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The software implements the methodology of cybersecurity training architecture and is leveraged to build a turn-key based simulated cyberattack game in which the player assumes the facility manager's role and must defend the OT network from adaptive cyberattacks by directly configuring the physical network environment and implementing security policies.
Worldwide growth in electric vehicle use is prompting new installations of private and public electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE). EVSE devices support the electrification of the transportation industry but also represent a linchpin for power systems and transportation infrastructures. Cybersecurity researchers have recently identified several vulnerabilities that exist in EVSE devices, communications to electric vehicles (EVs), and upstream services, such as EVSE vendor cloud services, third party systems, and grid operators. The potential impact of attacks on these systems stretches from localized, relatively minor effects to long-term national disruptions. Fortunately, there is a strong and expanding collection of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) cybersecurity best practices that may be applied to the EVSE environment to secure this equipment. In this paper, we survey publicly disclosed EVSE vulnerabilities, the impact of EV charger cyberattacks, and proposed security protections for EV charging technologies.
The Visualizer dashboard provides grid operator highly-trusted alarming environment for an ongoing or potential cyber-attack based on system anomalies and network-based verification. Once anomalies are detected by the IDS tool (HIDES, NREL SWR-19-65), this platform stores the signatures or alert logs that are generated by the intrusion detector, lays out the detailed summary of the possible alerts, and maps these attacks with high-level scenarios. These scenarios are later combined to define a final event using a decision tree approach and a final report is generated out of this tool for further forensic analysis. It also supports authentication and authorization to support roles-based access control (RBAC) for users and a group of people.
The Operational Process for Trigger Identification and Comprehension (OPTIC) is a standalone, downloadable application designed to enhance the CyOTE (Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment) methodology and will be made available for free download to industry. OPTIC brings key CyOTE functionalities into focus. OPTIC aids OT professionals in analyzing and determining whether an observed anomaly may indicate possible malicious activity or merely a maintenance related irregularity.
Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are more integrated than they have ever been before, but also the division between IT (Information Technology) and OT (Operational Technology) is becoming a grey area. As the integration of IT and OT occurs more often, cyber attack will also increase. Cyber attacks on Critical Infrastructure can be highly detrimental to society, notably via compromised Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Virtual and physical simulation has been used in medical fields, mathematics, architecture, aeronautics, space, and many more. Virtualization & Simulation in a lab environment is ideal because there is a need for the ability to test theories and designs is a safe and cost-effective way without risking equipment damage or, more importantly, human life. Furthermore, OT and ICS are some of the most difficult systems to use for research and development. They are either committed to operations or widely expensive to set up in a life-like environment. Virtualization and simulation will allow these otherwise accessible systems to be a test bed for the training, development, and research of SRNL customers or engineers and scientists at SRNL. This will allow the testbed to fit into a small form factor and interact with a simulator with minimum hardware components for easy transports and replication effort within the environment.
The High-Luminosity LHC (HL-LHC) is expected to deliver an integrated luminosity of 3000–4000 fb −1 over 10 years of operation with the peak instantaneous luminosity reaching about 5–7.5 × 1 0 34 cm −2 s −1 . During Long Shutdown 3, several components of the CMS detector will undergo major improvements, called Phase-2 upgrades, to be able to operate in the challenging environment of the HL-LHC. The current CMS tracker will be replaced. The Phase-2 Outer Tracker (OT) will have increased radiation tolerance, higher granularity, and the capability to handle higher data rates. Moreover, the OT will provide tracking information to the Level-1 trigger for the first time at a hadron collider, allowing trigger rates to be kept at a sustainable level without sacrificing physics potential. For this, the OT will be made of modules with two closely-spaced silicon sensors read out by front-end ASICs that can correlate hits in the two sensors to create short track segments, used in the Level-1 track finder. The modules come in two flavors: strip-strip and pixel-strip, containing different sensor configurations and multiple ASICs. This contribution presents the Phase-2 OT, the finalization of the OT module design, and the quality assurance and control procedures used to ensure that the modules fulfill both the specifications from the assembly steps as well as the proper communication among the ASICs.
The High Luminosity LHC (HL-LHC) is expected to deliver an integrated luminosity of 3000-4000~fb$^{-1}$ after 10 years of operation with peak instantaneous luminosity reaching about 5-7.5$\times10^{34}$cm$^{-2}$s$^{-1}$. During Long Shutdown 3, several components of the CMS detector will undergo major changes, called Phase-2 upgrades, to be able to operate in the challenging environment of the HL-LHC. The current CMS tracker will be replaced. The Phase-2 Outer Tracker (OT) will have high radiation tolerance, higher granularity, and the capability to handle higher data rates. Moreover, the OT will provide tracking information to the Level-1 trigger, for the first time at hadron colliders, allowing trigger rates to be kept at a sustainable level without sacrificing physics potential. For this, the OT will be made of modules with two closely spaced silicon sensors read out by front-end ASICs, which can correlate hits in the two sensors creating short track segments (stubs), used for tracking in the L1 track finder. The modules come in two flavors: strip-strip (2S) and pixel-strip (PS), containing different sensor configurations and multiple ASICs. This contribution will present the design of the Phase-2 OT, the first results with pre-production devices, and the quality assurance procedures used to ensure the functionality of the modules: from fulfilling the precision specification of the module assembly procedure to ensuring the proper communication among the module's ASICs.
While computer systems, software applications, and operational technology (OT)/Industrial Control System (ICS) devices are regularly updated through automated and manual processes, there are several unique challenges associated with distributed energy resource (DER) patching. Millions of DER devices from dozens of vendors have been deployed in home, corporate, and utility network environments that may or may not be internet-connected. These devices make up a growing portion of the electric power critical infrastructure system and are expected to operate for decades. During that operational period, it is anticipated that critical and noncritical firmware patches will be regularly created to improve DER functional capabilities or repair security deficiencies in the equipment. The SunSpec/Sandia DER Cybersecurity Workgroup created a Patching Subgroup to investigate appropriate recommendations for the DER patching, holding fortnightly meetings for more than nine months. The group focused on DER equipment, but the observations and recommendations contained in this report also apply to DERMS tools and other OT equipment used in the end-to-end DER communication environment. The group found there were many standards and guides that discuss firmware lifecycles, patch and asset management, and code-signing implementations, but did not singularly cover the needs of the DER industry. This report collates best practices from these standards organizations and establishes a set of best practices that may be used as a basis for future national or international patching guides or standards.
The High Luminosity LHC (HL-LHC) is expected to deliver an integrated luminosity of 3000 - 4000 fb -1 in its lifetime with peak instantaneous luminosities reaching about 5 - 7.5×10 34 cm -2 s -1 . During the Long Shutdown 3 period, several components of the CMS detector will undergo major changes, called Phase-2 upgrades, to be able to operate in the challenging environment of the HL-LHC, including the replacement of the entire silicon tracker. The Phase-2 Outer Tracker (OT) will have high radiation tolerance, higher granularity, and the capability to handle higher data rates. Another key feature of the OT will be to provide tracking information to the Level-1 trigger, allowing trigger rates to be kept at a sustainable level without sacrificing physics potential. For this, the OT will be made of modules that have two closely spaced sensors read out by the same electronics, which can correlate hits in the two sensors creating short track segments called ”stubs”. The stubs will be used for tracking at 40 MHz. In this contribution, the design of the CMS Phase-2 OT, the technological choices, and highlights of research and development activities are reported.
Ovonic threshold switching (OTS) selectors play an important role in the integration of advanced three-dimensional memory. Selectors based on tellurium (Te)-containing materials exhibit significant promise due to their low threshold voltages and superior consistency. Here we have theoretically studied the structure and electronic properties of a typical OTS material, amorphous GeTe 6 , to explore the switching mechanisms using ab initio molecular dynamics simulations. The results indicate that Ge atoms tend to bond with Te atoms, forming stable chemical bonds. The Te-centered clusters are predominantly in the form of distorted octahedrons, while the Ge-centered clusters are in the form of both octahedrons and tetrahedrons. Notably, the proportion of tetrahedrons within the 4-coordinated Ge-centered clusters reaches an impressive 66.9%. These tetrahedrons are randomly dispersed throughout the simulated cell, leading to a stable amorphous configuration. The mid-gap state observed in the mobility bandgap originates from the atomic chain composed of both over-coordinated Ge and Te atoms. It is the inherent stability of the chemical environment within amorphous GeTe 6 that enables it to maintain its amorphous phase under a repeated threshold voltage, a characteristic that distinguishes it from non-OTS materials, such as amorphous tellurium. Furthermore, our findings provide an in-depth understanding of the structure and electronic characteristics of amorphous GeTe 6 , which can promote the design and application of the Te-rich threshold switching materials.
To reduce cost and ease maintenance, industrial control systems (ICS) have adopted Ethernetbased interconnections that integrate operational technology (OT) systems with information technology (IT) networks. This integration has made these critical systems vulnerable to attack. Security solutions tailored to ICS environments are an active area of research. Anomalybased network intrusion detection systems are well-suited for these environments. Often these systems must be optimized for their specific environment. In prior work, we introduced a method for assessing the impact of various anomaly-based network IDS settings on security. This paper reviews the experimental outcomes when we applied our method to a full-scale ICS test bed using actual attacks. Our method provides new and valuable data to operators enabling more informed decisions about IDS configurations.
Ensuring the integrity of Ethernet-based networks is a challenging and constantly evolving domain. This problem is exacerbated for those operational technology (OT) networks supporting industrial control systems (ICS) since much of that equipment was originally designed to be on a network that was isolated and generally considered free of malefactors. Increasing pressure to bridge these systems with traditional information technology (IT) networks has introduced a bevy of new threats. In response, both academia and industry have responded with security solutions tailored to ICS environments. Deploying these protection systems often involves several configuration choices. While some of these choices are clear (e.g., block/enable protocol X) others are far more subjective (e.g. alert threshold == 3.43). Further complicating the situation, while often similar to IT networks, OT networks have unique challenges and characteristics that make the task of protecting them simultaneously more difficult and straight forward.Extant solutions for quantifying the relative security of intrusion detection systems fail to effectively support the operators of said systems with understanding the impact of various configuration changes. Further, they assume that the attacks are static and not subject to manipulation or alteration in the face of defenses. In this paper, we present a threat-based method for quantifying the relative impact of various security settings for intrusion detection systems (IDSs) within ICS environments. This method provides operational staff with a clear understanding of the relative impact of their settings and assumes that the attacks levied against them are dynamic. The model is described in detail, we apply the model to a synthetic data set, and discuss the inferences that can be made and what types of decisions they could be used to support.
The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure landscape in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure landscape as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space.
he High Luminosity LHC (HL-LHC) is expected to deliver an integrated luminosity of $3000-4000$~fb$^{-1}$ after 10 years of operation with peak instantaneous luminosity reaching about $5-7.5\times10^{34}$cm$^{-2}$s$^{-1}$. During Long Shutdown 3, several components of the CMS detector will undergo major changes, called Phase-2 upgrade, to be able to operate in the challenging environment of the HL-LHC. The current CMS silicon strip tracker has to be replaced with a new detector. The Phase-2 Outer Tracker (OT) will have higher radiation tolerance, higher granularity, and the capability to handle higher data rates compared to the current system. Another key feature of the OT will be to provide tracking information to the Level-1 (L1) trigger, allowing trigger rates to be kept at a sustainable level without sacrificing physics potential. For this, the OT will be made out of modules with two closely spaced sensors read out by front-end ASICs, which can correlate hits in the two sensors creating short track segments called stubs. The stubs will be used for tracking in the L1 track finder. The modules come in two flavors: strip-strip (2S) and pixel-strip (PS), which contain different sensor configurations and multiple ASICs. In this contribution, the design of the CMS Phase-2 OT, the technological choices, and the quality assurance (QA) procedures used to ensure the functionality of the modules will be reported. The contribution will cover the first results with pre-production devices and the different aspects taken into account during the QA: from fulfilling the precision specification of the module assembly procedure to ensuring the proper communication between the different ASICs on the module. The module noise performance is also checked and the full module functionality is verified at different temperatures.
The High Luminosity LHC (HL-LHC) is expected to deliver an integrated luminosity of $3000-4000\;$fb$^{-1}$ after 10 years of operation with peak instantaneous luminosity reaching about $5-7.5\times10^{34}$cm$^{-2}$s$^{-1}$. During Long Shutdown 3, several components of the CMS detector will undergo major changes, called Phase-2 upgrades, to be able to operate in the challenging environment of the HL-LHC. The current CMS silicon strip tracker has to be replaced with a new detector. The Phase-2 Outer Tracker (OT) will have high radiation tolerance, higher granularity and the capability to handle higher data rates. Another key feature of the OT will be to provide tracking information to the Level-1 trigger, allowing trigger rates to be kept at a sustainable level without sacrificing physics potential. For this, the OT will be made out of modules which have two closely spaced sensors read out by front-end ASICs, which can correlate hits in the two sensors creating short track segments, called stubs. The stubs will be used for tracking in the L1 track finder. In this contribution, the design of the CMS Phase-2 OT, the technological choices and first results with prototype devices are reported.
The Department of Energy’s Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response Office (CESER) has partnered with Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and energy companies to develop CyOTE. This research initiative addresses cybersecurity threats against operational technology (OT) networks by sharing intelligence about adversarial tactics and techniques with the energy sector. CyOTE improves the sector’s ability to detect anomalous behavior that indicates potential malicious cyber activity in OT networks.
Abstract The objective of this study is to demonstrate that melittin, a well‐studied antimicrobial peptide (AMP), can be solubilized in an active form in bicontinuous microemulsions (BMEs) that employ biocompatible oils. The systems investigated consisted of Winsor‐III and ‐IV BME phases composed of Water/Aerosol‐OT (AOT)/Polysorbate 85/isopropyl myristate and a Winsor‐IV BME employing Polysorbate 80 and limonene. We found that melittin resided in an α‐helix‐rich configuration and was in an apolar environment for the AOT/Polysorbate 85 Winsor‐III system, suggesting that melittin interacted with the surfactant monolayer and was in an active conformation. An apolar environment was also detected for melittin in the two Winsor‐IV systems, but to a lesser extent than the Winsor‐III system. Small‐angle X‐ray scattering analysis indicated that melittin at a concentration of 1.0 g/L aq in the aqueous subphase of the Winsor‐IV systems led to the greatest impact on the BME structure (e.g., decrease of quasi‐periodic repeat distance and correlation length and induction of interfacial fluidity). The antimicrobial activity of the Polysorbate 80 Winsor‐IV system was evaluated against several bacteria prominent in chronic wounds and surgical site infections (SSIs). Melittin‐free BMEs inhibited the growth of all tested bacteria due to its oil, limonene, while the inclusion of 1.0 g/L aq of melittin in the BMEs enhanced the activity against several bacteria. A further increase of melittin concentration in the BMEs had no further enhancement. These results demonstrate the potential utility of BMEs as a delivery platform for AMPs and other hydrophilic and lipophilic drugs to inhibit antibiotic‐resistant microorganisms in chronic wounds and SSIs.