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Successful Deployment of System for the Storage and Retrieval of Spent/Used Nuclear Fuel from Hanford K-West Fuel Storage Basin-13051

In 2012, a system was deployed to remove, transport, and interim store chemically reactive and highly radioactive sludge material from the Hanford Site's 105-K West Fuel Storage Basin that will be managed as spent/used nuclear fuel. The Knockout Pot (KOP) sludge in the 105-K West Basin was a legacy issue resulting from the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) washing process applied to 2200 metric tons of highly degraded fuel elements following long-term underwater storage. The washing process removed uranium metal and other non-uranium constituents that could pass through a screen with 0.25-inch openings; larger pieces are, by definition, SNF or fuel scrap. When originally retrieved, KOP sludge contained pieces of degraded uranium fuel ranging from 600 microns (μm) to 6350 μm mixed with inert material such as aluminum hydroxide, aluminum wire, and graphite in the same size range. In 2011, a system was developed, tested, successfully deployed and operated to pre-treat KOP sludge as part of 105-K West Basin cleanup. The pretreatment process successfully removed the vast majority of inert material from the KOP sludge stream and reduced the remaining volume of material by approximately 65 percent, down to approximately 50 liters of material requiring management as used fuel. The removal of inert material resulted in significant waste minimization and project cost savings because of the reduced number of transportation/storage containers and improvement in worker safety. The improvement in worker safety is a result of shorter operating times and reduced number of remote handled shipments to the site fuel storage facility. Additionally in 2011, technology development, final design, and cold testing was completed on the system to be used in processing and packaging the remaining KOP material for removal from the basin in much the same manner spent fuel was removed. This system was deployed and successfully operated from June through September 2012, to remove and package the last of the SNF fragments from the 105-K West Basin, ending the long and complex history of the KOP sludge materials. The planning and execution of this project demonstrated how the graded application of DOE O 413.3B, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets[1], DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process[2], and DOE G 413.3-4, U.S. Department of Energy Technology Readiness Assessment Guide[3], can positively affect the outcome of project implementation in the DOE Complex. Provided herein are relevant information, ideas, and tools for use by other projects facing similar issues in managing high risk waste streams in a complex regulatory environment. Positive aspects are also provided of appropriate time spent in detailed planning, design, and testing in non-hazardous environments to reduce project risks in both cost and safety performance, as well as improving confidence in meeting project goals through predictable and reliable performance. (authors)

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SLUDGE TREATMENT PROJECT ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS SUMMARY REPORT [VOLUME 1]

Highly radioactive sludge (containing up to 300,000 curies of actinides and fission products) resulting from the storage of degraded spent nuclear fuel is currently stored in temporary containers located in the 105-K West storage basin near the Columbia River. The background, history, and known characteristics of this sludge are discussed in Section 2 of this report. There are many compelling reasons to remove this sludge from the K-Basin. These reasons are discussed in detail in Section1, and they include the following: (1) Reduce the risk to the public (from a potential release of highly radioactive material as fine respirable particles by airborne or waterborn pathways); (2) Reduce the risk overall to the Hanford worker; and (3) Reduce the risk to the environment (the K-Basin is situated above a hazardous chemical contaminant plume and hinders remediation of the plume until the sludge is removed). The DOE-RL has stated that a key DOE objective is to remove the sludge from the K-West Basin and River Corridor as soon as possible, which will reduce risks to the environment, allow for remediation of contaminated areas underlying the basins, and support closure of the 100-KR-4 operable unit. The environmental and nuclear safety risks associated with this sludge have resulted in multiple legal and regulatory remedial action decisions, plans,and commitments that are summarized in Table ES-1 and discussed in more detail in Volume 2, Section 9.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Uranium Metal Analysis via Selective Dissolution

Uranium metal, which is present in sludge held in the Hanford Site K West Basin, can create hazardous hydrogen atmospheres during sludge handling, immobilization, or subsequent transport and storage operations by its oxidation/corrosion in water. A thorough knowledge of the uranium metal concentration in sludge therefore is essential to successful sludge management and waste process design. The goal of this work was to establish a rapid routine analytical method to determine uranium metal concentrations as low as 0.03 wt% in sludge even in the presence of up to 1000-fold higher total uranium concentrations (i.e., up to 30 wt% and more uranium) for samples to be taken during the upcoming sludge characterization campaign and in future analyses for sludge handling and processing. This report describes the experiments and results obtained in developing the selective dissolution technique to determine uranium metal concentration in K Basin sludge.

08 HYDROGEN↗

U-Pb provenance ages of shocked zircons from the K-T boundary, Raton Basin, Colorado

U-Pb isotopic systematics from analyses of single zircons identify at least two provenance ages, approximately 575 Ma and approximately 330 Ma, for zircons from the impact layer of the K-T boundary, Raton Basin, Colorado. These data are a preliminary confirmation of results reported from the same layer. The zircon provenance ages provide a unique signature for identification of the source crater since igneous rocks of these ages (or sedimentary rocks derived from them) must characterize part of the impact stratigraphy.

Premo, W. R.↗

Heat Flow and Gas Hydrates on the Continental Margin of India: Building on Results from NGHP Expedition 01

The Indian National Gas Hydrate Program (NGHP) Expedition 01 presented the unique opportunity to constrain regional heat flow derived from seismic observations by using drilling data in three regions on the continental margin of India. The seismic bottom simulating reflection (BSR) is a well-documented feature in hydrate sediments and and can serve as a proxy for apparent heat flow if data are available to estimate acoustic velocity and density in water and sediments, thermal conductivity, and seafloor temperature. Direct observations of temperature at depth and physical properties of the sediment obtained from drilling can be used to calibrate the seismic observations, decreasing the uncertainty of the seismically-derived estimates. Anomalies in apparent heat flow can result from a variety of sources, including sedimentation, erosion, topographic refraction and fluid flow. We constructed apparent heat flow maps for portions of the Krishna-Godavari (K-G) basin, the Mahanadi basin, and the Andaman basin and modeled anomalies using 1-D conductive thermal models. Apparent heat flow values in the Krishna-Godavari (K-G) basin and Mahanadi basin are generally 0.035 to 0.055 watts per square meter (W/m2).

03 NATURAL GAS↗

DEMOLISHING A COLD-WAR-ERA FUEL STORAGE BASIN SUPERSTRUCTURE LADEN WITH ASBESTOS

The K East (KE) Basin facilities are located near the north end of the Hanford Site's 100 K area. The facilities were built in 1950 as part of the KE Reactor complex and constructed within 400 meters of the Columbia River, which is the largest river in the Pacific Northwest and by volume the fourth largest river in the United States. The basin, located adjacent to the reactor, was used for the underwater storage of irradiated nuclear fuel discharged from the reactor. The basin was covered by a superstructure comprising steel columns and beams, concrete, and cement asbestos board (CAB) siding. The project's mission was to complete demolition of the structure over the K East basin within six months of tumover from facility deactivation activities. The demolition project team implemented open-air demolition techniques to demolish the facility to slab-on-grade. Several innovative techniques were used to control contamination and maintain contamination control within the confines of the demolition exclusion zone. The techniques, which focused on a defense-in-depth approach, included spraying fixatives on interior and exterior surfaces before demolition began; applying fixatives; misting using a fine spray of water during demolition; and demolishing the facility systematically. Another innovation that aided demolition was to demolish the building with the non-friable CAB remaining in place. The CAB siding covered the exterior of the building, portions of the interior walls, and was an integral part of the multiple layered roof. The project evaluated the risks involved in removing the CAB material in a radiologically contaminated environment and determined that radiological dose rates and exposure to radiological contamination and industrial hazards would be significantly reduced by removing the CAB during demolition using heavy equipment. The ability to perform this demolition safely and without spreading contamination (radiological or asbestos) demonstrates that similar open-air demolition ofcontaminated structures can be performed successfully.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DEMOLISHING A COLD WARE ERA FULE STORAGE BASIN SUPERSTRUCTURE LADEN WITH ASBESTOS

The K East (KE) Basin facilities are located near the north end of the Hanford Site's 100 K area. The facilities were built in 1950 as part of the KE Reactor complex and constructed within 400 meters of the Columbia River, which is the largest river in the Pacific Northwest and by volume the fourth largest river in the United States. The basin, located adjacent to the reactor, was used for the underwater storage of irradiated nuclear fuel discharged from the reactor. The basin was covered by a superstructure comprising steel columns and beams, concrete, and cement asbestos board (CAB) siding. The project's mission was to complete demolition of the structure over the KE Basin within six months of turnover from facility deactivation activities. The demolition project team applied open-air demolition techniques to bring the facility to slab-on-grade. Several innovative techniques were used to control contamination and maintain contamination control within the confines of the demolition exclusion zone. The techniques, which focused on a defense-in-depth approach, included spraying fixatives on interior and exterior surfaces before demolition began; applying fixatives during the demolition; misting using a fine spray of water during demolition; and demolishing the facility systematically. Another innovative approach that made demolition easier was to demolish the building with the non-friable CAB remaining in place. The CAB siding covered the exterior of the building and portions of the interior walls, and was an integral part of the multiple-layered roof. The project evaluated the risks involved in removing the CAB material in a radiologically contaminated environment and determined that radiological dose rates and exposure to radiological contamination and industrial hazards would be significantly reduced by using heavy equipment to remove the CAB during demolition. The ability to perform this demolition safely and without spreading contamination (radiological or asbestos) demonstrates that contaminated structures can be torn down successfully using similar open-air demolition techniques.

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Protecting the Columbia River through Removal and Packaging of Radioactive Sludge in Hanford's K Area - 16572

The Columbia River once provided power and cooling water to operations on the Hanford Site; today, more than a million people downstream from Hanford rely on the river for agriculture, fishing and recreation. The Department of Energy and contractor CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M) is making significant progress in protecting that vital resource. Eight of nine reactors along the river have been cocooned and soil and groundwater remediation is successfully reducing the concentration of contaminants in groundwater. The 100-K area is the last area where significant work remains to protect the river. CH2M has accomplished much in the past ten years, including demolishing the K East reactor fuel storage basin in 2009. Prior to demolition of the basin, highly radioactive sludge from that basin was transferred into containers located in the nearby K West reactor fuel storage basin. Today, the K East reactor is in interim surveillance mode, and work is underway in the K West basin to remove the sludge, which is a mixture of tiny fuel corrosion particles, fuel rod and metal fragments and soil and sand less than 1/4-inch in diameter. CH2M has designed a sludge removal system that will safely and efficiently remove the sludge from the K West basin and deposit it into specially designed containers which will be relocated to a storage facility on Hanford's Central Plateau. Procurement, fabrication and delivery of the sludge removal system is underway, with extensive testing and training planned for 2016 and 2017 ahead of the goal of removing sludge from the river by September 30, 2018. This project must account for many technical and safety considerations that render the project very challenging. Several safety measures have been incorporated as a result of safety evaluations. This paper will describe the issues facing the project team in developing the safety basis requirements and incorporating them into the design of the process equipment and construction of the facility to house the repackaging operations. This paper will allow CH2M and DOE-RL to share lessons learned and progress to date with other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

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The Spatiotemporal Structure of 20th Century Climate Variations in Observations and Reanalyses: Long-term Trend - Part 1

The dominant interannual El Nino-Southern Oscillation phenomenon (ENSO) and the short length of climate observation records make it difficult to study long-term climate variations in the spatiotemporal domain. Based on the fact that the ENS0 signal spreads to remote regions and induces delayed climate variation through atmospheric teleconnections, we develop an ENSO-removal method through which the ENS0 signal can be approximately removed at the grid box level from the spatiotemporal field of a climate parameter. After this signal is removed, long-term climate variations, namely, the global warming trend (GW) and the Pacific pan-decadal variability (PDV), are isolated at middle and low latitudes in the climate parameter fields from observed and reanalyses datasets. Except for known GW characteristics, the warming that occurs in the Pacific basin (approximately 0.4K in the 2oth century) is much weaker than in surrounding regions and the other two ocean basins (approximately 0.8K). The modest warming in the Pacific basin is likely due to its dynamic nature on the interannual and decadal time scales and/or the leakage of upper ocean water through the Indonesian Throughflow. Based on NCEP/NCAR and ERA-40 reanalyses, a comprehensive atmospheric structure associated with GW is given. Significant discrepancies exist between the two datasets, especially in the tightly coupled dynamic and water vapor fields. The dynamic field based on NCEP/NCAR reanalysis, which shows a change in the Walker Circulation, is consistent with the GW change in the surface temperature field. However, intensification in the Hadley Circulation is associated with GW trend in the ERA-40 reanalysis.

Chen, Junye↗

Application of Crunch-Flow Routines to Constrain Present and Past Carbon Fluxes at Gas-Hydrate Bearing Sites

In November 2012, Oregon State University initiated the project entitled: Application of Crunch-Flow routines to constrain present and past carbon fluxes at gas-hydrate bearing sites. Within this project we developed Crunch-Flow based modeling modules that include important biogeochemical processes that need to be considered in gas hydrate environments. Our modules were applied to quantify carbon cycling in present and past systems, using data collected during several DOE-supported drilling expeditions, which include the Cascadia margin in US, Ulleung Basin in South Korea, and several sites drilled offshore India on the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. Specifically, we completed modeling efforts that: 1) Reproduce the compositional and isotopic profiles observed at the eight drilled sites in the Ulleung Basin that constrain and contrast the carbon cycling pathways at chimney (high methane flux) and non-chimney sites (low methane, advective systems); 2) Simulate the Ba record in the sediments to quantify the past dynamics of methane flux in the southern Hydrate Ridge, Cascadia margin; and 3) Provide quantitative estimates of the thickness of individual mass transport deposits (MTDs), time elapsed after the MTD event, rate of sulfate reduction in the MTD, and time required to reach a new steady state at several sites drilled in the Krishna-Godavari (K-G) Basin off India. In addition we developed a hybrid model scheme by coupling a home-made MATLAB code with CrunchFlow to address the methane transport and chloride enrichment at the Ulleung Basins chimney sites, and contributed the modeling component to a study focusing on pore-scale controls on gas hydrate distribution in sediments from the Andaman Sea. These efforts resulted in two manuscripts currently under review, and contributed the modeling component of another pare, also under review. Lessons learned from these efforts are the basis of a mini-workshop to be held at Oregon State University (Feb 2014) to instruct graduate students (OSU and UW) as well as DOE staff from the NETL lab in Albany on the use of Crunch Flow for geochemical applications.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

SLUDGE TREATMENT PROJECT ENGINEERED CONTAINER RETRIEVAL AND TRANSFER SYSTEM PRELMINARY DESIGN HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY

This Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study addresses the Sludge Treatment Project (STP) Engineered Container Retrieval and Transfer System (ECRTS) preliminary design for retrieving sludge from underwater engineered containers located in the 105-K West (KW) Basin, transferring the sludge as a sludge-water slurry (hereafter referred to as 'slurry') to a Sludge Transport and Storage Container (STSC) located in a Modified KW Basin Annex, and preparing the STSC for transport to T Plant using the Sludge Transport System (STS). There are six, underwater engineered containers located in the KW Basin that, at the time of sludge retrieval, will contain an estimated volume of 5.2 m{sup 3} of KW Basin floor and pit sludge, 18.4 m{sup 3} of 105-K East (KE) Basin floor, pit, and canister sludge, and 3.5 m{sup 3} of settler tank sludge. The KE and KW Basin sludge consists of fuel corrosion products (including metallic uranium, and fission and activation products), small fuel fragments, iron and aluminum oxide, sand, dirt, operational debris, and biological debris. The settler tank sludge consists of sludge generated by the washing of KE and KW Basin fuel in the Primary Clean Machine. A detailed description of the origin of sludge and its chemical and physical characteristics can be found in HNF-41051, Preliminary STP Container and Settler Sludge Process System Description and Material Balance. In summary, the ECRTS retrieves sludge from the engineered containers and hydraulically transfers it as a slurry into an STSC positioned within a trailer-mounted STS cask located in a Modified KW Basin Annex. The slurry is allowed to settle within the STSC to concentrate the solids and clarify the supernate. After a prescribed settling period the supernate is decanted. The decanted supernate is filtered through a sand filter and returned to the basin. Subsequent batches of slurry are added to the STSC, settled, and excess supernate removed until the prescribed quantity of sludge is collected. The sand filter is then backwashed into the STSC. The STSC and STS cask are then inerted and transported to T Plant.

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Characterization of Settler Tank, KW Container and KE Container Sludge Simulants

The Sludge Treatment Project (STP), managed by CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) has specified base formulations for non-radioactive sludge simulants for use in the development and testing of equipment for sludge sampling, retrieval, transport, and processing. In general, the simulant formulations are based on the average or design-basis physical and chemical properties obtained by characterizing sludge samples. The simulants include surrogates for uranium metal, uranium oxides (agglomerates and fine particulate), and the predominant chemical phases (iron and aluminum hydroxides, sand). Specific surrogate components were selected to match the nominal particle-size distribution and particle-density data obtained from sludge sample analysis. Under contract to CHPRC, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has performed physical and rheological characterization of simulants, and the results are reported here. Two base simulant types (dry) were prepared by STP staff at the Maintenance and Storage Facility and received by PNNL in February 2009: Settler Tank Simulant and KW Container Sludge Simulant. A third simulant, KE Container Sludge Simulant was received by PNNL in December 2010. The objectives of this simulant characterization effort were to provide baseline characterization data on simulants being used by STP for process development and equipment testing and provide a high-level comparison of the simulant characteristics to the targets used to formulate the simulants.

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Heat Flow and Gas Hydrates on the Continental Margin of India: Building on Results from NGHP Expedition 01

The Indian National Gas Hydrate Program (NGHP) Expedition 01 presented the unique opportunity to constrain regional heat flow derived from seismic observations by using drilling data in three regions on the continental margin of India. The seismic bottom simulating reflection (BSR) is a well-documented feature in hydrate bearing sediments, and can serve as a proxy for apparent heat flow if data are available to estimate acoustic velocity and density in water and sediments, thermal conductivity, and seafloor temperature. Direct observations of temperature at depth and physical properties of the sediment obtained from drilling can be used to calibrate the seismic observations, decreasing the uncertainty of the seismically-derived estimates. Anomalies in apparent heat flow can result from a variety of sources, including sedimentation, erosion, topographic refraction and fluid flow. We constructed apparent heat flow maps for portions of the Krishna-Godavari (K-G) basin, the Mahanadi basin, and the Andaman basin and modeled anomalies using 1-D conductive thermal models.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Remote Handled Transuranic Sludge Retrieval Transfer And Storage System At Hanford

This paper describes the systems developed for processing and interim storage of the sludge managed as remote-handled transuranic (RH-TRU). An experienced, integrated CH2M HILL/AFS team was formed to design and build systems to retrieve, interim store, and treat for disposal the K West Basin sludge, namely the Sludge Treatment Project (STP). A system has been designed and is being constructed for retrieval and interim storage, namely the Engineered Container Retrieval, Transfer and Storage System (ECRTS).

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Example of a Risk-Based Disposal Approval: Solidification of Hanford Site Transuranic Waste

The Hanford Site requested, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 10 approved, a Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA) risk-based disposal approval (RBDA) for solidifying approximately four cubic meters of waste from a specific area of one of the K East Basin: the North Loadout Pit (NLOP). The NLOP waste is a highly radioactive sludge that contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) regulated under TSCA. The prescribed disposal method for liquid PCB waste under TSCA regulations is either thermal treatment or decontamination. Due to the radioactive nature of the waste, however, neither thermal treatment nor decontamination was a viable option. As a result, the proposed treatment consisted of solidifying the material to comply with waste acceptance criteria at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico, or possibly the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility at the Hanford Site, depending on the resulting transuranic (TRU) content of the stabilized waste. The RBDA evaluated environmental risks associated with potential airborne PCBs. In addition, the RBDA made use of waste management controls already in place at the treatment unit. The treatment unit, the T Plant Complex, is a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)-permitted facility used for storing and treating radioactive waste. The EPA found that the proposed activities did not pose an unreasonable risk to human health or the environment. Treatment took place from October 26, 2005 to June 9, 2006, and 332 208-liter (55-gallon) containers of solidified waste were produced. All treated drums assayed to date are TRU and will be disposed at WIPP. (authors)

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River Corridor Closure at DOE's Hanford Site - 12503

The discussion of Hanford's River Corridor will cover work that has already been completed plus the work remaining to be done. This includes the buildings, waste sites, and groundwater plumes in the 300 Area; large-scale burial ground remediation in the 600 Area; plutonium production reactor dismantling and 'cocooning' along the river; preservation of the world's first full-scale plutonium production reactor; removal of more than 14 million tons of contaminated soil and debris along the Columbia River shoreline and throughout the River Corridor; and the excavation of buried waste sites in the river shore area. It also includes operating an EPA-permitted low-level waste disposal facility in the central portion of the site. At the completions of cleanup in 2015, Hanford's River Corridor will be the largest closure project ever completed by the Department of Energy. Cleanup of the River Corridor has been one of Hanford's top priorities since the early 1990's. This urgency has been due to the proximity of hundreds of waste sites to the Columbia River. In addition, removal of the sludge from K West Basin, near the river, remains a high priority. This 220-square-mile area of the Hanford Site sits on the edge of the last free-flowing stretch of the Columbia River. The River Corridor portion of the Hanford Site includes the 100 and 300 Areas along the south shore of the Columbia River. The 100 Areas contain nine retired plutonium production reactors. These areas are also the location of numerous support facilities and solid and liquid waste disposal sites that have contaminated groundwater and soil. The 300 Area, located just north of the city of Richland, contains fuel fabrication facilities, nuclear research and development facilities, and their associated solid and liquid waste disposal sites that have contaminated groundwater and soil. In order to ensure that cleanup actions address all threats to human health and the environment, the River Corridor includes the adjacent areas that extend from the 100 Area and 300 Area to the Central Plateau. For sites in the River Corridor, remedial actions are expected to restore groundwater to drinking water standards and ensure that aquatic life in the Columbia River is protected by achieving ambient water quality standards. It is intended that these objectives be achieved, unless technically impracticable, within a reasonable timeframe. In those instances where remedial action objectives are not achievable in a reasonable time frame, or are determined to be technically impracticable, programs are being implemented to contain the plume, prevent exposure to contaminated groundwater, and evaluate further risk reduction opportunities as new technologies become available. River Corridor cleanup work also removes potential sources of contamination, which are close to the Columbia River, and places them on the Central Plateau for final disposal. The intent is to shrink the footprint of active cleanup to within the 75-square- mile area of the Central Plateau by removing excess facilities and remediating waste sites. Cleanup actions are supporting anticipated future land uses consistent with the Hanford Reach National Monument, where applicable, and the Hanford Comprehensive Land- Use Plan (DOE 1999). The River Corridor has been divided into six geographic decision areas to achieve source and groundwater remedy decisions. These decisions will provide comprehensive coverage for all areas within the River Corridor and will incorporate ongoing interim action cleanup activities. Cleanup levels will be achieved in order to support anticipated future land uses of conservation and preservation for most of this area and industrial use for the 300 Area. At the conclusion of cleanup actions, the federal government will implement long-term stewardship activities to ensure protection of human health and the environment. (authors)

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EXAMPLE OF A RISK BASED DISPOSAL APPROVAL SOLIDIFICATION OF HANFORD SITE TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE

The Hanford Site requested, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 10 approved, a Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA) risk-based disposal approval (RBDA) for solidifying approximately four cubic meters of waste from a specific area of one of the K East Basin: the North Loadout Pit (NLOP). The NLOP waste is a highly radioactive sludge that contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) regulated under TSCA. The prescribed disposal method for liquid PCB waste under TSCA regulations is either thermal treatment or decontamination. Due to the radioactive nature of the waste, however, neither thermal treatment nor decontamination was a viable option. As a result, the proposed treatment consisted of solidifying the material to comply with waste acceptance criteria at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico, or possibly the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility at the Hanford Site, depending on the resulting transuranic (TRU) content of the stabilized waste. The RBDA evaluated environmental risks associated with potential airborne PCBs. In addition, the RBDA made use of waste management controls already in place at the treatment unit. The treatment unit, the T Plant Complex, is a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)-permitted facility used for storing and treating radioactive waste. The EPA found that the proposed activities did not pose an unreasonable risk to human health or the environment. Treatment took place from October 26,2005 to June 9,2006, and 332 208-liter (55-gallon) containers of solidified waste were produced. All treated drums assayed to date are TRU and will be disposed at WIPP.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Characteristics of STP Pre-2004 Archived KE Basin Sludge Samples Before and After Re-Jarring in the RPL - April 2012

This report describes results of work performed in the Shielded Analytical Laboratory (SAL) at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL) with archive K East (KE) Basin sludge samples obtained before the year 2004, with some of them composited and initially characterized five years ago (Delegard et al. 2011). The previously performed testing included the physical properties determinations for selected samples (settled and particle densities, water and solids concentrations), the pH, as well as identification of crystalline phases by X-ray diffractometry (XRD) for selected samples. Another objective of the previous characterization and testing campaign was to transfer some sludge composites and individual samples into new storage containers to overcome the embrittlement effect which develops in original glass containers as a result of extended exposure to high radiation fields and which increases probability of sample loss.

K Basin↗