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DOE OSTI2020

Integrating Data Sources for Improved Safeguards and Accountancy of Electrochemical Fuel Reprocessing Systems. Final Report

Electrochemical reprocessing (also commonly known as “pyroprocessing”) of used nuclear fuel is an alternative to aqueous reprocessing that confers a number of advantages, including the ability to process more recently-discharged fuel, smaller resultant waste volumes, and the lack of isolation of plutonium in the product stream. While electrochemical reprocessing systems have seen a significant research and development effort, nuclear safeguards and security of these systems remains under-developed, particularly given the significant differences in operating environment and process flowsheet compared with established aqueous methods. Objective 4 of DOE’s nuclear energy research and development activities in Nuclear Energy Research and Development Roadmap is: “Understand and minimize the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.” Material Control & Accountancy (MC&A) programs at nuclear processing plants deter and detect theft and diversion of nuclear material by both outside and inside adversaries. Empirical modeling and data analytics of online measurements and state indicators can improve the timeliness of detection and reduce the uncertainty in accountancy measures. To support the development and demonstration of such methods, data are needed that capture expected measurement values collected throughout electrochemical reprocessing facilities. A review of the available literature of current research in measurements for electrochemical reprocessing systems identified twenty-two candidate measurement methodologies, which characterize fuel/salt composition, concentrations of various isotopes and elements, and operational parameters throughout the reprocessing facility. Four primary measurement methodologies have been simulated based on either physical simulations or empirical correlations: gamma emissions, neutron emissions, hybrid k-edge densitometry (HKED), and cyclic voltammetry. Initial investigation into the use of these measures for process monitoring and detection suggests the approach is viable and worthy of further investigation. This report summarizes efforts to generate signatures of key measurements during operation of electrochemical reprocessing facilities and initial investigation of data analytics to support process monitoring, diversion detection, and accountancy.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Special Nuclear Geometric Modeling

This report is a summary of our summer interns project that focused on investigating the usefulness of the Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software (GADRAS) into the Material Control & Accountability (MC&A) Measurements Team. The project's findings highlight the advantages of using GADRAS and demonstrate its value in improving the MC&A Measurements Team's analytical capabilities.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Development of MCNP Training Modules for Safeguards Practitioners [Abstract]

The Monte-Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) software developed at LANL is the most widely used neutron transport code in the world. It is an essential tool for a variety of applications including detector development and design, nuclear fuel burnup simulation, criticality safety, and nondestructive assay system optimization. For this reason, it is indispensable within the safeguards and materials control & accountability (MC&A) communities. Multiple MCNP training courses have been created and taught over the last several decades by the MCNP development team at LANL, however there are no existing courses that cover specialized topics considered fundamental to NDA and safeguards models. To fill this gap, the MCNP team and Safeguards Science and Technology group at LANL have co-created a set of training modules customized to meet the specialized needs of the safeguards and MC&A communities. The basic modules cover concepts such as NDA system optimization, He-specific and other capture tallies, and tools for improved theoretical understanding. An advanced module was also created to cover topics including variance reduction for active interrogation simulations, use of the LANL MCNPTools post-processor, PTRAC (particle tracking) and list-mode data simulations, and fuel burnup simulations. The training modules teach to the latest and most state-of-the-art MCNP features and tools released by the development team at LANL and are intended to be taught jointly by the developers and safeguards experts. Ultimately, we hope that creation of these modules will serve to capture and convey the safeguards modeling and MCNP expertise at LANL, and that we will be able to share the modules more broadly with the MC&A and safeguards communities.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safeguards Modeling for Advanced Nuclear Facility Design.

Future nuclear fuel cycle facilities will see a significant benefit from considering materials accountancy requirements early in the design process. The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group is demonstrating Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for a notional electrochemical reprocessing facility as part of a 2020 Milestone. The idea behind SSBD is to consider regulatory requirements early in the design process to provide more optimized systems and avoid costly retrofits later in the design process. Safeguards modeling, using single analyst tools, allows the designer to efficiently consider materials accountancy approaches that meet regulatory requirements. However, safeguards modeling also allows the facility designer to go beyond current regulations and work toward accountancy designs with rapid response and lower thresholds for detection of anomalies. This type of modeling enables new safeguards approaches and may inform future regulatory changes. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) has been used for materials accountancy system design and analysis. This paper steps through the process of designing a Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) system, presents the baseline system design for an electrochemical reprocessing facility, and provides performance metrics from the modeling analysis. The most critical measurements in the electrochemical facility are the spent fuel input, electrorefiner salt, and U/TRU product output measurements. Finally, material loss scenario analysis found that measurement uncertainties (relative standard deviations) for Pu would need to be at 1% (random and systematic error components) or better in order to meet domestic detection goals or as high as 3% in order to meet international detection goals, based on a 100 metric ton per year plant size.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Fuel Fabrication and Single Stage Aqueous Process Modeling

The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies program utilizes modeling and simulation to assess Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) concerns for a variety of nuclear facilities. Single analyst tools allow for rapid design and evaluation of advanced approaches for new and existing nuclear facilities. A low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel conversion and fabrication facility simulator is developed to assist with MC&A for existing facilities. Measurements are added to the model (consistent with current best practices). Material balance calculations and statistical tests are also added to the model. In addition, scoping work is performed for developing a single stage aqueous reprocessing model. Preliminary results are presented and discussed, and next steps outlined.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Low Enriched Fuel Fabrication Safeguards Modeling

The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program utilizes modeling and simulation to assess Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) concerns for a variety of nuclear facilities. Single analyst tools allow for rapid design and evaluation of advanced approaches for new and existing nuclear facilities. A low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel conversion and fabrication facility simulator has been developed to assist with MC&A for existing LEU fuel fabrication for light water reactors. Simulated measurement blocks were added to the model (consistent with current best practices). Material balance calculations and statistical tests have also been added to the model.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Application of Raman Spectroscopy to Determine Uranium Content in ADUN Solution

The work presented in this report is part of the ongoing efforts to address the nuclear material control and accounting needs for advanced reactor fuel fabrication facilities. This work was supported by the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program under the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy‘s Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Supply Chain program. The activities and engagements under the MPACT program are designed to support a robust US civilian nuclear energy enterprise. In the work described in this report, we supported MPACT objectives by developing measurement techniques that could be used for material accounting and process monitoring and by working with industry partners to identify existing gaps and areas for improvement. Oak Ridge National Laboratory has been working with commercial tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel fabricators such as Standard Nuclear to develop technology for rapid and cost-effective uranium content assessment. This work has focused on demonstrating advanced measurement techniques (e.g., Raman spectroscopy) that can be used for rapid, reliable, and cost-effective routine measurements of uranium content in feed solutions and liquid waste streams as well as for monitoring in-line process measurements and product streams. Specifically, this report explores techniques for accurately determining uranium content in acid-deficient uranyl nitrate (ADUN) solutions and detecting low uranium concentrations in ammonia solutions. Developing such measurement techniques will benefit TRISO fuel fabrication facilities, facilities involved in other parts of the fuel cycle that require online monitoring of aqueous solutions, and potentially molten salt fuel reactors. This work supports developing Raman spectroscopy procedures to determine uranium concentrations in ADUN solutions, which are used as feedstock in the sol–gel process for creating TRISO fuel. Some additional benefits of using Raman spectroscopy for uranium quantification in fabrication facilities include enabling online monitoring of the chemical process, which would provide near real-time feedback; eliminating the need for sample transfers, preparation, or dilution; providing nondestructive measurements; and user friendliness. In this fiscal year, FY25, we determined the identity of the unknown Raman band at approximately 853 cm−1 that was discovered in ADUN Raman spectra in FY24, created calibration curves and determined uranium concentrations of two ADUN solutions, and compared the Raman results to results obtained from inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry and Davies–Gray titration. Furthermore, we have identified focus areas for experimentation in future fiscal years. A key result is that the accuracy of using Raman can provide accuracy comparable to destructive analysist techniques, With a well-developed calibration curve, using standards and a large number of samples (more than five samples), uncertainty on the order of 1%–3% is achievable. Given that the uncertainties achieved by Raman spectroscopy were on the order of the uncertainties achieved using ICP-MS, we conclude that with a well-developed procedure Raman spectroscopy can be used to determine uranium concentrations in ADUN solutions for NMC&A applications. The benefits of such an approach are that the time and effort will be less than that of comparable destructive analysis techniques, with approximately the same level of technical expertise. This will be attractive to operators of fuel fabrication facilities as it will lower costs and improve efficiencies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Recommendations for a Fundamental Nuclear Material Control (FNMC) Plan for TRISO Fuel Fabrication Facilities Under NRC Regulations

A fundamental nuclear material control (FNMC) plan, which is required for all fuel fabrication facilities that are authorized to possess more than 1 effective kg of special nuclear material, describes how material control and accounting (MC&A) requirements will be met to comply with US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations. Tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel fabrication facilities are likely to have issues in meeting MC&A requirements because of the new processes and fuel types their work involves. This report provides recommendations for an FNMC plan specifically for a TRISO fuel fabrication facility under NRC regulations and includes a draft outline of an FNMC plan. This report was produced for the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program under the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technologies programs within the US Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

An In Situ Feed Monitoring System for Molten Salt Reactors with Fast Neutron Energy Spectrum Molten Salt Reactor Applications

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) are one of the six promising advanced reactor technologies selected for further research and development by the Generation IV International Forum. More than twenty MSR designs are actively being developed around the world. Several of these designs are liquid-fueled and intended for operation within the fast neutron energy spectrum.1 National regulations will require liquid-fueled MSRs to control and account for nuclear material within licensed facilities. Additionally, states with comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are obligated to declare nuclear material quantities within facilities. In return, the IAEA Department of Safeguards independently verifies these quantities and provides assurance that the nuclear material and facility are being used only for peaceful purposes. One key distinction of liquid-fueled MSRs compared with other types of reactors is that in portions of the facility, the nuclear material is in bulk form rather than discrete items. Traditional nuclear material accounting techniques such as physical item counting and verification of serial numbers on fresh fuel assemblies do not translate directly to all process streams within liquid-fueled reactors. Liquid-fueled MSRs are typically designed with low excess reactivity. This feature provides safety benefits but also means that most MSRs require the addition of makeup fuel salt while a reactor is operational. The nuclear material in the initial fuel salt and in any makeup fuel salt must be quantified. Additionally, distinct nuclear material diversion and reactor misuse scenarios form the basis of the detection methods and monitoring systems developed for liquid-fueled MSRs. For example, the IAEA provides assurance that fuel salt containing nuclear material is not being diverted from the system, that the feed salt matches the reported actinide concentrations and uranium enrichment, and that no additional fertile material is being introduced into the system. Measurement systems currently used for nuclear material control and accounting are not directly applicable to achieving MSR safeguards goals. This paper concerns a system being designed to account for the nuclear material added to liquid-fueled MSRs and monitor for diversion and misuse scenarios related to MSR feed systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Considerations of Radiation-Hardened Electronics for Alpha Detectors in Molten Salt Reactors

Along with advanced generations of reactors quickly becoming reality, the need for instrumentation to provide reliable information for their safety and operation is also becoming relevant. Instrumentation-wise, molten salt reactors (MSRs) represent an especially challenging case in which detectors must survive extreme temperatures, high amounts of radiation, and a highly corrosive coolant. Adding to the complexity, tight material control and accounting must be maintained with any special nuclear material (SNM), a practice made more difficult by the nature of a loop of flowing fuel. Alpha spectroscopy offers a unique window into investigating the isotopic concentrations of actinides within just such a molten salt environment. The characteristic α emissions of specific actinide isotopes in the salt enable quantification of their concentrations. Semiconductor devices based on wide bandgap materials such as silicon carbide and gallium oxide can withstand the extreme temperatures within MSRs and offer good chemical stability with the corrosive salt. Collaborators at The Ohio State University are fabricating and testing a β gallium oxide α particle sensor that could identify actinide concentrations within the fuel salt to help improve the material control and accounting required for complicated system inherent to MSRs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Development of an MC&A toolbox for liquid-fueled molten salt reactors with online reprocessing (Final Report)

A critical barrier to the deployment of MSRs is the absence of a well-defined nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) approach, a vital prerequisite to meet NRC licensing requirements as well as facilitating future international exports. Liquid-fueled MSR variants (especially those incorporating online refueling or reprocessing) present a unique set of challenges to traditional nuclear material control and accountancy. Unlike solid-fueled light-water reactors, traditional item-counting methods cannot be applied as an accountancy strategy. Rather, MC&A approaches to MSR variants (including both uranium and thorium fueled designs) are more analogous to bulk material handling facilities (e.g., enrichment and reprocessing); yet further complicating matters is the fact that fuel medium is also highly radioactive. Meanwhile, the space of MSRs covers a broad range of design parameters, including thermal and fast spectra designs; operation in actinide breeder or burner modes, choice of actinide fuel used (e.g., 235 U, 232 Th / 233 U, denatured 233 U, etc.), pool or loop-type configuration, and even different salt chemistry. Each of these design choices introduce significant challenges to MC&A approaches within MSR facilities. We propose to bridge this gap for liquid-fueled MSRs by developing a modular, component-based test framework for evaluating viable process monitoring and MC&A techniques specifically suited to liquid-fueled MSR system variants employing online refueling or reprocessing. This test platform will consist of a toolbox of independent process modules representing discrete physical units (such as the reactor core, off-gas processing, decay tanks, and actinide separation units), each with its own self-contained physics responsive to the input mass flow, along with appropriate measurement models that can be coupled to key flow points. These dynamic physical signatures thus afford the ability to test the viability and efficacy of potential accountancy techniques under the full range of reactor operating conditions. As process modules are connected via mass flows, the result is a reconfigurable, generic MSR mass flow model capable of serving as an MC&A test platform for a broad spectrum of possible MSR configurations. The resulting MSR MC&A toolbox will enable robust assessment of accountancy strategies for this unique facility type, including analysis of physical feedbacks arising both from depletion of the fuel over time as well as from potential off-normal events, including those introduced by equipment failures (e.g., a pump failure) as well as by malicious action (i.e., attempts to divert material). The proposed toolbox both addresses a critical needs area for the MPACT analysis toolkit while leveraging existing MPACT-sponsored tools, especially with respect to simulation of measurement and accountancy techniques for advanced fuel cycle facilities. Beyond enabling new analysis capabilities for MSR systems, the design of this toolbox will be to such to maximize compatibility with existing MPACT tools, such to enhance existing facility MC&A analysis capabilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fissionable Materials Handlers Operators-Initial Training

These courses were designed for all Initial Fissionable Material Handlers Operators and Supervisors whose job activities will require the performance of Fissile Material Operations located within the Plutonium Facility (PF-4). The course requirements are based on DOE order 426.2, Personnel Section, Qualification, and Training Requirements for Fissionable Material Handlers. These courses are required training for all initial Fissionable Material Handlers and is specific to TA-55 FMH Certification. It covers the core areas and topics in Criticality Safety, Material-at-Risk, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, Radiological Protection, TA-55 Material Handling and Movement.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Use Machine Learning to Improve Burnup Measurement in Pebble Bed Reactors

Advanced pebble bed reactor (PBR) designs post new challenges in material control and accountancy (MC&A) because the fuel materials, distributed in many discrete pebbles, are continuously circulated through the reactor core and the refueling path compared to the bulk fuel assembly design in conventional reactors, e.g., light water reactors. In pebble bed reactors, there are hundreds of thousands of fuel pebbles in the reactor core during the normal operation, and the burnup of each pebble is measured when ejected from the core. Accurate burnup measurement is an important step in material control and spent fuel disposition. The measurement is usually based on detection of radiation signatures of fission products accumulated in the pebble fuel over irradiation in the core. Previous research has shown that height of photopeaks of fission products, such as 134 Cs, 137 Cs, 154 Eu, etc., can be used independently or in combination to infer or predict the level of burnup in the fuel. However, it remains challenging to measure such complex sources due to self-shielding effects, strong radiation background and intervening materials. Another operational challenge is the required high throughput of pebbles undergoing burnup measurement, which necessitates limited measurement time and thus impacts quality of measured gamma-ray spectra. Hence, advanced spectral analysis methods are needed to analyze the noisy gamma spectra and predict the burnup values.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Uranium Holdup Monitoring with Compton Imaging as Function of Depth and Mass

Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) programs track masses of materials flowing through production processes, where some material remains in process equipment as holdup. Quantification of these masses using gamma emissions typically involves usage of a well characterized radiation detector and assumptions of geometric configuration to constrain detection efficiencies, where the Generalized Geometry Holdup (GGH) method is often used. Uncertainties on the order of ±50% are observed, where the difficulties arise based on the asymmetric and gradient distributions of material that do not fall within the bounds of GGH. Gamma imagers provide a possible means to improve this geometric knowledge. This work describes the process used in creating a series of mass standards to aid the development of imaging algorithms for quantification.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Technical Basis for Proposed Changes to DOE-STD-1194-2019, Nuclear Material Attractiveness Determination and Categorization

The Department of Energy (DOE)’s Technical Standard DOE-STD-1194-2019 (dated September 2019), Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability, provides key guidance for the determination of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) attractiveness levels. Attractiveness levels are a key component in the security categorization of SNM processed, used, and stored at DOE facilities. Upon review, the writing team identified specific components relating to the determination of attractiveness levels that could be modified to improve clarity, reduce burden on sites, and/or better align with the graded safeguards principle that is central to the DOE’s nuclear security program. The report outlines the original verbiage, issues with implementation of that verbiage, proposed new verbiage, and the expected benefits thus serving as the technical basis for the proposed changes.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Detector Response and Battery Reliability

The Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) measurements team performs confirmation measurements of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) at different locations around Sandia. The measurement team has access to two High purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors, the AEGIS (Model: AEGIS-BEGE5030), and the ORTEC (Model: trans-SPEC-DX-100). These two can operate purely on battery power, but the response of the detectors while on battery power is not well documented. To enhance our knowledge with these detectors the team wants to investigate the detectors response to changes in battery range, wall charging, and mid operation battery swaps (Hot Swaps).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2025

Diversion Path Analysis: A Proposed Methodology to Develop an MC&A Approach for Liquid-Fueled Molten Salt Reactors

Nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) is a critical element of both the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and US Department of Energy (DOE)’s domestic safeguards and security requirements. NRC licensees are required, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 74 to establish and maintain an MC&A program that captures and records the quantities and locations of special nuclear material (SNM) at the facility. Along with physical protection, MC&A is a key element of domestic nuclear material safeguards that enables the NRC to ensure that SNM is controlled and accounted for. SNM, per 10 CFR Part 74, refers to plutonium, 233 U, and uranium enriched in the isotope 233 U or 235 U, but does not include source material. Periodic physical inventories, coupled with material balance evaluations, are effective and demonstrated tools to account for and detect theft or diversion of SNM in facilities containing SNM in bulk material form (i.e., not in discrete, countable items). Historically in the United States, these types of facilities have included fuel fabrication, conversion, and enrichment facilities. In comparison, reactors have relied on item counting of assemblies and control of SNM while in containment (e.g., a sealed reactor pressure vessel) because, to date, reactor fuel has been in item form. In liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs), unlike traditional light water reactors (LWRs) or bulk facilities, bulk SNM quantities can change significantly during operation as a result of depletion and transmutation. This introduces challenges to the use of traditional periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations to detect theft or diversion of SNM in reactors that use SNM in bulk material form. Liquid-fueled (i.e., salt-fueled) MSR facilities are MSRs that use SNM within a salt eutectic as the fuel. The SNM is in a bulk material form any time it is outside of fresh or spent fuel storage containers. Some examples of when SNM will be in bulk form in the facility are during addition of fuel to the reactor system, while fuel is circulating in operation, and while fuel is in a drain tank. Periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations can likely be effectively applied to many portions of an MSR facility, including all areas where depletion and transmutation are not significantly changing the quantities of SNM within the control area. Within an MSR facility, this would include fresh fuel receipt and loading, waste streams that may contain SNM, irradiated fuel storage outside of the reactor core, and any irradiated fuel processing that may happen after SNM has been removed from the reactor. All of these process steps could rely on measurements of SNM quantities compared with documented inventories. Any discrepancies from predicted (i.e., book) inventories and measured inventories could be quantified as inventory differences, consistent with traditional MC&A guidance from the NRC (e.g., in NUREG-1065 Revision 2, NUREG-2159 Revision 1, and RG 5.29 Revision 2). Within the reactor system, additions and removals to the book inventory include depletion of the SNM (e.g., fission of 235 U), which complicates the use of physical inventories. SNM control, however, can also likely be effectively applied to detect theft of SNM throughout a liquid-fueled MSR facility. To complement these approaches, prior technical reports have identified that a diversion path analysis may be a useful, risk-informed, and performance-based tool to determine suitable elements of an MC&A approach for the reactor system within a liquid-fueled MSR facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗