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Domestic Constultancy Meeting on the IAEA's Regional Training Course (Project Summary)

A team of experts from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) partnered to revise the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities. This two-week course is a modified version of the three-week International Training Course (ITC) that is delivered on location at SNL. The last significant update to the IAEA Regional Training Course (RTC) RTC material was about 10 years ago. Prior revision efforts for two of the IAEA Materials and Facilities (MAFA) section courses, which were each one week in length, consisted of five consultancy meetings each with US DOE/NNSA personnel and international experts and held in Vienna, Austria. The level of effort anticipated to revise a two-week course was expected to double these previous efforts, which prompted development of an alternative approach to the revision process. The goal of the revision of the two-week course, labeled the RTC, was focused on the capability for delivery at any appropriate international location, most likely regionally by the IAEA.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Enhancing the Useability of the IAEA's Physical Model: An Analysis of User Feedback

This study presents the results of Physical Model user interviews conducted with 12 people who have International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards experience. The goal of this report is to provide additional context for policy makers when prioritizing the needs of the IAEA regarding support for enhancements to the Physical Model. The interviews covered the general usability of the Physical Model, its effectiveness as a technical reference, and the scope and utility of the Physical Model's indicators and content. The key conclusions from these interviews are as follows: 1) The Physical Model is difficult to find and not well advertised. 2) The Physical Model can be difficult to use due to its format, which makes searching for information difficult, and lack of visual content. Therefore, the Physical Model should be supported in multiple formats (print, PDF, web) to maximize its usability for different stakeholders. 3) The scope of the Physical Model's content and indicators is likely sufficient, and translating indicators into other languages is unlikely to be worth the effort. 4) Despite its inefficiencies and other issues, the Physical Model in its current form is a vital (albeit under-utilized) resource for key stakeholders. 5) Despite its broad use case the Physical Model is not a catch-all tool and force-fitting the Physical Model into functions for which it has not been designed for would likely diminish its value. 6) It can be difficult to disentangle challenges related to the Physical Model and its usability from broader challenges at the Agency, such as general issues with communication and coordination. Based on these conclusions and considering the results of past studies on the Physical Model funded by NA-241, the analysis team developed a list of recommendations and associated actions for IAEA consideration. These recommendations are prioritized based on the assessed level of difficulty for the IAEA to implement a recommendation, emphasizing low hanging fruit then building to more ambitious changes to the Physical Model's format and content.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF{sub 6} feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated load cell data; (8) hardware and software implementation for process load cell data collection; (9) costs associated with unattended monitoring of load cells (for both operator and inspector) weighed against the potential benefits of having access to such data; (10) results from field tests of load cell data collection systems in operating facilities; and (11) use of unattended load cell data to increase efficiency of on-site inspection schedules and activities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME II/III IAEA COMMITTEE 24, Major Issues Underlying the Model Additional Protocol (1996-1997).

Volume I of this Review traces the origins of the Model Additional Protocol. It covers the period from 1991, when events in Iraq triggered an intensive review of the safeguards system, until 1996, when the IAEA Board of Governors established Committee 24 to negotiate a new protocol to safeguards agreement. The period from 1991-1996 set the stage for this negotiation and shaped its outcome in important ways. During this 5-year period, many proposals for strengthening safeguards were suggested and reviewed. Some proposals were dropped, for example, the suggestion by the IAEA Secretariat to verify certain imports, and others were refined. A rough consensus was established about the directions in which the international community wanted to go, and this was reflected in the draft of an additional protocol that was submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors on May 6, 1996 in document GOV/2863, Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System - Proposals For Implementation Under Complementary Legal Authority, A Report by the Director General. This document ended with a recommendation that, 'the Board, through an appropriate mechanism, finalize the required legal instrument taking as a basis the draft protocol proposed by the Secretariat and the explanation of the measures contained in this document.'

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance of IAEA Safeguards: A TEXTBOOK

Nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are among the most pressing challenges to international peace and security that we face today. Iran and Syria remain in non-compliance with the safeguards requirements of the NPT, and the nuclear ambitions of North Korea remain unchecked. Despite these challenges, the NPT remains a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the NPT play a critical role in deterring nuclear proliferation.How do they work? Where did they come from? And what is their future? This book answers these questions. Anyone studying the field of nuclear non-proliferation will benefit from reading this book, and for anyone entering the field, the book will enable them to get a running start. Part I describes the foundations of the international safeguards system: its origins in the 1930s - when new discoveries in physics made it clear immediately that nuclear energy held both peril and promise - through the entry into force in 1970 of the NPT, which codified the role of IAEA safeguards as a means to verify states NPT commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. Part II describes the NPT safeguards system, which is based on a model safeguards agreement developed specifically for the NPT, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has been published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/153. Part III describes events, especially in South Africa, the DPRK, and Iraq in the early 1990s, that triggered a transformation in the way in which safeguards were conceptualized and implemented.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Progress and status of the IAEA coordinated research project: production of Mo-99 using LEU fission or neutron activation

Since late 2004, the IAEA has developed and implemented a Coordinated Research Project (CRP) to assist countries interested in initiating indigenous, small-scale production of Mo-99 to meet local nuclear medicine requirements. The objective of the CRP is to provide interested countries with access to non-proprietary technologies and methods to produce Mo-99 using LEU foil or LEU mini-plate targets, or for the utilization of n,gamma neutron activation, e.g. through the use of gel generators. The project has made further progress since the RERTR 2006 meeting, with a Technical Workshop on Operational Aspects of Mo99 Production held 28-30 November 2006 in Vienna and the Second Research Coordination Meeting held in Bucharest, Romania 16-20 April 2007. The paper describes activities carried out as noted above, and as well as the provision of LEU foils to a number of participants, and the progress by a number of groups in preparing for LEU target assembly and disassembly, irradiation, chemical processing, and waste management. The participants' progress in particular on thermal hydraulics computations required for using LEU targets is notable, as also the progress in gel generator plant operations in India and Kazakhstan. Poland has joined as a new research agreement holder and an application by Egypt to be a contract holder is undergoing internal review in the IAEA and is expected to be approved. The IAEA has also participated in several open meetings of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences Study on Producing Medical Radioisotopes without HEU, which will also be discussed in the paper. (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Overview of IAEA MODARIA II Program Working Group 1 on Assessment and Decision Making of Existing Exposure Situations for NORM and Nuclear Legacy Sites - 18308

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) launched the Modelling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessments (MODARIA) II Programme in October. As part of the IAEA effort to enhance the capabilities of its Member States in assessing radiological impacts of radionuclides released to the environment from sites that were not operated in accordance with current standards, and to ensure protection of the public and the environment, the MODARIA II Programme aims to: (1) test the performance of models developed for predicting the transfer of radionuclides in the environment and assessing radiological impacts to the public and the environment; (2) develop and improve models for particular environments and, where appropriate, to agree on data sets that are generally applicable for use in testing environmental transfer models; and (3) provide an international forum for the exchange of experiences, ideas and research information. The Programme will run for 3 years from 2016 to 2019. The Programme comprises seven working groups covering a wide range of topics (https://wwwns.iaea.org/projects/modaria/modaria2.asp?s=8 and l=129). MODARIA II Working Group 1 (WG1) is focused on dose assessment and decision making regarding existing exposure situations due to naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and nuclear legacy sites. WG1 was formed as a combination of two MODARIA I WGs: WG1 focused on application of decision-aiding tools in remediation; and WG3 focused on risk assessment for NORM and radioactively contaminated legacy sites (https://wwwns.iaea.org/projects/modaria/default.asp?s=8 and l=129). It was recognized that the decision-making needs will inform the scope of risk assessments, and the risk insights and structured decision analyses will aid in informed decision-making. Therefore, MODARIA II WG1 is focused on developing methods and toolsets for risk-informed decision-making for NORM and nuclear legacy sites, including demonstration of decision-making processes and tools through case studies. MODARIA II WG1 has 91 registered participants from 33 Member States and IAEA (as of November 2017), some 30 of whom are actively engaged in various collaborative research and development activities within WG1. Members of WG1 participated in the First Technical Meeting of MODARIA II, which was held in Vienna, Austria from 31 October to 4 November 2016. The group then held its First Interim Meeting in Brussels, Belgium from 26 to 30 June 2017, which included a field trip to the legacy Tessenderlo Chemie (TCH) Phosphate Processing Site. At this meeting, the TCH Site and the Pridneprovsky Chemical Plant (PChP) in Ukraine were selected for case studies. The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Material Disposal Area B in the USA and the Beaverlodge Uranium Mill and Mill Site in northern Canada were selected as examples for sharing of good practices and lessons learned in risk-informed decision-making for environmental remediation and land conveyance. At the Second Technical Meeting held in Vienna on 30 October to 3 November 2017, an additional NORM site for tin processing in Brazil was added to the case studies, with another NORM site in Yunnan, China included for consideration at the Second Interim Meeting of WG1. The Second Interim Meeting will be held in in early to mid-May, 2018. The group has also decided to prepare an Interim Report by October 2018 to document the WG1 discussions and analyses for the period of 2016-2018, which will be finalized at the conclusion of MODARIA II in October 2019. Initial assignments have been discussed for IM1 participants to collect data, conduct modelling and analyses, and prepare draft sections for the Interim Report. This paper will provide an overview of the work plans for WG1. It will also highlight some near-term activities that the group is currently working on. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The IAEA coordinated research project on modular HTGR safety design: status and outlook - 18608

The IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on Modular High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) Safety Design started in December 2014 and is now in its second year of implementation. The project investigates and makes proposals on safety design criteria by not only considering the existing water cooled reactors safety requirements for nuclear power plant design but also making use of past and current experience of HTGR licensing in the IAEA member states. Two approaches are being followed to establish the criteria. The first is to develop and apply a safety design process to specific reactor de-signs. The second is to use the existing IAEA specific safety requirements for designs based on water cooled reactor technology and then through expert judgment and review propose changes that is needed to make it applicable to HTGRs. The detailed project content and a description of modular HTGRs and its safety features are given. This informs the comments made on the applicability of the existing requirements and the examples of newly pro-posed HTGR specific safety requirements under development. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Research on the IAEA State-Level Safeguards Approach in KAERI

The IAEA has verified the declared nuclear material according to the comprehensive safeguards agreement under NPT between the Republic of Korea and the IAEA, as well as the undeclared nuclear material and nuclear activities under the Additional Protocol. In the safeguards Implementation Report for 2007, the Agency drew a broader conclusion for Korea that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in Korea because there was no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material, and no indication of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the ROK. The IAEA also informed that the implementation of Integrated Safeguards (IS) in Korea started on 1 July, 2008 in accordance with the state level IS approach after a drawing of the broader conclusion. In addition, for now, a State-Level Safeguards Approach (SLA) is adopted for the ROK, including 11 Material Balance Areas (MBAs) in KAERI. This paper describes a comparison analysis between IS and SLA.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Trip report on IAEA Training Workshop on Implementation of Integrated Management Systems for Research Reactors (T3-TR-45496).

From 17-21 June 2013, Sandia National Laboratories, Technical Area-V (SNL TA-V) represented the United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Training Workshop (T3-TR-45486). This report gives a breakdown of the IAEA regulatory structure for those unfamiliar, and the lessons learned and observations that apply to SNL TA-V that were obtained from the workshop. The Safety Report Series, IAEA workshop final report, and SNL TA-V presentation are included as attachments.

Pratt, Richard J.↗

IAEA TECDOC 055 Outline

An outline of suggestions for updating a version of IAEA-TECDOC-1276 is provided. This update will become IAEA-TECDOC-055, titled ''IAEA handbook for designing and implementing physical protection systems for nuclear material and nuclear facilities.''

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Turbo FRMAC Implemetation of IAEA Radiological Assessment Methodologies for Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies.

This report documents the findings of an assessment of the Turbo FRMAC software's ability to implement International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidance for calculating Operational Intervention Levels (OIL) 1 & 2 for nuclear and radiological emergencies. The IAEA OIL and U.S. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) Derived Response Level methodology and implementation in respective tools were compared, as demonstrated through benchmarking activities for a nuclear power plant source term and potential radionuclides of concern for radiological dispersal devices. This comparison revealed some shortcomings in Turbo FRMACs ability to perform IAEA OIL calculations and resulted in recommended software modifications to be considered for future development.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Advanced Algorithms for Scrutiny of Mandatory State Reports Declarations to the IAEA (Final Project Report)

In compliance with their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, based on INFCIRC/153 (corrected) (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1972), States Party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are obligated to declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all changes in their nuclear material inventory as well as movement of the material across boundaries of IAEA recognized material balance areas (MBA), inventories and nuclear material balances. This project addresses capabilities to detect irregularities in State reports, thus ensuring their accuracy and completeness, and in the broader context, States’ compliance with safeguards obligations of the NPT. A recent study (Henzl et al., 2022) (lead by this project’s PI) demonstrated how analysis of dynamic correlations in nuclear material movement within the entire fuel cycle of a State (viewed as a single system) can reveal variances consistent with and indicative of “irregular” activities. Expanding on this concept, novel ways to analyze State declarations themselves—again, for the State as a whole entity—will help the IAEA draw accurate safeguards conclusions and trust the validity and authenticity of Stategenerated declaration reports. Introducing new declaration analyses capabilities explored in this project will help to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State in general.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Summary Report of the Technical Meeting on International Network of Nuclear Reaction Data Centres IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, Austria

This report summarizes the IAEA Technical Meeting on the International Network of Nuclear Reaction Data Centres held at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria from 14 to 17 May 2024. The meeting was attended by 26 participants representing 13 cooperative Centres from eight Member States (China, Hungary, India, Japan, Korea, Russia, Ukraine and USA) and two International Organisations (NEA, IAEA). A summary of the meeting is given in this report along with the conclusions and actions.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Assessment of Alternative Funding Mechanisms for the IAEA

While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has enjoyed substantial success and prestige in the international community, there is growing concern that global demographic trends, advances in technology and the trend towards austerity in Member State budgets will stretch the Agency’s resources to a point where it may no longer be possible to execute its multifaceted mission in its entirety. As part of an ongoing effort by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative to evaluate the IAEA’s long-term budgetary concerns , this paper proposes a series of alternate funding mechanisms that have the potential to sustain the IAEA in the long-term, including endowment, charity, and fee-for-service funding models.

Toomey, Christopher↗

Funding for the 2ND IAEA technical meeting on fusion data processing, validation and analysis

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will organize the second Technical Meeting on Fusion Da Processing, Validation and Analysis from 30 May to 02 June, 2017, in Cambridge, MA USA. The meeting w be hosted by the MIT Plasma Science and Fusion Center (PSFC). The objective of the meeting is to provide a platform where a set of topics relevant to fusion data processing, validation and analysis are discussed with the view of extrapolation needs to next step fusion devices such as ITER. The validation and analysis of experimental data obtained from diagnostics used to characterize fusion plasmas are crucial for a knowledge based understanding of the physical processes governing the dynamics of these plasmas. The meeting will aim at fostering, in particular, discussions of research and development results that set out or underline trends observed in the current major fusion confinement devices. General information on the IAEA, including its mission and organization, can be found at the IAEA websit Uncertainty quantification (UQ) Model selection, validation, and verification (V&V) Probability theory and statistical analysis Inverse problems & equilibrium reconstru ction Integrated data analysis Real time data analysis Machine learning Signal/image proc essing & pattern recognition Experimental design and synthetic diagnostics Data management

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

ESTABLISHING ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR APPLYING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS

Drawing upon globally recognized efforts by a variety of institutions, the paper develops a practical and defensible framework for consideration and use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to support the adoption of credible ethical standards for autonomous and intelligent systems (AIS). The analysis is based on a future hypothetical AIS that identifies signatures of misuse, diversion, and other research and development (R&D). The hypothetical system serves as an exemplar for subject matter expert (SME) workshop participants to begin to answer ethical AIS questions around how these systems should be governed and maintained, what the internal and external considerations associated with artificial intelligence (AI) tools are, and where the boundaries between ethical and non-ethical uses are. The ethical AIS workshop explored several important topics: (a) Recommendations that can be currently implemented by the IAEA, (b) Proposed defensible criteria and metrics aligned with an ethical AI for safeguards implementation, (c) Discussion of future needs and capabilities, and (d) Derive appropriate next steps and actions to support filling current technological, operational, and cultural gaps and realizing an effective ethical AI for safeguards framework. The Establishing Ethical Guidelines for Applying AI to IAEA Safeguards project creates awareness in the community of the ethical AIS approach.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Gender Mainstreaming in Nuclear Security: Strategies for Incorporating Gender Equality by Design in the IAEA Milestones Approach

Gender mainstreaming has emerged as a critical mechanism towards achieving gender equality in the development and implementation of laws, policies, and programs, including those related to national security. Gender mainstreaming is generally defined as the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies, and programs, in all areas and at all levels, with the ultimate goal to achieve gender equality. Gender mainstreaming, which in essence can be thought of as “gender equality by design,” is an important element for building a robust nuclear security infrastructure. To date, however, gender mainstreaming has not been fully operationalized in the nuclear sector. For instance, the IAEA Milestones Approach, which provides important guidance to states seeking to develop nuclear power programs, has not yet incorporated or addressed gender considerations in its various phases or nuclear infrastructure issues, including those related to nuclear security. Therefore, this paper will argue that specifically for nuclear newcomer states, gender mainstreaming could serve as a powerful tool to integrate gender considerations into the design of laws, policies, programs, and entities necessary to successfully implement a nuclear power program. The objective of this study is twofold: first, to explore the concept of gender mainstreaming and its relevance to nuclear security, and second, to identify how gender can be incorporated into the IAEA Milestones Approach. The paper will emphasize the importance of developing guidance for the IAEA and nuclear newcomer states on how gender considerations could be incorporated throughout the development of a nuclear security program.

Siserman-Gray, Ioana-Cristina↗