Nuclear Weapon Blast Effects
Presentation Overview: Nuclear Weapon Blast Effects; Conventional Explosions; Energy Distribution; Thermal Effects; Fire Storm Effects; Blast and Shock Effects; Types of Bursts
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Presentation Overview: Nuclear Weapon Blast Effects; Conventional Explosions; Energy Distribution; Thermal Effects; Fire Storm Effects; Blast and Shock Effects; Types of Bursts
Presentation Overview: Nuclear Weapon Medical Effects; Psychological Effects; Contamination; Lethal Dose; Acute Radiation Syndromes; Chronic Radiation Effects; Thermal Injuries; Blast Injuries
Presentation Overview: Nuclear Weapon Radiation Effects; Types of Ionizing Radiation; Radiation Units of Measurement; How Radiation Can Travel; Radiation Effects
A Bayesian network (BN) model of social factors can support proliferation assessments by estimating the likelihood that a state will pursue a nuclear weapon. Social factors including political, economic, nuclear capability, security, and national identity and psychology factors may play as important a role in whether a State pursues nuclear weapons as more physical factors. This paper will show how using Bayesian reasoning on a generic case of a would-be proliferator State can be used to combine evidence that supports proliferation assessment. Theories and analysis by political scientists can be leveraged in a quantitative and transparent way to indicate proliferation risk. BN models facilitate diagnosis and inference in a probabilistic environment by using a network of nodes and acyclic directed arcs between the nodes whose connections, or absence of, indicate probabilistic relevance, or independence. We propose a BN model that would use information from both traditional safeguards and the strengthened safeguards associated with the Additional Protocol to indicate countries with a high risk of proliferating nuclear weapons. This model could be used in a variety of applications such a prioritization tool and as a component of state safeguards evaluations. This paper will discuss the benefits of BN reasoning, the development of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) BN state proliferation model and how it could be employed as an analytical tool.
The prospect of a nuclear renaissance has revived a decades old debate over the proliferation and terrorism risks of the use of nuclear power. This debate in the last few years has taken on an added dimension with renewed attention to disarmament. Increasingly, concerns that proliferation risks may reduce the prospects for realizing the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world are being voiced.
Here, the historical material culture produced by American Cold War nuclear weapons testing includes objects of scientific inquiry that can be generally categorized as being either ephemeral or enduring. Objects deemed to be ephemeral were of a less substantial nature, being impermanent and expendable in a nuclear test, while enduring objects were by nature more durable and long-lasting. Although all of these objects were ultimately subject to disappearance, the processes by which they were transformed, degraded, or destroyed prior to their disappearing differ. Drawing principally upon archaeological theory, this paper proposes a functional dichotomy for categorizing and studying the historical trajectories of nuclear weapons testing technoscience artifacts. In examining the transformation patterns of steel towers and concrete blockhouses in particular, it explores an associated loss of scientific method that accompanies a science object's disappearance.
With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.
This report discusses the primary weapon complex facilities and nuclear weapons program specifics.
Today’s nuclear weapons research builds upon the work of the past, often on the shoulders of the giants of nuclear document preservation in the absence of testing. One of these giants is weapons historian Betty Perkins. Before her retirement in 2016, Perkins held numerous roles at LANL, but she is best known for her pioneering work in the Weapons Program where she generated classified reports on nuclear weapons design and development. Over many years, she meticulously researched and recorded the histories of a number of critical efforts in Los Alamos’s nuclear weapons program, culminating in 13 reports comprising more than 7,200 pages.
Approved unanimously by the UN Security Council on July 20, the agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, aims "to ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful" and thus to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. Other states in the Middle East, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are planning to establish their own nuclear power programs during the period that the Iran deal is expected to be in force. Furthermore, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action provides an unprecedented opportunity for an international effort to make progress toward a Middle Eastern nuclear-weapon-free zone, possibly as part of WMD-free zone in that region. In building on the foundation created by that agreement, the measures proposed here constitute the essential technical steps toward a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Although it is unlikely that such a zone can be established anytime soon, it should be possible to make progress on a number of the building blocks for it.
What do Galileo, Husky Pup, Turquoise and Barracuda have in common? They are names of nuclear weapons tests conducted at what is now called the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Over 1,000 U.S. nuclear tests were conducted at various sites between 1945 and 1992, and each of the tests was inaugurated with a name, as documented in the Lab’s vast weapons test collections housed in the National Security Research Center (NSRC). To protect the classified information about nuclear weapons and maintain security, nuclear weapons tests were assigned names. This has been true from the beginning with Trinity, the first atomic bomb test in 1945. Lab Director J. Robert Oppenheimer later said the test name may have been inspired by his love of poetry.
There is a growing realization that neutrinos can be used as a diagnostic tool to better understand the inner workings of a nuclear weapon. Robust estimates demonstrate that an Inverse Beta Decay (IBD) neutrino scintillation detector built at the Nevada Test Site with a 1000-ton active target mass at a standoff distance of 500 m would detect thousands of antineutrino events per nuclear test. This would provide less than 4% statistical error on the measured antineutrino rate and 5% error on antineutrino energy. Extrapolating this to an error on the test device explosive yield requires knowledge from evaluated nuclear databases, non-equilibrium fission rates, and assumptions on internal neutron fluxes. Initial calculations demonstrate that the total number of neutrinos emitted per fission in the first 10 3 s after a short pulse of 239 Pu fission is about a factor of two less than that from Pu fissioning under steady state conditions. Furthermore, there are significant energy spectral differences as a function of time after the pulse that must be considered. These and other model dependencies will be discussed in the paper. In the absence of nuclear weapons testing, many of the technical and theoretical challenges of a full nuclear test could be mitigated with a low cost smaller scale 20 ton fiducial mass IBD demonstration detector placed near a pulsed reactor. Potential reactors include the Texas A&M University TRIGA 1 GW–10 ms pulsed facility or the Sandia Annular Core Research Reactor. The short duty cycle and repeatability of pulses would provide critical real environment testing and measurements, which would be valuable for planning a possible real test shot in the future. Furthermore, the antineutrino rate as a function of time data would provide unique constraints on fission databases and model assumptions. Finally, there are impactful science drivers such as sensitive searches for ∼1 eV 2 sterile neutrinos and ∼MeV scale axions.
In 2012, India and Pakistan reaffirmed the Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. Despite a history of mutual animosity and persistent conflict between the two countries, this agreement derives strength from a few successful nuclear confidence building measures that have stood the test of time. It also rests on the hope that the region would be spared a nuclear holocaust from an accidental nuclear weapon detonation that might be misconstrued as a deliberate use of a weapon by the other side. This study brings together two emerging strategic analysts from South Asia to explore measures to support the Agreement and further develop cooperation around this critical issue. This study briefly dwells upon the strategic landscape of nuclear South Asia with the respective nuclear force management structures, doctrines, and postures of India and Pakistan. It outlines the measures in place for the physical protection and safety of nuclear warheads, nuclear materials, and command and control mechanisms in the two countries, and it goes on to identify the prominent, emerging challenges posed by the introduction of new weapon technologies and modernization of the respective strategic forces. This is followed by an analysis of the agreement itself leading up to a proposed framework for cooperative measures that might enhance the spirit and implementation of the agreement.
The study of the effects of nuclear weapons has provided hundreds of persons a lifelong career in a technical field. This presentation is just a snapshot of the topic covering the four defined burst regions, documents devoted to the topic, and the actual effects of a nuclear explosive device. With the aid of previously released atomic testing movies and superb Hollywood actor narrations, we examine the effects of thermal, blast, radiation, EMP on both structures and people. Lastly, the effects of a 1 kt nuke detonated at the intersection of South Las Vegas Blvd. and Tropicana wiping out the Excalibur, MGM Grand, New York New York, and Tropicana hotels and the M&M store.
In this paper, we present a multi-scale study examining the impact of a regional exchange of nuclear weapons on global climate. Our models investigate multiple phases of the effects of nuclear weapons usage, including growth and rise of the nuclear fireball, ignition and spread of the induced firestorm, and comprehensive Earth system modeling of the oceans, land, ice, and atmosphere. This study follows from the scenario originally envisioned by Robock et al. (2007a), based on the analysis of Toon et al. (2007), which assumes a regional exchange between India and Pakistan of fifty 15-kiloton weapons detonated by each side. We expand this scenario by modeling the processes that lead to production of black carbon, in order to refine the black carbon forcing estimates of these previous studies. When the Earth system model is initiated with 5 × 10 9 kg of black carbon in the upper troposphere (approximately 9 to 13 km), the impact on climate variables such as global temperature and precipitation in our simulations is similar to that predicted by previously published work. However, while our thorough simulations of the firestorm produce about 3.7 × 10 9 kg of black carbon, we find that the vast majority of the black carbon never reaches an altitude above weather systems (approximately 12 km). Therefore, our Earth system model simulations conducted with model-informed atmospheric distributions of black carbon produce significantly lower global climatic impacts than assessed in prior studies, as the carbon at lower altitudes is more quickly removed from the atmosphere. In addition, our model ensembles indicate that statistically significant effects on global surface temperatures are limited to the first 5 years and are much smaller in magnitude than those shown in earlier works. None of the simulations produced a nuclear winter effect. We find that the effects on global surface temperatures are not uniform and are concentrated primarily around the highest arctic latitudes, dramatically reducing the global impact on human health and agriculture compared with that reported by earlier studies. Lastly, our analysis demonstrates that the probability of significant global cooling from a limited exchange scenario as envisioned in the previous studies is highly unlikely, a conclusion supported by examination of natural analogs, such as large forest fires and volcanic eruptions.
The Nuclear Weapons and Strategy minor was established in 2015 at the United States Air Force Academy with the goal of producing a cadre of officers with the foundation to make effective decisions within the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise and lead the United States Air Force into the second nuclear age. Available to cadets of all majors, the minor builds cadets' technical and strategic understanding of the nuclear dimension of warfare. This summary will discuss the reason for the addition of the minor as well as the specifics of the educational track.
Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine demonstrates the challenge for strategic deterrence and competition of countering contentious narratives and disinformation about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during conventional regional wars against a nucleararmed adversary. Moscow uses both tailored, contentious narratives and targeted disinformation about WMD in Ukraine to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in support of its deterrence and competition objectives vis-à-vis the United States and NATO. Since December 2021, Moscow has made a focal point of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons in its efforts to establish a permissive environment for its military buildup on the border with Ukraine and then its military intervention. These information tactics also demonstrate an opportunity for US Special Operations Forces (SOF). They are a case study for considering how SOF can contribute to strategic deterrence and competition objectives, specifically countering adversary gray-zone information efforts to alter regional security orders.1 Such a role is in line with the 2022 Special Operations Forces Vision and Strategy, which provides a framework for the evolution of SOF into “a force capable of creating strategic, asymmetric advantages for the nation as a key contributor of integrated deterrence” (United States Special Operations Command, 2022). This paper briefly examines this strategic challenge and SOF opportunity, focusing narrowly on the distinction between contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and the role of SOF in countering these gray-zone information tactics. The nuclear dimension of Moscow’s contentious narratives and disinformation in the “special military operation” is of particular interest because it demonstrates the distinction between strategic efforts to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in Moscow’s favor. This distinction between influence and disruption is less clear with Russia’s contentious narratives and disinformation about chemical and biological weapons in Ukraine, as disinformation about these two types of WMD appears to overwhelm contentious narratives. We believe this distinction is useful for policymakers and warfighters responsible for countering gray-zone information tactics because it provides a framework for crafting tailored responses to contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and other WMD. The chapter concludes with a discussion of efforts that could be undertaken by SOF in cooperation with other relevant stakeholders to address this aspect of adversary gray-zone information tactics.
The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) Dust Cloud Calculator is a Java™ application that can calculate the dust loading and radiation dose for an aircraft or cruise missile flying through a dust cloud created by a nuclear detonation. The dust cloud model is based upon the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) dust cloud and fallout model. The AFIT model uses a combination of algorithms from the Weapons System Evaluation Group (WSEG) model 10 fallout code, the Defense Land Fallout Interpretive Code (DELFIC), and algorithms developed at AFIT to calculate the nuclear dust cloud.