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NASA NTRS2002

NASA Langley/CNU Distance Learning Programs

NASA Langley Research Center and Christopher Newport University (CNU) provide, free to the public, distance learning programs that focus on math, science, and/or technology over a spectrum of education levels from K-adult. The effort started in 1997, and we currently have a suite of five distance-learning programs. We have around 450,000 registered educators and 12.5 million registered students in 60 countries. Partners and affiliates include the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), the Aerospace Education Coordinating Committee (AECC), the Alliance for Community Media, the National Educational Telecommunications Association, Public Broadcasting System (PBS) affiliates, the NASA Learning Technologies Channel, the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM), the Council of the Great City Schools, Hampton City Public Schools, Sea World Adventure Parks, Busch Gardens, ePALS.com, and Riverdeep. Our mission is based on the "Horizon of Learning," a vision for inspiring learning across a continuum of educational experiences. The programs form a continuum of educational experiences for elementary youth through adult learners. The strategic plan for the programs will evolve to reflect evolving national educational needs, changes within NASA, and emerging system initiatives. Plans for each program component include goals, objectives, learning outcomes, and rely on sound business models. It is well documented that if technology is used properly it can be a powerful partner in education. Our programs employ both advances in information technology and in effective pedagogy to produce a broad range of materials to complement and enhance other educational efforts. Collectively, the goals of the five programs are to increase educational excellence; enhance and enrich the teaching of mathematics, science, and technology; increase scientific and technological literacy; and communicate the results of NASA discovery, exploration, innovation and research. All pre-college distance learning programs support the national mathematics, science, and technology standards; support K-12 systemic change; involve educators in their development, implementation, and evaluation; and are based on alliances and partnerships. In addition the programs seek to invoke a sense of geographic, ethnic and cultural diversity by featuring schools from all over the U.S.; schools from urban, suburban, and rural areas; public, private, and religious schools; and schools with large populations of African-American, Asian and Hispanic students.

Caton, Randall↗
NASA NTRS2017

Relationship Between Carbon Dioxide Levels and Reported Congestion and Headaches on the International Space Station

Congestion is commonly reported during spaceflight, and most crewmembers have reported using medications for congestion during International Space Station (ISS) missions. Although congestion has been attributed to fluid shifts during spaceflight, fluid status reaches equilibrium during the first week after launch while congestion continues to be reported throughout long duration missions. Congestion complaints have anecdotally been reported in relation to ISS CO2 levels; this evaluation was undertaken to determine whether or not an association exists. METHODS: Reported headaches, congestion symptoms, and CO2 levels were obtained for ISS expeditions 2-31, and time-weighted means and single-point maxima were determined for 24-hour (24hr) and 7-day (7d) periods prior to each weekly private medical conference. Multiple imputation addressed missing data, and logistic regression modeled the relationship between probability of reported event of congestion or headache and CO2 levels, adjusted for possible confounding covariates. The first seven days of spaceflight were not included to control for fluid shifts. Data were evaluated to determine the concentration of CO2 required to maintain the risk of congestion below 1% to allow for direct comparison with a previously published evaluation of CO2 concentrations and headache. RESULTS: This study confirmed a previously identified significant association between CO2 and headache and also found a significant association between CO2 and congestion. For each 1-mm Hg increase in CO2, the odds of a crew member reporting congestion doubled. The average 7-day CO2 would need to be maintained below 1.5 mmHg to keep the risk of congestion below 1%. The predicted probability curves of ISS headache and congestion curves appear parallel when plotted against ppCO2 levels with congestion occurring at approximately 1mmHg lower than a headache would be reported. DISCUSSION: While the cause of congestion is multifactorial, this study showed congestion is associated with CO2 levels on ISS. Data from additional expeditions could be incorporated to further assess this finding. CO2 levels are also associated with reports of headaches on ISS. While it may be expected for astronauts with congestion to also complain of headaches, these two symptoms are commonly mutually exclusive. Furthermore, it is unknown if a temporal CO2 relationship exists between congestion and headache on ISS. CO2 levels were time-weighted for 24hr and 7d, and thus the time course of congestion leading to headache was not assessed; however, congestion could be an early CO2-related symptom when compared to headache. Future studies evaluating the association of CO2-related congestion leading to headache would be difficult due to the relatively stable daily CO2 levels on ISS currently, but a systematic study could be implemented on-orbit if desired.

Cole, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2009

Methods Reduce Cost, Enhance Quality of Nanotubes

For all the challenges posed by the microgravity conditions of space, weight is actually one of the more significant problems NASA faces in the development of the next generation of U.S. space vehicles. For the Agency s Constellation Program, engineers at NASA centers are designing and testing new vessels as safe, practical, and cost-effective means of space travel following the eventual retirement of the space shuttle. Program components like the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, intended to carry astronauts to the International Space Station and the Moon, must be designed to specific weight requirements to manage fuel consumption and match launch rocket capabilities; Orion s gross liftoff weight target is about 63,789 pounds. Future space vehicles will require even greater attention to lightweight construction to help conserve fuel for long-range missions to Mars and beyond. In order to reduce spacecraft weight without sacrificing structural integrity, NASA is pursuing the development of materials that promise to revolutionize not only spacecraft construction, but also a host of potential applications on Earth. Single-walled carbon nanotubes are one material of particular interest. These tubular, single-layer carbon molecules - 100,000 of them braided together would be no thicker than a human hair - display a range of remarkable characteristics. Possessing greater tensile strength than steel at a fraction of the weight, the nanotubes are efficient heat conductors with metallic or semiconductor electrical properties depending on their diameter and chirality (the pattern of each nanotube s hexagonal lattice structure). All of these properties make the nanotubes an appealing material for spacecraft construction, with the potential for nanotube composites to reduce spacecraft weight by 50 percent or more. The nanotubes may also feature in a number of other space exploration applications, including life support, energy storage, and sensor technologies. NASA s various efforts with carbon nanotubes have made it a global leader in this field. Among the many examples are Johnson Space Center s Carbon Nanotube Project, which focuses on bulk nanotube production, purification, and application, and Goddard Space Flight Center s improved arc discharge method of nanotube production, developed under the direction of Jeannette Benavides (featured in Spinoff 2007 and 2008). While the Agency continues its own research, it partners with private companies to advance this unique technology for use on Earth as well as among the stars.

Source record↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C Dempsey↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C. Dempsey↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C. Dempsey↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Soyuz Landing Risk Characterization

INTRODUCTION United States On-orbit Segment (USOS) astronauts have been returning to Earth from the International Space Station (ISS) aboard the Russian Soyuz vehicle since 2003. The energetics associated with Soyuz landings are comparable to our next generation of US space vehicles (Orion, Crew Dragon, and Starliner). Soyuz also lands crew in a similar state of spaceflight deconditioning that is anticipated using the future vehicles. A number of injuries have now been observed during these Soyuz landings. Currently it is unknown how Soyuz landing accelerations and the numbers and types of associated injuries relate to the new occupant protection requirements levied upon future space vehicles. Understanding this relationship will allow better quantification of the risk of injury for future spacecraft designs. METHODS An estimate of injury occurrence during Soyuz landings has been determined using data contained in NASA flight medicine databases and supplemented with data collected from crewmembers and flight surgeons. At the time of this abstract, 96 USOS astronauts have returned to Earth in the Soyuz (59 US, 31 International Partner, and 6 spaceflight participants). Of that total, data from 80 individual crew landings has been collected through this study as of 2021. Injuries are classified either as contusions/abrasions, Class I (minor, no medical follow-up), Class II (moderate, medical follow-up necessary), Class III (severe), or Class IV (life threatening). Current NASA occupant protection standards are primarily based on the Multi-axial Dynamic Response Index (MDRI), which is a simple lumped-parameter spring, mass, damper model tuned to human impact responses in three orthogonal axes. RESULTS Using what is known about Soyuz landing dynamics from airborne and drop test data, the MDRI predicts essentially no Class IV or III injuries, < 1% Class II injuries, and < 5% Class I injuries. Approximately one-third of all USOS crewmembers for whom data has been gathered have suffered some sort of injury related to landing in the Soyuz vehicle. Most of these injuries fall into the contusion/abrasion category (21.3 %) (n.b. This is the percent for whom contusion/abrasion was the worst injury. Those with class I or II injuries typically also received contusions/abrasions). Class I injuries have been sustained by 5.0% of all crew, and Class II injuries have been observed in 3.8%. No Class III or IV injuries have been sustained to date. Forty-three injuries have been documented, with some crewmembers sustaining more than one injury in a single landing. The knee was the most likely area of injury (n=9), followed by the back (n=8), then the arm (n=7). CONCLUSION Soyuz landing dynamics are the most comparable analog environment for the anticipated loads associated with Orion and commercial crew vehicle landings. The MDRI under predicts the percentage of Class II injuries experienced during Soyuz landings, but it is better at predicting Class I injury occurrences. However, if contusions/abrasions are included in the minor injury Class I category, then the MDRI vastly under predicts those injuries as well. Given this data, it is important to re-evaluate the expected injury rates for future vehicles and work toward improving the predictive tools for spaceflight use. Spaceflight deconditioning may account for some of the under prediction, and work is ongoing to assess the relationship between landing injuries and impact tolerance changes due to spaceflight deconditioning. Future work includes expanding this study to involve private space missions on new vehicles to better characterize the effects of time in flight, suit and seat design, and vehicle dynamics.

N Newby↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Soyuz Landing Risk Characterization

INTRODUCTION United States On-orbit Segment (USOS) astronauts have been returning to Earth from the International Space Station (ISS) aboard the Russian Soyuz vehicle since 2003. The energetics associated with Soyuz landings are comparable to our next generation of US space vehicles (Orion, Crew Dragon, and Starliner). Soyuz also lands crew in a similar state of spaceflight deconditioning that is anticipated using the future vehicles. A number of injuries have now been observed during these Soyuz landings. Currently it is unknown how Soyuz landing accelerations and the numbers and types of associated injuries relate to the new occupant protection requirements levied upon future space vehicles. Understanding this relationship will allow better quantification of the risk of injury for future spacecraft designs. METHODS An estimate of injury occurrence during Soyuz landings has been determined using data contained in NASA flight medicine databases and supplemented with data collected from crew members and flight surgeons. At the time of this abstract, 96 USOS astronauts have returned to Earth in the Soyuz (59 US, 31 International Partner, and 6 spaceflight participants). Of that total, data from 80individual crew landings has been collected through this study as of September 2023. Injuries are classified either as contusions/abrasions, Class I (minor, no medical follow-up), Class II (moderate, medical follow-up necessary), Class III (severe), or Class IV (life threatening). Current NASA occupant protection standards are primarily based on the Multi-axial Dynamic Response Index (MDRI), which is a simple lumped-parameter spring, mass, damper model tuned to human impact responses in three orthogonal axes. RESULTS Using what is known about Soyuz landing dynamics from airborne and drop test data, the MDRI predicts essentially no Class IV or III injuries, < 1% Class II injuries, and < 5% Class I injuries. Approximately one-third of all USOS crewmembers for whom data has been gathered have suffered some sort of injury related to landing in the Soyuz vehicle. Most of these injuries fall into the contusion/abrasion category (21.3%) (n.b. This is the percent for whom contusion/abrasion was the worst injury. Those with class I or II injuries typically also received contusions/abrasions). Class I injuries have been sustained by 5.0% of all crew, and Class II injuries have been observed in 3.8%. No Class III or IV injuries have been sustained to date. Forty-three injuries have been documented, with some crewmembers sustaining more than one injury in a single landing. The knee was the most likely area of injury (n=9), followed by the back (n=8), then the arm (n=7). CONCLUSION Soyuz landing dynamics are the most comparable analog environment for the anticipated loads associated with Orion and commercial crew vehicle landings. The MDRI under predicts the percentage of Class II injuries experienced during Soyuz landings, but it is better at predicting Class I injury occurrences. However, if contusions/abrasions are included in the minor injury Class I category, then the MDRI vastly under predicts those injuries as well. Given this data, it is important to re-evaluate the expected injury rates for future vehicles and work toward improving the predictive tools for spaceflight use. Spaceflight deconditioning may account for some of the under prediction, and work is ongoing to assess the relationship between landing injuries and impact tolerance changes due to spaceflight deconditioning. Future work includes expanding this study to involve private space missions on new vehicles to better characterize the effects of time in flight, suit and seat design, and vehicle dynamics.

N Newby↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Soyuz Landing Risk Characterization

INTRODUCTION United States On-orbit Segment (USOS) astronauts have been returning to Earth from the International Space Station (ISS) aboard the Russian Soyuz vehicle since 2003. The energetics associated with Soyuz landings are comparable to our next generation of US space vehicles (Orion, Crew Dragon, and Starliner). Soyuz also lands crew in a similar state of spaceflight deconditioning that is anticipated using the future vehicles. A number of injuries have now been observed during these Soyuz landings. Currently it is unknown how Soyuz landing accelerations and the numbers and types of associated injuries relate to the new occupant protection requirements levied upon future space vehicles. Understanding this relationship will allow better quantification of the risk of injury for future spacecraft designs. METHODS An estimate of injury occurrence during Soyuz landings has been determined using data contained in NASA flight medicine databases and supplemented with data collected from crewmembers and flight surgeons. At the time of this abstract, 96 USOS astronauts have returned to Earth in the Soyuz (59 US, 31 International Partner, and 6 spaceflight participants). Of that total, data from 80 individual crew landings has been collected through this study as of September 2023. Injuries are classified either as contusions/abrasions, Class I (minor, no medical follow-up), Class II (moderate, medical follow-up necessary), Class III (severe), or Class IV (life threatening). Current NASA occupant protection standards are primarily based on the Multi-axial Dynamic Response Index (MDRI), which is a simple lumped-parameter spring, mass, damper model tuned to human impact responses in three orthogonal axes. RESULTS Using what is known about Soyuz landing dynamics from airborne and drop test data, the MDRI predicts essentially no Class IV or III injuries, < 1% Class II injuries, and < 5% Class I injuries. Approximately one-third of all USOS crewmembers for whom data has been gathered have suffered some sort of injury related to landing in the Soyuz vehicle. Most of these injuries fall into the contusion/abrasion category (21.3 %) (n.b. This is the percent for whom contusion/abrasion was the worst injury. Those with class I or II injuries typically also received contusions/abrasions). Class I injuries have been sustained by 5.0% of all crew, and Class II injuries have been observed in 3.8%. No Class III or IV injuries have been sustained to date. Forty-three injuries have been documented, with some crewmembers sustaining more than one injury in a single landing. The knee was the most likely area of injury (n=9), followed by the back (n=8), then the arm (n=7). CONCLUSION Soyuz landing dynamics are the most comparable analog environment for the anticipated loads associated with Orion and commercial crew vehicle landings. The MDRI under predicts the percentage of Class II injuries experienced during Soyuz landings, but it is better at predicting Class I injury occurrences. However, if contusions/abrasions are included in the minor injury Class I category, then the MDRI vastly under predicts those injuries as well. Given this data, it is important to re-evaluate the expected injury rates for future vehicles and work toward improving the predictive tools for spaceflight use. Spaceflight deconditioning may account for some of the under prediction, and work is ongoing to assess the relationship between landing injuries and impact tolerance changes due to spaceflight deconditioning. Future work includes expanding this study to involve private space missions on new vehicles to better characterize the effects of time in flight, suit and seat design, and vehicle dynamics.

P Greenhalgh↗