Neimark; 288 Physical and Radiochemical Examinations of Debris from the TMI-2 Lower Head, D. W. Akers and B. K. Schuetz; 301 Results of Metallographic Examinations and Mechanical Tests of Pressure Vessel Samples from the TMI-2 Lower Head, D. R. Diercks and G. E. Korth; 313 Margin-to-Failure Calculations for the TMI-2 Vessel, J. Rempe, L. Stickler, S. Chavez, G. Thinnes, R. Witt, and M. Corradini; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 328 1993 Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program Results, L. N. Vanden Heuvel, J. W. Cletcher, D. A. Copinger, J. W. Minarick, B. W. Dolan, and P. D. O’Reilley; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 339 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 345 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1994; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 234 Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements; 356 1995 International Incineration Conference; 358 Fifth International Controls and Instrumentation Conference; 359 ANS International Topical Meeting on Safety of Operating Reactors; 359 Fifth International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety; 360 International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment Methodology and Applications; 351 The Authors; 357 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 35.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Reaction Rate Distribution Measurements in ZPPR-15

Small metal foils were irradiated in ZPPR-15 to measure distributions for 239 Pu(n,f), 235 U(n,f), 238 U(n,f), 238 U(n,γ), 115 In(n,n’) and 115 In(n,γ) reaction rates in ZPPR-15. The measured data were reported as basic reaction rate distributions for individual foils, cell-averaged reaction rate distributions and spectral indices or reaction rate ratios. All of the measured data were analyzed and tabulated in such a manner that the data can be readily compared with computed values. The published uncertainties for ZPPR-15 the reaction rate measurements include the statistical uncertainties in the measurements, reproducibility uncertainty and small uncertainties related to corrections for items such as foil compositions and post-irradiation decay between reactor shutdown and foil measurement. There are additional uncertainty components related to detector calibration that are not included in the published uncertainties. A full uncertainty analysis was performed for each foil measurement and for quantities derived from the basic foil measurements. The significant uncertainties were quantified, and a total uncertainty was derived for each measured value. The ZPPR-15 experimental records were used to create detailed as-built Monte Carlo models for the foil reaction rate measurements in ZPPR-15 loadings 123, 134 and 203 and for the fission chamber measurements of 237 Np and 242 Pu fission rates in ZPPR-15 loading 141. Because there were many foils distributed in the ZPPR-15 assembly and because an individual foil occupies a negligible volume in the ZPPR-15 assembly, direct Monte Carlo calculations of the measured foil reaction rates would require an impractical computational effort. The as-built Monte Carlo models and related files were prepared for conversion to deterministic models that can be calculated with realistic computational effort.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS1971

Fault tree applications within the safety program of Idaho Nuclear Corporation

Computerized fault tree analyses are used to obtain both qualitative and quantitative information about the safety and reliability of an electrical control system that shuts the reactor down when certain safety criteria are exceeded, in the design of a nuclear plant protection system, and in an investigation of a backup emergency system for reactor shutdown. The fault tree yields the modes by which the system failure or accident will occur, the most critical failure or accident causing areas, detailed failure probabilities, and the response of safety or reliability to design modifications and maintenance schemes.

W. E. Vesely↗
NASA NTRS1990

A radiological assessment of nuclear power and propulsion operations near Space Station Freedom

Scenarios were identified which involve the use of nuclear power systems in the vicinity of Space Station Freedom (SSF) and their radiological impact on the SSF crew was quantified. Several of the developed scenarios relate to the use of SSF as an evolutionary transportation node for lunar and Mars missions. In particular, radiation doses delivered to SSF crew were calculated for both the launch and subsequent return of a Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) cargo vehicle and a Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) personnel vehicle to low earth orbit. The use of nuclear power on co-orbiting platforms and the storage and handling issues associated with radioisotope power systems were also explored as they relate to SSF. A central philosophy in these analyses was the utilization of a radiation dose budget, defined as the difference between recommended dose limits from all radiation sources and estimated doses received by crew members from natural space radiations. Consequently, for each scenario examined, the dose budget concept was used to identify and quantify constraints on operational parameters such as launch separation distances, returned vehicle parking distances, and reactor shutdown times prior to vehicle approach. The results indicate that realistic scenarios do not exist which would preclude the use of nuclear power sources in the vicinity of SSF. The radiation dose to the SSF crew can be maintained at safe levels solely by implementing proper and reasonable operating procedures.

Bolch, Wesley E.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Quantity of 135I Released from the AGR 5/6/7 Experiment

A series of four Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART) experiments have been conducted in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). From 2006 through 2020, these experiments supported the development and qualification of the new U.S. tristructural isotropic (TRISO) particle fuel for Very High Temperature Reactors (VHTR). Each Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) experiment consisted of multiple fueled capsules, each plumbed for independent temperature control using a mix of helium and neon gases. The gas leaving a capsule was routed to individual Fission Product Monitor (FPM) detectors. For intact fuel particles, the TRISO particle coatings provide a substantial barrier to fission product release. However, particles with failed coatings, whether because of a minute percentage of initially defective particles, those which fail during irradiation, or those designed to fail (DTF) particles, can release fission products to the flowing gas stream. Because reactive fission product elements like iodine and cesium quickly deposit on cooler capsule components and piping structures as the effluent gas leaves the reactor core, only the noble fission gas isotopes of Kr and Xe tend to reach FPM detectors. The FPM system utilizes High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors coupled with a thallium activated sodium iodide NaI(Tl) scintillator. The HPGe detector provides individual isotopic information, while the NaI(Tl) scintillator is used as a gross count rate meter. During irradiation, the 135mXe concentration reaching the FPM detectors is from both direct fission and by decay of the accumulated 135I. About 2.5 hours after irradiation (ten 15.3 minute 135mXe half lives) the directly produced 135mXe has decayed and only the longer lived 135I remains as a source. Decay systematics dictate that 135mXe will be in secular equilibrium with its 135I parent, such that its production rate very nearly equals the decay rate of the parent, and its concentration in the flowing gas stream will appear to decay with the parent half life. This equilibrium condition enables the determination of the amount of 135I released from the fuel particles by measurement of the 135mXe at the FPM following reactor shutdown. In this paper, the 135I released will be reported.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS1974

Computer study of emergency shutdowns of a 60-kilowatt reactor Brayton space power system

A digital computer study of emergency shutdowns of a 60-kWe reactor Brayton power system was conducted. Malfunctions considered were (1) loss of reactor coolant flow, (2) loss of Brayton system gas flow, (3)turbine overspeed, and (4) a reactivity insertion error. Loss of reactor coolant flow was the most serious malfunction for the reactor. Methods for moderating the reactor transients due to this malfunction are considered.

Tew, R. C.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Jet pump-drive system for heat removal

The invention does away with the necessity of moving parts such as a check valve in a nuclear reactor cooling system. Instead, a jet pump, in combination with a TEMP, is employed to assure safe cooling of a nuclear reactor after shutdown. A main flow exists for a reactor coolant. A point of withdrawal is provided for a secondary flow. A TEMP, responsive to the heat from said coolant in the secondary flow path, automatically pumps said withdrawn coolant to a higher pressure and thus higher velocity compared to the main flow. The high velocity coolant is applied as a driver flow for the jet pump which has a main flow chamber located in the main flow circulation pump. Upon nuclear shutdown and loss of power for the main reactor pumping system, the TEMP/jet pump combination continues to boost the coolant flow in the direction it is already circulating. During the decay time for the nuclear reactor, the jet pump keeps running until the coolant temperature drops to a lower and safe temperature where the heat is no longer a problem. At this lower temperature, the TEMP/jet pump combination ceases its circulation boosting operation. When the nuclear reactor is restarted and the coolant again exceeds the lower temperature setting, the TEMP/jet pump automatically resumes operation. The TEMP/jet pump combination is thus automatic, self-regulating and provides an emergency pumping system free of moving parts.

French, James R.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Jet pump-drive system for heat removal

A jet pump, in combination with a TEMP, is employed to assure safe cooling of a nuclear reactor after shutdown. A TEMP, responsive to the heat from the coolant in the secondary flow path, automatically pumps the withdrawn coolant to a higher pressure and thus higher velocity compared to the main flow. The high velocity coolant is applied as a driver flow for the jet pump which has a main flow chamber located in the main flow circulation pump. Upon nuclear shutdown and loss of power for the main reactor pumping system, the TEMP/jet pump combination continues to boost the coolant flow in the direction it is already circulating. During the decay time for the nuclear reactor, the jet pump keeps running until the coolant temperature drops to a lower and safe temperature. At this lower temperature, the TEMP/jet jump combination ceases its circulation boosting operation. The TEMP/jet pump combination is automatic, self-regulating and provides an emergency pumping system free of moving parts.

French, J. R.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Strategic Survey of Antineutrino-based Nonproliferation Technologies

Antineutrinos carry approximately 3% of the total energy released in fission processes. As a consequence, nuclear energy production provides by far the brightest antineutrino sources on Earth. Antineutrino interactions with ordinary matter are weak and these particles cannot be shielded, making them an ideal signature of fissioning systems. However, the same property makes antineutrinos difficult to detect. Antineutrino detection technologies have matured in recent years, and emerging detection approaches warrant further investment. For near-field applications, the major enabling technological advancement, reported in 2018, is the conclusive detection of the antineutrino spectrum in segmented detectors operating at the surface with minimal shielding. For far-field applications, the highlights are the routine detection of reactor antineutrinos at hundreds of kilometer standoff in the kiloton-scale KamLAND and Borexino liquid scintillator detectors, and in particular the observation of the residual South Korean reactor antineutrino flux in KamLAND following the Fukushima disaster that led to shutdown of reactors in Japan

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Disruption avoidance via island suppression: the crucial roles of DIII-D and foundational research

The FESAC long range plan calls out disruption avoidance and mitigation as key remaining technical gaps. In discussing the roles of DIII-D and NSTX-U, the FESAC long range plan says “Additional research on these facilities, in combination with private and international collaborations, continuing support of existing university tokamak programs, and utilization of US expertise in theory and simulation, is needed to find solutions to remaining technical gaps. These gaps include disruption prediction, avoidance, and mitigation …”. Disruptions pose an existential threat to ITER and to FPPs. For a fusion reactor, unplanned shutdowns caused by disruptions will be a significant barrier to connecting such a reactor to the electric grid, even if disruption mitigation is successful. Disruption studies for ITER in recent years have largely focused on disruption mitigation (e.g., pellet injection), motivated by near-term deadlines for finalizing the design of the mitigation hardware. It is recognized, however, that mitigation alone will not suffice. The 2022 U.S. ITER Research Needs Workshop Report states that ”[d]isruptions are considered the largest threat to the ITER Research Program”, and that “[m]itigation should be a last resort”. As we discuss below, there are unresolved foundational issues that play a critical role in avoidance, and DIII-D is an ideal device for generating the data needed to address these issues.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Decommissioning of the V1 Nuclear Power Plant Jaslovske Bohunice - 20270

The paper focuses on introducing the approach and method applied for decommissioning of the V1 nuclear power plant (further the 'V1 NPP') located in Jaslovske Bohunice in the Slovak Republic, to the conference participants. The Paper outlines activities and steps necessary to comply with the requirements contained in the decision of the Slovak government from 1999 regarding the early shutdown of the V1 NPP. The company responsible for the V1 NPP decommissioning is Jadrova a vyradovacia spolocnost, a.s., (further JAVYS) with the State as a sole shareholder. On the basis of the V1 NPP Decommissioning Conceptual Plan, out of four assessed options, JAVYS selected the immediate decommissioning option (the 'IDO') for the V1 NPP. On the basis of multi-criteria analysis, the IDO specified the approach of immediate and continuous dismantling of equipment followed by demolition of buildings and preparation of the site for its further potential use. The IDO also included the summary of technical, environmental, legislative information as well as the determination of assumed costs for decommissioning of the V1 NPP. Prior to commencement of the V1 NPP decommissioning, within the process of termination of operation, activities connected with de-fuelling, monitoring, processing of historical waste and, not to forget, the process of obtaining the license for the V1 NPP decommissioning were executed. JAVYS decided to divide the decommissioning process into two stages. In 2011, JAVYS obtained a license for the first stage of the V1 NPP decommissioning. Within this stage, dismantling of inactive equipment, demolitions of inactive buildings, monitoring of systems and preparatory works for the upcoming stage of decommissioning were implemented. In 2015, in line with the license for the 2. stage of the V1 NPP decommissioning, the activities of decontamination and dismantling of contaminated and active equipment as well as demolitions of remaining buildings began. In this stage radioactive waste (RAW) produced during the decommissioning is to be processed. After decontamination, the material fulfilling the free release criteria is to be released into the environment, the site is to be cleared from the scope of the Atomic Act and released from the surveillance of the national regulators. Future application of certain methods and techniques for decontamination and dismantling in similar environments might bring an added value to the operators. Paper includes a description of best practices for Nuclear Power Plant VVER type reactors decommissioning. Schedule comparison is given to show how the critical path of certain projects is being managed. Application of the International Standard for Decommissioning Costing (ISDC) methodology provides a uniform method which enables comparison of cost estimates to other nuclear facilities under decommissioning. The cost estimate for the V1 NPP decommissioning has been continuously updated based on more advanced and detailed information on the decommissioning activities and projects. Monitoring of progress of the V1 NPP decommissioning is performed via four key-performance indicators. The Earned Value Management (EVM) methodology is used for evaluating time and cost aspect of decommissioning activities while waste conditioning index is calculated by comparing the actually produced waste to planned values of waste for a respective monitored period. Radiological safety index is assessed by comparison of the personnel records on the individual yearly doses received by each respective employee to the boundary value. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Feedback from International Decommissioning Planning Projects - 20269

Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants is an increasing reality in many countries with nuclear power. Already many years before final shutdown, planning of the decommissioning work is usually started in order to understand for example the costs, waste volume capacity and licensing work needed. In many countries it is required to have a final decommissioning plan before any decommissioning work is allowed to start. Westinghouse has been involved in international decommissioning planning for more than 30 years, where the first 20 years was mostly funding and preliminary plans due to that decommissioning was many years away. However, as many more plants are now moving into decommissioning, the focus has shifted to final decommissioning plans with budgets instead of funding plans, strategic decisions instead of choices, waste volume specifications instead of estimates and a defined approach instead of what ifs. Westinghouse has developed a methodology based on the planning and execution of many decommissioning projects in Europe, America and Asia. That international experience and understanding helps the customers to adopt a systematic planning process where strategy development is done with the end state in mind, where the goals are clearly outlined and the starting point described. The process and steps to reach the desired end state need to be clearly defined and all options/alternatives evaluated from a cost/benefit point of view. This is followed by a thorough and quantitative risk analysis in order to give solid recommendations and credible conclusions. One important feedback has been that real decommissioning experience from reference projects is invaluable for an efficient and timely progress in order not to spend unnecessary time and effort on understanding the barriers and links between different activities in decommissioning. Skilled project managers or engineers can drive the project forward, but without decommissioning experience previously gained, valuable lessons learned are not used and the same mistakes can be made again. Many utilities have invested in knowledge transfer from other decommissioning projects through site visits, exchange programs and supplier meetings, which is a valuable asset and way of implementing lessons learned from performed decommissioning projects into the planning process. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Optimization of the Post-Operational Phase on Two Belgian Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants: the Case of the Non-Fissile Irradiated Core Items - 20156

The current legal framework in Belgium foresees the progressive phase out of nuclear power between October 2022 (Doel 3) and December 2025 (Doel 2). Upon its definitive shutdown, each unit of the Tihange and Doel sites will enter a Post-Operational Phase (POP) and be prepared for its Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D). Prior to obtaining the D and D license, the Operator Electrabel is legally required to remove any non-fissile irradiated core items stored in the deactivation pools. The non-fissile irradiated core items consist essentially of control rods, poison rods and source thimbles as well as thimble plugs and foreign materials irradiated during operation: - Their significant content in highly radiant radionuclides (up to 6 TBq of Co-60 per kg of irradiated material) renders all existing operational waste management processes inadequate due to insufficient biological shielding; - Their high concentrations in long-lived radionuclides call for their disposal in a geological repository for which no final design nor waste acceptance criteria are expected prior to 2050. Uncertainties in the Belgian energy supply and security, however, require the Operator to be prepared for a partial nuclear phase out, where one or more units would benefit from lifetime extension while the remaining units would undergo decommissioning. The present paper aims at presenting how Electrabel, in partnership with Tractebel, addressed this challenge by maximizing the use of synergies within the respective sites as well as between both sites themselves, all the while accounting for site specificities. The most recent results and state of progress of the project will be detailed and the first lessons learned will be shared. The project has been split in multiple tasks and phased as follows: - An inventory phase aimed at mapping the contents, origin, composition and history of the non-fissile irradiated core items; - A pre-characterization phase based on neutron activation models; - A waste sorting phase aimed at separating waste forms for which an evacuation route exists from those for which such route does not exist; - A feasibility phase aimed at exploring all possible scenarios for the management of non-fissile irradiated core items and identifying the optimal feasible solution for each site; - A preparation phase (currently ongoing), developing further the optimal solution and ensuring that back-up solutions are available for any foreseeable change of context (licensing issue, modification in the nuclear phase-out program, etc.) and initiating early contacts with potential subcontractors for segmentation works and cask manufacturers, as well as the Belgian regulatory body and waste management agency. This phase also foresees the investigation of destructive and non-destructive radiological measurements to support the detailed characterization of the waste forms; - A realization phase (future work). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fission Gas Measurements in Spent Fuel: Literature Review

The fission-derived noble gases, xenon(Xe) and krypton(Kr), have long been proposed as a tool for supporting nuclear safeguards and declarations verification. A vast body of literature outlines how these non-reactive fission gases released during reactor operation and shutdowns correlate to burnup level, power history, other reactor specifications and reprocessing activities. However, irradiation conditions can vary appreciably both radially and axially within a fuel pin.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗