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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2011

Ares I-X Range Safety Simulation and Analysis IV and V

NASA s Ares I-X vehicle launched on a suborbital test flight from the Eastern Range in Florida on October 28, 2009. NASA generated a Range Safety (RS) product data package to meet the RS trajectory data requirements defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710. Some products included were a nominal ascent trajectory, ascent flight envelopes, and malfunction turn data. These products are used by the Air Force s 45th Space Wing (45SW) to ensure public safety and to make flight termination decisions on launch day. Due to the criticality of the RS data, an independent validation and verification (IV&V) effort was undertaken to accompany the data generation analyses to ensure utmost data quality and correct adherence to requirements. As a result of the IV&V efforts, the RS product package was delivered with confidence that two independent organizations using separate simulation software generated data to meet the range requirements and yielded similar results. This document captures the Ares I-X RS product IV&V analysis, including the methodology used to verify inputs, simulation, and output data for certain RS products. Additionally a discussion of lessons learned is presented to capture advantages and disadvantages to the IV&V processes used.

Merry, Carl M.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Independent Verification and Validation (IV and V) Criteria

The purpose of this appendix is to establish quantifiable criteria for determining whether IV&V should be applied to a given software development. Since IV&V should begin in the Formulation Subprocess of a project, the process here described is based on metrics which are available before project approval.

McGill, Kenneth↗
NASA NTRS2015

Assuring NASA's Safety and Mission Critical Software

What is IV&V? Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) is an objective examination of safety and mission critical software processes and products. Independence: 3 Key parameters: Technical Independence; Managerial Independence; Financial Independence. NASA IV&V perspectives: Will the system's software: Do what it is supposed to do?; Not do what it is not supposed to do?; Respond as expected under adverse conditions?. Systems Engineering: Determines if the right system has been built and that it has been built correctly. IV&V Technical Approaches: Aligned with IEEE 1012; Captured in a Catalog of Methods; Spans the full project lifecycle. IV&V Assurance Strategy: The IV&V Project's strategy for providing mission assurance; Assurance Strategy is driven by the specific needs of an individual project; Implemented via an Assurance Design; Communicated via Assurance Statements.

Validation↗
NASA NTRS2004

A Spectrum of IV and V Modeling Techniques

The aerospace industry in general and NASA in particular is using more (semi-formal) model-based software development. Model-based development produces a collection of artifacts, for example, state diagrams, module diagrams (such as class diagrams), control-block diagrams, etc. These artifacts may than be used as a basis for auto code generation for production use. Therefore, these models must be properly evaluated in the IV and V process. IV and V practitioners know how assess standard procedural systems. But what can we du about IV and V of model-based systems? The goal of the work outlined in this proposal is to use cost effective automated techniques to the largest extent possible during the IV and V process. Our working hypotheses are: 1. There exists a range of validation techniques that can assess models built using a range of modeling techniques of increasing cost and complexity. Specifically, we hypotesize that the "cheaper" techniques can find faults cheaply and early in a project. These early results are then used to predict if this is a problem system and if a more elaborate and expensive IV and V effort is justified. 2. There exists a set of migration procedures that let us seamlessly move from simple models using cheaper techniques into more elaborate models suitable for a more expensive and detailed analysis. 3. We further hypothesize that this migration process is much cheaper than simply remodeling the system under investigation from scratch when moving to models needed for the more detailed and expensive IV and V assessments.

Heimdahl, Mats↗
NASA NTRS1992

Independent verification and validation for Space Shuttle flight software

The Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle Software was asked by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Office of Space Flight to determine the need to continue independent verification and validation (IV&V) for Space Shuttle flight software. The Committee found that the current IV&V process is necessary to maintain NASA's stringent safety and quality requirements for man-rated vehicles. Therefore, the Committee does not support NASA's plan to eliminate funding for the IV&V effort in fiscal year 1993. The Committee believes that the Space Shuttle software development process is not adequate without IV&V and that elimination of IV&V as currently practiced will adversely affect the overall quality and safety of the software, both now and in the future. Furthermore, the Committee was told that no organization within NASA has the expertise or the manpower to replace the current IV&V function in a timely fashion, nor will building this expertise elsewhere necessarily reduce cost. Thus, the Committee does not recommend moving IV&V functions to other organizations within NASA unless the current IV&V is maintained for as long as it takes to build comparable expertise in the replacing organization.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1997

NASA software independent verification and validation (IV and V): An upfront approach to mission success

Software independent verification and validation (IV and V) implementation methods, specific approaches and accomplishments in the application of IV and V to NASA programs are discussed. Because software is mission critical, software assurance is a critical aspect of NASA's safety and mission assurance program. An overview of NASA's software IV and V facility is given.

Gregory, Frederick D.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Agile Approach to Adding Assurance and Mitigating Overall Mission Risk for Orion Software on EM-1

Human-rated missions like Orion are becoming exceedingly complex in terms of software contribution to achieving mission objectives, and this creates a resource challenge for everyone whose job is to add assurance that the mission is going to fly safely. Orion IV&V has addressed this challenge by providing focused assurance results of critical mission capabilities prioritized by a dynamic assessment of risk level. Prior to this approach, Orion IV&V was evaluating areas of risk in much broader, and more static, terms. Due to the Agile software development cycle that Orion follows, IV&V findings were often reported months out of phase with the developer. As a result of evolving the approach to providing assurance on Orion, IV&V is able to incrementally deliver high-priority assurance data and more impactful issues more in phase with the developer activities, thereby increasing the value of the findings to the project. The agile IV&V approach employed by the Orion IV&V team strives to achieve a cadence of delivery that matches the pace of development. This agile approach provides increased flexibility for the assurance provider to become more efficient in reporting assurance conclusions and issues. This presentation will discuss the principles which drive the design of our approach, results to date, and aspirations for long-term performance.

Assurance↗
NASA NTRS2016

Technical Reference Suite Addressing Challenges of Providing Assurance for Fault Management Architectural Design

Research into complexities of software systems Fault Management (FM) and how architectural design decisions affect safety, preservation of assets, and maintenance of desired system functionality has coalesced into a technical reference (TR) suite that advances the provision of safety and mission assurance. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program, with Software Assurance Research Program support, extracted FM architectures across the IV&V portfolio to evaluate robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods applied to the architectures and designs. This investigation spanned IV&V projects with seven different primary developers, a wide range of sizes and complexities, and encompassed Deep Space Robotic, Human Spaceflight, and Earth Orbiter mission FM architectures. The initiative continues with an expansion of the TR suite to include Launch Vehicles, adding the benefit of investigating differences intrinsic to model-based FM architectures and insight into complexities of FM within an Agile software development environment, in order to improve awareness of how nontraditional processes affect FM architectural design and system health management. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IV&V techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. Additionally, the role FM has with regard to strengthened security requirements, with potential to advance overall asset protection of flight software systems, is being addressed with the development of an adverse conditions database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities. Capitalizing on the established framework, this TR suite provides assurance capability for a variety of FM architectures and varied development approaches. Research results are being disseminated across NASA, other agencies, and the software community. This paper discusses the findings and TR suite informing the FM domain in best practices for FM architectural design, visibility observations, and methods employed for IV&V and mission assurance.

Fitz, Rhonda↗
NASA NTRS1985

A practical experience with independent verification and validation

One approach to reducing software cost and increasing reliability is the use of an independent verification and validation (IV & V) methodology. The Software Engineering Laboratory (SEL) applied the IV & V methodology to two medium-size flight dynamics software development projects. Then, to measure the effectiveness of the IV & V approach, the SEL compared these two projects with two similar past projects, using measures like productivity, reliability, and maintain ablilty. Results indicated that the use of the IV & V methodology did not help the overall process nor improve the product in these cases.

Page, Gerald↗
NASA NTRS2019

Agile Approach to Assuring the Safety-Critical Embedded Software for NASA's Orion Spacecraft

Human-rated missions like NASA's Exploration Mission - 1 (EM-1) and the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle are becoming exceedingly complex in terms of software's contribution to achieving mission objectives. The increasing complexity and inherent safety critical nature of the embedded flight software imposes a unique resource challenge to assurance providers responsible for affirming that the mission is going to fly safely. Another challenge NASA and other Government agencies are facing is that more and more software is being developed using an agile development methodology, which is divergent from the typical waterfall, iterative, and incremental development methodologies assurance providers generally observe in the development of safety-critical embedded software. Orion Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) has addressed these challenges by providing focused assurance results of critical mission capabilities prioritized by a dynamic assessment of risk level. Prior to this approach, Orion IV&V evaluated areas of risk in much broader, and more static, terms. Due to the agile software development life cycle that Orion follows, IV&V findings were often reported months out of phase with the developer thereby imposing increased rework costs. As a result of evolving the approach to adding assurance on Orion, IV&V is able to incrementally deliver high-priority assurance conclusions and more impactful issues more in phase with the developer activities, thereby increasing the value of the findings to the project. The agile IV&V approach employed by the Orion IV&V team strives to achieve a cadence of delivery that matches the pace of development. This agile approach provides increased flexibility for the assurance provider to become more efficient in reporting assurance conclusions and issues. This paper and presentation will discuss the principles which drive the design of our approach, results to date, and stimulate thinking for groups looking to add assurance to software being developed using an agile methodology.

Justin Smith↗
NASA NTRS1997

Applying Independent Verification and Validation to Automatic Test Equipment

This paper describes a general overview of applying Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) to Automatic Test Equipment (ATE). The overview is not inclusive of all IV&V activities that can occur or of all development and maintenance items that can be validated and verified, during the IV&V process. A sampling of possible IV&V activities that can occur within each phase of the ATE life cycle are described.

Calhoun, Cynthia C.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Fault Management Architectures and the Challenges of Providing Software Assurance

Fault Management (FM) is focused on safety, the preservation of assets, and maintaining the desired functionality of the system. How FM is implemented varies among missions. Common to most missions is system complexity due to a need to establish a multi-dimensional structure across hardware, software and spacecraft operations. FM is necessary to identify and respond to system faults, mitigate technical risks and ensure operational continuity. Generally, FM architecture, implementation, and software assurance efforts increase with mission complexity. Because FM is a systems engineering discipline with a distributed implementation, providing efficient and effective verification and validation (V&V) is challenging. A breakout session at the 2012 NASA Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) Annual Workshop titled "V&V of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes" exposed this issue in terms of V&V for a representative set of architectures. NASA's Software Assurance Research Program (SARP) has provided funds to NASA IV&V to extend the work performed at the Workshop session in partnership with NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). NASA IV&V will extract FM architectures across the IV&V portfolio and evaluate the data set, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods that could be applied to the various architectures and designs. This SARP initiative focuses efforts on FM architectures from critical and complex projects within NASA. The identification of particular FM architectures and associated V&V/IV&V techniques provides a data set that can enable improved assurance that a system will adequately detect and respond to adverse conditions. Ultimately, results from this activity will be incorporated into the NASA Fault Management Handbook providing dissemination across NASA, other agencies and the space community. This paper discusses the approach taken to perform the evaluations and preliminary findings from the research.

Fault Management↗
NASA NTRS2013

V&V of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes

This paper describes the results of a special breakout session of the NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Workshop held in the fall of 2012 entitled "V&V of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes." The NASA IV&V Program is in a unique position to interact with projects across all of the NASA development domains. Using this unique opportunity, the IV&V program convened a breakout session to enable IV&V teams to share their challenges and successes with respect to the V&V of Fault Management (FM) architectures and software. The presentations and discussions provided practical examples of pitfalls encountered while performing V&V of FM including the lack of consistent designs for implementing faults monitors and the fact that FM information is not centralized but scattered among many diverse project artifacts. The discussions also solidified the need for an early commitment to developing FM in parallel with the spacecraft systems as well as clearly defining FM terminology within a project.

Verification↗
NASA NTRS1997

A Case Study of 4 & 5 Cost Effectiveness

This paper looks at the Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) of NASA's Space Shuttle Day of Launch I-Load Update (DoLILU) project. IV&V is defined. The system's development life cycle is explained. Data collection and analysis are described. DoLILU Issue Tracking Reports (DITRs) authored by IV&V personnel are analyzed to determine the effectiveness of IV&V in finding errors before the code, testing, and integration phase of the software development life cycle. The study's findings are reported along with the limitations of the study and planned future research.

Neal, Ralph D.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Agile Approach to Assuring the Safety-Critical Embedded Software for NASA's Orion Spacecraft

Human-rated missions like those in NASA's Orion Program continue to grow in complexity. The role of software in achieving ambitious mission objectives has expanded dramatically in the last few decades. Assuring the safety and performance of the embedded flight software is quickly growing beyond the reach of traditional methods and resource levels. The methods used to build these software-dominant systems evolve in an on-going attempt to keep pace with the scope of our ambitions. Agile software development is now commonplace. The long timelines and large batches of work associated with traditional methods are being replaced by rapid delivery of small increments _ as system capabilities are realized in waves. Assurance of these critical software capabilities must therefore conquer an ever-expanding frontier of challenges, and do so with an approach matched to the evolving development methods. This paper recounts the journey of the Orion Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) team as we addressed this dynamic environment. Widening our aperture to encompass a dramatically larger mission scope, while adjusting our cadence to synchronize with the rapid pace of agile software development, a new approach to IV&V is emerging. This approach is characterized by a sharper focus on mission capabilities, matched with a method to dynamically _follow the risk' as the IV&V team delivers more compelling assurance data in waves. Traditional methods prevalent in IV&V tend to scope the work using artifacts of the development process as they evolve from preliminary to final versions, and the pace of delivery was synchronized with the development timelines prevalent in the waterfall lifecycle. That more static approach is out of phase with the demands of the new environment. Scoping work according to the critical capabilities of the system (rather than artifacts of development) and synchronizing with the rapid pace of agile development, we are moving toward more effective parity with the demands of the environment. We explain the concrete steps we took, the principles that motivated our choices, and the results we have achieved to date.

Capability based assurance↗
NASA NTRS1993

Lattice-matched heteroepitaxy of wide gap ternary compound semiconductors

A variety of applications are identified for heteroepitaxial structures of wide gap I-III-VI(sub 2) and II-IV-V(sub 2) semiconductors, and are assessed in comparison with ternary III-V alloys and other wide gap materials. Non-linear optical applications of the I-III-VI(sub 2) and II-IV-V(sub 2) compound heterostructures are discussed, which require the growth of thick epitaxial layers imposing stringent requirements on the conditions of heteroepitaxy. In particular, recent results concerning the MOCVD growth of ZnSi(x)Ge(1-x)P2 alloys lattice matching Si or GaP substrates are reviewed. Also, heterostructures of Cu(z)Ag(1-z)GaS2 alloys that lattice-match Si, Ge, GaP, or GaAs substrates are considered in the context of optoelectronic devices operating in the blue wavelength regime. Since under the conditions of MOCVD, metastable alloys of the II-IV-V(sub 2) compounds and group IV elements are realized, II-IV-V(sub 2) alloys may also serve as interlayers in the integration of silicon and germanium with exactly lattice-matched tetrahedrally coordinated compound semiconductors, e.g. ZnSi(x)Ge(1-x)P2.

Bachmann, Klaus J.↗
NASA NTRS1977

The ultraviolet spectra of Alpha Aquilae and Alpha Canis Minoris

Scans of Alpha Aql (A7 IV, V) and Alpha CMi (F5 IV-V) obtained with the Copernicus satellite spectrometer over the wavelength range from 2100 to 3200 A are presented along with a spectrum of the integrated solar disk over the same range procured during a calibrated rocket flight. About 1500 fairly strong absorption lines in the Alpha CMi spectrum between 2400 and 2961 A are identified by comparison with a solar atlas and by using a theoretical spectrum synthesized from a blanketed LTE model with an effective temperature of 6500 K and a surface gravity of 10,000 cm/sec per sec. The Mg II resonance doublet at 2795.528 and 2802.704 A is found to be present in all three stars together with a discontinuity at 2635 A due to Fe II, Fe I, Cr I, and Mn II. It is concluded that the Mg II resonance lines and the 2635-A continuum break would be the best spectral features for estimating the redshift of a galaxy observed at low resolution provided the redshift is not less than about 0.75.

Morton, D. C.↗