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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Developing an intrinsically secure information barrier for arms control verification through machine learning

Near-term solutions are needed to allow for flexible engagement in future nuclear arms control discussions. This project developed a method for implementing an information barrier (IB) on commercial systems, shortening the research and development lifecycle for warhead verification technologies while offering improved and inherently flexible capabilities. The crux of the verification challenge remains the difficulty in developing an authenticatable IB which prevents sensitive host country information from inadvertent transmission to an inspector. Many concepts for IB’s rely on dedicated “trusted” processor modules developed with dedicated custom radiation detection systems and associated algorithms. Without a priori knowledge of the treaty item, the parameter space for measurements can be nearly infinite and robustness against spoofing without the ability to view sensitive data is key. This project has produced an unclassified framework capable of ingesting data from common gamma detectors and identifying the presence of weapons grade nuclear material at over 90% accuracy.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Evaluation of neutron dosimetry capabilities with the MC-15 portable multiplicity counter

This work proposes a preliminary neutron dose rate estimation method for a neutron multiplicity detector through measurement- and simulation-based analyses. Uncharacterized neutron-emitting sources may be encountered in situations such as nuclear emergency response, safeguards, and treaty verification. These circumstances may present irradiation risk to personnel conducting field assay, search, and characterization measurements. It is therefore of interest to provide a field neutron dosimetry capability with the existing neutron multiplicity counting (NMC) capabilities. To date, no commercially-available neutron detection systems are capable of both accurate NMC and real-time neutron dosimetry. This work will focus on estimating dose rate using input from a single fielded NMC called the MC-15. The energy-dependent neutron detection efficiency response of the MC-15 was quantified in monoenergetic neutron simulations and evaluated in response to two neutron-emitting sources and to a polyethylene-moderated source. The results were compared to existing neutron dosimeters and established the proof of concept for further investigation of the MC-15 for dose estimation. Measurement results were also replicated in simulations; additional simulations were then conducted to expand upon the limited empirical data. The initial empirical results provided a conversion factor appropriate for use when measuring 252 Cf neutrons that is independent of polyethylene shielding presence and thickness. The simulated data sets were then used to evaluate a fit equation allowing estimation of the neutron dose rate for less restricted geometric configurations and dependent only on the distance between the source and the detector. Additionally, the energy dependence of the efficiency response indicates that further empirical evaluations could provide energy-dependent conversion factors for broader neutron dosimetry capabilities with a wider range of neutron-emitting sources.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Phase II testing of Xenon International on Mount Schauinsland, Germany

Station RN33 on Mount Schauinsland near Freiburg, Germany, is part of the International Monitoring System monitoring radioxenon in air ( 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe) for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Here, we present data from phase II testing of a new system, Xenon International at RN33, July 14th, 2021 to Jan 22nd, 2022, together with SPALAX data from the same time period. Radioxenon could be detected in 473 of 719 samples, among them many multiple isotope detections. Activity concentrations of spiked and selected environmental samples were verified by laboratory reanalysis. Finally, the sensitivity of Xenon International for radioxenons is up to one order of magnitude better for the metastable isotopes than that of the SPALAX, with a shorter sampling duration of 6 h.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS1998

Ionospheric Signature of Surface Mine Blasts from Global Positioning System Measurements

Sources such as atmospheric or buried explosions and shallow earthquakes are known to produce infrasonic pressure waves in the atmosphere. Because of the coupling between neutral particles and electrons at ionospheric altitudes, these acoustic and gravity waves induce variations of the ionospheric electron density. The Global Positioning System (GPS) provides a way of directly measuring the total electron content in the ionosphere and, therefore, of detecting such perturbations in the upper atmosphere. In July and August 1996, three large surface mine blasts (1.5 Kt each) were detonated at the Black Thunder coal mine in eastern Wyoming. As part of a seismic and acoustic monitoring- experiment, we deployed five dual-frequency GPS receivers at distances ranging from 50 to 200 km from the mine and were able to detect the ionospheric perturbation caused by the blasts. The perturbation starts 10 to 15 min after the blast, lasts for about 30 min, and propagates with an apparent horizontal velocity of 1200 meters per second. Its amplitude reaches 3 x 10 (exp 14) el per square meters in the 7-3 min period band, a value close to the ionospheric perturbation caused by the M = 6.7 Northridge earthquake. The small signal-to-noise ratio of the perturbation can be improved by slant-stacking the electron content time-series recorded by the different GPS receivers taking into account the horizontal propagation of the perturbation. The energy of the perturbation is concentrated in the 200 to 300 second period band, a result consistent with previous observations and numerical model predictions. The 300 second band probably corresponds to gravity modes and shorter periods to acoustic modes, respectively. Using a 1-D stratified velocity model of the atmosphere we show that linear acoustic ray tracing fits arrival times at all GPS receivers. We interpret the perturbation as a direct acoustic wave caused by the explosion itself. This study shows that even relatively small subsurface events can produce ionospheric perturbations that are above the detection threshold of the GPS technique. By sensing derivative signals, which can be detected over a relatively broad region, it appears that GPS might be particularly useful for source characterization within the first acoustic quiet zone where infrasound would probably be ineffective. This suggests that dual-frequency GPS monitoring could contribute to Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty verification.

Calais, Eric↗
DOE OSTI2021

Stochastic Approaches for Calculating and Aggregating Detection Probabilities for Nuclear Material Diversion

The authors built and tested a stochastic simulation to estimate achieved detection probabilities (DPs) on a stratum basis, over a tailorable range of diverted amounts from 0 to 2 significant quantities (SQ), using typical International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection data: i.e., SQ in stratum, number of items, number of gross/partial/bias defect measurements conducted, and realistic relative standard deviation (RSD) values for typical IAEA verification measurements. For bulk strata, the model calculates achieved DP at 0.01 SQ diversion increments; for item strata, the model calculates DP using the smallest realistic diversion increment (e.g., a plate, pin, or coupon). After successfully benchmarking against IAEA deterministic models, the simulation was used to test the sensitivity of DP to certain standard assumptions and selected input parameters. First, the equal defect assumption was tested; the results suggest significant complexity in the effectiveness of partial defect measurements. Next, the authors explored the sensitivity of DP to the assumed RSD of attribute tests. Then, the authors compared non-normal models for instrument performance (e.g., logistic, step, or arbitrary functions) to the typical results from a normal distribution (characterized by RSD). This last comparison was supplemented with experimentally derived performance data for an HM-5 gamma spectrometer. The HM-5 was used to make enrichment measurements on both LEU and HEU MTR fuel elements as plates were removed, and the results fit with logistic and step curves and applied in the simulation. These stochastic DP results were compared to DP estimates from a deterministic model assuming a normal curve and typical RSD, yielding insights that could improve effectiveness in the field. These early results illustrate the potential of stochastic models to better understand achieved DP and to improve safeguards effectiveness.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Exclusion and Verification of Remote Nuclear Reactors with a 1-kiloton Gd -Doped Water Detector

To date, antineutrino experiments built for the purpose of demonstrating a nonproliferation capability have typically employed organic scintillators situated as close to the core as possible (typically at a distance of a few meters to tens of meters) and have not exceeded a few tons in size. One problem with this approach is that proximity to the reactor core requires accommodation by the host facility. Water Cherenkov detectors located offsite, at distances of a few kilometers or greater, may facilitate nonintrusive monitoring and verification of reactor activities over a large area. As the standoff distance increases, the detector target mass must scale accordingly. This paper quantifies the degree to which a kiloton-scale gadolinium-doped water Cherenkov detector can exclude the existence of undeclared reactors within a specified distance, and remotely detect the presence of a hidden reactor in the presence of declared reactors, by verifying the operational power and standoff distance using a Feldman-Cousins-based likelihood analysis. A 1-kton scale (fiducial) water Cherenkov detector can exclude gigawatt-scale nuclear reactors up to tens of kilometers within a year. In conclusion, when attempting to identify the specific range and power of a reactor, the detector energy resolution is not sufficient to delineate between the two.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Development of local-power-free, remote α -particle detection using optical fibers

We demonstrate the application of fluorescence optical fiber coupled to a telecom grade fiber as a sensor for alpha particles using alpha-specific ZnS(Ag) scintillation materials whose wavelength is down-shifted into a low-loss region of the telecom grade fiber transmission band. Telecom-grade fiber optics offer a solution for sensing alpha radiation in deep repositories and cask storage for radioactive materials due to the stability of SiO 2 under normal environmental conditions and its relative radiation hardness at low radiation doses. Long-term nuclear waste storage facilities require sensors for the detection of leakage of radioactive materials that are maintenance-free, do not require power and can survive with no ‘wear out’ mechanisms for decades. By accomplishing the wavelength transformation, we maximize efficiencies in the detection of α-particles and signal transport and can detect alpha scintillation at distances on the order of >1 km with a sensor that is ~3% efficient and can be easily scaled as a sensor array. This paper describes the construction and testing of the sensor including manufacture of the controlled thickness films, verification of the wavelength shift from 450 to 620 nm and optimization of the sensitivity as a function of thickness. We also model the relative sensitivity of the film as a function of film thickness, and we demonstrate a signal-to-noise ratio of 10 at a range of greater than 1 km.

alpha particles↗
DOE OSTI2021

Understanding fission gas bubble distribution, lanthanide transportation, and thermal conductivity degradation in neutron-irradiated α-U using machine learning

U—10Zr based metallic nuclear fuel is the leading candidate for next-generation sodium-cooled fast reactors in the United States. US research reactors have used and tested this fuel type since the 1960s and accumulated considerable experience and knowledge about the fuel performance. Most of the knowledge, however, remains empirical. The lack of mechanistic understanding of fuel performance puts a large burden on proof through experimental verification for the qualification of U—10Zr fuel for commercial use. Further, this paper proposes an image data-driven machine learning approach, coupled with domain knowledge provided by advanced post irradiation examination, to provide unprecedented quantified insights into the morphology, size, density and the connectivity of fission gas bubbles and their effects on the fission product transportation and thermal conductivity. Specifically, we developed a method to automatically detect, extract statistics, and classify ~19,000 fission gas bubbles into different categories, and quantitatively link the data to lanthanide transportation through connected bubbles and degradation of thermal conductivity along the radial temperature gradient in a neutron irradiated U—10Zr annular fuel. Results indicate the approach can be modified to study other irradiation effects, such as secondary phase redistribution and gaseous fuel swelling in other irradiated nuclear fuels.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Direct Uranium Isotopic Analysis of Swipe Surfaces by Microextraction-ICP-MS

The ability to directly measure uranium isotope ratios on environmental swipes has been achieved through a solution-based microextraction process and represents a significant advancement toward the development of a rapid method to analyze international nuclear safeguard samples. Here, a microextraction probe is lowered and sealed onto the swipe surface, and analytes within the sampling site (~8 mm2) are dissolved and extracted into a flowing solvent of 2% nitric acid (HNO 3 ). The mobilized species are subsequently directed into an inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometer (ICP-MS) for accurate and precise isotope ratio determination. This work highlights the novelty of the sampling mechanism, particularly with the direct coupling of the microextraction probe to the ICP-MS and measurement of uranium isotope ratios. The preliminary method detection limit for the microextraction-ICP-MS method, utilizing a quadrupole-based MS, was determined to be ~50 pg of 238 U. Additionally, precise and accurate isotope ratio measurements were achieved on uranium reference materials for both the major ( 235 U/ 238 U) and minor ( 234 U/ 238 U and 236 U/ 238 U) ratios. While the present work is focused on directly measuring uranium isotopic systems on swipe surfaces for nuclear safeguards and verification applications, the benefits would extend across many applications in which direct solid sampling is sought for elemental and isotopic analysis.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
NASA NTRS2000

A Nuclear Interaction Model for Understanding Results of Single Event Testing with High Energy Protons

An internuclear cascade and evaporation model has been adapted to estimate the LET spectrum generated during testing with 200 MeV protons. The model-generated heavy ion LET spectrum is compared to the heavy ion LET spectrum seen on orbit. This comparison is the basis for predicting single event failure rates from heavy ions using results from a single proton test. Of equal importance, this spectra comparison also establishes an estimate of the risk of encountering a failure mode on orbit that was not detected during proton testing. Verification of the general results of the model is presented based on experiments, individual part test results, and flight data. Acceptance of this model and its estimate of remaining risk opens the hardware verification philosophy to the consideration of radiation testing with high energy protons at the board and box level instead of the more standard method of individual part testing with low energy heavy ions.

Culpepper, William X.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Subscale Validation of the Subsurface Active Filtration of Exhaust (SAFE) Approach to the NTP Ground Testing

Nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) has been recognized as an enabling technology for missions to Mars and beyond. However, one of the key challenges of developing a nuclear thermal rocket is conducting verification and development tests on the ground. A number of ground test options are presented, with the Sub-surface Active Filtration of Exhaust (SAFE) method identified as a preferred path forward for the NTP program. The SAFE concept utilizes the natural soil characteristics present at the Nevada National Security Site to provide a natural filter for nuclear rocket exhaust during ground testing. A validation method of the SAFE concept is presented, utilizing a non-nuclear sub-scale hydrogen/oxygen rocket seeded with detectible radioisotopes. Additionally, some alternative ground test concepts, based upon the SAFE concept, are presented. Finally, an overview of the ongoing discussions of developing a ground test campaign are presented.

Nuclear Rocket Engines↗
DOE OSTI2024

Utilizing Advanced Statistics to Determine Anomalistic Conditions in Pebble-Bed Reactors

Pebble-bed reactors (PBRs) utilize hundreds of thousands of fuel pebbles, which continuously circulate through the core, in lieu of traditional fuel assemblies to generate fissions and produce power. The use of unmarked fuel pebbles presents a challenge for international safeguards verification that nuclear material is not being diverted. To ensure pebble diversion is not taking place, new methods for accounting for and monitoring the pebbles should be examined to determine an appropriate methodology for performing bulk accountancy with pebbles. Here, this work examines the use of statistical methods for determining if the reactor is within a declared range of operation by examining the statistical distribution of pebble burnup as they are discharged from the core. Using this methodology, we created a model that detects diversion over 95% of the time, over multiple diversion pathways, if the reactor core maintains a constant power density during the diversion process and only falsely labels a diversion case nominal 2% of the time. For a diversion scenario where the reactor is maintained at a constant power, the statistical analysis can correctly identify if diversion is occurring over 80% of the time; however, nearly 20% of specific diversion pathways are mislabeled nominal. These results provide a basis and framework for exploring the further use of statistical methods to determine where these methods could be most useful and where additional methods, such as machine learning, could be used to capture if diversion is occurring in pebble-bed reactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Latent Pitfalls in Microstructure-Based Modeling for Thermally Aged 9Cr-1Mo-V Steel (Grade 91)

A case study was conducted on a mechanistic model development that predicted tensile strength deterioration with thermal aging of 9Cr-1Mo-V steel in supporting the 60-year design life expected for advanced nuclear reactors. For property prediction beyond practical testing times, mechanistic modeling is highly desired, as it taps into the physics of structure–property relationships and therefore can generate reliable results for extrapolation. Meanwhile, as mechanistic models are often complicated, reflecting the intricacy of microstructure and strengthening mechanisms, pitfalls that are difficult to detect often exist. Here, this paper discusses latent pitfalls that are common in mechanistic modeling or specific in this 9Cr-1Mo-V case development through using the American Society of Mechanical Engineers verification and validation in computational solid mechanics (ASME V&V 10) standard for evaluating credibility of modeling in materials engineering. Suggestions are also made for enhancing reliability of microstructure-based modeling.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

An In Situ Feed Monitoring System for Molten Salt Reactors with Fast Neutron Energy Spectrum Molten Salt Reactor Applications

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) are one of the six promising advanced reactor technologies selected for further research and development by the Generation IV International Forum. More than twenty MSR designs are actively being developed around the world. Several of these designs are liquid-fueled and intended for operation within the fast neutron energy spectrum.1 National regulations will require liquid-fueled MSRs to control and account for nuclear material within licensed facilities. Additionally, states with comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are obligated to declare nuclear material quantities within facilities. In return, the IAEA Department of Safeguards independently verifies these quantities and provides assurance that the nuclear material and facility are being used only for peaceful purposes. One key distinction of liquid-fueled MSRs compared with other types of reactors is that in portions of the facility, the nuclear material is in bulk form rather than discrete items. Traditional nuclear material accounting techniques such as physical item counting and verification of serial numbers on fresh fuel assemblies do not translate directly to all process streams within liquid-fueled reactors. Liquid-fueled MSRs are typically designed with low excess reactivity. This feature provides safety benefits but also means that most MSRs require the addition of makeup fuel salt while a reactor is operational. The nuclear material in the initial fuel salt and in any makeup fuel salt must be quantified. Additionally, distinct nuclear material diversion and reactor misuse scenarios form the basis of the detection methods and monitoring systems developed for liquid-fueled MSRs. For example, the IAEA provides assurance that fuel salt containing nuclear material is not being diverted from the system, that the feed salt matches the reported actinide concentrations and uranium enrichment, and that no additional fertile material is being introduced into the system. Measurement systems currently used for nuclear material control and accounting are not directly applicable to achieving MSR safeguards goals. This paper concerns a system being designed to account for the nuclear material added to liquid-fueled MSRs and monitor for diversion and misuse scenarios related to MSR feed systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Simulations of muon imaging with the LANL GMT detector for spent nuclear fuel cask content verification

Atmospheric muons are typically high energy, highly penetrating charged particles. They interact with matter primarily through multiple Coulomb scatterings. Muon scattering intensities can be used to characterize the density and atomic number of the matter that they pass through. Previously, the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) muon tomography team performed muon imaging of the partially filled MC-10 spent nuclear fuel (SNF) cask at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). This experiment demonstrated the feasibility of muon imaging for the verification of spent fuel container contents. That original effort used the mini muon tracker array, consisting of two arrays of drift tubes on either side of the SNF cask. The reconstructed image quality was limited by statistics, largely due to low muon flux at high zenith angles. A LANL led team will perform new measurements with a larger array, the Giant Muon Tracker (GMT), to improve data collection rates and statistics. In this work, simulations were performed with the GMT near the partially filled INL MC-10 cask. For more general fuel diversion detection, a full MC-10 cask and casks with a singular missing fuel bundle were also simulated. To understand minimum measurement times needed for missing bundle identification, 100 000 to millions of tracked muons (corresponding to 1.4 days to several weeks measurement time) were analyzed. Simulated images were then analyzed visually and numerically to explore techniques designed to minimize the collection time needed to identify the diversion of fuel in each scenario.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Electropotential Verification for Nuclear Safeguards

The international safeguards regime desires methods to efficiently verify that facilities are only performing declared activities. Electropotential verification (EPV) is a newly proposed technique that was tested for its feasibility to perform facility design information verification (DIV). EPV works by passing a constant, low voltage current through a conductive system (facility infrastructure of nuclear fuel assembly) and measuring the resulting voltage at various places throughout the infrastructure in order to establish a baseline. Changes made to the system affect these voltage readings, which will deviate from the baseline and indicate that a change to the system was made. For large scale infrastructure such as a nuclear facility DIV, it appears feasible that changes in configuration of the system’s grounding can be detected in real-time, and the location of the change can be inferred from the measured intensity of the change in voltage.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Electropotential Verification for Nuclear Safeguards

The international safeguards regime desires methods to efficiently verify that facilities are only performing declared activities. Electropotential verification (EPV) is a newly proposed technique that was tested for its feasibility to perform facility design information verification (DIV) and verification of spent nuclear fuel while in a cooling pool. EPV works by passing a constant, low voltage current through a conductive system (facility infrastructure of nuclear fuel assembly) and measuring the resulting voltage at various places throughout the infrastructure in order to establish a baseline. Changes made to the system affect these voltage readings, which will deviate from the baseline and indicate that a change to the system was made. For facility DIV, it appears feasible that changes in configuration of the system’s grounding can be detected in real-time, and the location of the change can be inferred from the measured intensity of the change in voltage. Determination of whether or not spent fuel was present in a fuel rod, as well as the presence/absence of a fuel rod from an assembly using EPV, proved unsuccessful with the sensitivity of instrumentation used in this study.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verification of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) using Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) and a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) Detector

SNM verification can be accomplished via two methods i.e. destructive analysis (DA) or nondestructive analysis (NDA). The DA modes are much more accurate compared to NDA modes; nevertheless, the sample's physical integrity is destroyed in the process. Techniques such as ICP-MS, ID-ICP-MS, TI-MS are few examples of DA, where a bulk material is ground and mixed with a solution (some form of acid) to acquire a homogenous sample. In contrast, NDA modes utilize signals emitted by the sample such as gamma, neutrons, light, or heat to analyze samples under investigation. HPGe detectors are some of the most frequently used gamma detectors to assay SNM. However, in a high activity scenario it provides a large uncertainty and sometimes becomes unfeasible to measure low energy gamma rays. Meanwhile, neutron detectors are not affected by the gamma background, therefore they can be used in addition to the gamma detectors to verify total fissile mass ({sup 235}U + {sup 239}Pu) of SNM. The AWCC is one of the thermal neutron NDA systems developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It consists of 42 {sup 3}He detectors to measure gross neutrons (singles), coincidence neutrons (doubles), higher order multiplicity counting (triples, quadruples, etc.). It can effectively operate in both active and passive neutron interrogation modes. It can utilize AmLi, AmBe, or {sup 252}Cf active interrogation neutron sources. It is used to verify declared fissile mass ({sup 235}U or {sup 239}Pu) present in SNM. Objectives: Calibrate HPGe and AWCC for lightly irradiated (with enough {sup 137}Cs gamma background) ∼93% enriched HEU fuels; Verify fissile mass ({sup 235}U +{sup 239}Pu) content using AWCC and HPGe; Model and benchmark AWCC in MCNP6. Neutron coincidence and multiplicity counting: Two or more neutrons are coincident if they are detected by the system within the specified gate window; In AWCC: Gate window is 128 μsec; Induced fission in fissile material such as {sup 235}U and {sup 239}Pu - emission of time correlated neutrons - Singles, Doubles, Triples, or Quadruples; No induced fission in non-fissile materials- no correlated neutrons - only singles. SNM can be verified with high accuracy and precision using gamma and neutron NDA instruments such as HPGe and AWCC. Interaction with thermal neutrons. Non-fissile atoms - do not emit correlated neutrons. Fissile atoms - emit correlated neutrons during induced fission events. The time correlated neutrons can be detected by using coincidence or multiplicity counters such as AWCC. Likewise, {sup 235}U produces 186 keV gamma peak that can be measured by a HPGe gamma detector. Counts under 186 keV gamma peak provide information about {sup 235}U content. Combining AWCC and HPGe results can provide better understanding of special nuclear material under investigation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗