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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2022

Tale of Three Molecular Nitrides: Mononuclear Vanadium (V) and (IV) Nitrides As Well As a Mixed-Valence Trivanadium Nitride Having a V 3 N 4 Double-Diamond Core

Here, transmetallation of [VCl 3 (THF) 3 ] and [TlTp tBu,Me ] afforded [(Tp tBu,Me )VCl 2 ] (1, Tp tBu,Me = hydro-tris(3-tert-butyl-5-methylpyrazol-1-yl)borate), which was reduced with KC 8 to form a $C_{3v}$ symmetric V II complex, [(Tp tBu,Me )VCl] (2). Complex 1 has a high-spin ($\textit{S}$ = 1) ground state and displays rhombic high-frequency and -field electron paramagnetic resonance (HFEPR) spectra, while complex 2 has an $\textit{S}$ = 3/2 4 A 2 ground state observable by conventional EPR spectroscopy. Complex 1 reacts with NaN 3 to form the V V nitride-azide complex [(Tp tBu,Me )V≡N(N 3 )] (3). A likely V III azide intermediate en route to 3, [(Tp tBu,Me )VCl(N 3 )] (4), was isolated by reacting 1 with N 3 SiMe 3 . Complex 4 is thermally stable but reacts with NaN3 to form 3, implying a bis-azide intermediate, [(Tp tBu,Me )V(N 3 ) 2 ] (A), leading to 3. Reduction of 3 with KC 8 furnishes a trinuclear and mixed-valent nitride, [{(Tp tBu,Me )V} 2 ($μ_{4-}$VN 4 )] (5), conforming to a Robin–Day class I description. Complex 5 features a central vanadium ion supported only by bridging nitride ligands. Contrary to 1, complex 2 reacts with NaN 3 to produce an azide-bridged dimer, [{(Tp tBu,Me )V} 2 (1,3-$μ_2$-N 3 ) 2 ] (6), with two antiferromagnetically coupled high-spin V II ions. Complex 5 could be independently produced along with [($κ_2$-Tp tBu,Me ) 2 V] upon photolysis of 6 in arene solvents. The putative {V IV ≡N} intermediate, [(Tp tBu,Me )V≡N] (B), was intercepted by photolyzing 6 in a coordinating solvent, such as tetrahydrofuran (THF), yielding [(Tp tBu,Me )V≡N(THF)] (B-THF). In arene solvents, B-THF expels THF to afford 5 and [($κ_2$-Tp tBu,Me ) 2 V]. A more stable adduct (B-OPPh 3 ) was prepared by reacting B-THF with OPPh 3 . These adducts of B are the first neutral and mononuclear V IV nitride complexes to be isolated.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

NASA NTRS2004

Robust Requirements Tracing via Internet Search Technology: Improving an IV and V Technique

There are three major objectives to this phase of the work. (1) Improvement of Information Retrieval (IR) methods for Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) requirements tracing. Information Retrieval methods are typically developed for very large (order of millions - tens of millions and more documents) document collections and therefore, most successfully used methods somewhat sacrifice precision and recall in order to achieve efficiency. At the same time typical IR systems treat all user queries as independent of each other and assume that relevance of documents to queries is subjective for each user. The IV&V requirements tracing problem has a much smaller data set to operate on, even for large software development projects; the set of queries is predetermined by the high-level specification document and individual requirements considered as query input to IR methods are not necessarily independent from each other. Namely, knowledge about the links for one requirement may be helpful in determining the links of another requirement. Finally, while the final decision on the exact form of the traceability matrix still belongs to the IV&V analyst, his/her decisions are much less arbitrary than those of an Internet search engine user. All this suggests that the information available to us in the framework of the IV&V tracing problem can be successfully leveraged to enhance standard IR techniques, which in turn would lead to increased recall and precision. We developed several new methods during Phase II; (2) IV&V requirements tracing IR toolkit. Based on the methods developed in Phase I and their improvements developed in Phase II, we built a toolkit of IR methods for IV&V requirements tracing. The toolkit has been integrated, at the data level, with SAIC's SuperTracePlus (STP) tool; (3) Toolkit testing. We tested the methods included in the IV&V requirements tracing IR toolkit on a number of projects.

Hayes, Jane↗

NASA NTRS2003

Optimizing IV and V for Mature Organizations

NASA is intending for its future software development agencies to have at least a Level 3 rating in the Carnegie Mellon University Capability Maturity Model (CMM). The CMM has built-in Verification and Validation (V&V) processes that support higher software quality. Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) of software developed by mature agencies can be therefore more effective than for software developed by less mature organizations. How is Independent V&V different with respect to the maturity of an organization? Knowing a priori the maturity of an organization's processes, how can IV&V planners better identify areas of need choose IV&V activities, etc? The objective of this research is to provide a complementary set of guidelines and criteria to assist the planning of IV&V activities on a project using a priori knowledge of the measurable levels of maturity of the organization developing the software.

Fuhman, Christopher↗

NASA NTRS2010

Ares I-X Range Safety Simulation Verification and Analysis IV and V

NASA s ARES I-X vehicle launched on a suborbital test flight from the Eastern Range in Florida on October 28, 2009. NASA generated a Range Safety (RS) flight data package to meet the RS trajectory data requirements defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710. Some products included in the flight data package were a nominal ascent trajectory, ascent flight envelope trajectories, and malfunction turn trajectories. These data are used by the Air Force s 45th Space Wing (45SW) to ensure Eastern Range public safety and to make flight termination decisions on launch day. Due to the criticality of the RS data in regards to public safety and mission success, an independent validation and verification (IV&V) effort was undertaken to accompany the data generation analyses to ensure utmost data quality and correct adherence to requirements. Multiple NASA centers and contractor organizations were assigned specific products to IV&V. The data generation and IV&V work was coordinated through the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel s Trajectory Working Group, which included members from the prime and IV&V organizations as well as the 45SW. As a result of the IV&V efforts, the RS product package was delivered with confidence that two independent organizations using separate simulation software generated data to meet the range requirements and yielded similar results. This document captures ARES I-X RS product IV&V analysis, including the methodology used to verify inputs, simulation, and output data for an RS product. Additionally a discussion of lessons learned is presented to capture advantages and disadvantages to the IV&V processes used.

Tarpley, Ashley↗

NASA NTRS2012

Analysis of Phoenix Anomalies and IV and V Findings Applied to the GRAIL Mission

Analysis of patterns in IV&V findings and their correlation with post-launch anomalies allowed GRAIL to make more efficient use of IV&V services . Fewer issues. . Higher fix rate. . Better communication. . Increased volume of potential issues vetted, at lower cost. . Hard to make predictions of post-launch performance based on IV&V findings . Phoenix made sound fix/use as-is decisions . Things that were fixed eliminated some problems, but hard to quantify. . Broad predictive success in one area, but inverse relationship in others.

Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL)↗

NASA NTRS2002

FY 2002 Report on Software Visualization Techniques for IV and V

One of the major challenges software engineers often face in performing IV&V is developing an understanding of a system created by a development team they have not been part of. As budgets shrink and software increases in complexity, this challenge will become even greater as these software engineers face increased time and resource constraints. This research will determine which current aspects of providing this understanding (e.g., code inspections, use of control graphs, use of adjacency matrices, requirements traceability) are critical to the performing IV&V and amenable to visualization techniques. We will then develop state-of-the-art software visualization techniques to facilitate the use of these aspects to understand software and perform IV&V.

Fotta, Michael E.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Independent Verification and Validation (IV and V) - Adding Mission Assurance to NASA Flight Software

The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Facility objective is to identify potential defects in flight software using independent analysis techniques. This paper describes the tailored IV&V techniques that have been developed in support of critical interactions on the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) project, scheduled to launch in November, 2011. The IV&V techniques for interface analysis use independently developed sequence diagrams of critical scenarios. The results from these analyses have had a positive impact on the requirements flow down, consistency amongst MSL requirements and identification of missing requirements. The results of these analyses and the positive impact to the MSL project are provided.

performance evaluation↗

DOE OSTI2022

Access to Ru(IV)–Ru(V) and Ru(V)–Ru(VI) Redox in Layered Li 7 RuO 6 via Intercalation Reactions

The push to increase the capacity of oxides to store charge as Li-ion battery cathodes has challenged our knowledge of the boundaries of redox chemistry and its relationship to the atomic structure. Layered phases with Ru are now classical models in the quest for refined theories. Current understanding dictates that the highest formal state that can be reached in them is Ru(V), after which activity centered at the oxide anions is triggered. Yet, this picture is challenged by this investigation of the intercalation chemistry of Li 7 RuO 6 . Coupling structural and spectroscopic analysis with computational simulations, we show that Li 7 RuO 6 is capable of highly reversible lithiation to Li 8 RuO 6 through the Ru(V)/Ru(IV) redox couple. Further, Li 7 RuO 6 can also undergo anodic Li deintercalation, showing clear evidence of the reversible formation of Ru(VI) with octahedral coordination, an unusual state that is not accessible in other layered oxides. The results highlight the versatility of the Ru-O bond to undergo distinct redox transitions depending on the specific layered arrangements. They enrich our understanding of redox chemistry in solids while underscoring the need for descriptions of charge compensation that reflect the nuance of covalent interactions.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

NASA NTRS2011

Ares I-X Range Safety Simulation and Analysis IV and V

NASA s Ares I-X vehicle launched on a suborbital test flight from the Eastern Range in Florida on October 28, 2009. NASA generated a Range Safety (RS) product data package to meet the RS trajectory data requirements defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710. Some products included were a nominal ascent trajectory, ascent flight envelopes, and malfunction turn data. These products are used by the Air Force s 45th Space Wing (45SW) to ensure public safety and to make flight termination decisions on launch day. Due to the criticality of the RS data, an independent validation and verification (IV&V) effort was undertaken to accompany the data generation analyses to ensure utmost data quality and correct adherence to requirements. As a result of the IV&V efforts, the RS product package was delivered with confidence that two independent organizations using separate simulation software generated data to meet the range requirements and yielded similar results. This document captures the Ares I-X RS product IV&V analysis, including the methodology used to verify inputs, simulation, and output data for certain RS products. Additionally a discussion of lessons learned is presented to capture advantages and disadvantages to the IV&V processes used.

Merry, Carl M.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Independent Verification and Validation (IV and V) Criteria

The purpose of this appendix is to establish quantifiable criteria for determining whether IV&V should be applied to a given software development. Since IV&V should begin in the Formulation Subprocess of a project, the process here described is based on metrics which are available before project approval.

McGill, Kenneth↗

NASA NTRS2015

Assuring NASA's Safety and Mission Critical Software

What is IV&V? Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) is an objective examination of safety and mission critical software processes and products. Independence: 3 Key parameters: Technical Independence; Managerial Independence; Financial Independence. NASA IV&V perspectives: Will the system's software: Do what it is supposed to do?; Not do what it is not supposed to do?; Respond as expected under adverse conditions?. Systems Engineering: Determines if the right system has been built and that it has been built correctly. IV&V Technical Approaches: Aligned with IEEE 1012; Captured in a Catalog of Methods; Spans the full project lifecycle. IV&V Assurance Strategy: The IV&V Project's strategy for providing mission assurance; Assurance Strategy is driven by the specific needs of an individual project; Implemented via an Assurance Design; Communicated via Assurance Statements.

Validation↗

NASA NTRS2004

A Spectrum of IV and V Modeling Techniques

The aerospace industry in general and NASA in particular is using more (semi-formal) model-based software development. Model-based development produces a collection of artifacts, for example, state diagrams, module diagrams (such as class diagrams), control-block diagrams, etc. These artifacts may than be used as a basis for auto code generation for production use. Therefore, these models must be properly evaluated in the IV and V process. IV and V practitioners know how assess standard procedural systems. But what can we du about IV and V of model-based systems? The goal of the work outlined in this proposal is to use cost effective automated techniques to the largest extent possible during the IV and V process. Our working hypotheses are: 1. There exists a range of validation techniques that can assess models built using a range of modeling techniques of increasing cost and complexity. Specifically, we hypotesize that the "cheaper" techniques can find faults cheaply and early in a project. These early results are then used to predict if this is a problem system and if a more elaborate and expensive IV and V effort is justified. 2. There exists a set of migration procedures that let us seamlessly move from simple models using cheaper techniques into more elaborate models suitable for a more expensive and detailed analysis. 3. We further hypothesize that this migration process is much cheaper than simply remodeling the system under investigation from scratch when moving to models needed for the more detailed and expensive IV and V assessments.

Heimdahl, Mats↗

NASA NTRS1992

Independent verification and validation for Space Shuttle flight software

The Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle Software was asked by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Office of Space Flight to determine the need to continue independent verification and validation (IV&V) for Space Shuttle flight software. The Committee found that the current IV&V process is necessary to maintain NASA's stringent safety and quality requirements for man-rated vehicles. Therefore, the Committee does not support NASA's plan to eliminate funding for the IV&V effort in fiscal year 1993. The Committee believes that the Space Shuttle software development process is not adequate without IV&V and that elimination of IV&V as currently practiced will adversely affect the overall quality and safety of the software, both now and in the future. Furthermore, the Committee was told that no organization within NASA has the expertise or the manpower to replace the current IV&V function in a timely fashion, nor will building this expertise elsewhere necessarily reduce cost. Thus, the Committee does not recommend moving IV&V functions to other organizations within NASA unless the current IV&V is maintained for as long as it takes to build comparable expertise in the replacing organization.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1997

NASA software independent verification and validation (IV and V): An upfront approach to mission success

Software independent verification and validation (IV and V) implementation methods, specific approaches and accomplishments in the application of IV and V to NASA programs are discussed. Because software is mission critical, software assurance is a critical aspect of NASA's safety and mission assurance program. An overview of NASA's software IV and V facility is given.

Gregory, Frederick D.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Agile Approach to Adding Assurance and Mitigating Overall Mission Risk for Orion Software on EM-1

Human-rated missions like Orion are becoming exceedingly complex in terms of software contribution to achieving mission objectives, and this creates a resource challenge for everyone whose job is to add assurance that the mission is going to fly safely. Orion IV&V has addressed this challenge by providing focused assurance results of critical mission capabilities prioritized by a dynamic assessment of risk level. Prior to this approach, Orion IV&V was evaluating areas of risk in much broader, and more static, terms. Due to the Agile software development cycle that Orion follows, IV&V findings were often reported months out of phase with the developer. As a result of evolving the approach to providing assurance on Orion, IV&V is able to incrementally deliver high-priority assurance data and more impactful issues more in phase with the developer activities, thereby increasing the value of the findings to the project. The agile IV&V approach employed by the Orion IV&V team strives to achieve a cadence of delivery that matches the pace of development. This agile approach provides increased flexibility for the assurance provider to become more efficient in reporting assurance conclusions and issues. This presentation will discuss the principles which drive the design of our approach, results to date, and aspirations for long-term performance.

Assurance↗

NASA NTRS2016

Technical Reference Suite Addressing Challenges of Providing Assurance for Fault Management Architectural Design

Research into complexities of software systems Fault Management (FM) and how architectural design decisions affect safety, preservation of assets, and maintenance of desired system functionality has coalesced into a technical reference (TR) suite that advances the provision of safety and mission assurance. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program, with Software Assurance Research Program support, extracted FM architectures across the IV&V portfolio to evaluate robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods applied to the architectures and designs. This investigation spanned IV&V projects with seven different primary developers, a wide range of sizes and complexities, and encompassed Deep Space Robotic, Human Spaceflight, and Earth Orbiter mission FM architectures. The initiative continues with an expansion of the TR suite to include Launch Vehicles, adding the benefit of investigating differences intrinsic to model-based FM architectures and insight into complexities of FM within an Agile software development environment, in order to improve awareness of how nontraditional processes affect FM architectural design and system health management. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IV&V techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. Additionally, the role FM has with regard to strengthened security requirements, with potential to advance overall asset protection of flight software systems, is being addressed with the development of an adverse conditions database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities. Capitalizing on the established framework, this TR suite provides assurance capability for a variety of FM architectures and varied development approaches. Research results are being disseminated across NASA, other agencies, and the software community. This paper discusses the findings and TR suite informing the FM domain in best practices for FM architectural design, visibility observations, and methods employed for IV&V and mission assurance.

Fitz, Rhonda↗

NASA NTRS1985

A practical experience with independent verification and validation

One approach to reducing software cost and increasing reliability is the use of an independent verification and validation (IV & V) methodology. The Software Engineering Laboratory (SEL) applied the IV & V methodology to two medium-size flight dynamics software development projects. Then, to measure the effectiveness of the IV & V approach, the SEL compared these two projects with two similar past projects, using measures like productivity, reliability, and maintain ablilty. Results indicated that the use of the IV & V methodology did not help the overall process nor improve the product in these cases.

Page, Gerald↗

NASA NTRS2019

Agile Approach to Assuring the Safety-Critical Embedded Software for NASA's Orion Spacecraft

Human-rated missions like NASA's Exploration Mission - 1 (EM-1) and the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle are becoming exceedingly complex in terms of software's contribution to achieving mission objectives. The increasing complexity and inherent safety critical nature of the embedded flight software imposes a unique resource challenge to assurance providers responsible for affirming that the mission is going to fly safely. Another challenge NASA and other Government agencies are facing is that more and more software is being developed using an agile development methodology, which is divergent from the typical waterfall, iterative, and incremental development methodologies assurance providers generally observe in the development of safety-critical embedded software. Orion Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) has addressed these challenges by providing focused assurance results of critical mission capabilities prioritized by a dynamic assessment of risk level. Prior to this approach, Orion IV&V evaluated areas of risk in much broader, and more static, terms. Due to the agile software development life cycle that Orion follows, IV&V findings were often reported months out of phase with the developer thereby imposing increased rework costs. As a result of evolving the approach to adding assurance on Orion, IV&V is able to incrementally deliver high-priority assurance conclusions and more impactful issues more in phase with the developer activities, thereby increasing the value of the findings to the project. The agile IV&V approach employed by the Orion IV&V team strives to achieve a cadence of delivery that matches the pace of development. This agile approach provides increased flexibility for the assurance provider to become more efficient in reporting assurance conclusions and issues. This paper and presentation will discuss the principles which drive the design of our approach, results to date, and stimulate thinking for groups looking to add assurance to software being developed using an agile methodology.

Justin Smith↗