Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEMS”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 55 records · Page 3

Design of a Commercial Scale Accelerator Driven Subcritical Aqueous Assembly

SHINE Medical Technologies is working towards producing a reliable, domestic supply of medical isotopes, including molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), xenon-133, and iodine 131, without using highly enriched uranium. Approximately 88% of Mo-99 decays to technetium-99m, which is the most widely used medical isotope in the world, accounting for approximately 80% of all nuclear medicine procedures. A novel aqueous, subcritical nuclear assembly has been designed by SHINE Medical Technologies. The assembly can produce medical radioisotopes in significant quantities for U.S. and foreign needs. The assembly produces isotopes without using a reactor, instead using a fusion-based neutron source coupled to a fission-based aqueous assembly. The subcritical nature of the aqueous assembly has safety and licensing benefits, including the elimination of the reactor control system and elimination of high level waste. SHINE plans to construct eight subcritical assemblies with a plant capacity of greater than 3000 6-day Curies, which is more than one-quarter of the world's Mo-99 requirements. From a nuclear design standpoint, the aqueous subcritical assembly needs to be able to generate sufficient fission power to meet the production capacity requirements while remaining subcritical at all times with an acceptable margin. To address these conflicting design goals, a simple nuclear design and reactivity control philosophy has been developed that allows for high power operation with a high degree of safety. A fusion-driven subcritical fission assembly has been designed by SHINE Medical Technologies to provide a reliable, domestic supply of medical isotopes. Nuclear models have been created and show that the assembly can be started up, operated, and shutdown in a safe manner without active reactivity control systems. A unique reactivity control strategy allows SHINE to operate the aqueous subcritical assembly at much higher power levels than would otherwise be practical, while still retaining the benefits of subcritical operation and avoiding the need for complex subcritical measurement techniques. Based on the current design, the subcritical target is capable of generating significant fission power (on the order of 100 kW) when being driven by a simple, low-cost deuterium-tritium accelerator, enabling the SHINE facility to supply over one-fourth of the worldwide demand of Mo- 99. SHINE has recently been issued a construction permit by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build the commercial facility in Janesville, WI, with eight subcritical assemblies and the associated production equipment. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 35, No. 1, January-June 1994]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 Chernobyl Accident Management Actions, A. R Sich 25 The IAEA-ASSET Approach to Avoiding Accidents is to Recognize the Precursors to Prevent Incidents, F. Reisch; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 36 A Review of the Available Information on the Triggering Stage of a Steam Explosion, D. F. Fletcher; 58 Analysis and Modeling of Flow-Blockage-Induced Steam Explosion Events in the High-Flux Isotope Reactor, R. P. Taleyarkhan, V. Georgevich, C. W. Nestor, U. Gat, B. L. Lepard, D. H. Cook, J. Freels, S. J. Chang, C. Luttrell, R. C. Gwaltney, and J. Kirkpatrick; 74 An Analysis of Disassembling the Radial Reflector of a Thermionic Space Nuclear Reactor Power System, M. S. El-Genk and D. V. Paramonov; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 86 Standards for High-Integrity Software, D. R. Wallace, D. R. Kuhn, L M. Ippolito, and L. Beltracchi; DESIGN FEATURES: 98 Adoption of New Design Features for the Next Generation Nuclear Power Reactors, L. S. Tong; 114 Review of Nuclear Piping Seismic Design Requirements, G. C. Slagis and S. E. Moore; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 128 PC-Based Probabilistic Safety Assessment Study for a Geological Waste Repository Placed in a Bedded Salt Formation, S. A. Khan; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 142 Managing Aging in Nuclear Power Plants: Insights from NRC’s Maintenance Team Inspection Reports, A. Fresco and M. Subudhi; 150 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 153 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 158 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 168 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31, 1993; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 177 Symposium on Radioactive and Mixed Waste—Risk as a Basis for Waste Classification; 177 1995 Incineration Conference 178 Ninth Power Plant Dynamics Control and Testing Symposium; 174 The Authors

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 35, No. 1, January-June 1994]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 Chernobyl Accident Management Actions, A. R Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 25 The IAEA-ASSET Approach to Avoiding Accidents is to Recognize the Precursors to Prevent Incidents, F. Reisch; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 36 A Review of the Available Information on the Triggering Stage of a Steam Explosion, D. F. Fletcher; 58 Analysis and Modeling of Flow-Blockage-Induced Steam Explosion Events in the High-Flux Isotope Reactor, R. P. Taleyarkhan, V. Georgevich, C. W. Nestor, U. Gat, B. L. Lepard, D. H. Cook, J. Freels, S. J. Chang, C. Luttrell, R. C. Gwaltney, and J. Kirkpatrick; 74 An Analysis of Disassembling the Radial Reflector of a Thermionic Space Nuclear Reactor Power System, M. S. El-Genk and D. V. Paramonov; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 86 Standards for High-Integrity Software, D. R. Wallace, D. R. Kuhn, L M. Ippolito, and L. Beltracchi; DESIGN FEATURES: 98 Adoption of New Design Features for the Next Generation Nuclear Power Reactors, L. S. Tong; 114 Review of Nuclear Piping Seismic Design Requirements, G. C. Slagis and S. E. Moore; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 128 PC-Based Probabilistic Safety Assessment Study for a Geological Waste Repository Placed in a Bedded Salt Formation, S. A. Khan; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 142 Managing Aging in Nuclear Power Plants: Insights from NRC’s Maintenance Team Inspection Reports, A. Fresco and M. Subudhi; 150 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 153 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 158 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 168 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31, 1993; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 177 Symposium on Radioactive and Mixed Waste—Risk as a Basis for Waste Classification; 177 1995 Incineration Conference 178 Ninth Power Plant Dynamics Control and Testing Symposium; 174 The Authors

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A novel priority selection system for nuclear power plant - 287

The priority selection system is an important component of security level instrument control platform for nuclear power plant, the main function of which is priority processing the manual or automatic command with various security levels and driving engineering safety features and field devices, such as pump and valve. Its stability and safety plays a crucial role in the operation of the power plant. The main objective of the present paper is to describe the new nuclear power plant-oriented priority selection system, which is developed independently by China Nuclear Control System Engineering Company. In this system, the control commands from 1E DCS, ECP and DAS systems are transmitted via hardwire, while those from NC DCS are transmitted by field-bus. The control commands experience priority output to control the field actuators. Meanwhile, in order to control key field devices when failure of the instrument control systems occurs, the issuing interface for native instructions with permissions setting is also offered. The whole system provides collection-feedback functions for field devices, high coverage self-diagnostic functions and periodic test functions for safety systems. Moreover, the feedback information of field devices, the results of self-diagnosis and periodic test will be submitted to DCS of nuclear power plant. In addition, the core part of priority selection system, namely priority selection module, is obtained by pure FPGA technology, which is different from DCS systems and could avoid common cause failure of software effectively. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The problem analysis of data processing performance in nuclear power plant computerized information and control system - 288

This paper is based on the data processing performance problems of operating command delay and system display not updating real-time for nuclear power plant computerized information and control system. The plant computerized information and control system is responsible for monitoring and controlling the plant operation, and it is a key part in the plant DCS system. Its data processing performance will affect the operation stability of nuclear power plant. The architecture, hardware configuration and data communication for plant computerized information and control system among the different levels in DCS are described. The main reasons affecting data processing performance in different signal channels are analyzed according to the plant load test results. The CPU load curves for real time server and central processing server are displayed, although the detailed cause for operating command delay and system display not updating realtime are not found, central processing server load is heavier than real time server which remind us to analyze the data processing of software resource scheduling deeply. So the resource distribution problem of software execution task is also analyzed according to CPU load test results. This paper provides the optimization analysis for data processing performance, and it is available and effective according to the latest test results. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Methodology on cyber security evaluation in nuclear facilities considering I and C architecture - 224

Cyber security has become a major issue in nuclear facilities recently due to obsolescence of existing analog system and increasing the use of digital system for instrumentation and control (I and C) system. There are several cases which are similar to cyber-attacks in nuclear facilities such as Davis-Besse NPP, Browns Ferry NPP, Hatch NPP, Natanz Nuclear Facility, and Monju NPP. Since the cyber-attack called 'Stuxnet' occurred to a Natanz Nuclear Facility at 2010, the regulatory agencies have developed regulatory guidance for cyber security of nuclear facilities. In this paper, we will propose a methodology on cyber security evaluation in nuclear facilities considering I and C architecture. We will introduce the cyber security evaluation model for I and C system with Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). The cyber security evaluation model for nuclear facilities consists of I and C architecture, cyber threat such as malicious activity of attacker, and mitigation measure against malicious activity. In order to make benchmark model with I and C architecture, cyber threat, and mitigation measure, the likelihood and consequence concepts are used as prior information to the model. Bayesian update can be used to evaluate the cyber security for nuclear facility by calculating posterior information and comparing between prior information and posterior information with the model. Moreover, we will propose the methodology on application of the cyber security to existing PSA by using the cyber security evaluation model with BBN. It presents quantitative information for cyber security against cyber-attack and it is helpful to communicate between licensee and regulator on nuclear facilities. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Development of an object-oriented dynamics simulator for a LFR DEMO

A control-oriented dynamics simulator for a Generation IV Lead-cooled Fast Reactor (LFR) demonstrator (DEMO) has been developed aimed at providing a flexible, simple and fast-running tool allowing to perform design-basis transient and stability analyses, and to lay the foundations for the study of the system control strategy. For such purposes, a model representing a compromise between accuracy and straightforwardness has been necessarily sought, and in this view an object-oriented approach based on the Modelica language has been adopted. The reactor primary and secondary systems have been implemented by assembling both component models already available in a specific thermal-hydraulic library, and ad hoc developed nuclear component models suitably modified according to the specific DEMO configuration. The resulting overall plant simulator, incorporating also the balance of plant, consists in the following essential parts: core, integrated steam generator/primary pump block, cold and hot legs, primary coolant cold pool, turbine, heat sink, secondary coolant pump. Afterwards, the reactor response to typical transient initiators has been investigated: feedwater mass flow rate and temperature enhancement, turbine admission valve coefficient variation, increase of primary coolant mass flow rate, and transient of overpower have been simulated; results have been compared with the outcomes of analogous analyses performed by employing a lumped-parameter DEMO plant model. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Suggestion of a Framework to Evaluate the Extent of Cyber Security Enhancements in NPP

Digital I and C systems have been developed and installed in nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, due to installation of digital I and C systems, cyber security concerns have been emerged. One of the major problems is that nuclear industry is in very early stage in dealing with cyber security issues. It is because that cyber security has received less attention compared to other safety problems. In addition, late adoption of digital I and C systems has resulted in lower level of cyber security advancements in nuclear industry than ones in other industries. With this regards, recently, international standard organizations, regulatory institutes, and research institutes have performed a number of studies addressing these cyber security issues in nuclear industries. In order to provide useful information about cyber security issues including cyber security enhancements, this paper suggests a framework to evaluate how much cyber security is improved when a specific cyber security enhancement is applied in NPPs. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies for Nuclear Power Plants

As any mechanical system ages, broken or outdated parts must be replaced; nuclear power plants (NPPs) are no different. The average age of a NPP in the United States' aging fleet of commercial reactors is 35 years, with many of these plants operating under extensions of their original licenses. These plants, originally designed in the 1960's and 1970's, are controlled by analog instrumentation and control (I and C) systems, and have since been upgraded (to varying degrees) to hybrid analog-digital systems. As these NPPs are upgraded to continue operating and to meet more stringent safety requirements imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the implementation of digital systems to monitor and run the power plant introduces new vulnerabilities that must be addressed. The main objectives of a vulnerability assessment (VA) are to identify, quantify, and prioritize all of the susceptibilities inherent in a system. This allows for all weaknesses to be analyzed, and for the most serious concerns to be addressed first. Traditional VA methodologies deal with the analysis of physical systems associated with the NPP; with the introduction of digital control systems and computer networks, these methodologies must be expanded to include these fundamentally different systems and vulnerability concerns. Digital systems have been used in NPPs since the 1980's, but only for non-safety control systems; attacks on these systems were not deemed consequential, and no dedicated VA methodology was required. However, 'all new NPPs are being designed with integrated digital instrumentation and control systems as the backbone of protection, controls, alarms, and display and monitoring'. This gives rise to new vulnerabilities such as disrupted data displays, the suppression of critical alarms, or unauthorized access to secure systems from connected networks. The NRC released formal cybersecurity regulations in March 2009 (10 CFR 73.54), as well as a guide for the program in January 2010 (RG 5.71). However, the regulations and guide provide limited insight on how to identify these vulnerabilities; the focus is on remediating them once found. Hence, there is a need for a comprehensive, systematic methodology to conduct a VA on digital computer and communications and network systems. In this paper, we review traditional VA methodologies and discuss relevant cases. Then we discuss challenges to vulnerabilities within the context of modernization of the fleet and what needs to be done to address this issue.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Development of functional requirements specification for digital instrumentation and control systems upgrades used at nuclear power plants (NPPs) - 396

Recent market conditions have driven the nuclear industry to become more innovative at reducing cost in order to remain competitive. Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems used by many NPPs are based on outdated 1960's and 70's technology. Many of the components used in these digital systems are no longer supported by Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and are rapidly becoming obsolete. Coping with the high cost of replacing I and C equipment due to obsolescence adds to this economic challenge. While other industries have migrated from analog to modern digital I and C technology, implementation of digital I and C controls within the nuclear industry has been very slow. This is primarily due to the high capital cost related to implementation of digital I and C upgrades, which is compounded by regulatory uncertainties that present significant licensing risks. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the industry's Digital I and C Working Group are working to address many of the regulatory barriers that adversely impacts implementation of digital upgrades at NPPs. The NRC has developed an 'Integrated Action Plan to Modernize Digital Instrumentation and Controls Regulatory Infrastructure' (ML16097A182), Reference 1. Once fully implemented, this plan is expected to help reduce regulatory uncertainties that affects project cost. Excluding regulatory uncertainty, most OEM's will concur that one of the most important factors in reducing project cost is assuring that all requirements are well defined and complete prior to starting the project. A detailed and high quality Functional Requirements Specification (FRS) is critical in documenting these requirements. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Digital I and C system upgrade integration technique

This work developed an integration technique for digital I and C system upgrade, the utility can replace the I and C systems step by step systematically by this method. Inst. of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) developed a digital Instrumentation and Control (I and C) replacement integration technique on the basis of requirement of the three existing nuclear power plants (NPPs), which are Chin-Shan (CS) NPP, Kuo-Sheng (KS) NPP, and Maanshan (MS) NPP, in Taiwan, and also developed the related Critical Digital Review (CDR) Procedure. The digital I and C replacement integration technique includes: (I) Establishment of Nuclear Power Plant Digital Replacement Integration Guideline, (2) Preliminary Investigation on I and C System Digitalization, (3) Evaluation on I and C System Digitalization, and (4) Establishment of I and C System Digitalization Architectures. These works can be a reference for performing I and C system digital replacement integration of the three existing NPPs of Taiwan Power Company (TPC). A CDR is the review for a critical system digital I and C replacement. The major reference of this procedure is EPRI TR- 1011710 (2005) 'Handbook for Evaluating Critical Digital Equipment and Systems' which was published by the Electric Power Research Inst. (EPRI). With this document, INER developed a TPC-specific CDR procedure. Currently, CDR becomes one of the policies for digital I and C replacement in TPC. The contents of this CDR procedure include: Scope, Responsibility, Operation Procedure, Operation Flow Chart, CDR review items. The CDR review items include the comparison of the design change, Software Verification and Validation (SVandV), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Evaluation of Diversity and Defense-in-depth (D3), Evaluation of Watchdog Timer, Evaluation of Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC), Evaluation of Grounding for System/Component, Seismic Evaluation, Witness and Inspection, Lessons Learnt from the Digital I and C Failure Events. A solid review can assure the quality of the digital I and C system replacement. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Graded approach for assessing digital system failure susceptibilities - 305

Owner/operators of nuclear plants must be able to identify and assess susceptibilities to digital system failures and unintended behaviors that could lead to plant system malfunctions, including common-cause failures (CCFs) of multiple controlled components that may impact overall plant safety. Nuclear plant designers and regulators often assess and manage potential failure modes by assuming the failure occurs and showing by analysis that the results are acceptable. In 2016 EPRI published a guideline on Methods for Assuring Safety and Dependability when Applying Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems (EPRI 3002005326), which takes a more holistic approach that considers digital system failure modes from the perspective of their impact on plant risk and includes a graded approach based on safety significance. This paper describes that graded approach. The methodology in EPRI 3002005326 systematically identifies potential I and C vulnerabilities that could lead to significant malfunctions of controlled components and systems, including common-cause failures (CCF), and discusses in detail methods to protect against them. It considers both preventive measures that reduce the likelihood of failures, and plant systems and features that mitigate the effects of component failures and misbehaviors. Coping analysis is then performed as appropriate to provide additional assurance of protection. The safety significance based graded approach is an important feature in that it can help users focus attention on overall plant safety, including potentially risk-significant scenarios that might not be considered in traditional safety analyses. The purpose is to help the user ensure that modifications to the I and C that could potentially be safety significant are treated appropriately and at the same time not waste valuable resources on excessive protection against changes that have little or no impact on safety. The graded approach allows the design engineer to tailor the rigor of the preventive, limiting, and mitigative measures commensurately with the effects the I and C modification has on overall plant safety. The graded approach focuses on safety significance impact, which is effectively a qualitative measure of the potential change in safety (or risk) caused by a proposed I and C modification, as compared to the I and C that is being replaced. Safety significance impact should not be confused with importance to safety or risk significance. It is possible that an upgrade to safety-related and/or risk-significant I and C systems may have little or no safety significant impact and vice versa. The approach considers three factors that influence the impact on safety significance of a proposed I and C modification: context, likelihood of failure, and consequences of failure. The most significant of the three factors is context - what the I and C is connected to, both directly and indirectly, including its potential effects on plant systems that respond to transients or accidents. The graded approach is particularly helpful in assessing potential CCFs resulting from digital I and C failures, and shows why the most problematic CCFs will be those that can affect multiple plant systems. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 1993]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 An Integrated Regional Approach To Risk Management of Industrial Systems, S. Chakraborty and R. Stratton; 9 Annual Technical Meeting of the NRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, E. G. Silver; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 13 Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria as Severe Accident Design Criteria and Policy for the New Production Reactor-Heavy Water Reactor, P. T. Rhoads; 20 Proposed Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria for the Heavy Water Reactor-New Production Reactor Containment, K. D. Bergeron, S. E. Slezak, and C. E. Leach; 33 Quasi-Static Core Liquid Level Depression and Long-Term Core Uncovery During a PWR LOCA, Y. Kukita, R. R. Schultz, H. Nakamura, and J. Katayama; 49 LIRA: An Advanced Containment System to Minimize the Accidental Radioactivity Releases, A. Turricchia; 63 Errata to “A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs,” Vol. 33, No. 4; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 64 The Nuplex 80+™ Advanced Control Complex from ABB Combustion Engineering, F. Ridolfo, D. Harmon, and K. Scarola; DESIGN FEATURES: 76 A Scheme for Passive Isolation of the Containment of a Reactor, A. K. Ghosh, V. V. Raj, and K. Kakodkar; 84 Utility Requirements for Safety in the Passive Advanced Light-Water Reactor, T. U. Marston, W. H. Layman, and G. Bockhold, Jr.; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 91 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 103 Testing Deficiencies in Auxiliary Systems Feedwater Systems, J. D. Kueck; 110 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 113 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 115 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 133 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 145 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 150 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 75 Harvard Short Course on Risk: Science, Assessment, and Management; 102 International Conference on Reactor Physics and Reactor Computations; 102 The Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Waste Reprocessing and Waste Management [RECOD ’94]; 132 International Symposium on the Radiological Exposure of the Population of the European Community from Radioactivity in the Mediterranean Sea [MARINA-MED]; 162 International High-Level Radioactive Waste Conference ‘Technology Integration—Above and Below”; 154 The Authors; 158 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 33.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Diverse methods of analyzing neutron detector signal for power monitoring in commercial fast reactors

In a fast reactor, the measurement of instantaneous power, accurately at any point of time is of prime importance. To control the reactor power within its design limit for safe operation, measurement of power and safety functions operated by different systems based on power is required. This is done with neutron detectors from which signal come as current pulses in random following Poisson distribution. Due to heavy overlap, individual pulse counting is extremely difficult beyond certain frequency. So to count pulses in the detector output in a given length of time, which will be measure of power in the reactor, indirect method of signal processing is applied here. After applying signal processing methods on the detector output, linear relation is established between maximum amplitude of absolute of FFT (Fast Fourier Transform) of the signal and no of pulses in a given length of time of the signal i.e. rate of arrival of pulses to the detector. This linear relation is verified in different ways i.e. with simulated fixed rate of arrival of the pulses, random rate of arrival of the pulses and with neutron detector simulator output. The paper explains various stages of development and testing. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Bioreactor with Ipomoea hederifolia adventitious roots and its endophyte Cladosporium cladosporioides for textile dye degradation

In vitro grown untransformed adventitious roots (AR) culture of Ipomoea hederifolia and its endophytic fungus (EF) Cladosporium cladosporioides decolorized Navy Blue HE2R (NB-HE2R) at a concentration of 20 ppm up to 83.3 and 65%, respectively within 96 h. Whereas the AR-EF consortium decolorized the dye more efficiently and gave 97% removal within 36 h. Significant inductions in the enzyme activities of lignin peroxidase, tyrosinase and laccase were observed in roots, while enzymes like tyrosinase, laccase and riboflavin reductase activities were induced in EF. Metabolites of dye were analyzed using UV—vis spectroscopy, FTIR and gas chromatography-mass spectrometry. Possible metabolic pathways of NB-HE2R were proposed with AR, EF and AR-EF systems independently. Looking at the superior efficacy of AR-EF system, a rhizoreactor was developed for the treatment of NB-HE2R at a concentration of 1000 ppm. Control reactor systems with independently grown AR and EF gave 94 and 85% NB-HE2R removal, respectively within 36 h. The AR-EF rhizoreactor, however, gave 97% decolorization. The endophyte colonization additionally increased root and shoot lengths of candidate plants through mutualism. Combined bioreactor strategies can be effectively used for future eco-friendly remediation purposes. - Highlights: • Endophytic fungus on Ipomoea hederifolia promotes root growth and shoot development • Endophytic Cladosporium cladosporioides synergistically degrade Navy Blue-HE2R dye • Endophyte colonized I. hederifolia roots proved superior in dye decolorization • Dye stress and toxicity was efficiently dealt by root-endophyte consortium • Root-endophyte consortium can be used as a sustainable remediation strategy.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Reliability enhancement of APR + diverse protection system regarding common cause failures

The Advanced Power Reactor Plus (APR +) nuclear power plant design has been developed on the basis of the APR1400 (Advanced Power Reactor 1400 MWe) to further enhance safety and economics. For the mitigation of Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) as well as Common Cause Failures (CCF) within the Plant Protection System (PPS) and the Emergency Safety Feature - Component Control System (ESF-CCS), several design improvement features have been implemented for the Diverse Protection System (DPS) of the APR + plant. As compared to the APR1400 DPS design, the APR + DPS has been designed to provide the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) considering a large break LOCA accident concurrent with the CCF. Additionally several design improvement features, such as channel structure with redundant processing modules, and changes of system communication methods and auto-system test methods, are introduced to enhance the functional reliability of the DPS. Therefore, it is expected that the APR + DPS can provide an enhanced safety and reliability regarding possible CCF in the safety-grade I and C systems as well as the DPS itself. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Preliminary Cyber-Informed Dynamic Branch Conditions for Analysis with the Dynamic Simplified Cyber MELCOR Model

Instrumentation and control of nuclear power is transforming from analog to modern digital assets. These control systems perform key safety and security functions. This transformation is occurring in new plant designs as well as in the existing fleet of plants as the operation of those plants is extended to 60 years. This transformation introduces new and unknown exploits involving both digital asset induced safety issues and security exploits. Traditional the open literature of nuclear power risk assessment tools and cyber security assessment methods have not been modified or developed to address the unique nature of cyber failure modes and of cyber security threats. Starting in 2015, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) embarked on a two year dynamic cyber-risk informed project to facilitate the analysis of unique cyber failure modes and the time sequencing of cyber faults, both malicious and non-malicious, and impose those cyber exploits and cyber faults onto a nuclear power plant accident sequence simulator code to assess how cyber exploits and cyber faults could interact with a plant's digital instrumentation and control (DI and C) system in the absence of digital controls. This will be achieved by coupling SNL's existing dynamic scheduler code (ADAPT), nuclear accident simulator code (MELCOR), and cyber Emulytics code (SCEPTRE) to demonstrate real-time simulation of cyber exploits and their impact on automatic DI and C responses. Studying such potential time-sequenced cyber-attacks and their risks (i.e., the associated impact and the associated degree of difficulty to achieve the attack vector) as they pertain to accident management will provide a risk informed basis for developing effective cyber security controls for nuclear power. This paper will discuss the rationale behind the proposed generic cyber exploits for an abstracted Pressurized Water Reactor that has adopted a unified DI and C System. Other papers related to this project submitted to this conference discuss: - The MELCOR model for this abstracted reactor, called the Dynamic Simplified Cyber (DSC) model, - Modifications to ADAPT to: Extend the framework for multiple simulators, Incorporation of importance measures into dynamic event tree analysis, Sort and reduce the dynamic event tree based upon inputs to or outputs from the tree, and - A feasibility study for using density based clustering methods with dynamic time wrapping to cluster and prune dynamic event trees. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Using Generative AI to implement the discrepancy checker for a Nearly Autonomous Management and Control System for Advanced Reactors

Developments related to generative artificial intelligence (AI) have brought a major breakthrough in AI. These developments are rapidly accelerating developments in different science and engineering applications. Nearly Autonomous Management and Control (NAMAC) system provides recommendations to the operator for maintaining the safety and performance of the reactor. The discrepancy checker (DC) is an important component of the NAMAC) system, whose goal is to determine if the plant is moving towards the expected system state after the control actions are injected. In this work, we explore generative AI methods, particularly, a generative pretrained transformer (GPT) for implementing the DC function in NAMAC. The GPT-based DC aims to alert the operator in situations outside NAMAC’s scope and act as a chatbot the operator can use to retrieve relevant information. This study involves two versions of GPT developed by OpenAI: GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. These GPTs are trained on huge amounts of undisclosed general domain datasets. We explored two methods to adapt GPTs for DC implementation in NAMAC: fine-tuning and retrieval augmented generation. A small knowledge base (information file) that encompasses rules for DC implementation and some general information related to NAMAC has been created to support DC implementation using GPT. In this work, the GPT-based DC implementations have been tested for their reasoning abilities, comprehension, information retrieval, and extraction abilities. It should be noted that this paper only presents a preliminary study to test the feasibility of DC implementation using generative AI technology. Given the potential risks and severe consequences associated with nuclear reactor applications, combined with the black-box nature of AI, extensive offline and online testing and reliability analyses of GPT-based DCs are needed for further developing such capabilities.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗