INL Materials and Fuel Complex and the Nuclear Materials Performance Division
INL Materials and Fuel Complex and the Nuclear Materials Performance Division.
36 - MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
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Results for “Nuclear Material”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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Overview of Nuclear Materials Discovery & Qualification initiative (NMDQi)
The Nuclear Materials Discovery and Qualification Initiative (NMDQi) is a program launched in 2020 to address the need for development of new nuclear materials on shorter timelines. The NMDQi has a goal to accelerate nuclear materials qualification to fulfill the promises of early and advanced reactor technologies as a safe, clean, and low-cost baseload energy. Materials development and qualification in the nuclear industry is by definition challenging due to stringent safety requirements, limited availability of specialized facilities for materials irradiation and testing, and the challenging high-temperature, high-radiation environment. Outside the nuclear industry, options exist for increasing the efficiency and rate of materials discovery for accelerated technology commercialization, which can also be applied for our use through the NMDQi. Focus will be on generating tools and capabilities that integrate experimental and computational techniques, allowing materials to be selected prior to fabrication, and providing crucial data to improve upon modeling.
36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
Utilizing Time Reversal Ultrasonics to Detect the Removal of Nuclear Materials from Geological Repositories (FY26 Mid-Year)
Detecting unauthorized nuclear material removal from storage environments, such as geological repositories, is a critical safeguards task essential to ensuring the integrity and non-diversion of nuclear materials. However, this process is fraught with significant technical challenges. Storage configurations often involve tightly packed nuclear material containers or obstructed environments, making detection of removal events exceedingly difficult. Optical surveillance cameras, which are commonly used for monitoring, suffer from substantial limitations, including restricted coverage, reliance on line-of-sight measurements, and vulnerability to environmental conditions in certain storage scenarios. As the global inventory of monitored nuclear materials increases and storage configurations become more complex— such as deep geological repositories, inaccessible storage vaults, and tightly packed containers—there is an urgent need for innovative detection technologies that can reliably identify unauthorized diversion events in these challenging environments. The challenge of detecting nuclear material removal in complex storage environments is both significant and urgent. Preventing unauthorized access, diversion, or tampering with nuclear materials is a cornerstone of global nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation efforts. Current detection methods are increasingly inadequate as storage configurations become more intricate and inaccessible. The limitations of existing technologies—such as their inability to detect changes behind obstructions, reliance on costly and labor-intensive processes, and vulnerability to environmental conditions—pose risks to the effectiveness of safeguards systems. Addressing this challenge is critical to maintaining international trust in nuclear safeguards frameworks and ensuring compliance with nonproliferation agreements. Our project builds on the proven concept of TRU technology that can address this unmet need. TRU has demonstrated exceptional spatial sensitivity and change detection capabilities in complex non-line-ofsight environments, making it uniquely suited for detecting unauthorized nuclear material removal in challenging storage configurations. Unlike optical methods, TRU is not limited by line-of-sight constraints or environmental conditions, enabling reliable detection of subtle alterations even behind obstructions. By leveraging TRU’s ability to identify removal or tampering events, we aim to develop a robust detection system that enhances safeguards in geological repositories, storage vaults, and other complex environments.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory
Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material has been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S&S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.
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A Perspective on Coupled Multiscale Simulation and Validation in Nuclear Materials
The field of nuclear materials encompasses numerous opportunities to address and ultimately solve longstanding industrial problems by improving the fundamental understanding of materials through the integration of experiments with multiscale modeling and high-performance simulation. A particularly noteworthy example is an ongoing study of axial power distortions in a nuclear reactor induced by corrosion deposits, known as CRUD (Chalk River unidentified deposits). We describe how progress is being made toward achieving scientific advances and technological solutions on two fronts. Specifically, the study of thermal conductivity of CRUD phases has augmented missing data as well as revealed new mechanisms. Additionally, the development of a multiscale simulation framework shows potential for the validation of a new capability to predict the power distribution of a reactor, in effect direct evidence of technological impact. The material- and system-level challenges identified in the study of CRUD are similar to other well-known vexing problems in nuclear materials, such as irradiation accelerated corrosion, stress corrosion cracking, and void swelling; they all involve connecting materials science fundamentals at the atomistic- and mesoscales to technology challenges at the macroscale.
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
Absolute nuclear material assay
A method of absolute nuclear material assay of an unknown source comprising counting neutrons from the unknown source and providing an absolute nuclear material assay utilizing a model to optimally compare to the measured count distributions. In one embodiment, the step of providing an absolute nuclear material assay comprises utilizing a random sampling of analytically computed fission chain distributions to generate a continuous time-evolving sequence of event-counts by spreading the fission chain distribution in time.
38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
Nuclear Materials Management Program at the NNSS
The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site, was established in 1951 mainly for weapons testing; because special nuclear materials (SNM) were expended during the tests, a nuclear material management program was not required. That changed in December 2004 with the receipt of Category I SNM for purposes other than weapons testing. At that time, Material Control and Accountability and Nuclear Material Management were a joint laboratory (Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore) effort with nuclear material management being performed at the laboratories. That changed in March 2006 when the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office appointed sole responsibility to the Management and Operations (M&O) contractor, National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). Since 2006 the basic nuclear material management work was completed by a combination of M&O employees and subcontractors, but a true Nuclear Material Management (NMM) Program was not determined to be necessary until recently. With expanding missions and more nuclear material (NM) coming to the NNSS, it became imperative to have an organization to manage these materials; therefore, an NMM Manager was officially appointed by NSTec in 2012. In June 2011 a Gap Analysis and white paper was completed by a subcontractor; this presentation will include highlights from those documents along with our plans to resolve the “gaps” and stand up a functional and compliant NMM Program at the NNSS.
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Comparing results of X-ray diffraction, µ-Raman spectroscopy and neutron diffraction when identifying chemical phases in seized nuclear material, during a comparative nuclear forensics exercise
This work presents the results for identification of chemical phases obtained by several laboratories as a part of an international nuclear forensic round-robin exercise. In this work powder X-ray diffraction (p-XRD) is regarded as the reference technique. Neutron diffraction produced a superior high-angle diffraction pattern relative to p-XRD. Requiring only small amounts of sample, µ-Raman spectroscopy was used for the first time in this context as a potentially complementary technique to p-XRD. The chemical phases were identified as pure UO 2 in two materials, and as a mixture of UO 2 , U 3 O 8 and an intermediate species U 3 O 7 in the third material.
36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
Testing and Versatility of the SAVY 4000 Nuclear Material Container - 15634
The SAVY 4000 container was designed by Nuclear Filter Technology, Inc. to meet DOE M441.1-1 requirements for safe storage of nuclear material, and it is currently being used at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Livermore National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory and Nevada National Security Site. The 316L stainless steel container can be manufactured in a range of sizes from 1 quart to 10 gallon capacity, it can be opened and closed easily by hand, it is sealed with a Viton{sup R} O-ring, and the filter retains particulates and resists liquid water entry while allowing hydrogen gas to escape. This innovative design has proven to provide benefits and uses beyond its original intent. For example, the container was tested in a simulated facility design basis accident involving high temperatures, fuel fire, and subsequent drop, and the damage ratio was measured. This has allowed the LANL plutonium facility to take credit for a material-at-risk reduction of approximately two orders of magnitude for material stored in the SAVY 4000 container. In addition, the water resistant filter allows the nuclear facility to credit the container as a safety feature to mitigate the risk of a criticality accident in the event of facility sprinkler system activation. The container has also been approved to transfer small quantities of solid nuclear material by hand carry between Los Alamos facilities, and it has been approved and used as a waste container for transuranic waste destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The 1 quart capacity container and the future 2 quart design both fit inside the 9977 shipping container, and this has facilitated the transport of nuclear material from Idaho National Laboratory to Nevada Nuclear Security Site, obviated the need for repackaging the material for storage upon arrival. Finally, Los Alamos has recently contracted with Nuclear Filter Technology, Inc. to perform testing to certify the SAVY 4000 container as a DOT Type A liquid transport container. This paper will provide an overview of the various testing regimes and describe the resulting versatility of the container for nuclear material containment. (authors)
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Nuclear Forensic Science: Analysis of Nuclear Material Out of Regulatory Control
Nuclear forensic science seeks to identify the origin of nuclear materials found outside regulatory control. It is increasingly recognized as an integral part of a robust nuclear security program. Our review highlights areas of active, evolving research in nuclear forensics, with a focus on analytical techniques commonly employed in Earth and planetary sciences. Applications of nuclear forensics to uranium ore concentrates (UOCs) are discussed first. UOCs have become an attractive target for nuclear forensic researchers because of the richness in impurities compared to materials produced later in the fuel cycle. Furthermore, the development of chronometric methods for age dating nuclear materials is then discussed, with an emphasis on improvements in accuracy that have been gained from measurements of multiple radioisotopic systems. Finally, papers that report on casework are reviewed, to provide a window into current scientific practice.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Exploring the Use of Muon Momentum for Detection of Nuclear Material Within Shielded Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Casks
The inspection of the storage containers that house used nuclear fuel is an important issue facing the nuclear industry; currently, there are limited options available to provide for even minimal inspections. During the long storage life of the fuel, intermediate handling and transportation activities may take place that can create concerns regarding fuel integrity (safety) and continuity of knowledge (safeguards and security). Accidents and natural disasters also contribute to this concern. The reliable and safe management of used nuclear fuel is among the critical tasks to be addressed for the advancement of fission-based nuclear energy in the United States and elsewhere. Since the early 1950's, when the first nuclear power plant began to produce electricity, approximately 65,000 metric tons of used nuclear fuel have been generated in the United States. The postponement of the opening of a permanent repository until 2048 will lead to increased used fuel accumulation at reactor sites. A rapid increase in storage installations with more than 9,000 casks storing {approx}420,000 assemblies is anticipated by 2050 even if no new nuclear power plants are built. After used nuclear fuel has been placed inside a cask, the cask is sealed, not allowing for visual inspection. Conventional methods, e.g., x-rays, are limited in that they cannot penetrate dense, well-shielded objects. More sophisticated techniques, such as penetrating neutrons or proton radiography, require the use of an expensive accelerator. Efforts by Ziock et al. using neutron and gamma-ray imagers concluded that '...the signatures are deemed insufficient to uniquely identify individual casks of the same type...'. It was found that the gamma-ray and neutron images were dominated by diffusion and thermalization effects resulting from the large amount of shielding. One promising mode of inspection would use cosmic-ray muons. These muons are naturally generated, are able to penetrate dense materials, and are incident from all directions above the horizon. Tomography performed using these muons could potentially provide efficient, inexpensive, remote assessment of used nuclear fuel. However, current muon applications are limited in that they have not included momentum measurement. If momentum measurement could be incorporated, that would represent a big step forward because it would allow more accurate estimation of the muon observables, e.g., scattering variance. This approach has the potential to reconstruct the contents of a cask with improved resolution and identify partial defects, fuel assemblies, and individual fuel rods.
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Resolving Issues Regarding Disposal of Safeguarded Nuclear Materials: Concepts for Near Surface and Intermediate Depth Disposal sites
This document presents two case studies on nuclear waste disposal to explore the safeguards challenges and potential solutions present under each scenario. Both involve the disposal of nuclear materials, either for waste containing safeguarded nuclear materials or waste where safeguards on the nuclear materials have been previously terminated. The first case study is that of a low-level waste (LLW) repository that is situated near the surface. This facility will accept safeguarded nuclear materials for disposal. Examples of this type of activity are rare, but the potential for more facilities of this type is very possible as States become more comfortable with considering safeguards measures in perpetuity on deep geological repositories. The second study extends this to the case of terminated wastes at an intermediate depth disposal site. In this case, the reasons why terminated nuclear materials could be found in these disposal facilities and how obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) are met when the disposed waste items are intermediate level waste (ILW) or high-level waste (HLW).
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Nuclear Material Management Database Development at the Nevada National Security Site
The Nuclear Material Management & Storage (NMM&S) program at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) have the responsibility for the life-cycle management of accountable nuclear materials (NM) in accordance with Department of Energy (DOE) Order 410.2, “Management of Nuclear Materials” and for ensuring workers are protected from exposure to nuclear materials stored outside of an authorized shipping package under DOE Manual 441.1-1. To ensure these responsibilities were addressed in an effective, concise, and secure manner the development of NMM&S databases was undertaken. Using the existing database server structure and data acquired from the official Material Control & Accountability (MC&A) accounting program development of two separate applications, one for O 410.2 inventory requirements (NMIA) and one for M441, were begun in September 2015. The databases were deployed onto the production server in January 2017. The inventory database allows for entering NM characterization data, production of O 410.2 reports, and the ability to retain history files. The M441 database screens NM to determine if it is subject to the manual's requirements, ability to pull in unclassified RadCon materials, and provide reports as required by NMM&S, NM owners, and headquarters programs. These two databases provide NMM&S the ability to better ensure safe and secure packaging, storage, stabilization, consolidation, or disposition of NM and achieve life-cycle management goals.
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TA55 Nuclear Material Packaging, TA55-DOP-091 / PA-RD-01022
This report outlines the safe handling of nuclear materials, nuclear package restrictions, and packaging configurations and procedures.
36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
Application of a deep learning semantic segmentation model to helium bubbles and voids in nuclear materials
Imaging nanoscale radiation-induced defects using the transmission electron microscope (TEM) is a key factor in the successful implementation of materials for nuclear energy structural applications. Analyzing each defect in a TEM micrograph is currently a manual task. To identify the defects in a single image can take anywhere from 15 min to an hour and a project can require the analysis of anywhere from tens to ≥ 100 images. Here, we use artificial intelligence (AI) models to automate this task. For simplification, we evaluated images with only a single type of defect; helium bubbles. Additionally, we performed semantic segmentation of these helium bubble defects in electron microscopy images of irradiated FeCrAl alloys using a deep learning DefectSegNet model. This model, which was previously used to classify crystal defects, is inspired by the classic DenseNet and U-Net image segmentation models. It claims high spatial resolution, but has poor performance at object boundaries. Our paper improves the DefectSegNet model’s application by adding two new features. First, the DefectSegNet model is applied not only to perform calculation pixel-wise but also object (or feature) wise. Because object-wise metrics are directly relevant to our final goal of detecting bubbles, whereas pixel-wise classification is only an intermediate step, it is an important part of our study. Second, a distance map loss (DML) function has been added to increase its performance at object boundaries. It is crucial to accurately represent defects boundaries, especially bubbles, in order to track the bubble-induced swelling caused by irradiation. The boundary-focused DML function is also compared to other loss functions like Cross-entropy, Weighted Binary Cross Entropy (WBCE), Dice and Intersection over Union (IOU). Finally, by incorporating new features, we found a marked improvement on segmentation quality and better shape preservation at the boundaries and areas of the bubbles.
42 ENGINEERING↗
Exploring the Use of Muon Momentum for Detection of Nuclear Material Within Shielded Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Casks
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Chatzidakis, Stylianos↗
Combinatorial and High-Throughput Materials Synthesis to Advanced Nuclear Materials Discovery
Poster for end of LDRD project
36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
NMDQi Nuclear Materials Discovery and Qualification Initiative Conference Overview
The Nuclear Materials Discovery and Qualification Initiative (NMDQi) is designed to accelerate nuclear materials qualification to fulfill the promises of early and advanced reactor technologies as a safe, clean, and low-cost baseload energy. Materials development and qualification in the nuclear industry is by definition challenging due to stringent safety requirements, limited availability of specialized facilities for materials irradiation and testing, and the challenging high-temperature, high-radiation environment. NMDQi will establish tools and capabilities that will greatly accelerate the nuclear fuels and materials development process. These tools will provide both computationally informed insights and high-throughput infrastructure with the goal of completing qualification in a single pass. In this approach, materials must be fabricated with a range of properties of interest so that materials performance can be examined in parallel, rather than with multiple discrete specimens. Advanced manufacturing (AM) techniques, which can produce complex component geometries, microstructures, and compositions, are ideal. The improved process monitoring and control that AM can provide are ideal for ensuring and reducing material variability, which will be particularly important as standards committees pursue regulations for AM components. However, gaining these benefits requires overcoming the substantial barrier of qualifying AM processes and the resulting materials and components for supporting research campaigns and eventually nuclear service.
36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗