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DOE OSTI2020

Overview of the Long-Term Stewardship of the Remediated Uranium Mining and Milling Sites in Europe - 20079

Uranium mining in Europe began in the ' 40's for civil and military applications. The great majority of the uranium mines have now been closed and are going through the stages of decommissioning and/or rehabilitation. Today, the main uranium producers are outside the EU; only a few mines are still in operation inside the EU. In 2006, the situation of the uranium mines and mill tailings in Europe, identifying the tailings liabilities, their status, the plans for these sites and any associated hazards, was reported to the EC. The legacy of uranium mines and mill tailing disposals in the EU are located mainly in 12 Member States where, in total, 87 tailing objects were identified at 63 sites. The volume of each one of these tailings disposal varies from a few thousand to several tens of million m{sup 3}. The majority of these sites are no longer in operation. More than 40 tailing embankments have already been completely remediated. Approximately 20 are currently being remediated while for the remaining objects, remediation has yet to start. After ten years, and for a few cases where the respective projects have not yet been completed, it seems that most of Europe's uranium mines and milling legacies were remediated according to acceptable environmental standards. Nevertheless, Europe is about to face a new challenge that comes from the concluded remediation projects for which an effective set of measures for coordinated institutional control, known as 'long-term stewardship', is needed including, in most cases, continuous and active maintenance. Moreover, the uncertainty of what will happen to these sites if institutional control fails at some point in time is a major concern. This work presents a summary of the situation and current issues of the uranium mine and mill tailings in Europe and their remediation status. It addresses not only the management of existing uranium mine and mill legacies but also the methods and strategies that have been used to prevent the creation of new future legacy sites from uranium mines still in operation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Virtual and Augmented Realities to Support Development, Training, Deployment, and Operations of Remote Systems - 20516

Throughout the U.S. Department of Energy complex, there is a need to deploy new, unique equipment and systems for cleanup activities, waste processing, infrastructure repair, and decommissioning and demolition in radioactive and hazardous environments. The new equipment often consists of custom systems created by integrating and modifying commercial technologies. In addition, the systems are deployed in unique environments due to limited access, waste properties, and the presence of previously installed equipment or infrastructure that has been left in place. The deployment of custom systems that are 'turnkey' ready for first-time installation and application has its risks. Use of test platforms and mockups for cold (i.e., non-radioactive) testing is one method to mitigate that risk: however, full-scale test mockups for operations such as waste retrieval and tank inspection can be expensive and must be modified to incorporate the uniqueness of each application. An alternative to full-scale mockups is to use three-dimensional (3D) virtual environments and virtual reality (VR) technology to develop interactive virtual test beds. These can be used throughout the down-selection, development, system integration, operational planning, operator training, and mission execution phases of a task. Virtual test beds are readily reconfigured, can be used for multiple tasks, support multiple users in parallel, and can accommodate enhancements and changes not originally planned or conceived in the initial design. Virtual test beds also provide a platform for developing and testing augmented reality (AR) tools for improving operator efficiency. A VR experience has been generated for waste retrieval from a Hanford waste tank to present the potential applications of a virtual test bed. Features of the VR experience are presented, potential applications of VR and AR for remote applications are discussed, and development areas for improving future application are considered. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Electrolytically Assisted Surface Decontamination (EASD{sup TM}) for POCO Operations - 20282

NNL in collaboration with C-Tech Innovation Ltd and Sellafield Ltd has been exploring innovative technologies to enable a significant reduction of radiological hazards within facilities during the Post Operational Clean Out (POCO) phase of a nuclear plant's life cycle. Reducing the hazard by effectively decontaminating plants in-situ during POCO delivers huge cost reductions for future decommissioning operations. These cost reduction benefits are realized by reducing the number and complexity of remote operations as well as lowering the long-term waste disposal costs. Whilst chemical decontamination can achieve the desired level of decontamination, applying aggressive chemical reagents is hazardous, potentially difficult to control and requires there to be complimentary effluent treatment and waste routes. This work has aimed to develop flexible and controllable decontamination processes which could be operated without the additional complexity and issues associated with chemical decontamination. The processes needed to be relatively fast and effective to minimize the time operators would spend in an active area. In addition, there was a driver to produce decontamination methodologies which generated a secondary waste compatible with current routes and which takes advantage of current waste capacity. The strategy therefore was to come up with a solution that works with, rather than against, the science and engineering behind process plants at Sellafield. Electrolytically Assisted Surface Decontamination (EASD{sup TM}) is an innovative electrochemical decontamination process (developed by NNL and C-Tech Innovation Ltd) that can remove activity from contaminated metal in very short time periods. Application of the patented electric waveform to the surface when treating contaminated metal with nitric acid has been shown to significantly enhance the decontamination performance. When compared to proposed baseline washout procedures at Sellafield, the only change to the process is the applied electrical waveform which is temporary and controllable. The current causes dissolution of the metal surface being decontaminated which leads to activity transferring from the plant item into the nitric acid effluent stream. This innovation has the potential to transform the POCO process and allow a nitric acid based washout approach to deliver POCO quickly and cost effectively within the existing infrastructure. Several devices have now been designed that incorporate this EASD{sup TM} technology and enable the decontamination process to be applied to a range items commonly identified as being contaminated during nuclear decommissioning programmes such as pipework, tanks and hotspots of walls/floors. Inactive and active laboratory-scale testing has been completed using both simulated and 'real-life' contaminated (low level waste) metallic items retrieved from different nuclear sites. Active trials demonstrated that contaminated items could be treated to free release levels within minutes. Engineering scale tests are currently being performed, with guidance from Sellafield's system engineers and plant managers, to provide the necessary re-assurance the designed devices could be successfully deployed in an on-plant scenario. The final stage of this development work is to carry out an active demonstration of the decontamination technology on Thorp at Sellafield. This paper aims to highlight progress made to date with the EASD{sup TM} technology and, more specifically, the development of an in-situ decontamination device for deployment within radioactive pipework. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Radiation Toxicity in Patients With Collagen Vascular Disease: A Meta-Analysis of Case-Control Studies

Several retrospective series have reported that patients with collagen vascular disease (CVD) are at increased risk of radiation (RT) toxicity. However, the evidence is mixed, and many series lack control groups. We performed a meta-analysis including only case-cohort or randomized studies that examined the risk of RT toxicity for patients with CVD compared with controls.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Dirty bomb source term characterization and downwind dispersion: Review of experimental evidence

Dirty bombs are considered one of the easiest forms of radiological terrorism, a form of terrorism based on the deliberate use of radiological material to cause adverse effects in a target population. One U.S. Government official has even described a dirty bomb attack as “all but inevitable”. While people in the vicinity of the blast may experience acute radiation effects, people downwind may unknowingly be contaminated by the radioactive airborne particulate and face increased long-term cancer risk. The likelihood of increased cancer risk depends on the radionuclide used and its specific activity, its aerosolization potential, the particle sizes generated in the blast, and where a person is with respect to the detonation. Different studies have reported that plausible radionuclides for dirty bomb include 60 Co, 90 Sr, 137 Cs, 192 Ir, 241 Am based on their availability in commercial sources as well as safeguards, the amount needed for adverse health effects, previous mishandling of radionuclides and malicious uses. In order to have increased long-term cancer risk, the radionuclide would have to deposit inside the body by entering the respiratory tract and then possibly migrate to other organs or bones (ground shine is not considered in this paper because areas affected by the event will likely become inaccessible). This implies that the particles will have to be smaller than 10 μm to be inhaled. Experiments involving the detonation of dirty bombs have shown that particles or droplets smaller than 10 μm are generated, independently from the initial radionuclide or its state (e.g., powder, solution). Atmospheric tests have shown that in unobstructed terrain, the radionuclide laden cloud can travel kilometers downwind even for relatively small amounts of explosives. Furthermore, buildings in the path of the cloud can change the dose rate. For instance, in one experiment with a single building, the dose rate was 1–2 orders of magnitude lower behind the obstacle compared to its front face. For people walking around, the amount of particulate deposited on them and inhaled will depend on their path relative to the cloud, resulting in the counterintuitive result that the closer people may actually not be the ones more at risk because they could simply miss the bulk of the cloud in their wandering. In summary, the long-term cancer risk for people caught in a dirty bomb cloud away from the detonation requires considering where and when the people are, which radionuclide was used, and the layout of the obstacles (e.g., buildings, vegetation) in the path of the cloud.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗
DOE OSTI2023

Algorithm Theoretical Basis Document For PreMevE 2.0 Model

Man-made satellites operating in medium- and high-altitude Earth orbits are continuously exposed to hazardous space radiation originated from different sources. Among them, one major contributor is the relativistic electron population—with kinetic energies comparable to or larger than their rest energy of 0.511 Megaelectron-volt (MeV)—trapped inside Earth’s outer Van Allen belt. Owing to their high penetration capability, these MeV electrons are difficult to be fully stopped by normal shielding. Particularly, during MeV electron events when electron intensities across the outer belt are greatly elevated to sustaining high levels—up to 10 3 - 10 4 times as observed in the geosynchronous (GEO) orbit and low-Earth-orbits (LEOs), space-borne electronic systems with inadequate hardening are susceptible to deep-dielectric charging and discharging phenomenon caused by those electrons, and thus may suffer severe damages or even stop functioning. Therefore, protecting critical space infrastructures from harsh space weather conditions– including MeV electron events – has high priority for many space sectors, such as the aerospace industry, service providers and government agencies.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Importance of Hands-on Training within the Nuclear Industry

Almost all work performed within the nuclear industry requires some form of training, regardless of an individual’s education. While many of the hazards that exist in nuclear operations are present in other industries (e.g., industrial safety), nuclear operations have the unique hazards of radiation and inadvertent criticality. Therefore, these topics require additional training for individuals performing hands-on work or accessing those work areas. Many methods are available to train people including lectures (either with an instructor or automated video), reading procedures/policies, hands-on demonstrations, and on-the-job training.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Characterizing The Mechanical Properties of Polyurethane Foams

The Department of Energy has many radioactive facilities that are on the path of deactivation and decommissioning (D and D). These facilities can sit cold and dark for many years before final disposition, and must be maintained to ensure no radiological release occurs in the interim. Improvements and additions to D and D tool sets can greatly: Save time and money, Reduce worker risk. Conventional fixatives widely used often take the form of paints or films that are not readily applicable to 3-dimensional void spaces. Foams are one promising platform that may offer solutions to a number of contaminated problem sets such as: Gloveboxes, Pipes, Tanks. SRNL is working to characterize various commercial foams that would encapsulate the interior volume of a given space and are capable of immobilizing any remaining contamination. One key performance metric of these foams is how well they will perform in an accident scenario. To this end, SRNL is researching the mechanical properties of these foams to ensure that the material can withstand the environment of application while maintaining structural integrity. ASTM standard E3191-18 served as a guiding document for this project, outlining the requirements that foaming fixatives used for the mitigation of radioactive contamination need to meet before being implemented. Objective: Quantification of the mechanical properties of 6 commercial polyurethane foams was performed using multiple ASTM standards to record measurements for: Compression testing: Flexible Foams, Force required to produce 50% compression, Rigid Foams, Compressive and apparent modulus, Point of 10% core deformation, The 'Zero Deformation' point, Compressive strength, Yield point. Tensile testing: Tensile strength, Tensile stress, Percent elongation. Experiment 1: An electromechanical compressive tester (MTS Criterion Series 43) was used to evaluate 6 foams (4 flexible, 2 rigid). Per ASTM D1621, each rigid foam was compressed at 10% of the measured thickness per minute until the sample was 13% of it's original thickness. Per ASTM D35/4, each flexible foam was pre-flexed twice to 80% original thickness at a rate of 250 mm/min, then compressed to 80% original thickness at a rate of 50 mm/min. Experiment 2: An electromechanical tensile tester (MTS Criterion Series 43) was used to evaluate 6 foams (4 flexible, 2 rigid). Per ASTM D1623, rigid foams were pulled apart at a rate of 1.27 mm/min until the sample broke. Per ASTM D35/4, flexible foams were pulled apart at a rate of 500 mm/min until the sample broke. The strongest material in both compression and tensile testing scenarios was found to be the rigid intumescent polyurethane Hilti foam. The experiments revealed that the Hilti foam in a tensile scenario had a peak stress value that was larger than the closest competitor by a factor of 2.3 and a compressive yield point that was larger than the closest competitor by a factor of 1.4, indicating that the Hilti foam is the best choice for implementation in mechanically harsh environments. The performance metrics measured can serve as a basis for future mechanical tests that would help set relevant ASTM standards (E3191) for intumescent polyurethane foams in fixating applications. Tests like surface adhesion, impact, and flame tests would serve as a better indicator as to how this material would perform in environmentally harsh scenarios often found in decommissioned nuclear facilities. Further tests of the foams' intumescent properties would also be important should these foams be implemented in environmentally harsh scenarios.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Risk Model for EM Decision Support Toolsets

The Government Office of Accountability (GAO) has published several reports identifying the need for the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) to address mounting costs for DoE's cleanup program. DOEEM could greatly benefit from independent decision tool-sets/models that would allow them to evaluate options and inform business decision at the enterprise level considering site-specific life cycle costs and system plans. Program goals: Develop a tool-set that enables EM to independently evaluate alternatives, assess outcomes from different contracting strategies, and inform critical decisions for the enterprise. Project goals: Adaption of a Risk Model for integration with complimentary tool-sets for project level decision making. Operational Events: Discrete event model that evaluates operational variables (e.g. capacity, throughput, maintenance constraints) and identify bottlenecks. Identifying and Bounding Project Risk: Identify risks that impact confidence in meeting goals (e.g. production). Life cycle Cost: Evaluate impacts of staffing levels, inventory, and capital investments on life cycle costs. Methods and approach: Monte Carlo Analysis is being executed to generate results: Input derives from Risk Register Data; Tied to Projected and Target Schedules; Incorporates float duration within the model. Assumes associated risk mitigation actions being completed within a timeline of five fiscal years. Metrics include: Confidence in Meeting Production Goal; Confidence in Safety Standards; Confidence in Continuous Operation; Other Metrics can be added as appropriate regarding specific site needs. The adapted risk model can be used as a stand alone decision tool or can be integrated complementary tool-sets (i.e. process and cost models) for project-specific decisions. These support tool-sets can then be integrated with others for site- and complex- level evaluations. Future work includes designing an adaptable and modular framework that would allow integration of multiple tool-sets for holistic and/or targeted evaluation of alternative strategies for decision making that could lead to risk and cost reduction across the enterprise.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

ANDRA's Underground Research Laboratory in Bure: Major Role in the Cigeo Development - 20005

The Industrial Center for Geological Disposal, also called Cigeo, is the deep geological disposal facility project developed by Andra since 1991. It is intended for the final disposal of High-Level Waste (HLW) and Intermediate Level Waste-Long Lived (ILW-LL) generated in France by the nuclear industry. Cigeo is located in the east of France (Meuse/Haute-Marne site). The disposal will be implemented in a 140 to 160 m thick clay layer at about 500 m depth. The license application file will be submitted in 2020. If the license is granted, the construction of the pilot phase of Cigeo (ramp, shafts, drifts, initial disposal vaults) could start in 2025 at the earliest. Since 2000, the development of the safety case of Cigeo for post closure has been supported by a three-stage construction, design, and scientific and technological experiment program performed in the French Underground Research Laboratory (URL) in Bure. These stages of the URL activities supported the iterative interactions between the knowledge acquired by scientific and technological R and D program, the design process and the safety assessment. The stages focused on assessing the suitability of the disposal concept, providing the basis for safety options and construction design, and preparing for licensing using large scale demonstrations. Recently, Andra launched the fourth development stage of the URL to implement a new set of technological experiments aiming at consolidating the design options of disposal cells and galleries for the pilot phase of Cigeo and at assessing monitoring technologies. Recently, Andra launched the fourth development stage of the URL to implement a new set of technological experiments aiming at consolidating the design of the pilot phase of Cigeo and at assessing design options and monitoring technologies. Removal of a segment ring, construction of an X drift crossing, improved construction techniques for HLW vaults, and construction of an ILW-LL prototype disposal vault are example activities during the fourth phase. In the future, the URL in Bure will remain a unique location to carry out research on promising technical solutions, to reduce Cigeo's construction and operation risks and strengthen the long-term safety assessment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Improving PCM Waste Management Through New Approaches to Screening for LLW Treatment and Disposal - 20145

A major step forward in the management of Plutonium Contaminated Material (PCM) Waste has been taken at the Sellafield site with the introduction of new capabilities to enable wastes previously conservatively designated as PCM Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) to be re-classified for treatment as Low Level Waste (LLW). The Sellafield site, located in the North West of England, within the United Kingdom (UK), has operated plutonium processing plants and waste facilities for almost 70 years. During this time management of the raw PCM waste produced has presented a variety of challenges. The waste is currently processed by high force waste compaction in the Waste Treatment Complex (WTC). The WTC converts 200 litre drums of raw PCM waste into a compacted, grout encapsulated monolith form within stainless steel containment, ready for emplacement within the UK's Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) when it becomes available. To help progress some of the wastes waiting for treatment, recent improvements have been made with the introduction of new waste assay instrumentation which enables the identification of a 'candidate' waste potentially suitable for disposal via the LLW treatment route. Opening a new LLW route for previously designated PCM has been a major advance in PCM waste management policy. It has required a range of technical assessment arrangements to be developed, tested and commissioned and involved the engagement of a wide range of stakeholders. In particular, very detailed technical analysis methods have been developed to ensure that there is a robust and conservative approach to the final sentencing of waste. Following completion of commissioning tests, the first 86 m{sup 3} of previously designated PCM waste was successfully treated through the LLW route and consigned to LLW disposal in June 2019. The direct benefit of sentencing waste to the correct waste route (LLW) is the significant cost savings across the complete range of waste management activities. This work is also strategically important for demonstrating to a range of stakeholders including workforce and regulators, that waste previously designated as PCM can be re-classified in a systematic and justifiable way without increasing risk to personnel or the wider environment. By ensuring that waste is being managed appropriately it will be possible to carry out more remediation work safely, in less time, and at a lower cost. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Distribution Development for Residual Inventory at the New York West Valley Site - 20400

The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is the owner of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC), a 1,351 ha site located approximately 48 km south of Buffalo, New York. In 1962, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) entered into Agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission and New York State to construct the first commercial reprocessing plant of nuclear fuel in the United States. NFS, a private company, built and operated the spent fuel reprocessing plant and waste disposal facilities, processing 640 Mg of spent nuclear fuel from 1966 to 1972 under an Atomic Energy Commission license. Nuclear fuel reprocessing operations ended in 1972 and never reopened, leaving behind radioactive and chemical wastes. Operations led to contamination in a number of facilities and locations. Some of that contamination has migrated from waste disposal zones to other layers, formations, and features on and off the WNYNSC. Phase I decommissioning activities are ongoing and involve the removal of a number of areas and structures that have been associated with contamination. The purpose of this work is to outline the approach for characterizing contamination not associated with disposed wastes, contaminated structures, or specific releases. In this work, the term, residual radiological activity, is used to describe environmental contamination that exists subsequent to the completion of Phase I decommissioning activities, that is not associated with disposed wastes, contaminated structures, or specific releases. Contamination from the Site was quantified relative to data that characterize the concentrations of radionuclides that exist in background. Background concentrations are those present in the area but having no influence from Site related activities. The existence of residual radiological activity that is elevated relative to background has the potential to contribute to future risks to human health and the environment. As a consequence, the residual inventory information is used to inform the West Valley Probabilistic Performance Assessment (PPA) model to characterize potential future risks to human health and the environment. The centralized West Valley Data Management System (DMS) was the source of information for the data assembled in this analysis. The DMS is a fairly large compilation consisting of thousands of records from investigation studies, with sample dates ranging from 1990 to present. Samples from monitoring wells, boreholes, geoprobe studies, surface water, surface soils, storm water outfalls, ventilation stack filters, plant and animal tissues, and more are included in the DMS. Results are typically reported in units of activity per unit volume. For the purpose of the analyses presented here, all results were converted into consistent units of pCi per unit volume. Since 1990, data have been collected from various locations across the WNYNSC at different times with varying frequency over the course of several decades. As a consequence, a number of potential issues can arise with respect to the assembly of a dataset that is deemed adequate for the characterization of residual radiological activity. These issues were assessed and resolved to the extent possible through careful consideration of the properties of the distributions. The intent was to use data which characterize the current state of the Site. Radionuclides can be designated to one of several groups depending on their origin. In this work the groups considered were 1) Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM), 2) fallout, and 3) Other (including power plant, medical research, etc). This grouping is a useful construct with respect to the interpretation of fixed laboratory results. For example, NORM radionuclides that exist within a decay chain should have approximately equivalent distributions of concentrations if they are representative of background conditions. Insights such as these can be used as a check to identify sample results that need to be further investigated or omitted due to issues associated with reported results from fixed laboratory analyses. This type of analysis provided a foundation for the assessment of the adequacy of sample results for use in subsequent components of an assessment. The general process for the assessment of residual radiological contamination at the Site consists of a sequence of several steps. First, for each analyte, several statistical tests were performed to assess the weight of evidence against the null hypothesis that the mean of the distribution of concentrations was equal to zero. If the mean of the distribution of concentrations for a given radionuclide was not found to be greater than zero, then it was removed from consideration as a component of the residual radiological contamination. If there was significant evidence to reject the hypothesis of the mean being equal to zero, the second step was to compare the distribution of the data from the Site to that of the corresponding background. A suite of tests was used to compare the distributions of the site and background data. The results of these tests were collectively used to determine if site data are elevated relative to background. The third step was to develop distributions using a Bayesian framework to characterize the distribution of mean of the increment present above background for each of the radionuclides. The Bayesian model implemented allowed for the comparison of site-specific records to background concentrations to better approximate contamination attributed to the Site. A final screening step was employed for radionuclides that exceed background. This screening step compared 95% upper confidence limits (UCLs) from the increment distribution developed in the previous step to the risk screening levels. This approach yields a list of analytes that were determined to be elevated relative to background.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Field Test Bed for Vadose-Zone Monitoring Approaches - 20404

In the Central Plateau at the U.S. Department of Energy Hanford Site, a large inventory of contaminants resides in unsaturated sediments within the approximately 100-meter-thick vadose zone, posing a potential continuing risk to groundwater. Vadose zone remedies used to address these contaminants will require performance monitoring to provide feedback during implementation and for long-term verification that remedial action objectives have been met. Passive approaches may also need long-term monitoring to demonstrate that the flux of contaminants from the vadose zone to the groundwater are below thresholds established to meet groundwater protection goals. Collection of physical (e.g., groundwater or sediment) samples is a common method for identifying contaminant concentration distributions, but this approach is limited by the number of locations and the frequency with which data can be collected. In situ vadose zone measurements have evolved over the past few years to include key measurements of water content, soil water pressure, temperature, and chemical concentration. However, the current generation of sensors is designed for relatively short-term use in near-surface soils or sediments. Geophysical methods have been evolving but are also limited in that they have not been designed for the specific long-term vadose zone monitoring needs at the Hanford Site. Overall, monitoring under unsaturated conditions can be difficult due to the need to install and maintain instrumentation over a large area and depth and the need to identify preferential flow pathways due to geologic and chemical heterogeneities over long periods. Thus, a vadose zone monitoring test bed was initiated to address these challenges and identify cost-effective approaches for implementation and postclosure monitoring of the deep vadose zone. The monitoring test bed is expected to provide valuable field-scale information for the design of vadose zone monitoring systems. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Viability of In-Drum Treatment for Transuranic Wastes Containing Nitrates and Organics - 20406

In February of 2014, a breach in a waste drum stored at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant resulted in the release of radioactive material into the immediate surroundings and outside of the plant. The waste drum contained a mixture of an organic absorbent and nitrate salts that pressurized the drum, eventually causing the drum lid to fail, leading to the adverse event. Other waste drums with similar contents exist posing both storage and treatment risks. These drums may successfully be treated by an in-drum treatment system. This paper considers the design and operation of an in-drum treatment system and the characteristics of waste containing organics and nitrates to evaluate the viability of treatment. A description of the system, how it is operated, and a summary of previous testing performed is provided. Treatment of both liquids and absorbed liquids comprised of organics and nitrates is addressed. Viability of treatment is demonstrated by presenting operational methods and design strategies to ensure successful treatment of the waste drums. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Analysis of Exposure during Transportation of Waste to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) - 20445

Safety is a priority for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program. This commitment to safety is integrated into requirements and work procedures at DOE sites across the U.S. that generate low-level radioactive waste, mixed low-level radioactive waste, and classified waste that is transported to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for permanent disposal. Generators of this waste are responsible for ensuring it is packaged and transported in a safe and compliant manner. These generators and their contracted commercial carriers must comply with U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations; the Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC); and other applicable federal, state, and local regulations and requirements. This includes packaging and shipping the waste to meet DOT regulatory radiation dose limits to ensure public safety during transportation. NNSS waste generators have a solid safety record for complying with these stringent regulations as demonstrated by the fact that no shipments exceeding DOT dose rate limits were received at the NNSS Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) during FY 2014 through FY 2018. A 2005 study conducted by the Desert Research Institute validated shipments to the NNSS comply with DOT radiation dose limits. In response to recent Nevada stakeholder requests for an updated study, an analysis was conducted to verify and provide evidence that the public continues to be safe from exposure to radioactive waste shipment to the NNSS. Radiation exposure from radioactive waste shipments in transit to the NNSS was evaluated. Three studies were performed: 1. Confirm compliance of waste shipments to the DOT radiation limits using dose rate surveys taken at the generator site and at the disposal site. 2. Estimate the dose to the public from waste shipments using the dosimetry results for disposal site personnel by comparing time of exposure for various individuals/scenarios. 3. Estimate the truck driver dose using the receipt dose rate surveys and time of exposure, and from dosimetry results. Study 1 confirmed compliance with the DOT dose rate limits for a sample of waste shipments (123 of 1,038) received during fiscal year (FY) 2017. Study 2 showed that the average annual radiation equivalent dose for disposal site personnel during FY 2017 was approximately 6.7% [0.415 mSv (41.5 millirem)] of the annual average dose that a person living in the U.S. receives from all sources [6.2 mSv (620 mrem)]. Maximum dose to a member of the public, a person resting/sleeping in an adjacent truck at a rest area to a waste shipment, was 0.0166 mSv (1.66 mrem), which is less than the dose received from a person taking a round trip from the east coast to the west coast of the continental U.S. on an airplane [0.07 mSv (7 mrem) per round trip]. Study 3 showed that the truck driver who made the most shipments of radioactive waste to the NNSS, who drove the most hours (estimated time of exposure 2,520 hours), during FY 2017 had a total dose of 0.15 mSv (15 mrem), which was obtained from their personal dosimeter. The annual dose recorded for disposal site personnel, the dose estimates for the public, and the truck driver dose were all a small percentage of the average radiation dose a person receives from all sources (e.g., background and medical radiation). At these levels, risk should only be described qualitatively. Radiation exposure from radioactive waste shipments to the NNSS were shown to be compliant with the DOT dose rate limits, safe, and very low (i.e., within background levels). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Progress towards the POCO of UK Highly Active Storage Tanks - 20112

In the UK Highly Active (HA) waste is stored in stainless steel Highly Active Storage Tanks (HASTs) prior to encapsulation in glass in one of three operating vitrification plants. Significant progress has been made towards the reduction in the volume of HA Liquor (HAL) stored in these HASTs and several tanks currently operate at heel levels. In recent years a strategy has been developed towards the Post Operational Clean Out (POCO) of the tanks and significant progress has been made in confirming this strategy since it was last presented at WMS [1]. For a variety of reasons changes to associated operational assumptions have also been made. This paper will highlight recent progress and changes associated with the strategy, including a description of some of the challenges that have been overcome and associated technical work undertaken. It will also detail current plans to POCO the HASTs, as quickly as possible, while minimising the risk and continuing to support other ongoing reprocessing and clean-up programmes as part of the overall UK clean-up mission. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Innovative Approaches to the Decommissioning of a Redundant Plutonium Processing Facility - 20147

At Sellafield, in the North West of the United Kingdom (UK), there are a number of redundant plutonium processing facilities. Over the past three decades several decommissioning strategies have been deployed to clean up these redundant facilities. Whilst there have been many successes previously reported, there remain many challenges. As previously presented at WM2017 (Paper Ref 17081) some of these challenges have recently been addressed through a new approach which introduced a number of innovations. The purpose of these innovations is to seek ways to significantly reduce risks to both decommissioning personnel and the environment by minimising the extent of physical 'hands on' decommissioning activities and by simplifying the waste production process. This paper provides an update on the progress of these innovations since 2017. Additionally, the paper also provides details of the new decommissioning technologies which have been introduced over the past 2 years to enable the most challenging aspects of the redundant plutonium processing facility to be decommissioned. These new decommissioning technologies address challenges associated with the preparation of process vessels and pipework to enable their safe in-situ size reduction by remote means: - New decommissioning techniques have been introduced to allow penetrations to be remotely cut into process vessels and pipework to provide a means of accessing and controlling the venting of any potential hydrogen gas present. - Additionally, a new large scale bespoke remote diamond wire cutting machine has been designed and manufactured to enable the process vessels to be size reduced in situ. Both of these new cutting technologies have involved collaborative working with specialist equipment suppliers including extensive development, trialling demonstration and commissioning prior to bringing the equipment into operational service. Several years of work have now culminated in reaching the final stages of decommissioning of the redundant plutonium processing facility with decommissioning of the final process vessels now underway and completion expected by the end of 2019. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Drying Wet Stored and Corroded Magnox Fuel for Interim Dry Storage - 20187

To investigate the feasibility of drying corroded Magnesium alloy clad nuclear fuel, the corrosion products of inactive and unirradiated Magnox simulant dry corrosion product and dried corroded Magnox sludge were characterised by X-ray diffraction and thermogravimetric analysis. XRD identified brucite in the dried corrosion product and both brucite and hydromagnesite in the sludge. TGA identified mass loss on dehydration of ∼9.1% up to 250 deg. C and 27.9% from dehydroxylation up to 440 deg. C, with total mass loss of 41.9% up to 800 deg. C for the dried corrosion product. The sludge TGA showed 8.3% mass loss up to 250 deg. C from dehydration, 7.5% up to 330 deg. C from dehydroxylation and 31.4% mass loss up to 47.2% for decarbonation, with total mass loss of 49.2% up to 800 deg. C. Water removal up to 1.8 g was performed by cold vacuum drying (40 deg. C-120 deg. C) on a ≅14.8 g (wet) corroded Magnox sample. The process was monitored by observing pressure, dew point, temperature and gas flow changes supported by measuring the sample mass loss as water is removed. From these tests, it was observed that the dried corroded Magnox displayed some hygroscopic capacity which has implications for water retention following vacuum drying and the length of exposure required to achieve the desired dryness. Whilst at higher temperatures the water was removed faster, the increased temperature also risks the fuel cladding undergoing unwanted chemical reactions with the residual water during the process. However, at lower temperatures the achievable levels of dryness were reduced. Therefore, from these observations this work has identified that there is a temperature balance that may be necessary to optimise the drying process with respect to allowing the greatest level of dryness whilst restricting unwanted chemical reactions. (authors)

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