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DOE OSTI2021

Deep Learning Systems for Increased Safeguards Surveillance Review Productivity

Nuclear safeguards inspectors expend significant time and maintain intense focus in reviewing video surveillance for safeguards relevant events. To increase efficiency and reduce the time burden of safeguards inspectors performing surveillance data review, this paper presents a novel deep learning (DL) systems concept to integrate generalized DL models into the safeguards surveillance review workflow. The Agency is investigating several DL algorithms for object recognition, localization, tracking, and flagging relevant activities. The project team is working closely with nuclear safeguards inspectors to identify review use cases (based on specific safeguards objectives) and collect their associated requirements. We focused on CANDU and LWR Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and their associated dry storage areas as these present a particularly heavy burden on the inspector surveillance review process due to the number of these facilities under safeguards worldwide. Initial DL algorithm results on safeguards data are promising. Using a convolutional neural network, the team attained a mean average precision (mAP) of 92.9% identifying and localizing spent fuel (SF) casks from a 475 surveillance image dataset. Further, the team had initial success in training a recurrent neural network to identify reactor area activities in video clips, successfully indicating when SF casks enter or exit a pool. We discuss how such DL algorithms would be integrated into the Next Generation Surveillance Review (NGSR) software application. Another issue impacting review productivity is the long time inspectors may have to wait when running these algorithms in NGSR. We present a concept to pre-process remotely collected surveillance data with DL models as the data arrives to IAEA headquarters so that results are already available when starting a new review in NGSR. The proposed DL system concept shows a pathway and workflow for increasing an inspector’s surveillance review productivity by quickly and accurately identifying declared and undeclared safeguards relevant objects and activities in large quantities of surveillance imagery data.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2021

Tamper-Indicating Enclosures with Visually Obvious Tamper Response

Sandia National Laboratories is developing a way to visualize molecular changes that indicate penetration of a tamper-indicating enclosure (TIE). Such "bleeding" materials (analogous to visually obvious, colorful bruised skin that doesn't heal) allows inspectors to use simple visual observation to readily recognize that penetration into a material used as a TIE has been attempted, without providing adversaries the ability to repair damage. Such a material can significantly enhance the current capability for TIEs, used to support treaty verification regimes. Current approaches rely on time-consuming and subjective visual assessment by an inspector, external equipment, such as eddy current or camera devices, or active approaches that may be limited due to application environment. The complexity of securing whole volumes includes: (1) enclosures that are non-standard in size/shape; (2) enclosures that may be inspectorate- or facility-owned; (3) tamper attempts that are detectable but difficult or timely for an inspector to locate; (4) the requirement for solutions that are robust regarding reliability and environment (including facility handling); and (5) the need for solutions that prevent adversaries from repairing penetrations. The approach is based on a transition metal ion solution within a microsphere changing color irreversibly when the microsphere is ruptured. Investigators examine 3D printing of the microspheres as well as the spray coating formulation. The anticipated benefits of this work are passive, flexible, scalable, cost-effective TIEs with obvious and robust responses to tamper attempts. This results in more efficient and effective monitoring, as inspectors will require little or no additional equipment and will be able to detect tamper without extensive time-consuming visual examination. Applications can include custom TIEs (cabinets or equipment enclosures), spray-coating onto facility-owned items, spray-coating of walls or structures, spray-coatings of circuit boards, and 3D-printed seal bodies. The paper describes research to-date on the sensor compounds and microspheres.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2021

Tamper-Indicating Enclosures with Visually Obvious Tamper Response (Final Project Report)

Sandia National Laboratories is developing a new method for detecting penetration of tamper - indicating enclosures (TIEs). This method incorporates the use of "bleeding" materials (analogous to visually obvious, colorful bruised skin that doesn't heal) into the design of TIEs. As designed, it will allow inspectors to use simple visual observation to detect attempts to penetrate the external surfaces of a TIE, without providing adversaries the ability to repair damage. A material of this type can enhance tamper indication of current TIEs used to support treaty verification regimes. Current TIE inspections are time - consuming and rely on subjective visual assessment by an inspector, equipment such as eddy current or camera devices, or involve approaches that may be limited due to application environment. The complexities and requirements that volumetric sealing methods (or TIEs) must address are: (1) enclosures that are non - standard in size/shape; (2) enclosures that may be inspectorate - or facility - owned; (3) finding tamper attempts that are difficult and time consuming for an inspector to locate; (4) enclosures that are reliable and durable enough to survive the conditions that exist in the operating environment (including facility handling); and (5) methods that prevent adversaries from repairing penetrations. Early project R&D [1] focused on encapsulated transition metals. Due to the challenges associated with the transition metal - based approach, a mitigation approach was investigated resulting in two separate research paths — one that involves fabricating custom TIE molds that meet the specific (size and shape) needs of safeguards equipment a nd one that can be deployed as a sprayed on or painted coating to an existing TIE or surface. The "custom mold" approach is based on creating thin layers of materials that , when penetrated, expose an inner material to O 2 which causes an irreversible color change. The "in-situ coating" approach is based on applying a sensor solution containing color changing microcapsules that bleed when the microcapsule is ruptured. The anticipated benefits of this work are passive, flexible, scalable, robust , cost-effective TIEs with visually obvious responses to tamper attempts. This provides more efficient and effective monitoring , as inspectors will require little or no additional equipment and will be able to detect tamper without extensive time - consuming visual examination. Applications include custom TIEs (cabinets , equipment enclosures or seal bodies ), or spray-coating/painting onto facility-owned items, walls or structures, or circuit boards. The paper describes research and testing completed to-date on the method and integration of select system components.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2014

Laboratory and Field Testing of Commercially Available Detectors for the Identification of Chemicals of Interest in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle for the Detection of Undeclared Activities

Traditionally, IAEA inspectors have focused on the detection of nuclear indicators as part of infield inspection activities. The ability to rapidly detect and identify chemical as well as nuclear signatures can increase the ability of IAEA inspectors to detect undeclared activities at a site. Identification of chemical indicators have been limited to use in the analysis of environmental samples. Although IAEA analytical laboratories are highly effective, environmental sample processing does not allow for immediate or real-time results to an IAEA inspector at a facility. During a complementary access inspection, under the Additional Protocol, the use of fieldable technologies that can quickly provide accurate information on chemicals that may be indicative of undeclared activities can increase the ability of IAEA to effectively and efficiently complete their mission. The Complementary Access Working Group (CAWG) is a multi-laboratory team with members from Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratory. The team identified chemicals at each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle that may provide IAEA inspectors with indications that proliferation activities may be occurring. The group eliminated all indicators related to equipment, technology and training, developing a list of by-products/effluents, non-nuclear materials, nuclear materials, and other observables. These proliferation indicators were prioritized based on detectability from a conduct of operations (CONOPS) perspective of a CA inspection (for example, whether an inspector actually can access the S&O or whether it is in process with no physical access), and the IAEA’s interest in the detection technology in conjunction with radiation detectors. The list was consolidated to general categories (nuclear materials from a chemical detection technique, inorganic chemicals, organic chemicals, halogens, and miscellaneous materials). The team then identified commercial off the shelf (COTS) chemical detectors that may detect the chemicals of interest. Three chemical detectors were selected and tested both in laboratory settings and in field operations settings at Idaho National Laboratory. The instruments selected are: Thermo Scientific TruDefender FT (FTIR), Thermo Scientific FirstDefender RM (Raman), and Bruker Tracer III SD (XRF). Functional specifications, operability, and chemical detectability, selectivity, and limits of detection were determined. Results from the laboratory and field tests will be presented. This work is supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, National Nuclear Security Administration.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

DOE OSTI2024

Machine learning at the edge to improve in-field safeguards inspections

Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) are near-ubiquitous in day-to-day life; from cars with automated driver-assistance, recommender systems, generative content platforms, and large language chatbots. Implementing AI as a tool for international safeguards could significantly decrease the burden on safeguards inspectors and nuclear facility operators. The use of AI would allow inspectors to complete their in-field activities quicker, while identifying patterns and anomalies and freeing inspectors to focus on the uniquely human component of inspections. Sandia National Laboratories has spent the past two and a half years developing on-device machine learning to develop both a digital and robotic assistant. This combined platform, which we term inspecta, has numerous on-device machine learning capabilities that have been demonstrated at the laboratory scale. Here this work describes early successes implementing AI/ML capabilities to reduce the burden of tedious inspector tasks such as seal examination, information recall, note taking, and more.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2014

Ultrafast dark-field surface inspection with hybrid-dispersion laser scanning

High-speed surface inspection plays an important role in industrial manufacturing, safety monitoring, and quality control. It is desirable to go beyond the speed limitation of current technologies for reducing manufacturing costs and opening a new window onto a class of applications that require high-throughput sensing. Here, we report a high-speed dark-field surface inspector for detection of micrometer-sized surface defects that can travel at a record high speed as high as a few kilometers per second. This method is based on a modified time-stretch microscope that illuminates temporally and spatially dispersed laser pulses on the surface of a fast-moving object and detects scattered light from defects on the surface with a sensitive photodetector in a dark-field configuration. The inspector's ability to perform ultrafast dark-field surface inspection enables real-time identification of difficult-to-detect features on weakly reflecting surfaces and hence renders the method much more practical than in the previously demonstrated bright-field configuration. Consequently, our inspector provides nearly 1000 times higher scanning speed than conventional inspectors. To show our method's broad utility, we demonstrate real-time inspection of the surface of various objects (a non-reflective black film, transparent flexible film, and reflective hard disk) for detection of 10 μm or smaller defects on a moving target at 20 m/s within a scan width of 25 mm at a scan rate of 90.9 MHz. Our method holds promise for improving the cost and performance of organic light-emitting diode displays for next-generation smart phones, lithium-ion batteries for green electronics, and high-efficiency solar cells.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

DOE OSTI2020

Enabling human–infrastructure interfaces for inspection using augmented reality

Decaying infrastructure maintenance cost allocation depends heavily on accurate and safe inspection in the field. New tools to conduct inspections can assist in prioritizing investments in maintenance and repairs. The industrial revolution termed as “Industry 4.0” is based on the intelligence of machines working with humans in a collaborative workspace. Contrarily, infrastructure management has relied on the human for making day-to-day decisions. New emerging technologies can assist during infrastructure inspections, to quantify structural condition with more objective data. However, today’s owners agree in trusting the inspector’s decision in the field over data collected with sensors. If data collected in the field is accessible during the inspections, the inspector decisions can be improved with sensors. New research opportunities in the human–infrastructure interface would allow researchers to improve the human awareness of their surrounding environment during inspections. This article studies the role of Augmented Reality (AR) technology as a tool to increase human awareness of infrastructure in their inspection work. The domains of interest of this research include both infrastructure inspections (emphasis on the collection of data of structures to inform management decisions) and emergency management (focus on the data collection of the environment to inform human actions). This article describes the use of a head-mounted device to access real-time data and information during their field inspection. The authors leverage the use of low-cost smart sensors and QR code scanners integrated with Augmented Reality applications for augmented human interface with the physical environment. This article presents a novel interface architecture for developing Augmented Reality–enabled inspection to assist the inspector’s workflow in conducting infrastructure inspection works with two new applications and summarizes the results from various experiments. The main contributions of this work to computer-aided community are enabling inspectors to visualize data files from database and real-time data access using an Augmented Reality environment.

Maharjan, D.↗

DOE OSTI2017

FPGA Authentication Methods.

One of the greatest challenges facing designers of equipment to be used in a nuclear arms control treaty is how to convince the other party in the treaty to trust its results and functionality. Whether the host provides equipment meant to prove treaty obligations and the inspector needs to gain that trust (commonly referred to as authentication), or the inspector provides this equipment and the host needs to gain this trust (commonly considered to be included in certification), one party generally has higher confidence in the equipment at the start of a treaty regime and the other party needs to gain that confidence prior to use. While we focus on authentication in this document—that is, the inspector gaining confidence in host-provided equipment—our conclusions will likely apply to host certification of inspector-provided equipment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2018

Eyes On the Ground: Path Forward Analysis.

A previous report assesses our progress to date on the Eyes On the Ground project, and reviews lessons learned. In this report, we address the implications of those lessons in defining the most productive path forward for the remainder of the project. We propose two main concepts: Interactive Diagnosis and Model-Driven Assistance. Among these, the Model-Driven Assistance concept appears the most promising. The Model-Driven Assistance concept is based on an approximate but useful model of a facility, which provides a unified representation for storing, viewing, and analyzing data that is known about the facility. This representation provides value to both inspectors and IAEA headquarters, and facilitates communication between the two. The concept further includes a lightweight, portable field tool to aid the inspector in executing a variety of inspection tasks, including capture of images and 3-d scan data. We develop a detailed description of this concept, including its system components, functionality, and example use cases. The envisioned tool would provide value by reducing inspector cognitive load, streamlining inspection tasks, and facilitating communication between the inspector and teams at IAEA headquarters. We conclude by enumerating the top implementation priorities to pursue in the remaining limited time of the project. Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2017

Brain Science and International Nuclear Safeguards: Implications from Cognitive Science and Human Factors Research on the Provision and Use of Safeguards-Relevant Information in the Field

Today’s international nuclear safeguards inspectors have access to an increasing volume of supplemental information about the facilities under their purview, including commercial satellite imagery, nuclear trade data, open source information, and results from previous safeguards activities. In addition to completing traditional in-field safeguards activities, inspectors are now responsible for being able to act upon this growing corpus of supplemental safeguards-relevant data and for maintaining situational awareness of unusual activities taking place in their environment. However, cognitive science research suggests that maintaining too much information can be detrimental to a user’s understanding, and externalizing information (for example, to a mobile device) to reduce cognitive burden can decrease cognitive function related to memory, navigation, and attention. Given this dichotomy, how can international nuclear safeguards inspectors better synthesize information to enhance situational awareness, decision making, and performance in the field? This paper examines literature from the fields of cognitive science and human factors in the areas of wayfinding, situational awareness, equipment and technical assistance, and knowledge transfer, and describes the implications for the provision of, and interaction with, safeguards-relevant information for international nuclear safeguards inspectors working in the field.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2018

Using Deep Machine Learning to Conduct Object-Based Identification and Motion Detection on Safeguards Video Surveillance

Video surveillance is one of the core monitoring technologies used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards at safeguarded nuclear facilities worldwide. Current IAEA image-review software has functions for scene-change detection, black image detection and missing scene analysis, but their capabilities are not optimum. The current workflow for the detection of safeguards relevant events heavily depends on inspectors’ laborious visual examination of surveillance videos, which is a time-consuming process and prone to errors. To improve the accuracy of the process and reduce inspectors’ burden, the paper proposes using deep machine learning to detect objects of interest in video streams and to conduct object-based motion detection. The hypothesis of this work is that deep machine learning will reduce the burden on inspectors and reduce errors by automatically locating and identifying objects of interest in video streams. Objects of interest include casks and fuel assemblies that are typically monitored by inspectors. The algorithm being developed in this work is based on a computationally efficient deep machine learning algorithm – You Only Look Once (YOLO) – but is further devised to address specific challenges related to the operation of nuclear facilities. The developed model (which is called YOLO-NSG – YOLO for Nuclear Safeguards) is evaluated with data sets collected at the test facilities at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The initial focus of the research is for application at safeguarded nuclear reactors, such as pressurized heavy-water reactors, where video surveillance is broadly deployed, but can be extended to other use cases of nuclear safeguards. The detailed structure of YOLO-NSG model is introduced and the test results are reported in the paper.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2021

Defending Weapons Inspections from the Effects of Disinformation

The intentional spread of disinformation is not a new challenge for the scientific world. We have seen it perpetuate the idea of a flat earth, convince communities that vaccines are more dangerous than helpful, and even suggest a connection between the “5G” communication infrastructure and COVID-19. Nor is disinformation a new phenomenon in the weapons inspection arena. Weapons inspectors themselves are often forced to sift through alternative narratives of events and inconsistent reporting, and they regularly see their credibility and conclusions questioned in the face of government politics or public biases. But certain recent disinformation campaigns have become so overwhelmingly comprehensive and effective that they constitute a new kind of threat. By preventing accountability for clear violations of international law, these campaigns have created a challenge to the survival of arms control treaties themselves. If weapons inspectors cannot regain the trust of the international community in the face of this challenge, it will be increasingly difficult to ensure compliance with arms control and disarmament treaties going forward. In this essay, I will briefly discuss one of the most comprehensive disinformation efforts of the past decade: the disinformation campaign used to prevent accountability for Syria's repeated use of chemical weapons. After this discussion, I will propose one possible approach to help protect the credibility of disarmament experts and weapons inspectors in the face of pervasive disinformation. This approach will require a concerted effort to connect and support compliance experts and to understand and explain their expertise across cultural, political, national, economic, and religious divides.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2014

CTBT on-site inspections

On-site inspection (OSI) is a critical part of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The OSI verification regime provides for international inspectors to make a suite of measurements and observations on site at the location of an event of interest. The other critical component of the verification regime is the International Monitoring System (IMS), which is a globally distributed network of monitoring stations. The IMS along with technical monitoring data from CTBT member countries, as appropriate, will be used to trigger an OSI. After the decision is made to carry out an OSI, it is important for the inspectors to deploy to the field site rapidly to be able to detect short-lived phenomena such as the aftershocks that may be observable after an underground nuclear explosion. The inspectors will be on site from weeks to months and will be working with many tens of tons of equipment. Parts of the OSI regime will be tested in a field exercise in the country of Jordan late in 2014. The build-up of the OSI regime has been proceeding steadily since the CTBT was signed in 1996 and is on track to becoming a deterrent to someone considering conducting a nuclear explosion in violation of the Treaty.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2024

Utilizing a Virtual Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor Digital Twin to Aid in Diversion Pathway Analysis for International Safeguards Applications

We report digital twin technology has the potential to improve the effectiveness of international safeguards inspectors by providing a tool which can: first, perform an accurate diversion path analysis, identify their indicators, and required sensors to detect them; and second, monitor facilities in real-time using critical data streams that benefit from this safeguards-by-design approach. Safeguards inspectors are required to visit facilities and verify the nuclear material to ensure no diversion has taken place and detect misuse of the facility; however, this analysis and verification effort is time consuming, and with limited funding it is imperative that time spent at a nuclear facility is focused on key areas. A virtual digital twin of three prototypic sodium fast reactors was developed, where diversion and misuse scenarios were explored to determine how a digital twin could provide inspectors with an understanding of how proliferation may occur and where the most likely areas for proliferation would be. For each of the three reactors, an optimization algorithm was able to find core designs which would be difficult to detect via sensors alone; however, the use of a machine learning adapter provided by the digital twin was able to show general trends in where proliferation as likely to take place.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2017

Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators

Once a geological repository has begun operations, the encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel will be performed as a continuous, industrial-scale series of processes, during which time safeguards seals will be applied to transportation casks before shipment from an encapsulation plant, and then verified and removed following receipt at the repository. These operations will occur approximately daily during several decades of Sweden's repository operation; however, requiring safeguards inspectors to perform the application, verification, and removal of every seal would be an onerous burden on International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) resources. Current IAEA practice includes allowing operators to either apply seals or remove them, but not both, so the daily task of either applying or verifying and removing would still require continuous presence of IAEA inspectors at one site at least. Of special importance is the inability to re-verify cask or canisters from which seals have been removed and the canisters emplaced underground. Successfully designing seals that can be applied, verified and removed by an operator with IAEA approval could impact more than repository shipments, but other applications as well, potentially reducing inspector burdens for a wide range of such duties.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2018

Eyes On the Ground: Year 2 Assessment.

The goal of the Eyes On the Ground project is to develop tools to aid IAEA inspectors. Our original vision was to produce a tool that would take three-dimensional measurements of an unknown piece of equipment, construct a semantic representation of the measured object, and then use the resulting data to infer possible explanations of equipment function. We report our tests of a 3-d laser scanner to obtain 3-d point cloud data, and subsequent tests of software to convert the resulting point clouds into primitive geometric objects such as planes and cylinders. These tests successfully identified pipes of moderate diameter and planar surfaces, but also incurred significant noise. We also investigated the IAEA inspector task context, and learned that task constraints may present significant obstacles to using 3-d laser scanners. We further learned that equipment scale and enclosing cases may confound our original goal of equipment diagnosis. Meanwhile, we also surveyed the rapidly evolving field of 3-d measurement technology, and identified alternative sensor modalities that may prove more suitable for inspector use in a safeguards context. We conclude with a detailed discussion of lessons learned and the resulting implications for project goals. Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2018

Eyes On the Ground: Final Report

This report summarizes the work performed under the Sandia LDRD project "Eyes on the Ground: Visual Verification for On-Site Inspection." The goal of the project was to develop methods and tools to assist an IAEA inspector in assessing visual and other information encountered during an inspection. Effective IAEA inspections are key to verifying states' compliance with nuclear non-proliferation treaties. In the course of this work we developed a taxonomy of candidate inspector assistance tasks, selected key tasks to focus on, identified hardware and software solution approaches, and made progress in implementing them. In particular, we demonstrated the use of multiple types of 3-d scanning technology applied to simulated inspection environments, and implemented a preliminary prototype of a novel inspector assistance tool. This report summarizes the project's major accomplishments, and gathers the abstracts and references for the publication and reports that were prepared as part of this work. We then describe work in progress that is not yet ready for publication. Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2018

Eyes On the Ground (Final Report)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗