SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
During its use on the ISS, Astrobee and its systems have encountered multiple anomalies, which were either resolved remotely via software updates, or, where not possible, with hardware replacements on orbit or by the return of the faulty unit to NASA’s ground facilities for its repair.
The Solar Alpha Rotary Joint (SARJ) is a mechanism of the International Space Station (ISS) that orients the solar power generating arrays toward the sun as the ISS orbits our planet. The orientation with the sun must be maintained to fully charge the ISS batteries and maintain all the other ISS electrical systems operating properly. In 2007, just a few months after full deployment, the starboard SARJ developed anomalies that warranted a full investigation including ISS Extravehicular Activity (EVA). The EVA uncovered unexpected debris that was due to degradation of a nitride layer on the SARJ bearing race. ISS personnel identified the failure root-cause and applied an aerospace grease to lubricate the area associated with the anomaly. The corrective action allowed the starboard SARJ to continue operating within the specified engineering parameters. The SARJ LITE (Lubrication Interval Test and Evaluation) program was initiated by NASA, Lockheed Martin, and Boeing to simulate the operation of the ISS SARJ for an extended time. The hardware was designed to test and evaluate the exact material components used aboard the ISS SARJ, but in a controlled area where engineers could continuously monitor the performance. After running the SARJ LITE test for an equivalent of 36+ years of continuous use, the test was opened to evaluate the metallography and lubrication. We have sampled the SARJ LITE rollers and plate to fully assess the grease used for lubrication. Chemical and thermal analysis of these samples has generated information that has allowed us to assess the location, migration, and current condition of the grease. The collective information will be key toward understanding and circumventing any performance deviations involving the ISS SARJ in the years to come.
The International Space Station (ISS) continues to mature and operate its life support equipment. Major events occurring between February 2005 and February 2006 are discussed in this paper, as are updates from previously ongoing hardware anomalies. This paper addresses the major ISS operation events over the last year. Impact to overall ISS operations is also discussed.
The International Space Station (ISS) continues to mature and operate its life support equipment. Major events occurring between February 2006 and February 2007 are discussed in this paper, as are updates from previously ongoing hardware anomalies. This paper addresses the major ISS operation events over the last year. Impact to overall ISS operations is also discussed.
Traditional mission and vehicle management involves teams of highly trained specialists monitoring vehicle status and crew activities, responding rapidly to any anomalies encountered during operations. These teams work from the Mission Control Center and have access to engineering support teams with specialized expertise in International Space Station (ISS) subsystems. Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) applications can significantly augment these capabilities by providing enhanced monitoring, prognostic and diagnostic tools for critical decision support and mission management. The Intelligent Systems Division of NASA Ames Research Center is developing many prototype applications using model-based reasoning, data mining and simulation, working with Mission Control through the ISHM Testbed and Prototypes Project. This paper will briefly describe information technology that supports current mission management practice, and will extend this to a vision for future mission control workflow incorporating new ISHM applications. It will describe ISHM applications currently under development at NASA and will define technical approaches for implementing our vision of future human exploration mission management incorporating artificial intelligence and distributed web service architectures using specific examples. Several prototypes are under development, each highlighting a different computational approach. The ISStrider application allows in-depth analysis of Caution and Warning (C&W) events by correlating real-time telemetry with the logical fault trees used to define off-nominal events. The application uses live telemetry data and the Livingstone diagnostic inference engine to display the specific parameters and fault trees that generated the C&W event, allowing a flight controller to identify the root cause of the event from thousands of possibilities by simply navigating animated fault tree models on their workstation. SimStation models the functional power flow for the ISS Electrical Power System and can predict power balance for nominal and off-nominal conditions. SimStation uses realtime telemetry data to keep detailed computational physics models synchronized with actual ISS power system state. In the event of failure, the application can then rapidly diagnose root cause, predict future resource levels and even correlate technical documents relevant to the specific failure. These advanced computational models will allow better insight and more precise control of ISS subsystems, increasing safety margins by speeding up anomaly resolution and reducing,engineering team effort and cost. This technology will make operating ISS more efficient and is directly applicable to next-generation exploration missions and Crew Exploration Vehicles.
The Data Mining project seeks to bring the capability of data visualization to NASA anomaly and problem reporting systems for the purpose of improving data trending, evaluations, and analyses. Currently NASA systems are tailored to meet the specific needs of its organizations. This tailoring has led to a variety of nomenclatures and levels of annotation for procedures, parts and anomalies making difficult the realization of the common causes for anomalies. Making significant observations and realizing the connection between these causes without a common way to view data is difficult to impossible. The Data Mining project is in its early stages of presenting a common visualization of normalized data through a web based portal. In this paper I detail what I have learned and what I have accomplished during my time as an intern toward the purpose of creating the project portal. I have gone through an iterative process of familiarization with the project and its goals, site design, research, modification and review on the road to creating a common method and location to view the visualized data created under this project.
Electric potential variations on the International Space Station (ISS) structure in low Earth orbit are dominated by contributions from interactions of the United States (US) 160 volt solar arrays with the relatively high density, low temperature plasma environment and inductive potentials generated by motion of the large vehicle across the Earth?s magnetic field. The Floating Potential Measurement Unit (FPMU) instrument suite comprising two Langmuir probes, a plasma impedance probe, and a floating potential probe was deployed in August 2006 for use in characterizing variations in ISS potential, the state of the ionosphere along the ISS orbit and its effect on ISS charging, evaluating effects of payloads and visiting vehicles, and for supporting ISS plasma hazard assessments. This presentation summarizes observations of ISS frame potential variations obtained from the FPMU from deployment in 2006 through the current time. We first describe ISS potential variations due to current collection by solar arrays in the day time sector of the orbit including eclipse exit and entry charging events, potential variations due to plasma environment variations in the equatorial anomaly, and visiting vehicles docked to the ISS structure. Next, we discuss potential variations due to inductive electric fields generated by motion of the vehicle across the geomagnetic field and the effects of external electric fields in the ionosphere. Examples of night time potential variations at high latitudes and their possible relationship to auroral charging are described and, finally, we demonstrate effects on the ISS potential due to European Space Agency and US plasma contactor devices.
For new flight controllers, the two main learning tools are simulations and real time console performance training. These benefit the new flight controllers in different ways and could possibly be improved. Simulations: a) Allow for mistakes without serious consequences. b) Lets new flight controllers learn the working style of other new flight controllers. c) Lets new flight controllers eventually begin to feel like they have mastered the sim world, so therefore they must be competent in the real time world too. Real time: a) Shows new flight controllers some of the unique problems that develop and have to be accounted for when dealing with certain payloads or systems. b) Lets new flight controllers experience handovers - gathering information from the previous shift on what the room needs to be aware of and what still needs to be done. c) Gives new flight controllers confidence that they can succeed in the position they are training for when they can solve real anomalies. How Sims could be improved and more like real-time ops for the ISS Operations Controller position: a) Operations Change Requests to review. b) Fewer anomalies (but still more than real time for practice). c) Payload Planning Manager Handover sheet for the E-1 and E-3 reviews. d) Flight note in system with at least one comment to verify for the E-1 and E-3 reviews How the real time console performance training could be improved for the ISS Operations Controller position: a) Schedule the new flight controller to be on console for four days but with a different certified person each day. This will force them to be the source of knowledge about every OCR in progress, everything that has happened in those few days, and every activity on the timeline. Constellation program flight controllers will have to learn entirely from simulations, thereby losing some of the elements that they will need to have experience with for real time ops. It may help them to practice real time console performance training in the International Space Station or Space Shuttle to gather some general anomaly resolution and day-to-day task management skills.
The IATCS coolant has experienced a number of anomalies in the time since the US Lab was first activated on Flight 5A in February 2001. These have included: 1) a decrease in coolant pH, 2) increases in inorganic carbon, 3) a reduction in phosphate buffer concentration, 4) an increase in dissolved nickel and precipitation of nickel salts, and 5) increases in microbial concentration. These anomalies represent some risk to the system, have been implicated in some hardware failures and are suspect in others. The ISS program has conducted extensive investigations of the causes and effects of these anomalies and has developed a comprehensive program to remediate the coolant chemistry of the on-orbit system as well as provide a robust and compatible coolant solution for the hardware yet to be delivered. The remediation steps include changes in the coolant chemistry specification, development of a suite of new antimicrobial additives, and development of devices for the removal of nickel and phosphate ions from the coolant. This paper presents an overview of the anomalies, their known and suspected system effects, their causes, and the actions being taken to remediate the coolant.
In early 2011, the ISS Vehicle Configuration Office began considering the relocation of the Permanent Multipurpose Module (PMM) to the aft facing Common Berthing Mechanism (CBM) on Node 3 to open a berthing location for visiting vehicles on the Node 1 nadir CBM. In this position, computer-aided design (CAD) models indicated that the aft end of the PMM would be only a few inches from the stowed Functional Cargo Block (FGB) port solar array. To validate the CAD model clearance analysis, in the late summer of 2011 the Image Science and Analysis Group (ISAG) was asked to determine the true geometric relationship between the on-orbit aft facing Node 3 CBM and the FGB port solar array. The desired measurements could be computed easily by photogrammetric analysis if current imagery of the ISS hardware were obtained. Beginning in the fall of 2011, ISAG used the Dynamic Onboard Ubiquitous Graphics (DOUG) program to design a way to acquire imagery of the aft face of Node 3, the aft end-cone of Node 1, the port side of pressurized mating adapter 1 (PMA1), and the port side of the FGB out to the tip of the port solar array using cameras on the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS). This was complicated by the need to thread the SSRMS under the truss, past Node 3 and the Cupola, and into the space between the aft side of Node 3 and the FGB solar array to acquire more than 100 images from multiple positions. To minimize the number of SSRMS movements, the Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator (SPDM) would be attached to the SSRMS. This would make it possible to park the SPDM in one position and acquire multiple images by changing the viewing orientation of the SPDM body cameras using the pan/tilt units on which the cameras are mounted. Using this implementation concept, ISAG identified four SSRMS/SPDM positions from which all of the needed imagery could be acquired. Based on a photogrammetric simulation, it was estimated that the location of the FGB solar array could be measured within an accuracy of about 1 in. in each axis relative to the ISS Analysis Coordinate System (ISSACS). In October 2011, a proposed image-acquisition plan was drafted by ISAG and released for review. The ISS Robotics flight control team (ROBO) proposed minor changes to SPDM positions 1 and 4 to meet ISS proximity requirements. The updated image acquisition plan and draft chit were presented to and approved by the Systems Working Group (SWG) November 18 and were sent to the Vehicle Configuration Board (VCB) in early December 2011. Working with ROBO on 3 successive days (February 21, 22, and 23), ISAG collected 161 images of the ISS. Approximately 40 images were collected from each of the four different SSRMS/SPDM positions, with each set mapping the region from the Node 3 end cone, across Node 1, along the forward port side portion of the FGB, and out the port side FGB solar arrays. From this imagery, the best 80 images were selected for use in the analysis. The images were radiometrically enhanced to improve color and contrast and loaded into the FotoG analysis software along with the camera parameters and control data, which consisted of the coordinates for 54 handrail attachment bolts on the aft face of Node 3, in the ISSACS coordinate system. The results of this analysis produced the measured coordinates of 116 points distributed across the face of the FGB solar array panels (see figure 3) along with propagated uncertainty estimates in each coordinate axis. These results were sent to the ISS Vehicle Configuration Office, which sent them to the Configuration Analysis Modeling and Mass Properties (CAMMP) team for comparison with the Russian-provided CAD model for the retracted FGB solar arrays. The CAMMP analysis unexpectedly showed that the measured location of the port FGB solar array was up to 41-in. further outboard than the design and was slightly twisted about its rotational axis. The unexpected comparison results produced some initial concern regarding the accuracy of the photogrammetric measurements. To verify the measured results, ISAG personnel conducted a second analysis using just the imagery of the solar arrays in an arbitrary coordinate system defined by the three corner points of the inboard-most panel, with the design distance between points A1 and A10 as the only scale. The new measurements agreed with the original results to within less than 1 in. RMS in each axis, confirming the original solar array measurements. ISAG produced a final report for the ISS Vehicle Configuration Office documenting an apparent anomaly in the retracted configuration of the port FGB solar arrays. A copy of the measurement report was translated and sent to the Russian Space Agency. During a Vehicle Integrated Performance and Resources (VIPeR) teleconference September 24, 2012, the Russians acknowledged receipt of a translated copy of the ISAG report. The Russian representative stated that the head of the solar array design team claimed that the measured configuration was impossible unless the structure was physically broken. The Russians acknowledged that they had no expertise in photogrammetry, so the analysis technique employed was a "black box" to them, and they did not know how to use the ISAG results. They asked for a single image in which the overextension of the port solar array could be obviously seen. On November 10, 2012, during a face-to-face meeting with their Russian counterparts at JSC, ISAG presented nadir-view imagery of the FGB acquired during Space Shuttle rendezvous. Using the known width of the pressurized portion of the FGB as a scale, this analysis clearly showed that the port FGB solar array was extended outboard further than the Russian design for the retracted solar array.
The IATCS coolant has experienced a number of anomalies in the time since the US Lab was first activated on Flight 5A in February 2001. These have included: 1) a decrease in coolant pH, 2) increases in inorganic carbon, 3) a reduction in phosphate concentration, 4) an increase in dissolved nickel and precipitation of nickel salts, and 5) increases in microbial concentration. These anomalies represent some risk to the system, have been implicated in some hardware failures and are suspect in others. The ISS program has conducted extensive investigations of the causes and effects of these anomalies and has developed a comprehensive program to remediate the coolant chemistry of the on-orbit system as well as provide a robust and compatible coolant solution for the hardware yet to be delivered. This paper presents a status of the coolant stability over the past year as well as results from destructive analyses of hardware removed from the on-orbit system and the current approach to coolant remediation.
Human urine and flush water are eventually converted into drinking water with the Urine Processor Assembly (UPA) aboard the International Space Station (ISS). This conversion is made possible through the Distillation Assembly (DA) of the UPA. One component of the DA is a molded circular piston cup made of virgin polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE). The piston cup is assembled to a titanium component using eight fasteners and washers. Molded PTFE produced for spare piston cups in the first quarter of 2010 was different in appearance and texture, and softer than material molded for previous cups. For the suspect newer PTFE material, cup fasteners were tightened to only one-half the required torque value, yet the washers embedded almost halfway into the material. The molded PTFE used in the DA piston cup should be Type II, based on AMS 3667D and ASTM D4894 specifications. The properties of molded PTFE are considerably different between Type I and II materials. Engineers working with the DA thought that if Type I PTFE was molded by mistake instead of Type II material, that could have resulted in the anomalous material properties. Typically, the vendor molds flat sheet PTFE from the same material lot used to mold the piston cups, and tensile testing as part of quality control should verify that the PTFE is Type II material. However, for this discrepant lot of material, such tensile data was not available. Differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) and dynamic mechanical analysis (DMA) were two of the testing techniques used at the NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to investigate the anomaly for the PTFE material. Other techniques used on PTFE specimens were: Shore D hardness testing, tensile testing on dog bone specimens and a qualitative estimation of porosity by optical and scanning electron microscopy.
In many cases, an initial symptom of hardware malfunction is unusual or unexpected acoustic noise. Many industries such as automotive, heating and air conditioning, and petro-chemical processing use noise and vibration data along with rotating machinery analysis techniques to identify noise sources and correct hardware defects. The NASA/Johnson Space Center Acoustics Office monitors the acoustic environment of the International Space Station (ISS) through periodic sound level measurement surveys. Trending of the sound level measurement survey results can identify in-flight hardware anomalies. The crew of the ISS also serves as a "detection tool" in identifying unusual hardware noises; in these cases the spectral analysis of audio recordings made on orbit can be used to identify hardware defects that are related to rotating components such as fans, pumps, and compressors. In this paper, three examples of the use of sound level measurements and audio recordings for the diagnosis of in-flight hardware anomalies are discussed: identification of blocked inter-module ventilation (IMV) ducts, diagnosis of abnormal ISS Crew Quarters rack exhaust fan noise, and the identification and replacement of a defective flywheel assembly in the Treadmill with Vibration Isolation (TVIS) hardware. In each of these examples, crew time was saved by identifying the off nominal component or condition that existed and in directing in-flight maintenance activities to address and correct each of these problems.
Optical lighting detection from space has been ongoing since 1995 from the Optical Transient detector (1995-2000), then later by the Lightning Imaging Sensors (LIS) on the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) satellite (1997-2015) and the International Space Station (ISS) (ISS 2017-present). A rapid readout (2 ms) 128x128 pixel CCD (Charge-coupled Device) array detects optical transients from lightning (events) and transmits the observations to ground. Ground processing determines whether individual events are likely due to lightning or noise. Likely lightning events are then grouped into groups, flashes, and areas and their location on the earth are determined. The lightning data are saved in orbit files; each file containing the time, location, and intensity of the lightning events, groups, flashes, and areas detected during one orbit. Even after this processing anomalies may exist in some of the orbits. A manual quality assurance (QA) procedure is performed monthly to assess the data and omit orbits with obvious anomalies from the dataset. These files are not included in the final dataset that has undergone QA. The manual QA was developed during the OTD mission to identify artifacts that made it through ground processing algorithms. The manual QA process was continued for the TRMM and ISS LIS missions. Many anomalies have been identified and software updates now address many of them. However, some anomalies still occur in the processed datasets. The manual QA process examines the data for obvious issues in the lightning files that passed through the processing algorithms. These files are considered anomalous and are not included in the final QA dataset. Some issues that may cause an orbit to be considered anomalous include: obvious noise (excess events that make it through the processing), suspect geolocation, and excessive missing data packets. As an example, one way noise manifests is as “streaks” in lightning climatology plots. These streaks are especially apparent in low lightning rate regions (eg., over oceans). Since there is no method at present to extract these anomalies during processing, orbit files with significant anomalies are identified and removed from the final QA ISS LIS dataset. The final QA dataset can be obtained files from the Global Hydrometeorological Resource Center (GHRC). This presentation will provide examples of the various anomalies and examine how often the various anomalies occur and how much data is lost due to the omission of the anomalous orbits. Comparisons with OTD and TRMM LIS will also be examined.
The International Space Station (ISS) Air Quality Monitors (AQMs) have provided targeted in-flight analysis of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the ISS atmosphere since early 2013. During their initial half decade of use covering multiple sets of units, the AQMs performed well, meeting their validation criteria and showing excellent accuracy compared to archival samples. In addition to routine environmental monitoring, the AQMs have also been used during a number of contingency situations and investigations related to Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS). These include a potential ammonia leak, increases in atmospheric ethanol, and efforts to locate potential sources of polydimethylsiloxanes that lead to the production of dimethylsilanediol (DMSD) in the US Water Processor Assembly (WPA). As the fleet of AQMs has aged, several issues have arisen. These have ranged from pervasive problems on electronics boards to loss of sensitivity due to operating in an elevated CO2 environment. The most notable issue encountered during on-orbit operations was incorrect identification of compounds. This initially occurred in mid-2020, when AQM1 reported the presence of benzene. While the AQM team questioned the validity of these results, the concentration of the “benzene” continued to increase and eventually exceeded the 30- and 180-day Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration (SMAC). This led to wide-ranging efforts by a number of groups aimed at understanding the situation and identifying the source of the “benzene.” AQM1 failed after being relocated to the Russian Segment as part of the investigation, and the unit was returned for evaluation. When archive samples collected while the AQM was measuring elevated benzene showed no detectable benzene, the focus of the investigation shifted to determining the cause of the false positive readings. Here, we will discuss the results of this investigation by the AQM team, potential causes of the interference, and subsequent reporting of AQM1 results.
The International Space Station (ISS) Air Quality Monitors (AQMs) have provided targeted in-flight analysis of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the ISS atmosphere since early 2013. During their initial half decade of use covering multiple sets of units, the AQMs performed well, meeting their validation criteria and showing excellent accuracy compared to archival samples. In addition to routine environmental monitoring, the AQMs have also been used during a number of contingency situations and investigations related to Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS). These include a potential ammonia leak, increases in atmospheric ethanol, and efforts to locate potential sources of polydimethylsiloxanes that lead to the production of dimethylsilanediol (DMSD) in the US Water Processor Assembly (WPA). As the fleet of AQMs has aged, several issues have arisen. These have ranged from pervasive problems on electronics boards to loss of sensitivity due to operating in an elevated CO2 environment. The most notable issue encountered during on-orbit operations was incorrect identification of compounds. This initially occurred in mid-2020, when AQM1 reported the presence of benzene. While the AQM team questioned the validity of these results, the concentration of the “benzene” continued to increase and eventually exceeded the 30- and 180-day Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration (SMAC). This led to wide-ranging efforts by a number of groups aimed at understanding the situation and identifying the source of the “benzene.” AQM1 failed after being relocated to the Russian Segment as part of the investigation, and the unit was returned for evaluation. When archive samples collected while the AQM was measuring elevated benzene showed no detectable benzene, the focus of the investigation shifted to determining the cause of the false positive readings. Here, we will discuss the results of this investigation by the AQM team, potential causes of the interference, and subsequent reporting of AQM1 results.
The International Space Station (ISS) Air Quality Monitors (AQMs) have provided targeted in-flight analysis of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the ISS atmosphere since early 2013. During their initial half decade of use covering multiple sets of units, the AQMs performed well, meeting their validation criteria and showing excellent accuracy compared to archival samples. In addition to routine environmental monitoring, the AQMs have also been used during a number of contingency situations and investigations related to Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS). These include a potential ammonia leak, increases in atmospheric ethanol, and efforts to locate potential sources of polydimethylsiloxanes that lead to the production of dimethylsilanediol (DMSD) in the US Water Processor Assembly (WPA). As the fleet of AQMs has aged, several issues have arisen. These have ranged from pervasive problems on electronics boards to loss of sensitivity due to operating in an elevated CO2 environment. The most notable issue encountered during on-orbit operations was incorrect identification of compounds. This initially occurred in mid-2020, when AQM1 reported the presence of benzene. While the AQM team questioned the validity of these results, the concentration of the “benzene” continued to increase and eventually exceeded the 30- and 180-day Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration (SMAC). This led to wide-ranging efforts by a number of groups aimed at understanding the situation and identifying the source of the “benzene.” AQM1 failed after being relocated to the Russian Segment as part of the investigation, and the unit was returned for evaluation. When archive samples collected while the AQM was measuring elevated benzene showed no detectable benzene, the focus of the investigation shifted to determining the cause of the false positive readings. Here, we will discuss the results of this investigation by the AQM team, potential causes of the interference, and subsequent reporting of AQM1 results.
Microorganisms in our living environments are unavoidable. A community of microbes arrived in space with the delivery of the first element of the International Space Station (ISS), attached to hardware and on the bodies of the humans tasked with the initial assembly missions. The risk that microorganisms could cause adverse effects in the health of both the human occupants of the ISS as well as the physical integrity of the station environment and life support systems has been both a driver and a function of engineering and operational controls. Scientists and engineers at NASA have gone to extensive measures to control microbial growth at levels safe for the crewmembers and the spacecraft environment. Many of these measures were initiated with the design of the spacecraft and its systems. Materials used in the ISS were tested for resistance to fungi, such as mold and a paint with a fungus-killing chemical was also used. Controlling the humidity of the air in the Station is also an effective way of discouraging microbe growth. The breathing air is reconditioned by the Environmental Control Life Support System (ECLSS) prior to distribution, utilizing High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration. Requirements restricting the accumulation of water condensate in the air handlers and habitable volume of the ISS were other safeguards added. Water for drinking and food rehydration is disinfected or filtered. A robust in-flight housekeeping regimen for the ISS significantly reduces inappropriate growth of microorganisms and includes a regular cleaning of accessible surfaces with disinfectant wipes. Most of these requirements were suggested by microbiologists to mitigate and possibly prevent many microbiological risks. In addition to these controls, before flight monitoring and analyses of the cabin air, exposed surfaces, water and food, consumables, and crew members are conducted to mitigate microbial risk to the crew and spacecraft. Many microbial risks are much easier to identify and resolve before launch than during space flight. Although the focus has been on prevention of microbiologically related, not all problems can be anticipated. A number of microbial anomalies have occurred on ISS. This paper will discuss the occurrences, root-cause investigations, and mitigation steps taken to remediate the contamination.