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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Secure and Resilient Operations Using Open-Source Distributed Systems Platform (OpenDSP)

The goal of this project is to identify and address cybersecurity gaps by developing a multi-layer multi-channel cyber-physical defense and survival mechanism for operating distribution networks with high penetration of solar / inverter-based resource (IBR) / distributed energy resource (DER). The proposed security enhancements are built upon the distributed framework and solution architecture for both information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems. The technical solutions consist of two composite functionalities and six layers: proactive defense (vulnerability assessment, communication protection, and attack detection, as layers 1-3), and adaptive self-healing (attack-resilient control, adaptive recovery, and resilient survival, as layers 4-6). These layers, built on and extended from DHS CISA Cyber Framework, establish an integrated and robust cybersecurity framework for operating large-scale distribution networks.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Performing Numerical Analysis of Cybersecurity Options Using Dynamic Risk Analysis Tool EMRALD

Cyberattacks can have many different attack paths, durations, and goals. There are also many different mitigation options involving hardware, software, and/or humans. Considering a cyber threat should involve defense-in-depth methods and a quantitative or numerical evaluation of overall effectiveness against dynamic, time-dependent attacks to make cost and risk-informed decisions. Typical cyberattack modeling methods only provide a qualitative evaluation. The main areas of cybersecurity are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For companies with cyber-physical systems such as advanced nuclear reactors, cyber-related safety is a requirement set by North American Electric Reliability and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. They are also concerned about availability or reliability as a business case. As cyber threats are evolving to a business-for-hire structure, more attacks may focus on disrupting business success and reliability, causing financial and economic stability risk. Companies want to know business reliability and recovery from those threats, and that requires modeling physical behavior of the targets. Dynamic-state-based and Markov-based modeling provides a method for better cyber scenario modeling with different tools having issues such as state-base explosion. Dynamic modeling enables time and conditional features not found in other numerical evaluation methods. EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Lined Diagrams) is a dynamic risk analysis modeling and simulation tool and has features that reduce modeling issues. It has been used to model different time-dependent events including plant behavior and operator procedures. As a general modeling tool, EMRALD can also be used to model cyberattack scenarios with varying mitigation options and quantify effectiveness, producing numerical data for risk-informed decisions. This paper uses EMRALD to demonstrate that dynamic numerical risk analysis can be used for cyber threat modeling to provide insights for design decision-making and optimize defense strategies. Keywords: cyber modeling; cyber-physical systems; numerical cyber modeling

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Prototype Software to Demonstrate a Data Catalog for Hanford Environmental Datasets

Ensuring that data on long-term environmental remediation at the Hanford Site is high-quality, traceable, and easily accessible is an ongoing challenge, complicated by decades of data collection, multiple contractors maintaining data sources, and the wide range of data types. A centralized data catalog, known as the Hanford Environmental Information and Data Index (HEIDI), has been under development as part of the Hanford Environmental Data Management (HEDM) program to address these challenges. HEIDI fulfills a critical need to bring together a wide range of data types and sizes from multiple authoritative data sources, while documenting the data pedigree and quality information (i.e., traceable to the data source/originator). This document describes additional development and maturation of the HEIDI prototype. Key accomplishments included deploying the catalog software, Esri Geoportal Server, on a server accessible to Hanford Local Area Network users, conducting cybersecurity evaluations, investigating integrated authentication solutions, and conducting functional testing of the catalog prototype. The server-based deployment enabled targeted feedback, leading to enhancements including improved accessibility features and an expanded metadata schema. Specifications for the server-based deployment of the prototype catalog and the HEIDI metadata schema are provided in this document to support subsequent HEIDI deployment by the U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 2 – Prioritizing Digital Assurance Challenges, Session 2

The second session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 10, 2025, focused on prioritizing digital assurance challenges at the intersection of data centers and the electric grid. Building on the foundational concepts introduced in Workshop 1, this session deepened the application of the Threat–Vulnerability–Consequence (TVC) framework and emphasized the urgency of addressing cybersecurity, supply chain integrity, and operational reliability. Participants explored the growing convergence of digital and physical systems, the expanding attack surface due to global supply chain dependencies, and the implications of AI-driven load behavior. Real-world incidents—including the Volt Typhoon campaign and vulnerabilities in Solarman and Deye platforms—were analyzed to illustrate the risks of unpatched systems, insecure APIs, and inadequate vendor oversight. Key themes included architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and human and procedural shortcomings. The workshop also examined the evolving regulatory landscape, highlighting new federal mandates around Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) compliance and large-load reliability standards. Through interactive exercises, stakeholders ranked and mapped digital assurance risks from their respective perspectives—utilities, operators, and vendors—laying the groundwork for mitigation strategies and shared accountability models to be developed in Workshop 3. Session 2 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

PSA 2025 DPRA for Cyber Optimization

Cyberattacks can have many different attack paths, durations, and goals. There are also many different mitigation options involving hardware, software, and/or humans. Evaluating defense options should include quantitative evaluation of overall effectiveness to make cost and risk-informed decisions. Typical cyberattack modeling methods only provide a qualitative evaluation and have difficulty with time dependent scenarios. The main areas of cybersecurity are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For companies with cyber-physical systems such as advanced nuclear reactors, cyber-related integrity is a requirement set by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. But companies are also concerned about availability or reliability as a business case. As cyber threats are evolving to a business-for-hire structure, more attacks focus on disrupting business success and reliability, causing financial and economic stability risk. Companies want reliability analysis while optimizing cost, which requires more than safety modeling methods. Dynamic-state-based and Markov-based modeling provides a method for better cyber scenario modeling with timing and conditional features not found in other numerical evaluation methods. EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Lined Diagrams) is a dynamic risk analysis modeling and simulation tool and has features that reduce modeling issues such as state-base explosion found in Markov-based tools. It has been used to model different time-dependent events including plant behavior and operator procedures. As a general modeling tool, EMRALD can also be used to model cyberattack scenarios with varying mitigation options and quantify effectiveness, producing numerical data for risk-informed decisions. This paper uses EMRALD to demonstrate that dynamic risk analysis can be used for cyber threat modeling to provide insights for design decision-making and optimize defense strategies.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Integrated behavior-based infrastructure command validation

A cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system is provided herein for validating asset commands issued within an infrastructure network. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can be integrated into an infrastructure network to monitor and validate infrastructure asset commands in real-time or while the infrastructure network is active. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can receive or intercept commands issued by asset controllers. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can validate the commands based on a command validation model. The command validation model can represent normal operating behavior of the infrastructure network. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can provide valid commands to the intended infrastructure asset, or can reject invalid commands. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can store validation results for use in updating the command validation model. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can flag or otherwise warn the infrastructure network or administrators of invalid commands.

Akyol, Bora A.↗
DOE OSTI2026

Building Nuclear-Specific Cybersecurity Expertise in Higher Education

The rapid digitalization of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the deployment of advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs) have expanded the cybersecurity attack surface within the nuclear sector. This evolution introduces unique challenges beyond those faced in general information technology (IT), operational technology (OT) and industrial control system (ICS) security, due to nuclear power’s regulatory rigor, safety-critical nature, and operational needs. A pressing workforce gap persists; cybersecurity graduates typically lack nuclear-specific context and retraining them for industry readiness requires 12–18 months, creating a significant burden. This paper addresses this gap by defining the domains of knowledge that nuclear cybersecurity specialists must master, spanning cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, OT/ICS security, and regulatory governance. We propose a curricular framework integrating technical, regulatory, and applied learning components to accelerate workforce readiness. Our approach builds on existing findings that current curricula inadequately integrate nuclear engineering and cybersecurity, shifting the discourse from why specialization is needed to what knowledge must be taught. The recommendations have implications for workforce development and long-term resilience of the nuclear energy sector.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Progress on the MARVEL Cybersecurity by Design Model-Based Systems Engineering Project

Formal model-based systems engineering (MBSE) combines a model, systems thinking, and systems engineering to visually depict the boundaries, context, and behavior of interconnected systems, facilitating effective design, development, and utilization of engineered systems throughout the systems engineering lifecycle. Although nuclear reactor vendors employ these tools to integrate functionality, performance, and safety, they are not yet addressing digital risk concerns introduced by use of operational technology, such as digital instrumentation and control systems. To accomplish this objective, the Microreactor Applications Research Validation and EvaLuation (MARVEL) microreactor was used as an MBSE case study. This real-world application provides a first-of-a-kind opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of integrating digital risk and cybersecurity into the MBSE design process of a nuclear reactor. This paper provides an update of the ongoing MARVEL Cyber MBSE project as it specifically relates to the integration of digital risk management and cybersecurity by design.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cybersecurity Platform and Certification Framework Development for Extreme Fast Charging (XFC)-Integrated Charging Ecosystem (Final Project Report)

This report summarizes a pioneering effort in Electric Vehicle charging infrastructure ecosystem cybersecurity requirements, assessment methodologies, functional verification, as well as embodiment of the key technologies in the form of hardware and software tools being made available to the public. EPRI led a team of experts, as well as a stakeholder coalition encompassing all key actors in the EV charging infrastructure ecosystem that includes eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC) equipment (defined as 200kW or above). EV charging infrastructure in the United States is a patchwork of networks that have continued to grow organically and have been designed to serve the charging needs of the EV owners, who are their customers. In doing so, each network provider, as well as their connected entities such as the cloud Electric Vehicle Service Providers or EVSPs, utility back office, utility AMI networks, payment networks, as well as Original Equipment Manufacturer (EV manufacturer) telematics networks, have designed systems that may work well individually, but no single entity is responsible for the entire ecosystem to be secure in terms of data exchange. Furthermore, there is no uniformity in how each actor has implemented the cybersecurity requirements since no system-wide cybersecurity requirements existed prior to this project. The final project report describes the technical approach guided by the EV charging infrastructure cybersecurity working group, convened specifically for this project. The technical approach included definition of requirements at the ecosystem level, treated as a ‘system of systems’, and then passed down to individual systems (EVSE, EV, cloud EVSP, utility, and the payment networks), followed by developing the cybersecurity risk and vulnerability assessment methods, that were later applied to real-world cyber-physical systems at EPRI, ANL, and NREL laboratories, to validate both the process and the results. Finally, in a spotlight over the most vulnerable equipment, which is the EV charge station (AC or DC), the team developed a multi-layer cybersecurity implementation in the embedded domain embodied by the open-source Secure Network Interface Card (SNIC) demonstrating the various ways in which the infrastructure can be secured protecting against the identified attack surfaces. Finally, the entire process of EV infrastructure cybersecurity assessment was encapsulated in the Electric Vehicle Charging Cybersecurity Management (EVC2M) online GUI-based tool, that is expected to be released to the public. The report presents the objectives, the technical approach, the key results, and recommendations for future work.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Evaluation of IEC 62443 Standard Gaps for Electric Grid Substation Model Use Case

This report presents an evaluation of the IEC 62443 standards in the context of electric grid substations, as part of a collaborative effort among Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). The primary objective is to assess the applicability of these standards to enhance cybersecurity measures for industrial automation and control systems (IACS) within the energy sector. The evaluation identifies strengths, such as the scalability of security levels and the structured lifecycle guidance provided by IEC 62443. However, it also highlights significant gaps, including limited integration of physical security, insufficient guidance for legacy systems, and challenges in addressing emerging threats like supply chain vulnerabilities. Recommendations for refining the standards are proposed, including the need for tailored guidance for securing legacy systems, integrating physical security with cybersecurity frameworks, and enhancing interoperability across multi-vendor environments. By addressing these gaps, the IEC 62443 standards can be strengthened to ensure comprehensive cybersecurity for electric grid substations, thereby supporting the resilience and reliability of critical energy infrastructure.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Anomaly Detection and Mitigation for Dynamic Frequency Regulation in Hydropower-Battery Systems

Hydropower operators and energy storage providers are increasingly interested in participating in frequency regulation services, driven by the incentives offered by independent system operators, such as the PJM Interconnection. This transition, however, unfolds against the backdrop of a modernizing and rapidly digitizing power grid, exposing the integrated legacy infrastructure to a multitude of cybersecurity threats. This work presents an approach for developing an anomaly detection and mitigation system to address cybersecurity challenges during the participation of a hydropower-integrated battery energy storage system (BESS) in a frequency regulation market. The applied anomaly detector utilizes machine learning algorithms to provide detailed classification of cyber-physical events. Later, the applied mitigation system triggers predefined corrective actions to minimize the impact of data integrity attacks on the regulation market and system stability. We evaluated the proposed approach on a hydropower-integrated BESS topology, specifically analyzing the slow regulation signal (Reg A) coming from the PJM market. Our simulation results demonstrate that the proposed approach performs well in detecting data integrity attacks within the allocated time frame and also minimizes the system's transient instability during the participation of hydropower and BESS in the regulation market.

battery energy storage system↗
DOE OSTI2022

Security Architecture for Microgrid Integration

The purpose of this document is to present cyber security risk considerations and mitigations for community microgrids. The mitigations discussed herein specifically focus on cyber security technical requirements for the De-centralized Autonomous Community Controller (DAC) as part of the SECURE project’s technology development effort. These requirements also consider the associated security implementation challenges involved with the decentralized characteristics of microgrids where upstream communications to utility security management functions are lost. These security recommendations and technical requirements may be used by microgrid implementers and technology vendors to specify the security design of the microgrid systems and their components.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Trade-off Analysis of Operational Technologies to Advance Cyber Resilience through Automated and Autonomous Response to Threats

The advancement of cyber resilience requires a preliminary stage of characterizing the trade-off space of mitigation options and how these might affect the stability and determinism of an operational technology (OT). This first step will set the stage for the proper cyber-secure and cyber-resilient design and confirm the affects that can be considered and approved by the OT and the security groups. To provide a baseline for this discussion, this paper provides a consideration of the cyberphysical interactions, possible mitigation steps against certain attacks and their corresponding affects that lend to the security design planning and evaluation process. As an integral part of the proposed scheme this work introduces the concept of systemwide fuzzer, i.e., a tool that manipulates the system state in an effort to determine mitigation response sequences that minimize detriments and maximize benefit in accordance with specified operational requirements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Situational Awareness of Grid Anomalies (SAGA) for Visual Analytics—Near-Real-Time Cyber-Physical Resiliency Through Machine Learning

The Situational Awareness of Grid Anomalies (SAGA) project built upon foundational power system tools developed at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) integrated with an ever-increasing set of Gridmetrics data extracted from the cable television (CATV) broadband network infrastructure while assimilating other time-series geospatial data and information, such as weather and cyber-physical phenomena, to demonstrate a disruptive technology for power system data analytics relying on existing infrastructure. Three research thrusts supported (1) visual analytics, (2) cyber-physical power system simulation, and (3) anomaly detection. SAGA created technology that leverages, couples, and fortifies two vastly different realms - power and broadband - to increase the resiliency of the power grid in the face of increasing cyberattacks and operational challenges related to integrating DERs. The exploration of potential synergies of broadband-enabled grids resulted in identifying a mutually beneficial symbiosis that can increase the resiliency of both power and broadband services. Broadband networks perform better with reliable power and are good at providing real-time measurements that identify where the grid is under attack, is failing, or is weak. Likewise, sensor-starved distribution grids perform better and can be more reliable when their operation is buttressed with observations of broadband-detected anomalies. Future research can explore broadband's contribution to continuing to improve grid resiliency, reliability, and cost-effective operation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Connecting the Dots: An Assessment of Cyber-risks in Networked Building and Municipal Infrastructure Systems

The buildings and city streets we walk down are changing. Driven by various data-driven use cases, there is increased interest in networking and integrating lighting and other building systems (e.g., heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), security, scheduling) that were previously not internet-facing, and equipping them with sensors that collect information about their environment and the people that inhabit it. These data-enabled systems can potentially deliver improved occupant and resident experiences and help meet the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) national energy and carbon reduction goals. Deploying connected devices new to being networked, however, is not without its challenges. This paper explores tools available to system designers and integrators that facilitate a cybersecurity landscape assessment – or more specifically the identification of threats, vulnerabilities, and adversarial behaviors that could be used against these networked systems. These assessments can help stakeholders shift security prioritization proactively toward the beginning of the development process.

cyber-risk assesment, adversarial behavior, MITRE ↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Transmission Technologies – GETs and HPCs Session 2: Advanced Power Flow Control and Transmission Topology Optimization

The INL TADA GETs Cohort Session 2, held on November 7, 2025, conducted in collaboration with ScottMadden, focused on two core Advanced Transmission Technologies (ATTs): Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC) and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO). These technologies are pivotal in enhancing grid flexibility, reliability, and cybersecurity resilience. APFC, particularly through modular FACTS devices like Modular Static Synchronous Series Compensators (M-SSSCs), enables dynamic voltage injection to reroute power flows. The session highlighted the deployment benefits of APFC, such as rapid installation, minimal civil works, and re-deployability. Regulatory drivers like FERC Order 2023 mandate the inclusion of Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs) in interconnection studies. Case studies from Central Hudson, CAISO, and National Grid (UK) demonstrated APFC’s effectiveness in congestion relief and cost savings. The session also addressed cybersecurity concerns, including firmware vulnerabilities, SCADA integration risks, and supply chain dependencies. Participants engaged in interactive exercises to rank cybersecurity and supply chain risks, emphasizing the need for robust digital assurance strategies. TTO involves software-based reconfiguration of transmission networks to optimize power flow without new infrastructure. The session showcased its operational value, with examples from SPP, PJM, and MISO showing significant congestion cost reductions. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities were discussed, particularly in API security and software supply chains, referencing incidents like SolarWinds and attacks on Danish utilities. Digital assurance exercises explored worst-case scenarios, attack paths, and mitigation responsibilities between vendors and utilities. Reliability challenges such as algorithm stability, vendor dependency, and operator trust were also examined. Cross-cutting themes emphasized the importance of digital assurance tools, including Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) and hardware-in-loop testing. Human performance, training, and operational confidence were identified as critical enablers of technology adoption. The session concluded with a preview of Session 3, which will focus on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and risk-based cybersecurity tools. Session 2 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Oakland University Cybersecurity Center (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

This report summarizes the outcomes of Award DE-CR0000023, “Oakland University Cybersecurity Center,” a 31-month project funded by the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). The project addressed cybersecurity risks facing small and medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs) transitioning to Industry 4.0. The project integrated customer discovery, applied research, and cybersecurity training development. A total of 51 cybersecurity assessments identified significant gaps in baseline practices, incident response, and workforce capability. Research efforts produced a scalable mitigation framework tailored to SMM environments, and workforce analysis identified persistent talent gaps. Eight cybersecurity training modules were developed and deployed via Oakland University’s Professional and Continuing Education (PACE) platform. All objectives were completed, with 98.93% federal budget utilization and cost share exceeding requirements. The project establishes a scalable model for strengthening cybersecurity resilience and workforce capacity across U.S. manufacturing supply chains.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system’s lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements—but does not replace—the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system’s engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

42 ENGINEERING↗