Some determinants of organizational success
Organizational efficiency and productivity determined by variables associated with economics, psychology, and sociology
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Organizational efficiency and productivity determined by variables associated with economics, psychology, and sociology
Management survey on economic, sociological, and psychological determinants of organizational success
Research and analysis outline for organizational behavior and administration of scientific and engineering facilities
Organizational accounting system for government laboratories
Lateral organizational patterns in Apollo mission planning activities in research and development
Correlations between organizational factors and individual engineer performance, analyzing stability of relationships and time lags in measurement
Interorganizational analysis of NASA's acquisition process for research and development systems is discussed. The importance of understanding the contractor environment, constraints, and motives in selecting an acquisition strategy is demonstrated. By articulating clear project goals, by utilizing information about the contractor and his needs at each stage in the acquisition process, and by thorough analysis of the inter-organizational relationship, improved selection of acquisition strategies and business practices is possible.
The organizational issues pertaining to the prevention of inbound contamination associated with possible Viking missions to Mars are considered. The completed Apollo missions, which returned samples from the moon, provide a convenient base for analysis of inbound contamination issues. Despite concern over the threat of inbound contamination from the moon and efforts to prevent back contamination, the back contamination efforts in the Apollo missions were considered ineffective had these missions encountered living organisms. Several alternatives for consideration in the design of future programs dealing with back contamination are examined and proposed for special consideration.
The space telescope management information system development effort is a guideline for discussing effective organizational solutions used in implementing DBMS software. Focus is on the importance of strategic planning. The value of constructing an information system architecture to conform to the organization's managerial needs, the need for a senior decision maker, dealing with shifting user requirements, and the establishment of a reliable working relationship with the DBMS vendor are examined. Requirements for a schedule to demonstrate progress against a defined timeline and the importance of continued monitoring for production software control, production data control, and software enhancements are also discussed.
Topics concerning Space Exploration Initiative technical interchange are presented in viewgraph form and include the following: models of change, elements of the current period, the signs of change, leaders' contribution, paradigms - our worldview, paradigm change, the effects of revealing paradigms, a checklist for change, and organizational control.
Recognizing that NASA has traditionally been in the forefront of technological change, the NASA Administrator challenged the Agency in 1982 to also become a leader in developing and applying advanced technology and management practices to increase productivity. One of the activities undertaken by the Agency to support this ambitious productivity goal was participation in a 2-year experimental action research project devoted to learning more about improving and assessing the performance of professional organizations. Participating with a dozen private sector organizations, NASA explored the usefulness of a productivity improvement process that addressed all aspects of organizational performance. This experience has given NASA valuable insight into the enhancement of professional productivity. More importantly, it has provided the Agency with a specific management approach that managers and supervisors can effectively use to emphasize and implement continuous improvement. This report documents the experiences of the five different NASA installations participating in the project, describes the improvement process that was applied and refined, and offers recommendations for expanded application of that process. Of particular interest is the conclusion that measuring white collar productivity may be possible, and at a minimum, the measurement process itself is beneficial to management. Volume I of the report provides a project overview, significant findings, and recommendations. Volume II presents individual case studies of the NASA pilot projects that were part of the action research effort.
After the Shuttle Columbia catastrophe, the investigation board (CAIB) stated that NASA needs to develop a "learning culture", meaning a capability to learn from past failures by understanding the technical and organizational causes of these mistakes (CAIB report, 2003). While many organizations learn from obvious failures, we argue that it is harder for organizations to learn from near-miss events (i.e., situations where a failure does not occur but nearly did), because these near-misses are processed as successes. For the shuttle program, prior debris problems could have caused a similar failure as on the Columbia mission except that the large pieces missed the highly sensitive portions of the orbiter. This acceptance of foam debris was adopted as a normal occurrence by the shuttle program managers similar to the problems at the time of the Challenger Disaster (detailed in Vaughan, 1996). We extend that work to show that an outcome bias influences people's evaluation of project managers, such that managers of failed missions were perceived more poorly than managers who made the same decisions but whose mission ended in either success or a near-miss. The similarity of ratings between the near-miss and success condition imply that even when a problem occurs that is clearly linked to prior managerial decisions, if the project is not harmed because of good luck, that manager is not held accountable for faculty decision making and neither the individual manager nor the organization learn from the experience potentially increasing the likelihood of a failure in the future.
We present a methodology to access the proclivity of an organization to commit violence against nongovernment personnel. We fitted a Random Forest model using the Minority at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROS) dataset. The MAROS data is longitudinal; so, individual observations are not independent. We propose a modification to the standard Random Forest methodology to account for the violation of the independence assumption. We present the results of the model fit, an example of predicting violence for an organization; and finally, we present a summary of the forest in a "meta-tree,"
This paper identifies essential principles and practices that help an organization to accept change.
This paper discusses business practices that organizations should follow to improve their chances of initiating and sustaining successful software process improvement efforts.
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Engineer acquisition and utilization in research and development projects