Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Protection & Control”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 55 records · Page 3

Protecting Accelerator Control Systems in the Face of Sophisticated Cyber Attacks

Cyber security for industrial control systems has received significant attention in the past two years. The news coverage of the Stuxnet attack, believed to be targeted at the control system for a uranium enrichment plant, brought the issue to the attention of news media and policy makers. This has led to increased scrutiny of control systems for critical infrastructure such as power generation and distribution, and industrial systems such as chemical plants and petroleum refineries. The past two years have also seen targeted network attacks aimed at corporate and government entities including US Department of Energy National Laboratories. Both of these developments have potential repercussions for the control systems of particle accelerators. The need to balance risks from potential attacks with the operational needs of an accelerator present a unique challenge for the system architecture and access model.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies for Nuclear Power Plants

As any mechanical system ages, broken or outdated parts must be replaced; nuclear power plants (NPPs) are no different. The average age of a NPP in the United States' aging fleet of commercial reactors is 35 years, with many of these plants operating under extensions of their original licenses. These plants, originally designed in the 1960's and 1970's, are controlled by analog instrumentation and control (I and C) systems, and have since been upgraded (to varying degrees) to hybrid analog-digital systems. As these NPPs are upgraded to continue operating and to meet more stringent safety requirements imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the implementation of digital systems to monitor and run the power plant introduces new vulnerabilities that must be addressed. The main objectives of a vulnerability assessment (VA) are to identify, quantify, and prioritize all of the susceptibilities inherent in a system. This allows for all weaknesses to be analyzed, and for the most serious concerns to be addressed first. Traditional VA methodologies deal with the analysis of physical systems associated with the NPP; with the introduction of digital control systems and computer networks, these methodologies must be expanded to include these fundamentally different systems and vulnerability concerns. Digital systems have been used in NPPs since the 1980's, but only for non-safety control systems; attacks on these systems were not deemed consequential, and no dedicated VA methodology was required. However, 'all new NPPs are being designed with integrated digital instrumentation and control systems as the backbone of protection, controls, alarms, and display and monitoring'. This gives rise to new vulnerabilities such as disrupted data displays, the suppression of critical alarms, or unauthorized access to secure systems from connected networks. The NRC released formal cybersecurity regulations in March 2009 (10 CFR 73.54), as well as a guide for the program in January 2010 (RG 5.71). However, the regulations and guide provide limited insight on how to identify these vulnerabilities; the focus is on remediating them once found. Hence, there is a need for a comprehensive, systematic methodology to conduct a VA on digital computer and communications and network systems. In this paper, we review traditional VA methodologies and discuss relevant cases. Then we discuss challenges to vulnerabilities within the context of modernization of the fleet and what needs to be done to address this issue.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Mock Nuclear Processing Facility-Safeguards Training Requirements

This document outlines specific training requirements in the topical areas of Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) and Physical Protection(PP) which are to be used as technical input for designing a mock Integrated Security Facility (ISF) at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The overall project objective for these requirements is to enhance the ability to deliver training on Material Protection Control and Accounting (MC&A) concepts regarding hazardous material such as irradiated materials with respect to bulk processing facilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Estimating and Calibrating DER Model Parameters Using Levenberg–Marquardt Algorithm in Renewable Rich Power Grid

The proliferation of inverter-based distributed energy resources (IBDERs) has increased the number of control variables and dynamic interactions, leading to new grid control challenges. For stability analysis and designing appropriate protection controls, it is important that IBDER models are accurate. This paper focuses on the accurate estimation and parameter calibration of DER_A, a recently proposed aggregated IBDER model. In particular, we focus on the parameters of the reactive power–voltage regulation module. We formulate the problem of parameter tuning as a non-linear least square minimization problem and solve it using the Levenberg–Marquardt (LM) method. The LM method is primarily chosen due to its flexibility in adaptively selecting between the steepest descent and Gauss–Newton methods through a damping parameter. The LM approach is used to minimize the error between the actual measurements and the estimated response of the model. Further, the computational challenges posed by the numerical calculation of the Jacobian are tackled using a quasi-Newton root-finding approach. The proposed method is validated on a real feeder model in the northeastern part of the United States. The feeder is modeled in OpenDSS and the measurements thus obtained are fed to the DER_A model for calibration. The simulation results indicate that our approach is able to successfully calibrate the relevant model parameters quickly and with high accuracy, with a total sum of square error of 3.57 × 10 –7 .

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Implementation of the MPC and A Operations Monitorying (MOM) System at JSC PO Sevmas

The Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program has been working since 1994 with nuclear sites in Russia to upgrade the physical protection (PP) and material control and accounting (MC&A) functions at facilities containing weapons usable nuclear material. In early 2001, the MPC&A program initiated the MPC&A Operations Monitoring (MOM) Project to monitor facilities where MPC&A upgrades have been installed to provide increased confidence that personnel are present and vigilant, provide confidence that security procedures are being properly performed and provide additional assurance that nuclear materials have not been stolen. The MOM project began as a pilot project at the Moscow State Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and a MOM system was successfully installed in October 2001. Following the success of the MEPhI pilot project, the MPC&A Program expanded the installation of MOM systems to several other Russian facilities, including the JSC 'PO' Sevmash', Severodvinsk, Russia. The MOM system was made operational at Sevmash in September, 2008. This paper will discuss the objectives of the MOM system installed at Sevmash and indicate how the objectives influenced the development of the conceptual design. The paper will also describe activities related to installation of the infrastructure and the MOM system at Sevmash. Experience gained from operation of the system and how the objectives are being met will also be discussed. The paper will describe how the MOM system is used at Sevmash and, in particular, how the data is analyzed. Finally, future activities including potential expansion of the MOM system, operator training, data sharing and analysis, procedure development, repair and maintenance will be included in the paper.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

An Overview of the Cooperative Effort between the United States Department of Energy and the China Atomic Energy Authority to Enhance MPC&A Inspections for Civil Nuclear Facilities in China

The United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) are cooperating to enhance the domestic regulatory inspections capacity for special nuclear material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) requirements for civil nuclear facilities in China. This cooperation is conducted under the auspices of the Agreement between the Department of Energy of the United States of America and the State Development and Planning Commission of the People s Republic of China on Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology. This initial successful effort was conducted in three phases. Phase I focused on introducing CAEA personnel to DOE and U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspection methods for U. S. facilities. This phase was completed in January 2008 during meetings in Beijing. Phase II focused on developing physical protection and material control and accounting inspection exercises that enforced U. S. inspection methods identified during Phase 1. Hands on inspection activities were conducted in the United States over a two week period in July 2009. Simulated deficiencies were integrated into the inspection exercises. The U. S. and Chinese participants actively identified and discussed deficiencies noted during the two week training course. The material control and accounting inspection exercises were conducted at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) in Paducah, KY. The physical protection inspection exercises were conducted at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in Oak Ridge, TN. Phase III leveraged information provided under Phase I and experience gained under Phase II to develop a formal inspection guide that incorporates a systematic approach to training for Chinese MPC&A field inspectors. Additional hands on exercises that are applicable to Chinese regulations were incorporated into the Phase III training material. Phase III was completed in May 2010 at the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) in Beijing. This paper provides details of the successful cooperation between DOE/NNSA and CAEA for all phases of the cooperative effort to enhance civil domestic MPC&A inspections in China.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Impact Analysis of High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Coupling Effects on Power Grid Protection Relays

Protection relays are important equipment used for protection, control, and metering functions in the power grid. These relays are used to protect critical and difficult-to-replace equipment, like generators, transformers, and capacitor banks. Once the protection devices are disturbed or damaged, a high risk of power generation interruption occurs. Therefore, it is important and necessary to study the relay’s immunity to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) events. As a preliminary step toward empirical experimentation on actual equipment, this manuscript outlines an economical and efficient methodology for evaluating the impact of an EMP. An impedance measurement strategy was employed to model the equipment, setting the stage for subsequent immunity analyses. These analyses included the pulse current injection (PCI) method, which utilized an injecting probe to introduce the transient, and frequency domain electromagnetic (FEKO) simulation, which integrated electromagnetic coupling effects into the transient simulation. The impedance measurement and simulation results in this paper provide a reliable basis for gauging equipment performance in the face of HEMP threats. The results obtained using the PCI and FEKO simulations demonstrated the performance of different port responses under a high-altitude EMP, indicating the requirement for some protection to ensure the reliable operation of relays.

42 ENGINEERING↗

ACCREDITED STANDARDS COMMITTEE N15 DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) N15, Methods of Nuclear Material Control, is sponsored by the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) to develop standards for protection, control and accounting of special nuclear materials in all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle, including analytical procedures where necessary and special to this purpose, except that physical protection of special nuclear material within a nuclear power plant is not included. Voluntary consensus standards complement federal regulations and technical standards and fulfill an important role for the nuclear regulatory agencies. This paper describes the N15 standards development process, with INMM as the Standards Developing Organization (SDO) and the N15 Committee responsible for implementation. Key components of the N15 standards development process include ANSI accreditation; compliance with the ANSI Essential Requirements (ER), coordination with other SDOs, communication with stakeholders, maintenance of balance between interest categories, and ANSI periodic audits. Recent and future ASC N15 activities are discussed, with a particular focus on new directions in anticipation of renewed growth in nuclear power.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Fall Protection Introduction, #33462

The proper use of fall prevention and fall protection controls can reduce the risk of deaths and injuries caused by falls. This course, Fall Protection Introduction (#33462), is designed as an introduction to various types of recognized fall prevention and fall protection systems at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), including guardrail systems, safety net systems, fall restraint systems, and fall arrest systems. Special emphasis is given to the components, inspection, care, and storage of personal fall arrest systems (PFASs). This course also presents controls for falling object hazards and emergency planning considerations for persons who have fallen.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Fall Protection Introduction: Instructor Guide

The proper use of fall prevention and fall protection controls can reduce the risk of deaths and injuries caused by falls. This course, Fall Protection Introduction (#33462), is designed as an introduction to various types of recognized fall prevention and fall protection systems at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), including guardrail systems, safety net systems, fall restraint systems, and fall arrest systems. Special emphasis is given to the components, inspection, care, and storage of personal fall arrest systems (PFAS). This course also presents controls for falling object hazards and emergency planning considerations for persons who have fallen.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

An Overview of Process Monitoring Related to the Production of Uranium Ore Concentrate

Uranium ore concentrate (UOC) in various chemical forms, is a high-value commodity in the commercial nuclear market, is a potential target for illicit acquisition, by both State and non-State actors. With the global expansion of uranium production capacity, control of UOC is emerging as a potentially weak link in the nuclear supply chain. Its protection, control and management thus pose a key challenge for the international community, including States, regulatory authorities and industry. This report evaluates current process monitoring practice and makes recommendations for utilization of existing or new techniques for managing the inventory and tracking this material.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radioactive waste repository when contacted by water provides borates that absorb neutrons

A container holds radioactive material. A sub-criticality controller protects the radioactive material from reaching a criticality from contact with the water. The sub-criticality controller includes a metallic composition having at least one metal component and at least one borate component bonded to the at least one metal component. The metallic composition forms borates when the metallic composition contacts the water.

Xiong, Yongliang↗

Nuclear Material Control and Accountability System Effectiveness Tool (MSET)

A nuclear material control and accountability (MC&A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) has been developed in the United States for use in evaluating material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) systems in nuclear facilities. The project was commissioned by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation. MSET was developed by personnel with experience spanning more than six decades in both the U.S. and international nuclear programs and with experience in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in the nuclear power industry. MSET offers significant potential benefits for improving nuclear safeguards and security in any nation with a nuclear program. MSET provides a design basis for developing an MC&A system at a nuclear facility that functions to protect against insider theft or diversion of nuclear materials. MSET analyzes the system and identifies several risk importance factors that show where sustainability is essential for optimal performance and where performance degradation has the greatest impact on total system risk. MSET contains five major components: (1) A functional model that shows how to design, build, implement, and operate a robust nuclear MC&A system (2) A fault tree of the operating MC&A system that adapts PRA methodology to analyze system effectiveness and give a relative risk of failure assessment of the system (3) A questionnaire used to document the facility's current MPC&A system (provides data to evaluate the quality of the system and the level of performance of each basic task performed throughout the material balance area [MBA]) (4) A formal process of applying expert judgment to convert the facility questionnaire data into numeric values representing the performance level of each basic event for use in the fault tree risk assessment calculations (5) PRA software that performs the fault tree risk assessment calculations and produces risk importance factor reports on the facility's MC&A (software widely used in the aerospace, chemical, and nuclear power industries) MSET was peer reviewed in 2007 and validated in 2008 by benchmark testing at the Idaho National Laboratory in the United States. The MSET documents were translated into Russian and provided to Rosatom in July of 2008, and MSET is currently being evaluated for potential application in Russian Nuclear Facilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗