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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Cost and Performance Requirements for Flexible Advanced Nuclear Plants in Future U.S. Power Markets

Advanced reactor developers are at various stages of commercializing new products and must design for future market environments that will exist when their plants are available. It is therefore critical to have a clear understanding about what plants will need to cost to be attractive investments, and what performance characteristics will create the most value for plant owners. This study is among the first to model the substantial contribution that flexible advanced reactors can make towards reliable, responsive, affordable, and clean future energy systems by supplying clean dispatchable generating capacity. Advanced reactor technologies could make a major contribution to lowering the overall system cost while reducing emissions and improving the performance of future energy systems. Depending on specific market conditions, it may also be beneficial to co-locate thermal energy storage systems (ESS).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Hydrogen Plant Hazards and Risk Analysis Supporting Hydrogen Plant Siting near Nuclear Power Plants. Final report

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are considering flexible plant operations to take advantage of excess thermal and electrical energy. One option for NPPs is to pursue hydrogen production through high temperature electrolysis as an alternate revenue stream to remain economically viable. The intent of this study is to investigate the risk of a high temperature steam electrolysis hydrogen production facility (HTEF) in close proximity to an NPP. This analysis evaluates a postulated HTEF located 1 km from an NPP, including the likelihood of an accident and the associated consequence to critical NPP targets. This analysis shows that although the likelihood of a leak in an HTEF is not negligible, the consequence to critical NPP targets is not expected to lead to a failure at a distance of 1 km. Furthermore, the minimum separation distance of the HTEF is calculated based on the target fragility criteria of 1 psi defined in Regulatory Guide 1.91.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2020

Hydrogen Plant Hazards and Risk Analysis Supporting Hydrogen Plant Siting near Nuclear Power Plants (Final Report)

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are considering flexible plant operations to take advantage of excess thermal and electrical energy. One option for NPPs is to pursue hydrogen production through high temperature electrolysis as an alternate revenue stream to remain economically viable. The intent of this study is to investigate the risk of a high temperature steam electrolysis hydrogen production facility (HTEF) in close proximity to an NPP. This analysis evaluates a postulated HTEF located 1 km from an NPP, including the likelihood of an accident and the associated consequence to critical NPP targets. This analysis shows that although the likelihood of a leak in an HTEF is not negligible, the consequence to critical NPP targets is not expected to lead to a failure at a distance of 1 km. Furthermore, the minimum separation distance of the HTEF is calculated based on the target fragility criteria of 1 psi defined in Regulatory Guide 1.91.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2023

A New Offering for the Seaman Status Labyrinth - Seaman Status for Nuclear Reactor Operators on Floating Nuclear Power Plants

Floating nuclear power plants present a unique operating environment for land-based nuclear reactor operators. Traditionally located in the control room of a nuclear power plant on land, development of floating nuclear power plants exposes the traditional land-based employees to the marine environment. With the extension of nuclear power generation facilities into the maritime domain, do nuclear reactor operators working on a floating nuclear power plant qualify as seaman under maritime law? Applying existing maritime law, the answer is no, a nuclear reactor operator who operates the nuclear reactor on a floating nuclear power plant does not qualify as a seaman because their work is not in support of the mission of the vessel and the reactor is not connected to a vessel because a floating nuclear power plant is not a vessel. Applying the analysis developed by the Supreme Court in Chandris v. Latsis and the recent Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Texas, L.L.C. en banc decision by the Fifth Circuit, a nuclear reactor operator on a floating nuclear power plant does not qualify for seaman status under the Jones Act because their function supports the operation of the reactor and the structure on which the reactor resides does not meet the reasonable person standard established in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach. Further, existing case law highlights that rendering a structure practically impossible to move eliminates the structure from consideration as a vessel. Because a floating nuclear power plant may be anchored at a seaport or anchored offshore but connected via transmission cables and protected by physical protection barriers, a floating nuclear power plant, with no current means of propulsion is rendered a power plant on water, which is its true function. Recognizing that technological change may alter the conclusion presented in this Article, current designs and structures that exist illustrate the intersection between nuclear and maritime law and the ever-evolving concepts that underpin seamen status in maritime law.

Fialkoff, Marc↗
DOE OSTI2021

DETECTING FIRE WITH MACHINE LEARNING-ENABLED VISUAL MONITORING FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ENVIRONMENTS

Nuclear power plants are experiencing significant cost challenges to remain competitive with other energy-generation utilities. Unlike other industries, the cost of operation and maintenance activities is mostly attributed to workforce costs. To mitigate this, nuclear power plant stakeholders are increasingly interested in the development and deployment of machine learning methods to potentially automate or augment manually intensive tasks to reduce costs, especially for monitoring activities. One monitoring function that is visually demanding and that can occur frequently to meet the requirements of a fire protection program is visually monitoring an area for fire occurrence. Currently, fire watch activities consist of a worker physically stationed at a given location with the sole responsibility of observing a given area to ensure a fire is detected and mitigated promptly. This effort focused on the development and evaluation of a suitable deep convolutional neural network to classify individual video frames at a sub-second frequency for the occurrence of “fire” and “no fire” in varying industrial environments similar to nuclear power plants. It is believed that a trained neural network model could be integrated with existing facility video surveillance camera feeds to generate alerts when fire inferences occur in individual frames captured at sub-second temporal resolutions. Extensive effort was dedicated to identifying and curating suitable imagery training data representing varying environments and scene settings with and without flame features to maximize generalization in nuclear power plant environments. The data collection effort resulted in the aggregation of a large, labeled image library exceeding 12,000 images to support model training for diverse industrial environments. A deep neural network model incorporating parallel multi-scale capabilities was developed and trained to support accurate image-based detection of flame incidents of varying sizes and spectral feature properties within heterogeneous scenes. Analysis results show that the trained model can achieve high inference accuracy despite heterogeneous scene environments and components. Testing accuracy exceeded 95.0 percent with very low false positive and false negative inferences.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Demonstrating the Value of 3D Models to Support Large-Scale Digital Modifications at Nuclear Power Plants

Many Nuclear Power Plants are currently in the process of extending their operating licenses for continued generation. The use of three-dimensional (3D) modeling in the early stages of large scale NPP modernization efforts is one lower cost method that can verify proposed design changes against established guidelines and allows for visual presentation of the 3D model to various stakeholders in the project. Guidance from Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG 0711 and 0700, and other sources on performing HF/E for control rooms and design modifications can be visually represented in 3D models. Distance and measurements, workstation design, anthropometric considerations, and early feedback of modifications are used in 3D models to identify potential human issues early in the design process. 3D modeling is a useful tool for early design and help to reduce costs and present visuals to stakeholders early in the design.

3D Models↗
DOE OSTI2023

Extending Data-Driven Anomaly Detection Methods to Transient Power Conditions in Nuclear Power Plants

Historically, nuclear power plants have operated predominantly at or near full power, meaning that data driven anomaly detection methods can likely perform well at full power operations. This presents a challenge when the power drops (referred to as a transient) and may result in false alarms due to the lack of historical data at those new power levels. The current approach to handling this challenge is to turn detectors off during transients, which makes it impossible to use the algorithms to detect anomalies during these periods, i.e., causing missed detection.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Addressing Function Allocation for the Digital Transformation of Existing Nuclear Power Plants

The existing nuclear power plants in the United States (U.S.) have a vital role in providing carbon-free electricity. For the existing nuclear power plant fleet to remain economically viable, a significant digital transformation that fundamentally changes the way in which these plants are operated, maintained, and supported ought to be seriously considered. Safe and reliable automation is needed. This work describes important considerations and challenges that come with function allocation for the adoption of new automation at existing nuclear power plants. Specifically, this work reviews the state-of-the-art in function allocation guidance and highlights how it can be used within the U.S. nuclear industry. An objective of this work is to present the current challenges and proposed approaches to the human factors community to support future research and development that ultimately supports the effective use of function allocation in the digital transformation of existing nuclear power plants.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Experiences with Mobile Units for Liquid RAW Management in Slovak and Czech Nuclear Power Plants - 20089

In Nuclear Power Plants VVER 440, Russian type of reactor there was designed auxiliary building where according to basic design all operational liquid radioactive waste (RAW) should be stored in large capacity tanks during the whole operational period. That's why there are in the auxiliary building several types of large storage tanks with different internal volume from 110 m{sup 3}, 460 m{sup 3} to 550 m{sup 3}. Storage tanks are usually situated in rooms with limited access and minimal handling space. Operational waste was here transported by the system of pipes from the reactor building. There is possibility to handle with the waste and set the pipeline in to the chosen storage tanks. Nobody takes care about the quality of waste in the storage tanks and waste waits for the period of decommissioning when it should be treated. The storage capacity was designed for the whole lifetime of nuclear power plant. Currently the life time of Nuclear Power Plant's (NPP) is extended and there is necessity to retrieve and treat the RAW in advance. Another reason why the stakeholder, who operates the NPPs, decides to treat the operational RAW during the operational period of NPP, is that there are still new requirements from safety point of view which need to have free available space for example because of potential accident. So treating the operational RAW during the life time of NPP is present issue. Because in basic design nobody cares how the RAW will be retrieved and treated in the future, there is usually no technology for that in existing NPP. Some of the NPPs build an additional building with suitable technologies for treatment or hire the company which offer mobile technology for retrieving the waste from the storage tanks. Wood Nuclear Slovakia PLC provides all activities within liquid RAW management projects by its own staff including management, design, construction and deployment of equipment, engineering support, as well as all RAW retrieval and solidification activities. We offer RAW management as a service without any significant changes in existing NPP's buildings and technology. It is always a technical challenge to conduct successful retrieval, pumping and treatment of RAW. The complex RAW retrieval system can be designed as tailored solution for any RAW storage according to known boundary conditions and specific needs. These systems are based on years of experience with RAW manipulation, processing and treatment and the whole RAW management knowledge by Wood Nuclear Slovakia LTD. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Floating Chameleon: Floating Nuclear Power Plants and the Nexus of Maritime and Nuclear Security Law

During the 63rd regular session of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, as part of Norway's statement to the General Conference, Mr. Auden Halvorsen, State Secretary for Norway, made the following statement about transportable nuclear power plants (TNPPs): "Deployment of transportable nuclear power plants—TNPPs—demands our attention. The Agency must intensify its conversations of all aspects of the safety and security of such facilities. . . . The scope and applicability of existing requirements and instruments need to be clarified and developed including dialogue with the International Maritime Organization [IMO]." Ensuring the security of TNPPs is essential for their deployment and implementation. TNPPs may be floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs), which bring together elements of nuclear security related to the nuclear power plant with elements of maritime security. Insofar as an FNPP weds the principles of nuclear and maritime security, it also weds the two domains, the ancient traditions and contemporary practices of maritime law with the contemporary practices of nuclear law. Fundamentally, this raises the question, what are the legal requirements for the security of a FNPP? Although both maritime law and nuclear law have established regimes for security through various legal instruments, does an FNPP expose gaps between the current international legal instruments? The previous question of whether international legal regimes define requirements for the security of FNPPs, but a threshold question remains: what is an FNPP? For purposes of nuclear and maritime security, is an FNPP a facility, is an FNPP a vessel and therefore a transport, or does an FNPP change its status based upon temporal and spatial considerations such as when it is docked at a port generating power or in transit to its destination? This set of questions, and others addressed later in this article, highlights that the issue is not merely a question about security but intersects elements of safety whether an FNPP is in uncharted waters of the international regime for both nuclear and maritime law. Here, this paper addresses many of the questions posed above related to the security regulations for an FNPP.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗