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NASA NTRS2024

Earth Independent Medical Operations (EIMO) Datascope: Challenges and Potential Solutions

Data flows and storage/retrieval capacity are severely constrained during missions in space and challenges will become even greater during exploration class missions. There is a need for an artificial intelligence (AI)-based clinical decision support system (CDSS) to monitor and analyze data to provide real-time consultative support for crew medical officer (CMO) decision-making. EIMO is defined as the gradual transition of medical care and decision making from terrestrial to space-based assets, enabling support of astronaut health and performance and reducing overall mission risk. While a hallmark of this paradigm shift from low-earth orbit is that on-board care will increasingly become the responsibility of the astronauts for primary management and decision making, terrestrial assets will continue to be paramount in pre-mission screening and planning, as well as prevention, health maintenance and long-term care contingencies. New capabilities and systems that enable progressively more robust and resilient systems and crews will be necessary to reduce risk and increase probability of deep space exploration mission success. An aspiration for EIMO is to develop AI-enhanced solutions for analysis of crew health & performance data and to facilitate clinical decision support for autonomous medical operations. A “system of systems” approach is envisioned whereby EIMO will deploy AI-supported natural language processing and machine learning (ML) techniques to utilize embedded reference databases and real-time data streams [input vectors] from multiple data sources. Constituent input vectors may include environmental controls, countermeasures data, behavioral data, physiologic wearables, point-of-care laboratory tests, personalized medical records, inventory trade space risk assessments, COTS medical databases, and ground support inputs. An ideal AI capability would possess trained fusion algorithms to cross reference input vectors with medical ‘knowledge’ [cultivated database] to stratify relevant data streams for predictive and actionable capabilities. In addition, EIMO will feature mobility, in that it can be accessed and can push/pull data within and between multiple vehicles/habitats. Large amounts and variable sources of data can be leveraged to diagnose, inform treatment strategies, and potentially predict medical events and performance decrements. Inclusion of advanced training tools using extended reality will enable increasingly autonomous medical care to aid a CMO when ground support is unavailable or time-delayed beyond required action window, e.g., emergent medical situations. EIMO CDSS would require very large datasets to train pre-flight and significant amounts of data are needed to support ML via in-flight CDSS operations. An additional challenge will be to find sufficient data to train a model relevant to astronaut demographics. The rapid, accelerating evolution of this field creates a propitious solution space to leverage multi-modal AI through public-private partnership(s). The status of multi-modal AI systems today would preclude their use for long duration missions as they remain unreliable and are subject to “digital hallucinations” and other errors that could pose operational risk. A federated labs structure is being considered to test and optimize data flow from the multiple input vectors leading to field testing in suitable ground/flight analogs. Critical to the success of an EIMO CDSS will be integration and interoperability and success will be defined by a system that can serve as an in-flight medical consult for the CMO providing critical support during medical contingencies. Benefits to terrestrial medicine may be significant as an outflow of the EIMO medical system, particularly for remote areas and communities lacking significant infrastructure, personnel and resources.

Medical Operations↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Moon Trek Portal: New Capabilities Supporting Mission Planning and Engagement

Introduction: NASA’s Moon Trek (https://trek.nasa.gov/moon/) is one of a growing number of interactive, browser-based, online portals for planetary data visualization and analysis produced by NASA’s Solar System Treks Project (SSTP). Moon Trek continues to be enhanced with new data and new capabilities enabling it to facilitate the planning and conducting of upcoming lunar missions by NASA, its commercial partners, and its international partners, as well as advancing its role as a valuable outreach tool. A Comprehensive Online Web Portal: Developed at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and managed as a project of NASA’s Solar System Exploration Research Virtual Institute (SSERVI) at NASA Ames Research Center, Moon Trek is a browser-based web portal. The portal provides easy-to-use tools for browsing, data layering, data product blending, and feature search among thousands of data products covering topography, mineralogy, elemental abundance, geology, and much more. Visualizations are provided in var-ious map projections, interactive 3D viewing, and in virtual reality. Using an in-house stereo workflow, SSTP is able to produce new NAC-based high-resolution mosaics and DEMs. Diverse Applications for Lunar Exploration: Baseline analytic tools available to all users include dis-tance measurement, elevation profiling, sun angle calculation, and 3D print file generation. More advanced account-level tools allow users to perform more computationally intensive analyses. These include ray-traced lighting analysis for user-specified areas over user-specified time/date ranges and time intervals, electro-static surface potential analysis, subsetting of large data products, slope analysis, and Lunar Laser Ranging geometry calculation. Artificial intelligence (AI) and ma-chine learning (ML) based tools have been implemented for crater detection and hazard analysis, boulder detection and hazard analysis, and rockfall detection. New Tools Facilitating Exploration: Additional, new tools have recently been added and others are in development, offering even greater functionality in con-ducting analyses of potential landing sites and areas of surface operations. The new Line-of-Sight tool facilitates communications planning between locations on the lunar surface, between any given site on the lunar surface and a specified ground station on the Earth, and between a site on the lunar surface and a relay asset in lunar orbit, all taking into account local lunar topography. The new Data Plotter tool provides both tabular and graphical representations of pixel values along a user specified path for a growing number of data products. The new NAC Finder tool will identify and pro-vide access to NAC images that intersect a user-defined path or bounded area. The SSTP development team is looking to leverage the capabilities of its existing AI and ML crater, boulder, and rockfall detection and analysis tools, and extend that technology to a generalized feature detector that can be trained on instances of specific types of landforms and then search the lunar surface for more examples of such features. New traverse planning tools are being developed with use cases in generalized concept studies and specific mission planning in mind. These will facilitate finding optimal traverse paths based on constraints such as slope, lighting, hazard avoidance, and communications. These will be complemented by new traverse visualization capabilities. Users will be able to interactively ride along with a rover, examining 3D views of the terrain while adjusting camera height and viewing angle along with selecting different data layer overlays to drape across the terrain. Engaging the Public: The capabilities being developed for mission planning are being leveraged to further enhance Moon Trek’s proven utility as a valuable public outreach resource. This includes providing multiple lev-els of engagement with different points of entry. At its simplest level, promoting understanding through visualization, media and the public will be able to easily visualize and conduct their own exploration of lunar sites targeted by NASA and its partners. For a more in-depth experience, we are working with our stakeholders to promote understanding through interaction by extend-ing our current landing site and traverse analysis capabilities, making simplified access to these tools available to those who want to explore more deeply key factors in planning a mission through interactive and possibly even gamified experiences. The highest degree of public outreach, focusing on engagement through scientific participation, could be achieved through our work with missions and the NASA Office of the Chief Scientist on Moon Trek’s extension as a tool with specialized capabilities for facilitating citizen science. In such scenarios, participants become members of extended mis-sion science teams, using dedicated and integrated interfaces to analyze mission data to help answer questions key to lunar science and exploration. We are work-ing with NASA’s Office of Communications, museums, planetariums, and the media to help them easily integrate accurate, detailed visualizations of NASA’s lunar destinations and exploration into their content/productions and to engage diverse audiences in diverse venues.

Moon Trek↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗