Risk-Informed Security Analysis Methodology with Application to Small Modular Reactors.
Abstract not provided.
Bonano, Evaristo J.↗
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COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SECURITY TRAINING AND AWARENESS PROGRAMMES FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES.
Abstract not provided.
Rowland, Michael T↗
Mind the Gap: On Bridging the Semantic Gap between Machine Learning and Information Security.
Abstract not provided.
Smith, Michael Reed↗
Managing information technology security risk
Information Technology (IT) Security Risk Management is a critical task for the organization to protect against the loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability of IT resources. As systems bgecome more complex and diverse and and attacks from intrusions and malicious content increase, it is becoming increasingly difficult to manage IT security risk. This paper describes a two-pronged approach in addressing IT security risk and risk management in the organization: 1) an institutional enterprise appraoch, and 2) a project life cycle approach.
security toolset↗
Information technology security system engineering methodology
A methodology is described for system engineering security into large information technology systems under development. The methodology is an integration of a risk management process and a generic system development life cycle process. The methodology is to be used by Security System Engineers to effectively engineer and integrate information technology security into a target system as it progresses through the development life cycle. The methodology can also be used to re-engineer security into a legacy system.
Security risk analysis system engineering↗
Information Assurance and Security for Safeguards: "Information Surety".
Abstract not provided.
Baldwin, George Thomas↗
Building Cybersecurity Educational Materials for Students: The Windfarm Capture-The-Flag Exercise
Securing and protecting critical infrastructure in an increasingly digital world is vital but it is all too often an afterthought. It is especially important that students become aware of internet safety and security at an early age. However, the availability of interactive and educational cybersecurity material targeted toward students is minimal in the United States. Here we show an example of interactive cyber security educational material that an educator can use in their classroom to encourage students to think about the interaction between real-world physical objects, cyber security, and information security. By putting together a “capture-the-flag” exercise, students can see in real time how hackers and cybercriminals exploit vulnerabilities and gain access information. The students try to “capture” the “flag” (i.e., information) in the wind farm by looking for oddities in the code or by taking advantage of weaknesses in everyday protocols. Students can also see how cybersecurity interacts with the power grid through the wind farm project scenario and how a hacker could cause serious problems to a critical infrastructure sector. Our goal for the project is getting students interested in cybersecurity and help them develop an awareness of how important having robust security systems is. We also hope that this project demonstrates the importance of introducing these concepts early and inspires others to create similar projects geared toward students.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
Finite Energy and Bounded Attacks on Control System Sensor Signals
Control system networks are increasingly being connected to enterprise level networks. These connections leave critical industrial controls systems vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Most of the effort in protecting these cyber-physical systems (CPS) has been in securing the networks using information security techniques and protection and reliability concerns at the control system level against random hardware and software failures. However, besides these failures the inability of information security techniques to protect against all intrusions means that the control system must be resilient to various signal attacks for which new analysis and detection methods need to be developed. In this paper, sensor signal attacks are analyzed for observer-based controlled systems. The threat surface for sensor signal attacks is subdivided into denial of service, finite energy, and bounded attacks. In particular, the error signals between states of attack free systems and systems subject to these attacks are quantified. Optimal sensor and actuator signal attacks for the finite and infinite horizon linear quadratic (LQ) control in terms of maximizing the corresponding cost functions are computed. The closed-loop system under optimal signal attacks are provided. Illustrative numerical examples are provided together with an application to a power network with distributed LQ controllers.
Cyber-physical↗
Security Analysis of Smart Grid Cyber Physical Infrastructures Using Modeling and Game Theoretic Simulation
Cyber physical computing infrastructures typically consist of a number of sites are interconnected. Its operation critically depends both on cyber components and physical components. Both types of components are subject to attacks of different kinds and frequencies, which must be accounted for the initial provisioning and subsequent operation of the infrastructure via information security analysis. Information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic Agent Based Game Theoretic (ABGT) simulations. Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. We concentrated our analysis on the electric sector failure scenarios and impact analyses by the NESCOR Working Group Study, From the Section 5 electric sector representative failure scenarios; we extracted the four generic failure scenarios and grouped them into three specific threat categories (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) to the system. These specific failure scenarios serve as a demonstration of our simulation. The analysis using our ABGT simulation demonstrates how to model the electric sector functional domain using a set of rationalized game theoretic rules decomposed from the failure scenarios in terms of how those scenarios might impact the cyber physical infrastructure network with respect to CIA.
Availability↗
Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES)
Information security continues to evolve in response to disruptive changes with a persistent focus on information-centric controls and a healthy debate about balancing endpoint and network protection, with a goal of improved enterprise/business risk management. Economic uncertainty, intensively collaborative styles of work, virtualization, increased outsourcing and ongoing complance pressures require careful consideration and adaption. The CSES provides a measure (i.e. a quantitative indication) of reliability, performance, and/or safety of a system that accounts for the criticality of each requirement as a function of one or more stakeholders' interests in that requirement. For a given stakeholder, CSES accounts for the variance that may exist among the stakes one attaches to meeting each requirement.
Source record↗
Quantum Computing and Cryptography: Analysis, Risks, and Recommendations for Decisionmakers
Some influential American policymakers, scholars, and analysts are extremely concerned with the effects that quantum computing will have on national security. Similar to the way space technology was viewed in the context of the US-Soviet rivalry in the Cold War, they view scientific advancement in quantum computing as a race with significant national security consequences and a part of the emerging US-China rivalry. It is claimed that the winner of this race will be able to thwart all the cryptographic efforts of the loser and gain unfettered access to any state secret of the losing government. Additionally, it is suggested that the winner will be able to protect their secrets with a higher level of security than contemporary cryptography guarantees at the moment. This paper argues that these three claims are considerably overstated, and that policymakers and scholars should shift focus to a different national security problem that quantum computing will create. Maintaining the long-term security of secret information secured by contemporary cryptographic protections, which will fail against an attack by a future quantum computer, is the predominant challenge needing attention. This paper takes a technically-informed approach to this issue. It first lays out the national security problems that are envisioned in much of the current discourse surrounding quantum computing. Then, it will assess the technical advantages that quantum computers will have over classical computers in the field of cryptography. Next, it will provide an explanation of the specific ways that the technical realities of quantum computing are inconsistent with the predominant areas of concern. Following, it will highlight the more pressing national security problem posed by quantum computing that the public discussion has, for the most part, missed. The piece will conclude with recommendations for how to mitigate this issue.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
MOD control center automated information systems security evolution
The role of the technology infusion process in future Control Center Automated Information Systems (AIS) is highlighted. The following subject areas are presented in the form of the viewgraphs: goals, background, threat, MOD's AISS program, TQM, SDLC integration, payback, future challenges, and bottom line.
Owen, Rich↗
Computer security approach for Rolls-Royce spinline{sup R} safety platform - 227
The number of digital assets at commercial nuclear power plants is significant and will likely continue to increase with time. As a consequence, these plants have become potential targets for cyber-attacks. Around the world, nuclear safety authorities and national Computer and Information Security Agencies are implementing stricter regulations and inspections for critical systems in nuclear plants. There is a particular focus on instrumentation and control systems as they implement key nuclear safety functions. Rolls-Royce follows a strict computer and information security program based on general and nuclear specific norms, Rolls-Royce group processes, and proven technologies. The Spinline digital safety platform has been designed specifically for nuclear applications and features a secure development and operational environment that provides barriers against unauthorized modifications and implements design requirements promoting integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance. The Rolls-Royce secure development environment provides layers of protection utilizing physical and environmental security, human resource security, and information technology systems access control. The Spinline platform strengthens security functions by providing protection against unauthorized, unintended, and unsafe modifications to the system. The Spinline platform has design features promote integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance in the event of inadvertent operator actions or undesirable behavior of connected equipment. The Spinline technology and these computer security processes are based in a wide spectrum of international standards that were accepted as providing a secure development and operating environment by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2014. (authors)
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Enabling Secure Grid Information Sharing through Hash Calendar-based Blockchain Infrastructures
The power grid is becoming increasingly interconnected, as information from grid operations must be accessible to an array of engineers, grid regulators, and market operators. However, there remain challenges ensuring the appropriate integrity and authenticity of the grid information. While traditional cryptographic protocols, like public key infrastructure, provide security for in-transit communication, they come with key exchanges and cost to get public key certificates from a centralized authority. To address these challenges, this paper demonstrates how a hash calendar-based blockchain can be used to provide improved security for communication with the use of distributed ledgers. It demonstrates the security requirements and threats to this communication, and then provides a theoretic definition of the process. Furthermore, it introduces a use-case of the proposed process within the WSU Smart City Testbed DMS with the Guardtime’s Keyless Signature Infrastructure (KSI) architecture.
Kaur, Kudrat J.↗
EFCOG, IOSC Best Practices Guide
Members of the Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG), Safeguards and Security Working Group, Information Security Sub-Working Group Incidents of Security Concern (IOSC) Team prepared this best practice guide. For the purposes of this guide, “best practices” are “positive examples of work processes, procedures, good ideas, or effective solutions. The team made up of IOSC Subject Matter Experts (SME) identified these best practices as a result of actual operational experience and training. The guide describes best practices for categorizing incidents and managing inquiries. These practices may serve as guidelines for developing program plans, policy and procedures. These practices are suggestions for Department sites to consider while working in the IOSC subject area. The authors acknowledge that there may be alternatives to the practices identified in this guide. Subject matter Experts from the IOSC program across the Department developed this guide. Extensive discussion and document reviews were conducted to identify best practices relating to security inquiries. It was not within the scope of this study to assess individual site performance or evaluate compliance. Department of Energy’s (DOE), Order 470.4B, Chg.2, Safeguards and Security Program, July-21-2011, Chg 2, January-17-2017, Attachment 5, Incidents of Security Concern, contains the requirements for the IOSC program. In accordance with DOE directives and requirements established by DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) oversight, the working group evaluated elements of the IOSC program at each of the working group member’s sites such as categorizing events, conducting inquiries, and reporting events. Inconsistencies in categorization across the sites may be due to various factors, including each local field office having different reporting expectations, subjectivity in making determinations, and potential inherent deficiencies in the categorization tables and category descriptions. Many sites have adopted a sub reportable category for a security anomaly event that it believes does not meet the criteria as a reportable IOSC. The sites typically establish a local standardized process for reporting, analyzing, and trending sub-reportable events. Security incident program managers may need to discuss inconsistent categorization with other Inquiry Officials (IO) and suggest standardized solutions (ie…through policy changes or a forum attended by incident program managers and inquiry officials to discuss standardization solutions. At least one EFCOG IOSC team member’s site is currently using the best practices identified in this guide.
96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
Risk-informed Physical Security Using Dynamic Force-on-Force Modelling Tools (ABSTRACT)
Physical security requirement of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the US is regulated in a mainly prescriptive manner. This “one size fits all” approach may consequently overlook plant-specific characteristics which are beneficial for the inherent safety and security of the plant. Although a performance-based security measure has been promulgated in 10 CFR 73.55(r), current evaluation methods generally emphasize static and conservative assumptions on physical security uncertainties. This conservatism contributes to the overall operational and maintenance costs, which account to 70% of total operating expenditures for an NPP. This paper describes an ongoing work at the Idaho National Laboratory within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway, which aims to optimize physical protection system with regards to system effectiveness and dollar costs. To achieve this goal, a risk-informed approach to physical security is proposed. This approach leverages the Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool to model facility infiltration and Force-on-Force (FoF) engagement in a dynamic manner. The dynamic FoF analysis was conducted by coupling human performance uncertainties modeled in EMRALD to existing commercial 3-dimensional FoF software, i.e. SCRIBE3D, AVERT and Simajin. Meanwhile, risk analysis was accomplished by coupling the attack outcomes to existing plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model with FLEX strategy. This approach reduces the conservatisms in security modeling and further acknowledges the possibility for plant operators to mitigate the attack outcomes. A sabotage attack on a hypothetical NPP facility was devised to demonstrate the proposed methodology. Dynamic FoF rules were implemented in EMRALD coupled to SCRIBE3D. This dynamic evaluation revealed an additional 21% system effectiveness in protecting the target set relative to the static modelling approach. Furthermore, the conditional core damage probability could be reduced by up to 46% by crediting operator actions in mitigating the sabotage outcomes. We evaluated the relative importance of each component of the physical security posture included in the model and assessed tradeoffs between components to identify potential opportunities for cost reduction while maintaining a specific level of system effectiveness. Results of the cost analysis will be presented in the conference. This study is expected to help NPP operators in allocating resources optimally to satisfy the security requirements.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
Contact-Less Integrity Verification of Microelectronics Using Near-Field EM Analysis
Modern microelectronics life-cycle and supply chain ecosystem bring multiple untrusted entities, which can compromise their integrity. A major integrity issue of microelectronics stems from piracy of intellectual properties (IP) and counterfeiting, which causes significant revenue loss to the semiconductor manufacturers. Further, these components often lead to compromised functionality, reliability, security, and safety of an electronic system. This paper presents secure information transmission and probing methods for verifying the integrity of digital integrated circuit (ICs) based on their electromagnetic (EM) near-field emissions and thereby protecting systems against counterfeit components. The proposed method has been tested on both high-level instructions executed by microprocessors or Systems-on-Chip (serving as examples of software), and also logic circuits within FPGA fabrics and ASICs (serving as examples of hardware). The authentication information required by each digital system is generated using a pseudo-random number generator circuit and securely transmitted via near-field magnetic emissions. The authorized party can probe these emissions using a near-field probe, process the acquired signals to improve the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and then recover the secure information through matched filtering. Experimental results from commercial SoCs are used to demonstrate the proposed technique. Methods for reducing EM interference during integrity verification of both FPGAs and ASICs are also described.
47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗