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HELIOS Critical Design Review: Quality Assurance

The following is an account of the activities of the Quality Assurance (QA) department of the project management office highlighting some of the ways in which it controls QA of the subcontractors on one hand and reports on Quality to GfW (Gesellschaft fur Weltraumforschung) on the other hand. The basic document prepared by MBB (Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm) for QA activities is 1. The QA plan based on GfW 002. The QA department is responsible moreover for monitoring and making decisions about the quality of parts and materials and the governing document for this activity is 2. The Parts and Materials Control Plan based on GfW 001 - the reliability program provisions, as well as GfW 002. A brief survey of the contents of the QA Plan is shown. It should be noted that QA activity dealing with parts procurement is partially covered in a separate presentation entitled "Hi-Rel Parts". Supplementary quality documents are shown.

Benoehr, H. C.↗

Recommendations on the Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts for NASA Missions - Phase II

This assessment had two Phases. Phase I captured NASA Centers’ current practices for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts 1 used in spaceflight systems and ground support equipment (available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20205011579) [ref. 1]. The Phase II report provides guidance for selecting and using COTS parts in NASA missions. The approaches proposed in this report differ from current agency practices. This top-level executive summary touches on these new approaches for using COTS parts but does not provide the detailed information that is critical in understanding the rationale behind these new approaches. Readers will need to read the entire report to gain full understanding and effectively use the recommendations herein. NASA’s historical approach to selecting and applying parts has been to define certain parts, primarily specific classes of military specification (MIL-SPEC) parts, as “standard”, leaving all others, including COTS parts, as nonstandard. Standard parts typically are used without further testing (“use-as-is”). Nonstandard parts are subjected to initial screening and subsequent lot acceptance testing of representative samples from each procured lot per MIL-SPEC or similar requirements. Decades later, top-tier commercial part manufacturers have evolved significant manufacturing, statistical control, and technological improvements that can now provide parts as reliable or more reliable than MIL-SPEC parts, when used within their datasheet limits. Concurrently, the space science and exploration community’s needs demand technological advances unavailable with MIL-SPEC parts. This ongoing change necessitates using COTS parts for space missions. Properly selected COTS parts in appropriate applications can offer performance and supply availability advantages compared to MIL-SPEC parts. Their utility and demonstrated reliability result from large volumes and automated production and testing processes. However, careful review and a thorough understanding of their specifications (i.e., datasheet limitations) is needed, and verifying that manufacturer specifications and reliability meet space hardware application needs are necessary. This report recommends MIL-SPEC screening and non-radiation-related lot acceptance testing be reduced or eliminated in cases where evidence of sufficient quality and reliability exists for COTS parts. The extent of NASA's insight into COTS manufacturers and the amount and nature of the needed evidence will differ by mission and will likely be driven by a mission's resources and associated risk posture. To facilitate this goal, two new terminologies have been defined and described: “Industry Leading Parts Manufacturer (ILPM)” and “Established COTS parts.” An ILPM is a COTS manufacturer that produces high quality and reliable parts. Some parts produced by ILPMs, defined as Established COTS parts, do not need any additional MIL-SPEC or NASA screening and lot acceptance testing to be used in space applications. This report provides guidance for selecting, procuring, and applying COTS parts and for performing part-, board-, and system-level COTS parts verification. The recommendation to select Established COTS parts from ILPMs will assure those COTS parts will have comparable quality to corresponding MIL-SPEC parts. Selecting, applying, and verifying Established COTS parts from ILPMs requires a holistic team approach, engaging parts engineers, circuit designers, quality, reliability, and systems engineers, procurement specialists, radiation specialists, avionics leads, and program/project managers. A mission-specific approach tailored to a project’s Mission, Environment, Applications and Lifetime (MEAL) [ref. 2] requirements should be developed and approved by program/project managers. Any associated risks should be clearly identified, quantified, mitigated, and/or accepted. Different approaches are recommended according to program/project Risk Classes A, B, C, and D [ref. 3] and human-rated missions [ref. 4]: 1. Recommend Classes A and B and human-rated missions consider a “MIL-SPEC parts- based design” approach. ”MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach is one in which most parts are MIL-SPEC parts and Established COTS parts from ILPMs are used only when an equivalent MIL-SPEC part does not meet functional or size, weight, and power (SWaP) or performance requirements, or is not available. 2. Recommend Classes D and Sub-D missions consider a “System of COTS” approach. “System of COTS” approach is one which most parts are Established COTS parts from ILPMs. 3. Recommend Class C missions determine which approach is the best for their projects; that is, use either a “MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach, “System of COTS” approach, or a combined approach utilizing elements of both. This report intends to provide guidance in using COTS parts for NASA missions with risk classifications of A through D and human-rated missions; but it does not address the costs of using COTS parts. Costs of using COTS parts in different NASA mission classes can vary significantly even if the same parts are used in different risk postures, due to differing verification levels needed. The guidance does not distinguish between critical or non-critical systems, and a given project will need to apply the appropriate guidance based on their risk posture. The intended audience of this report are NASA personnel and commercial practitioners who support NASA’s spaceflight missions, including spaceflight program or project managers, parts engineers, parts manufacturers, radiation engineers, avionics engineers, system engineers, circuit design engineers, reliability engineers, safety and mission assurance (SMA) personnel, and parts procurement specialists. The NEPP Program will perform a pathfinder study to explore implementing the guidance in this NESC report. An ILPM verification process is not the same as conventional vendor qualification processes performed according to military standards and specifications. This NESC report intends to provide guidance in utilizing available parts data from ILPM manufacturers for parts assurance assessments needed for NASA missions. The report also captured the current practices from DoD and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Section 10. Note each DoD and FAA report was provided by the corresponding agencies regarding their practices, which are independent from the NESC recommendations in the report.

Commercial-Off-The-Shelf↗

CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) Connectors in Space Flight Applications

This report documents the current status of CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors in GSFC spaceflight applications. To the extent the information is known, this report summarizes to what component quality level each NASA contractor (referred to as OEM in this report) procured the parts, and what board level and system level testing was performed. The report also provides the current status of the reliability assessment for each GSFC project based on the results of testing and FMEA (Failure Mode Effects Analysis). This report addresses how the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors came into existence, and how these became the connector style chosen by many designers of space flight hardware. It identifies the design philosophy and the lack of robustness which has led to several known failure modes. These failure modes include fretting of connector pins during vibration, shock and thermal cycling, exposure of underplating, and increased resistance, including brief excursions to very high resistance. Each of these are signs of aging, which becomes an increasing concern for long duration orbiting space flight applications. This report addresses the mitigation strategy to replace CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors with space qualified Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connectors. The Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connectors are pin-to-pin compatible with the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors and meet all of the same technical requirements, except the ability to hot mate, and to mate directly with a CompactPCI of the opposite gender. A detailed comparison of the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connector and the Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connector is provided to describe the ruggedness of Hypertronics connector for space flight applications. Finally, this report makes recommendations for flight hardware for the future missions where the hardware is yet to be built, as well as for the hardware which has already been built with CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors.

Williams, Richard↗

Supplier Management System

Supplier Management System (SMS) allows for a consistent, agency-wide performance rating system for suppliers used by NASA. This version (2.0) combines separate databases into one central database that allows for the sharing of supplier data. Information extracted from the NBS/Oracle database can be used to generate ratings. Also, supplier ratings can now be generated in the areas of cost, product quality, delivery, and audit data. Supplier data can be charted based on real-time user input. Based on these individual ratings, an overall rating can be generated. Data that normally would be stored in multiple databases, each requiring its own log-in, is now readily available and easily accessible with only one log-in required. Additionally, the database can accommodate the storage and display of quality-related data that can be analyzed and used in the supplier procurement decision-making process. Moreover, the software allows for a Closed-Loop System (supplier feedback), as well as the capability to communicate with other federal agencies.

Ramirez, Eric↗

Metrology: Measurement Assurance Program Guidelines

The 5300.4 series of NASA Handbooks for Reliability and Quality Assurance Programs have provisions for the establishment and utilization of a documented metrology system to control measurement processes and to provide objective evidence of quality conformance. The intent of these provisions is to assure consistency and conformance to specifications and tolerances of equipment, systems, materials, and processes procured and/or used by NASA, its international partners, contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers. This Measurement Assurance Program (MAP) guideline has the specific objectives to: (1) ensure the quality of measurements made within NASA programs; (2) establish realistic measurement process uncertainties; (3) maintain continuous control over the measurement processes; and (4) ensure measurement compatibility among NASA facilities. The publication addresses MAP methods as applied within and among NASA installations and serves as a guide to: control measurement processes at the local level (one facility); conduct measurement assurance programs in which a number of field installations are joint participants; and conduct measurement integrity (round robin) experiments in which a number of field installations participate to assess the overall quality of particular measurement processes at a point in time.

Eicke, W. G.↗

Streamlined acquisition handbook

NASA has always placed great emphasis on the acquisition process, recognizing it as among its most important activities. This handbook is intended to facilitate the application of streamlined acquisition procedures. The development of these procedures reflects the efforts of an action group composed of NASA Headquarters and center acquisition professionals. It is the intent to accomplish the real change in the acquisition process as a result of this effort. An important part of streamlining the acquisition process is a commitment by the people involved in the process to accomplishing acquisition activities quickly and with high quality. Too often we continue to accomplish work in 'the same old way' without considering available alternatives which would require no changes to regulations, approvals from Headquarters, or waivers of required practice. Similarly, we must be sensitive to schedule opportunities throughout the acquisition cycle, not just once the purchase request arrives at the procurement office. Techniques that have been identified as ways of reducing acquisition lead time while maintaining high quality in our acquisition process are presented.

Source record↗

Quality assurance and risk management: Perspectives on Human Factors Certification of Advanced Aviation Systems

This paper is based on the experience of engineering psychologists advising the U.K. Ministry of Defense (MoD) on the procurement of advanced aviation systems that conform to good human engineering (HE) practice. Traditional approaches to HE in systems procurement focus on the physical nature of the human-machine interface. Advanced aviation systems present increasingly complex design requirements for human functional integration, information processing, and cognitive task performance effectiveness. These developing requirements present new challenges for HE quality assurance (QA) and risk management, requiring focus on design processes as well as on design content or product. A new approach to the application of HE, recently adopted by NATO, provides more systematic ordering and control of HE processes and activities to meet the challenges of advanced aircrew systems design. This systematic approach to HE has been applied by MoD to the procurement of mission systems for the Royal Navy Merlin helicopter. In MoD procurement, certification is a judicial function, essentially independent of the service customer and industry contractor. Certification decisions are based on advice from MoD's appointed Acceptance Agency. Test and evaluation (T&E) conducted by the contractor and by the Acceptance Agency provide evidence for certification. Certification identifies limitations of systems upon release to the service. Evidence of compliance with HE standards traditionally forms the main basis of HE certification and significant non-compliance could restrict release. The systems HE approach shows concern for the quality of processes as well as for the content of the product. Human factors certification should be concerned with the quality of HE processes as well as products. Certification should require proof of process as well as proof of content and performance. QA criteria such as completeness, consistency, timeliness, and compatibility provide generic guidelines for progressive acceptance and certification of HE processes. Threats to the validity of certification arise from problems and assumptions in T&E methods. T&E should seek to reduce the risk of specification non-compliance and certification failure.

Taylor, Robert M.↗

Management of government quality assurance functions for NASA contracts

This handbook sets forth requirements for NASA direction and management of government quality assurance functions performed for NASA contracts and is applicable to all NASA installations. These requirements will standardize management to provide the minimum oversight and effective use of resources. This handbook implements Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 46, NASA FAR Supplement 18-46, Quality Assurance, and NMI 7410.1. Achievement of established quality and reliability goals at all levels is essential to the success of NASA programs. Active participation by NASA and other agency quality assurance personnel in all phases of contract operations, including precontract activity, will assist in the economic and timely achievement of program results. This involves broad participation in design, development, procurement, inspection, testing, and preventive and corrective actions. Consequently, government, as well as industry, must place strong emphasis on the accomplishment of all functions having a significant bearing on quality and reliability from program initiation through end-use of supplies and services produced. For purposes of implementing NASA and other agency agreements, and to provide for uniformity and consistency, the terminology and definitions prescribed herein and in a future handbook shall be utilized for all NASA quality assurance delegations and subsequent redelegations.

Source record↗

The Ejectable Data Recorder: A Lean, Risk-Informed Approach for Hardware Development

NASA is developing the Orion spacecraft to transport crew from the Earth to the Moon as part of the Artemis series of missions. To provide a crew escape capability from pre-launch through ascent, the Orion vehicle is equipped with a Launch Abort System (LAS), built by Lockheed Martin, which pulls the capsule away from the launch vehicle in the event of an abort scenario. The Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) test flight occurred on July 2, 2019,and tested a production version of the LAS to ensure that it can operate as intended, and to collect a large data set from hundreds of sensors on the vehicle to support Orion flight certification. In the original AA-2 architecture, a single-string set of communications antennas on the LAS would downlink all of the in-flight test data to ground stations. However, that communications architecture was predicted to have data dropouts during abort and jettison of the LAS, and would not support data transmission at all after LAS jettison. As a result, a comprehensive trade study was completed, yielding the addition of antennas on the crew module (CM), a buffer/rebroadcast capability for key portions of the flight, and an ejectable data recorder (EDR) subsystem. This EDR subsystem would serve as a backup to the radio frequency (RF) communications system, and would be non-flight critical, providing a unique capability that enabled management to take a different approach with the hardware and software development. The Crew Module and Separation Ring were developed as “Class 1”Flight Hardware, albeit with some tailoring approaches to enable efficiencies. The Class 1 designation requires full rigor for flight hardware and software, documenting everything that happens to a piece of hardware from procurement through disposal, requiring a full spectrum of acceptance tests, and the highest rigor of quality assurance processes. At the other end of the spectrum, Class 3hardware is controlled, but not intended for flight, and leaves the level of rigor up to the project manager. This classification is often used for research and development projects. Similarly,Class-1E has been recently defined at NASA for ISS payloads and technology development projects that are not flight critical and do not need the full rigor of Class 1 to be successful. The EDR subsystem was challenged at commencement to adopt a skunkworks and agile-like approach to hardware development, allowing for a different risk posture than the rest of the AA-2 hardware. After initially pursuing Class 1 processes, the EDR subsystem design evolved to incorporating numerous commercial components, leading to re-designation as a Class-1E subsystem. The resulting EDR subsystem was fully successful in meeting all flight system requirements, and achieved 100% retrieval of flight test data. This paper will discuss the risk posture of the EDR subsystem and the subsequent tailoring that was enacted as part of its Class-1E status.

EDR↗

Specification for IBM/IBM compatible 3480 tape cartridge

This document establishes the same kinds of standards and controls that are currently in use for the procurement on new analog and digital magnetic tapes. The Magnetic Tape Certification Facility (MTCF) currently maintains a Quality Products List (QPL) for all new analog and digital magnetic tapes purchased by NASA-GSFC. Extensive tests are conducted in the MTCF on an annual basis to determine the manufacturer's tape types to be added to or deleted from the current QPL. The MTCF currently maintains two specifications for magnetic tapes: NASA TM-79724 is used for the QPL and acceptance testing of new analog tapes; and NASA TM-80599 is used for the QPL and acceptance testing of new digital tapes. This specification will be used for the QPL and acceptance testing of new 3480 cartridges. The magnetic tapes used by GSFC, LaRC, ARC/Dryden, WFF, and the Network Tracking Stations are covered by the NASA-GSFC specifications. The 3480 cartridge was introduced approximately 3.5 years ago and is becoming an increasingly attractive alternative to digital magnetic tapes. Many users have already converted to the 3480 system and have more tape drives on order.

Perry, Jimmy L.↗

Weld procedure produces quality welds for thick sections of Hastelloy-X

Welding program produces premium quality, multipass welds in heavy tube sections of Hastelloy-X. It develops semiautomatic tungsten/inert gas procedures, weld wire procurement specifications material weld properties, welder-operator training, and nondestructive testing inspection techniques and procedures.

Flens, F. J.↗

Fuel Cell/Reformers Technology Development

NASA Glenn Research Center is interested in developing Solid Oxide Fuel Cell for use in aerospace applications. Solid oxide fuel cell requires hydrogen rich feed stream by converting commercial aviation jet fuel in a fuel processing process. The grantee's primary research activities center on designing and constructing a test facility for evaluating injector concepts to provide optimum feeds to fuel processor; collecting and analyzing literature information on fuel processing and desulfurization technologies; establishing industry and academic contacts in related areas; providing technical support to in-house SOFC-based system studies. Fuel processing is a chemical reaction process that requires efficient delivery of reactants to reactor beds for optimum performance, i.e., high conversion efficiency and maximum hydrogen production, and reliable continuous operation. Feed delivery and vaporization quality can be improved by applying NASA's expertise in combustor injector design. A 10 KWe injector rig has been designed, procured, and constructed to provide a tool to employ laser diagnostic capability to evaluate various injector concepts for fuel processing reactor feed delivery application. This injector rig facility is now undergoing mechanical and system check-out with an anticipated actual operation in July 2004. Multiple injector concepts including impinging jet, venturi mixing, discrete jet, will be tested and evaluated with actual fuel mixture compatible with reforming catalyst requirement. Research activities from September 2002 to the closing of this collaborative agreement have been in the following areas: compiling literature information on jet fuel reforming; conducting autothermal reforming catalyst screening; establishing contacts with other government agencies for collaborative research in jet fuel reforming and desulfurization; providing process design basis for the build-up of injector rig facility and individual injector design.

Source record↗

Machine Learning Based Crater Detection for Terrain Relative Navigation

As Lunar exploration continues to become more commonplace, reliable methods of precise Terrain Relative Navigation (TRN) are needed. While there are many TRN techniques available, one that has received increased interest in the past few years is that of crater based navigation. Crater based navigation has numerous benefits, including being a human recognizable feature (important for crewed missions), as well as the fact that craters are often possible hazards that need to be detected and avoided. The use of crater based navigation has been limited however. This has been due to the difficulty of running such algorithms on board a spacecraft, as well as the difficulty in procuring large amounts of the required training data. This paper presents a new rendering tool for generating large amounts of high quality training data. It then looks at two recently developed machine learning techniques for crater detection and crater identification in real-time on near-future space hardware.

computer vision↗

Quality assurance program guidelines for application to and use by manufacturers of rail/guideway vehicles, buses, automatic train control systems, and their major subsystems

Guidelines are presented for a quality assurance system to be implemented by the manufacturer in support of designing, developing, fabricating, assembling, inspecting, testing, handling, and delivery of equipment being procured for use in public urban mass transit systems. The guidelines apply to this equipment when being procured for: (1) use in revenue service; (2) demonstration of systems that will be revenue producing or used by the public; (3) use as a prototype for follow-on operational/revenue producing equipment procurements; and (4) qualification tests.

Witkin, S. A.↗

Development of Reliable Life Support Systems

The life support systems on the International Space Station (ISS) are the culmination of an extensive effort encompassing development, design, and test to provide the highest possible confidence in their operation on ISS. Many years of development testing are initially performed to identify the optimum technology and the optimum operational approach. The success of this development program depends on the accuracy of the system interfaces. The critical interfaces include the specific operational environment, the composition of the waste stream to be processed and the quality of the product. Once the development program is complete, a detailed system schematic is built based on the specific design requirements, followed by component procurement, assembly, and acceptance testing. A successful acceptance test again depends on accurately simulating the anticipated environment on ISS. The ISS Water Recovery System (WRS) provides an excellent example of where this process worked, as well as lessons learned that can be applied to the success of future missions. More importantly, ISS has provided a test bed to identify these design issues. Mechanical design issues have included an unreliable harmonic drive train in the Urine Processor's fluids pump, and seals in the Water Processor's Catalytic Reactor with insufficient life at the operational temperature. Systems issues have included elevated calcium in crew urine (due to microgravity effect) that resulted in precipitation at the desired water recovery rate, and the presence of an organosilicon compound (dimethylsilanediol) in the condensate that is not well removed by the water treatment process. Modifications to the WRS to address these issues are either complete (and now being evaluated on ISS) or are currently in work to insure the WRS has the required reliability before embarking on a mission to Mars.

Carter, Layne↗

Development of Reliable Life Support Systems

The life support systems on the International Space Station (ISS) are the culmination of an extensive effort encompassing development, design, and test to provide the highest possible confidence in their operation on ISS. Many years of development testing are initially performed to identify the optimum technology and the optimum operational approach. The success of this development program depends on the accuracy of the system interfaces. The critical interfaces include the specific operational environment, the composition of the waste stream to be processed and the quality of the product. Once the development program is complete, a detailed system schematic is built based on the specific design requirements, followed by component procurement, assembly, and acceptance testing. A successful acceptance test again depends on accurately simulating the anticipated environment on ISS. The ISS Water Recovery System (WRS) provides an excellent example of where this process worked, as well as lessons learned that can be applied to the success of future missions. More importantly, ISS has provided a test bed to identify these design issues. Mechanical design issues have included an unreliable harmonic drive train in the Urine Processor's fluids pump, and seals in the Water Processor's Catalytic Reactor with insufficient life at the operational temperature. Systems issues have included elevated calcium in crew urine (due to microgravity effect) that resulted in precipitation at the desired water recovery rate, and the presence of an organosilicon compound (dimethylsilanediol) in the condensate that is not well removed by the water treatment process. Modifications to the WRS to address these issues are either complete (and now being evaluated on ISS) or are currently in work to insure the WRS has the required reliability before embarking on a mission to Mars.

Carter, Layne↗

Operational and Mission Highlights A Monthly Summary of Top Achievements: September 2022

Associate Laboratory Director for Plutonium Infrastructure Mark Anthony and a procurement team visited three glovebox fabricators the week of Aug. 23, 2022, to discuss equipment procurement options and assess the vendors’ production capability, factory conditions, and safety records. The team determined that all three fabricators can produce complex gloveboxes and meet Nuclear Quality Assurance-1 standards.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗