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At least 55 records · Page 3

Hazard Detection Software for Lunar Landing

The Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) Project is developing a system for safe and precise manned lunar landing that involves novel sensors, but also specific algorithms. ALHAT has selected imaging LIDAR (light detection and ranging) as the sensing modality for onboard hazard detection because imaging LIDARs can rapidly generate direct measurements of the lunar surface elevation from high altitude. Then, starting with the LIDAR-based Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA) algorithm developed for Mars Landing, JPL has developed a mature set of HDA software for the manned lunar landing problem. Landing hazards exist everywhere on the Moon, and many of the more desirable landing sites are near the most hazardous terrain, so HDA is needed to autonomously and safely land payloads over much of the lunar surface. The HDA requirements used in the ALHAT project are to detect hazards that are 0.3 m tall or higher and slopes that are 5 or greater. Steep slopes, rocks, cliffs, and gullies are all hazards for landing and, by computing the local slope and roughness in an elevation map, all of these hazards can be detected. The algorithm in this innovation is used to measure slope and roughness hazards. In addition to detecting these hazards, the HDA capability also is able to find a safe landing site free of these hazards for a lunar lander with diameter .15 m over most of the lunar surface. This software includes an implementation of the HDA algorithm, software for generating simulated lunar terrain maps for testing, hazard detection performance analysis tools, and associated documentation. The HDA software has been deployed to Langley Research Center and integrated into the POST II Monte Carlo simulation environment. The high-fidelity Monte Carlo simulations determine the required ground spacing between LIDAR samples (ground sample distances) and the noise on the LIDAR range measurement. This simulation has also been used to determine the effect of viewing on hazard detection performance. The software has also been deployed to Johnson Space Center and integrated into the ALHAT real-time Hardware-in-the-Loop testbed.

Huertas, Andres↗

Helicopter Flight Test of a Compact, Real-Time 3-D Flash Lidar for Imaging Hazardous Terrain During Planetary Landing

A second generation, compact, real-time, air-cooled 3-D imaging Flash Lidar sensor system, developed from a number of cutting-edge components from industry and NASA, is lab characterized and helicopter flight tested under the Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Detection and Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project. The ALHAT project is seeking to develop a guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) and sensing system based on lidar technology capable of enabling safe, precise crewed or robotic landings in challenging terrain on planetary bodies under any ambient lighting conditions. The Flash Lidar incorporates a 3-D imaging video camera based on Indium-Gallium-Arsenide Avalanche Photo Diode and novel micro-electronic technology for a 128 x 128 pixel array operating at a video rate of 20 Hz, a high pulse-energy 1.06 μm Neodymium-doped: Yttrium Aluminum Garnet (Nd:YAG) laser, a remote laser safety termination system, high performance transmitter and receiver optics with one and five degrees field-of-view (FOV), enhanced onboard thermal control, as well as a compact and self-contained suite of support electronics housed in a single box and built around a PC-104 architecture to enable autonomous operations. The Flash Lidar was developed and then characterized at two NASA-Langley Research Center (LaRC) outdoor laser test range facilities both statically and dynamically, integrated with other ALHAT GN&C subsystems from partner organizations, and installed onto a Bell UH-1H Iroquois "Huey" helicopter at LaRC. The integrated system was flight tested at the NASA-Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on simulated lunar approach to a custom hazard field consisting of rocks, craters, hazardous slopes, and safe-sites near the Shuttle Landing Facility runway starting at slant ranges of 750 m. In order to evaluate different methods of achieving hazard detection, the lidar, in conjunction with the ALHAT hazard detection and GN&C system, operates in both a narrow 1deg FOV raster-scanning mode in which successive, gimbaled images of the hazard field are mosaicked together as well as in a wider, 4.85deg FOV staring mode in which digital magnification, via a novel 3-D superresolution technique, is used to effectively achieve the same spatial precision attained with the more narrow FOV optics. The lidar generates calibrated and corrected 3-D range images of the hazard field in real-time and passes them to the ALHAT Hazard Detection System (HDS) which stitches the images together to generate on-the-fly Digital Elevation Maps (DEM's) and identifies hazards and safe-landing sites which the ALHAT GN&C system can then use to guide the host vehicle to a safe landing on the selected site. Results indicate that, for the KSC hazard field, the lidar operational range extends from 100m to 1.35 km for a 30 degree line-of-sight angle and a range precision as low as 8 cm which permits hazards as small as 25 cm to be identified. Based on the Flash Lidar images, the HDS correctly found and reported safe sites in near-real-time during several of the flights. A follow-on field test, planned for 2013, seeks to complete the closing of the GN&C loop for fully-autonomous operations on-board the Morpheus robotic, rocket-powered, free-flyer test bed in which the ALHAT system would scan the KSC hazard field (which was vetted during the present testing) and command the vehicle to landing on one of the selected safe sites.

Roback, VIncent E.↗

A critical analysis of hazard resilience measures within sustainability assessment frameworks

Today, numerous sustainability assessment frameworks (SAFs) exist to guide designers in achieving sustainable performance in the design of structures and communities. SAFs are beneficial in educating users and are useful tools for incorporating sustainability strategies into planning, design, and construction; however, there is currently a substantial gap in the ability of existing SAFs to incorporate hazard resistance and hazard mitigation in the broader context of sustainable design. This paper analyzes the incorporation of hazard resistant design and hazard mitigation strategies within SAFs via a multi-level analysis of eleven SAFs. The SAFs analyzed range in scale of application (i.e. building, site, community). Three levels of analysis are presented: (1) macro-level analysis comparing the number of measures strictly addressing resilience versus sustainability, (2) meso-level analysis of the coverage of types of hazards within SAFs (e.g. flood, fire), and (3) micro-level analysis of SAF measures connected to flood-related hazard resilience. The results demonstrate that hazard resistance and hazard mitigation do not figure prominently in the intent of SAFs and that weaknesses in resilience coverage exist that have the potential to lead to the design of structures and communities that are still highly vulnerable to the impacts of extreme events. - Highlights: • Sustainability assessment frameworks (SAFs) were analyzed for resilience coverage • Hazard resistance and mitigation do not figure prominently in the intent of SAFs • Approximately 75% of SAFs analyzed address three or fewer hazards • Lack of economic measures within SAFs could impact resilience and sustainability • Resilience measures for flood hazards are not consistently included in SAFs.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Community Relations Plan

The requirements of the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit are fulfilled through execution of LANL's fourth strategic goal: “Enabling mission delivery through next-generation facility, infrastructure, and operational excellence.” With input from our stakeholders, we will continue to fulfill those requirements and to improve our waste operations. In 2015, the Laboratory purpose statement focused waste management efforts by directing delivery of mission success through operational effectiveness and scientific excellence. This Plan advances that purpose through community involvement. In the process of achieving our national security mission, Los Alamos National Laboratory generates some hazardous and mixed waste. Hazardous waste is solid waste that is dangerous or potentially harmful to human health or the environment. Hazardous wastes can be liquids, solids, gases, or sludges. They can be discarded as commercial products, such as cleaning fluids or pesticides, or as the byproducts of operations. Specific substances are listed in 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 261: 40 CFR Part 261. Hazardous waste management activities are regulated by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency and the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) pursuant to New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act (HWA; Chapter 74, Article 4 NMSA 1978) and regulations under the Act. In 1989, NMED issued the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (EPA ID Number NM0890010515-1) that established standards for the Laboratory to manage, store, and treat hazardous wastes on-site and to undertake the closure, post closure care, and cleanup as necessary, of permitted waste management units. On November 30, 2010, NMED renewed the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (the Permit). In June 2020 the Permittees submitted a permit renewal application to the NMED for their review and approval. The Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Community Relations Plan (CRP) describes the scope of public involvement in the activities of the Permit. The CRP is specifically designed to facilitate the community outreach, engagement, and relations activities concerning the Laboratory’s Hazardous Waste Facility Permit and coordinates with but does not include public involvement for other Laboratory programs, initiatives, or environmental activities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Hazard Analysis for Building 34 Vacuum Glove Box Assembly

One of the characteristics of an effective safety program is the recognition and control of hazards before mishaps or failures occur. Conducting potentially hazardous tests necessitates a thorough hazard analysis in order to prevent injury to personnel, and to prevent damage to facilities and equipment. The primary purpose of this hazard analysis is to define and address the potential hazards and controls associated with the Building 34 Vacuum Glove Box Assembly, and to provide the applicable team of personnel with the documented results. It is imperative that each member of the team be familiar with the hazards and controls associated with his/her particular tasks, assignments and activities while interfacing with facility test systems, equipment and hardware. In fulfillment of the stated purposes, the goal of this hazard analysis is to identify all hazards that have the potential to harm personnel, damage the facility or its test systems or equipment, test articles, Government or personal property, or the environment. This analysis may also assess the significance and risk, when applicable, of lost test objectives when substantial monetary value is involved. The hazards, causes, controls, verifications, and risk assessment codes have been documented on the hazard analysis work sheets in Appendix A of this document. The preparation and development of this report is in accordance with JPR 1700.1, "JSC Safety and Health Handbook" and JSC 17773 Rev D "Instructions for Preparation of Hazard Analysis for JSC Ground Operations".

Meginnis, Ian↗

Natural Hazard Risk Assessments at the Global Scale

Since 1990, natural hazards have led to over 1.6 million fatalities globally, and economic losses are estimated at an average of around USD 260–310 billion per year. The scientific and policy communities recognise the need to reduce these risks. As a result, the last decade has seen a rapid development of global models for assessing risk from natural hazards at the global scale. In this paper, we review the scientific literature on natural hazard risk assessments at the global scale, and we specifically examine whether and how they have examined future projections of hazard, exposure, and/or vulnerability. In doing so, we examine similarities and differences between the approaches taken across the different hazards, and we identify potential ways in which different hazard communities can learn from each other. For example, there are a number of global risk studies focusing on hydrological, climatological, and meteorological hazards that have included future projections and disaster risk reduction measures (in the case of floods), whereas fewer exist in the peer-reviewed literature for global studies related to geological hazards. On the other hand, studies of earthquake and tsunami risk are now using stochastic modelling approaches to allow for a fully probabilistic assessment of risk, which could benefit the modelling of risk from other hazards. Finally, we discuss opportunities for learning from methods and approaches being developed and applied to assess natural hazard risks at more continental or regional scales. Through this paper, we hope to encourage further dialogue on knowledge sharing between disciplines and communities working on different hazards and risk and at different spatial scales.

Philip J. Ward↗

Wildfire Emergency Response Hazard Extraction and Analysis of Trends (HEAT) through Natural Language Processing and Time Series

A methodology for Hazard Extraction and Analysis of Trends (HEAT) is proposed and conducted on a data set of wildfire incident response forms, known as ICS-209-PLUS.The HEAT processes: (1) extract a set of hazards from a data set, (2) calculate hazard-relevant metrics in a primary analysis, (3) analyze trends over time in metrics using timeseries, and (4) examine potential explanations for metric trends using a secondary analysis. Hazards are extracted from narrative data in the ICS-209-PLUS based on a framework previously developed by the authors, using natural language processing. Metrics examined for each hazard include operational time to occurrence, rate of occurrence, frequency, and severity. Primary results include a taxonomy of hazards present in the data set with relevant quantitative metrics. The most frequent hazards identified are environmental and include hazardous terrain. Most hazards occur on average between 35-55% containment. Incidents with hazards tend to have a higher average severity score when compared to the average score for all incidents. Time series of the metrics and relevant predictors, including fire characteristics, fire intensity, and operations, are created to facilitate further analysis. Secondary results used to determine which factors best predict hazard frequency include a correlation matrix and regression analysis. These findings are relevant to safety for current, as well as emerging wildfire operations, and are an exploratory first step in developing historical data-driven risk assessment models.

Sequoia R. Andrade↗

Pre-Flight Hazardous Gas Assessment Methodology for the Space Launch System

The complexity of the Artemis I liquid rocket propulsion systems produces many sources of hazards during the operation of the vehicle. Pre-flight hazardous gas leakages pose fire and explosion risks to rocket that could potentially lead to loss of the vehicle, mission, and crew. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses a probability risk assessment strategy to assess the likelihood of the hazard and the consequence should the hazardous situation occur. For high probability hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic consequence to the vehicle, the most effective strategy for reducing the risk is accomplished by engineering and implementing systems that actively mitigate the hazard. A hazards analysis is completed to determine the likelihood and severity of each hazard. These hazard analyses are informed using relevant empirical data and physics-based analytical models. Time-accurate Computational Fluid Dynamics models used to quantify and understand the risks posed to Artemis I due to expulsions of hazardous gas near the vehicle. Several sources of hazardous gas that posed a risk to Artemis I during nominal pre-flight operations are analyzed in this work. The results of the analyses were used to develop flight rationale and make risk acceptance decisions for the Artemis I launch.

Brian R. Richardson↗

Pre-Flight Hazardous Gas Assessment Methodology for the Space Launch System

The complexity of the Artemis I liquid rocket propulsion systems produces many sources of hazards during the operation of the vehicle. Pre-flight hazardous gas leakages pose fire and explosion risks to rocket that could potentially lead to loss of the vehicle, mission, and crew. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses a probability risk assessment strategy to assess the likelihood of the hazard and the consequence should the hazardous situation occur. For high probability hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic consequence to the vehicle, the most effective strategy for reducing the risk is accomplished by engineering and implementing systems that actively mitigate the hazard. A hazards analysis is completed to determine the likelihood and severity of each hazard. These hazard analyses are informed using relevant empirical data and physics-based analytical models. Time-accurate Computational Fluid Dynamics models used to quantify and understand the risks posed to Artemis I due to expulsions of hazardous gas near the vehicle. Several sources of hazardous gas that posed a risk to Artemis I during nominal pre-flight operations are analyzed in this work. The results of the analyses were used to develop flight rationale and make risk acceptance decisions for the Artemis I launch.

Brian R. Richardson↗

A complete electrical shock hazard classification system and its application

Current electrical safety standards evolved to address the hazards of 60-Hz power that are faced primarily by electricians, linemen, and others performing facility and utility work. As a result, this leaves a substantial gap in the management of electrical hazards in Research and Development (R&D) and specialized high voltage and high power equipment. We find substantial use of direct current (dc) electrical energy, and the use of capacitors, inductors, batteries, and radiofrequency (RF) power. The electrical hazards of these forms of electricity and their systems are different than for 50/60 Hz power. This paper proposes a method of classifying all of the electrical shock hazards found in all types of R&D and utilization equipment. Examples of the variation of these hazards from NFPA 70E include (a) high voltage can be harmless, if the available current is sufficiently low, (b) low voltage can be harmful if the available current/power is high, (c) high voltage capacitor hazards are unique and include severe reflex action, affects on the heart, and tissue damage, and (d) arc flash hazard analysis for dc and capacitor systems are not provided in existing standards. This work has led to a comprehensive electrical hazard classification system that is based on various research conducted over the past 100 years, on analysis of such systems in R&D, and on decades of experience. Lastly, the new comprehensive electrical shock hazard classification system uses a combination of voltage, shock current available, fault current available, power, energy, and waveform to classify all forms of electrical hazards.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Assessment of External Hazards at Radioactive Waste and Used Fuel Management Facilities - 13505

One of the key lessons from the Fukushima accident is the importance of having a comprehensive identification and evaluation of risks posed by external events to nuclear facilities. While the primary focus has been on nuclear power plants, the Canadian nuclear industry has also been updating hazard assessments for radioactive waste and used fuel management facilities to ensure that lessons learnt from Fukushima are addressed. External events are events that originate either physically outside the nuclear site or outside its control. They include natural events, such as high winds, lightning, earthquakes or flood due to extreme rainfall. The approaches that have been applied to the identification and assessment of external hazards in Canada are presented and analyzed. Specific aspects and considerations concerning hazards posed to radioactive waste and used fuel management operations are identified. Relevant hazard identification techniques are described, which draw upon available regulatory guidance and standard assessment techniques such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPs) and 'What-if' analysis. Consideration is given to ensuring that hazard combinations (for example: high winds and flooding due to rainfall) are properly taken into account. Approaches that can be used to screen out external hazards, through a combination of frequency and impact assessments, are summarized. For those hazards that cannot be screened out, a brief overview of methods that can be used to conduct more detailed hazard assessments is also provided. The lessons learnt from the Fukushima accident have had a significant impact on specific aspects of the approaches used to hazard assessment for waste management. Practical examples of the effect of these impacts are provided. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Identifying human failure events (HFEs) for external hazard probabilistic risk assessment

In recent years, several advancements in nuclear power plant (NPP) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) have been driven by increased understanding of external hazards, plant response, and uncertainties. However, major sources of uncertainty associated with external hazard PRA remain. One important source is how risk-significant human actions that are carried out to enable plant response and recovery from natural hazards cause the close coupling of physical impacts on plants and overall plant risk during these hazard events. This makes human reliability and human-plant interactions important elements to consider in resolving PRA gaps in external hazards. One of the challenges in considering human response in external hazard probabilistic risk assessment (XHPRA) is that most existing human reliability analysis (HRA) models were not developed for assessing actions outside the control room (termed ex-control room actions) and hazard response. To support this new scope, HRA models will need to be developed or modified to support identification of human activities, causal factors, and uncertainties inherent in external hazard response, thereby providing insights regarding event timing and physical event conditions as they relate to human performance. In this study, there are two main objectives: (1) evaluate the applicability of an existing cognitive-based HRA method, Phoenix, to ex-control room actions, and (2) identify sources of uncertainty to be characterized or reduced in order to make this method suitable for XHPRA. The first step of such work is performed by assessing the suitability of existing HRA methods to support identifying human failure events (HFEs) for human response to flooding hazards. These HFEs are human actions or inactions that are involved in human responses to flooding hazards and could contribute to the loss of a critical function for the plant in the scenario being examined. Here, in this work, decomposition analyses using the cognitive-based Phoenix HRA model are used to identify HFEs. The Phoenix method was found to be suitable for analyzing ex-control room actions as well as identifying specific HFEs and underlying crew failure modes (CFMs). However, the method's suitability for use in ex-control room actions would benefit from expanding the available CFMs to accommodate a larger variety of physical and communication tasks.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA LaRC Hazardous Material Pharmacy

In 1993-1994 the Office of Environmental Engineering contracted SAIC to develop NASA Langley's Pollution Prevention (P2) Program. One of the priority projects identified in this contract was the development of a hazardous waste minimization (HAZMIN)/hazardous materials reutilization (HAZMART) program in the form of a Hazardous Materials Pharmacy. A hazardous materials pharmacy is designed to reduce hazardous material procurement costs and hazardous waste disposal costs. This is accomplished through the collection and reissue of excess hazardous material. Currently, a rarely used hazardous material may be stored in a shop area, unused, until it passes its expiration date. The material is then usually disposed of as a hazardous waste, often at a greater expense than the original cost of the material. While this material was on the shelf expiring, other shop areas may have ordered new supplies of the same material. The hazardous material pharmacy would act as a clearinghouse for such materials. Material that is not going to be used would be turned in to the pharmacy. Other users could then be issued this material free of charge, thereby reducing procurement costs. The use of this material by another shop prevents it from expiring, thereby reducing hazardous waste disposal costs.

Esquenet, Remy↗

Hazard Analysis for Pneumatic Flipper Suitport/Z-1 Manned Evaluation, Chamber B, Building 32

One of the characteristics of an effective safety program is the recognition and control of hazards before mishaps or failures occur. Conducting potentially hazardous tests necessitates a thorough hazard analysis in order to protect our personnel from injury and our equipment from damage. The purpose of this hazard analysis is to define and address the potential hazards and controls associated with the Z1 Suit Port Test in Chamber B located in building 32, and to provide the applicable team of personnel with the documented results. It is imperative that each member of the team be familiar with the hazards and controls associated with his/her particular tasks, assignments, and activities while interfacing with facility test systems, equipment, and hardware. The goal of this hazard analysis is to identify all hazards that have the potential to harm personnel and/or damage facility equipment, flight hardware, property, or harm the environment. This analysis may also assess the significance and risk, when applicable, of lost test objectives when substantial monetary value is involved. The hazards, causes, controls, verifications, and risk assessment codes have been documented on the hazard analysis work sheets in appendix A of this document. The preparation and development of this report is in accordance with JPR 1700.1, JSC Safety and Health Handbook.

Source record↗

Lidar Sensor Performance in Closed-Loop Flight Testing of the Morpheus Rocket-Propelled Lander to a Lunar-Like Hazard Field

For the first time, a suite of three lidar sensors have been used in flight to scan a lunar-like hazard field, identify a safe landing site, and, in concert with an experimental Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) system, guide the Morpheus autonomous, rocket-propelled, free-flying test bed to a safe landing on the hazard field. The lidar sensors and GN&C system are part of the Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Detection and Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project which has been seeking to develop a system capable of enabling safe, precise crewed or robotic landings in challenging terrain on planetary bodies under any ambient lighting conditions. The 3-D imaging flash lidar is a second generation, compact, real-time, air-cooled instrument developed from a number of cutting-edge components from industry and NASA and is used as part of the ALHAT Hazard Detection System (HDS) to scan the hazard field and build a 3-D Digital Elevation Map (DEM) in near-real time for identifying safe sites. The flash lidar is capable of identifying a 30 cm hazard from a slant range of 1 km with its 8 cm range precision at 1 sigma. The flash lidar is also used in Hazard Relative Navigation (HRN) to provide position updates down to a 250m slant range to the ALHAT navigation filter as it guides Morpheus to the safe site. The Doppler Lidar system has been developed within NASA to provide velocity measurements with an accuracy of 0.2 cm/sec and range measurements with an accuracy of 17 cm both from a maximum range of 2,200 m to a minimum range of several meters above the ground. The Doppler Lidar's measurements are fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The Laser Altimeter, also developed within NASA, provides range measurements with an accuracy of 5 cm from a maximum operational range of 30 km down to 1 m and, being a separate sensor from the flash lidar, can provide range along a separate vector. The Laser Altimeter measurements are also fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The flight tests served as the culmination of the TRL 6 journey for the lidar suite and included launch from a pad situated at the NASA-Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) runway, a lunar-like descent trajectory from an altitude of 250m, and landing on a lunar-like hazard field of rocks, craters, hazardous slopes, and safe sites 400m down-range just off the North end of the runway. The tests both confirmed the expected performance and also revealed several challenges present in the flight-like environment which will feed into future TRL advancement of the sensors. The flash lidar identified hazards as small as 30 cm from the maximum slant range of 450 m which Morpheus could provide, however, it was occasionally susceptible to an increase in range noise due to heated air from the Morpheus rocket plume which entered its Field-of-View (FOV). The flash lidar was also susceptible to pre-triggering on dust during the HRN phase which was created during launch and transported by the wind. The Doppler Lidar provided velocity and range measurements to the expected accuracy levels yet it was also susceptible to signal degradation due to air heated by the rocket engine. The Laser Altimeter, operating with a degraded transmitter laser, also showed signal attenuation over a few seconds at a specific phase of the flight due to the heat plume generated by the rocket engine.

Roback, Vincent E.↗

Lidar Sensor Performance in Closed-Loop Flight Testing of the Morpheus Rocket-Propelled Lander to a Lunar-Like Hazard Field

For the first time, a suite of three lidar sensors have been used in flight to scan a lunar-like hazard field, identify a safe landing site, and, in concert with an experimental Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) system, help to guide the Morpheus autonomous, rocket-propelled, free-flying lander to that safe site on the hazard field. The lidar sensors and GN&C system are part of the Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Detection and Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project which has been seeking to develop a system capable of enabling safe, precise crewed or robotic landings in challenging terrain on planetary bodies under any ambient lighting conditions. The 3-D imaging Flash Lidar is a second generation, compact, real-time, aircooled instrument developed from a number of components from industry and NASA and is used as part of the ALHAT Hazard Detection System (HDS) to scan the hazard field and build a 3-D Digital Elevation Map (DEM) in near-real time for identifying safe sites. The Flash Lidar is capable of identifying a 30 cm hazard from a slant range of 1 km with its 8 cm range precision (1-s). The Flash Lidar is also used in Hazard Relative Navigation (HRN) to provide position updates down to a 250m slant range to the ALHAT navigation filter as it guides Morpheus to the safe site. The Navigation Doppler Lidar (NDL) system has been developed within NASA to provide velocity measurements with an accuracy of 0.2 cm/sec and range measurements with an accuracy of 17 cm both from a maximum range of 2,200 m to a minimum range of several meters above the ground. The NDLâ€"TM"s measurements are fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The Laser Altimeter (LA), also developed within NASA, provides range measurements with an accuracy of 5 cm from a maximum operational range of 30 km down to 1 m and, being a separate sensor from the Flash Lidar, can provide range along a separate vector. The LA measurements are also fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The flight tests served as the culmination of the TRL 6 journey for the ALHAT system and included launch from a pad situated at the NASA-Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) runway, a lunar-like descent trajectory from an altitude of 250m, and landing on a lunar-like hazard field of rocks, craters, hazardous slopes, and safe sites 400m down-range just off the North end of the runway. The tests both confirmed the expected performance and also revealed several challenges present in the flight-like environment which will feed into future TRL advancement of the sensors. Guidance provided by the ALHAT system was impeded in portions of the trajectory and intermittent near the end of the trajectory due to optical effects arising from air heated by the rocket engine. The Flash Lidar identified hazards as small as 30 cm from the maximum slant range of 450 m which Morpheus could provide; however, it was occasionally susceptible to an increase in range noise due to scintillation arising from air heated by the Morpheus rocket engine which entered its Field-of-View (FOV). The Flash Lidar was also susceptible to pre-triggering, during the HRN phase, on a dust cloud created during launch and transported down-range by the wind. The NDL provided velocity and range measurements to the expected accuracy levels yet it was also susceptible to signal degradation due to air heated by the rocket engine. The LA, operating with a degraded transmitter laser, also showed signal attenuation over a few seconds at a specific phase of the flight due to the heat plume generated by the rocket engine.

Roback, V. Eric↗

On the Moral Hazard of Autonomy

This paper describes the concept of moral hazard as applied to technologies that incorporate automation and autonomy. Moral hazard is said to exist when a party to a transaction feels more comfortable taking undue risks because another party will bear the costs if things go badly. As opposed to regular physical hazards, a moral hazard comes from within a person. In this paper, we reveal two categories of moral hazards related to autonomy. The first category of moral hazard occurs when the owner of the autonomy introduces an autonomous system without accepting the full responsibility for improper operation thereby shifting the risks from one party to another party. This category of moral hazard is similar to moral hazards experienced in other industries and can often be addressed through appropriate policy and establishing liability for irresponsible behavior. The issue becomes more complicated in cases where the operator of the autonomy may not have a full understanding of the system behavior. In the second category of moral hazard, risks are shifted from people to autonomy. In this category, the humans in proximity to the autonomous system begin to trust its behavior. Their behavior may change in that they may believe they are more insulated from harm and subsequently exhibit more risky behavior towards increasingly autonomous technologies. Mitigating this type of moral hazard may require the autonomy to possess certain design features to discourage this type of harmful human behavior so that humans do not suffer needlessly in their interactions with autonomous systems by placing inappropriate trust where that trust is neither warranted nor deserved.

Cybernetics↗

Dysfunctionality Hazard Curve: Risk-Based Tool to Support the Resilient Design of Systems Subjected to Multihazards

While resilience metrics have been proposed and studied given a functionality recovery curve, they have not emphasized enough on accounting for the uncertainties in the multihazard occurrences and intensities. Moreover, these resilience metrics are not risk-based (i.e., they do not express the system's resilience loss as a frequency of exceedance), leading to inconsistencies in system performance description when compared to performance-based engineering frameworks. A risk-based tool termed dysfunctionality hazard curve is proposed to assess the resilience of systems subjected to single hazards or multihazards with inter-event dependencies. Dysfunctionality hazard curve expresses system resilience performance as frequency of exceedance of time to full functionality. In doing so, it characterizes system recovery as a sequence of repair activities and also considers the uncertainties in the multihazard occurrences and intensities. Dysfunctionality hazard curve is demonstrated for a residential building susceptible to earthquake and hurricane hazards. Results indicate that Dysfunctionality hazard curve for earthquakes is greater than that for hurricane winds under single hazards. Under multihazards, considering inter-event dependencies during system recovery leads to larger dysfunctionality hazard curve than ignoring them. Finally, the concept of dysfunctionality hazard curve is also extended to a system-of-systems consisting of residential and commercial buildings.

42 ENGINEERING↗